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THE PANCHADASĪ

OR

AN EXPOSITON IN FIFTEEN CHAPTERS OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY

BY

S'RIMAD VIDYĀRANYA SWAMI.

TRANSLATED FREELY INTO ENGLISH WITH THE HELP
OF COMMENTARIES, &c.,

BY

A HUMBLE DEVOTEE

OF

S'RÎ GOPĀLA KRISHNA.

PRINTED FOR

THE BOMBAY THEOSOPHICAL PUBLICATION FUND

BY

RAJARAM TUKARAM TATYA

BOMBAY.

1912.

Price Rs. 28.

G. K. Vander Lye

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
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
TRANSLATOR'S WORDS OF APOLOGY.

In presenting to the public this translation of such an important treatise as the Panchadas'i it might be expected that an erudite and a lengthy preface should be prefixed, but I plainly confess that I am not gifted with the necessary erudition, nor have I the inclination to patch one up by embodying information gathered from available sources. I will only write a few lines to explain the circumstances which led to my undertaking this work of translation, which is clearly beyond my capability. I have been hearing of the Panchadas'i from my boyhood, and when the late Mr. Tukaram Tatyā asked me, through a common friend, to take up this important work of translation, I frankly said that I had not the required qualifications but that I was willing to comply with his request simply because that would prove as an incentive to enter upon the study of such an important text. I further urged that I should in the first instance prepare a free rendering of the first chapter and if that was approved by those whom he considered competent to judge of its merits I should proceed further. This having been done I proceeded with my work, which unfortunately was not finished until the lapse of some years. Subsequently the translation, after it was completed, remained in the hands of the publishers for a number of years. While the translation was proceeding I often felt that it was necessary to supplement it by copious notes explanatory of different points referred to in the text and I wished that I was able to devote more time to it. I then feathered myself with the hope of doing it when I retired from service. A gradual change was however coming over me and by the time I was able to have all my time to myself I was completely weaned from all such work. It is in this frame of mind that I have gone through the proofs and though I am aware that much can be

added to improve the matter as published, I have no inspiration to do more than what has been done. I am now deeply imbibed by the conviction that S'rî Gopāla Krishna desires no improvement through me. I ask for no credit for what has been done nor will I feel aggrieved to hear that what has been done is not satisfactory. I will simply conclude with the words of the poet devotee :

यत्कृतं यत्करिष्यमि सत्सर्वं नमयाकृतम् ॥
 स्वया कृतं तु फल भुक्त्वमे व मधुसूदन ॥

PANCHADAŚI.



CHAPTER I.

Differentiation of (real) spirit from (unreal) matter.

1. Bow to the lotus-like feet of my preceptor S'ree S'ankarānanda, whose name indicates the two connotations of the Supreme Spirit *viz.*, *S'ankar*, *i.e.*, conferring happiness and *A'nanda*, *i.e.*, bliss; and the chief function of whose feet is the destruction of the sharks of ignorance accompanied by the delusion of worldly existence.

2. The following differentiation of the real from the unreal is made for the enlightenment of those persons whose minds have been purified by paying homage to the lotus-like feet of the preceptor.

(The author commences his discourse with establishing the oneness of knowledge in all conditions and at all times. This he does with the view of proving that the individual spirit, being part and parcel of the supreme all-pervading spirit, and being therefore possessed of the same attributes as the latter is identical with it.)

3. During the state of wakefulness all objects of knowledge such as sound, touch, form, taste and smell, as also the elements of creation of which these are the properties, are perceived distinctly, being different from each other. But their knowledge when separated from its objects does not differ on account of its being the same everywhere.

(This may be further illustrated thus : The sense of sound differs from the sense of touch, and that again differs from each of the rest on account of the difference in the medium

through which the sense is derived but the faculty by the help of which the perception is gained is the same in all cases.)

4. The same is the case in the state of dreaming (in which the impressions received during the state of wakefulness are reproduced without the assistance of the organs of sense). If it is so, it may be asked what difference is there between the two states, in both of which the objects of knowledge are separate but the knowledge is identical. The answer is that in the state of dreaming the objects of knowledge being immaterial are not lasting, while they are so in the state of wakefulness; hence the difference between the two states. But the knowledge remains the same in both.

5. A person who awakes after a sound sleep has the consciousness that during the state of sound sleep he was perfectly ignorant of everything. Such consciousness is remembrance (स्मृति) as distinguished from अनुभव, which signifies knowledge derived from personal observation; and as what is remembered must have been previously experienced, it follows that complete absence of knowledge, during a state of sound sleep, is what is experienced.

6. That knowledge (*i.e.* experience of absence of knowledge, during the state of sound sleep) is distinct from its object *viz.*, absence of knowledge (in the same way as knowledge of a material object is distinct from the object itself) but is not different in kind from the knowledge during the conditions of wakefulness and dreaming. It is thus established that in one single day in all the three states of wakefulness, dreaming and sound sleep, knowledge is identical.

7. What is true of a single day is also true from day to day during the divisions of time such as month, year, age, &c., that have elapsed and that are to follow. Knowledge being

thus one in all states at all times it is devoid of origin and destruction and shines by its own light. (These attributes of knowledge are proved by the following reasoning :—If it is urged that knowledge has both a beginning and an end then it will lead to the assumption that there must be some other knowledge by the help of which the origin and destruction of this knowledge are witnessed, because it is impossible that it should witness its own origin and destruction. But this assumption cannot be true as knowledge has been shown to be one and the same everywhere. Similarly this knowledge does not need the assistance of anything else for being perceived. Everything else is perceivable by the help of knowledge but knowledge is perceivable by itself and is therefore स्वयंप्रकाश, *i. e.*, shining by its own light and is therefore intelligence itself).

8. This knowledge is आत्मा, *i.e.*, self, and therefore the attributes of eternity and self-luminousness which have been proved in the case of knowledge may be taken to be proved in the case of आत्मा. According to the Srutis आत्मा is सच्चिदानन्दरूप *i.e.* having the properties of existence for all time (सद्रूप) intelligence (चिद्रूप) and blissfulness (आनन्दरूप). The first two having been proved in the case of knowledge it remains to prove the third. This आत्मा is also full of unsurpassable bliss, because it is the object of supreme affection. Everyone strives for securing happiness and therefore his affection or liking for a thing is in proportion to the amount of happiness derived from it. Everyone has the greatest affection for one's own self and from this it follows that that self is full of happiness. It may be argued that when one is miserable he gives vent to expressions implying abhorrence of one self and this is calculated to throw a doubt on the validity of the assertion, made above, that everyone has the greatest affection for one's own self. The reply is that such expressions have reference to the misery and other causes that have created

the abhorrence and not to one self. One's love for himself is observed from the fact that he not only never wishes that he should not exist, but on the contrary desires that he should always exist.

The excellence of one's love for self can be further demonstrated by the fact that one's love for others such as sons, friends, &c., is not for the sake of others, but, for one's own self. Hence love for self is highest and therefore आत्मा is full of supreme happiness.

9. The affection that one feels for his son, friend, &c., is on account of their being *his i.e.*, on account of their connection with his own self, and is not felt irrespective of that consideration. If that connecting link disappears they become strangers and he no longer feels for them any affection. So love for others is invariably traceable to one's own self. One's love for self is not influenced by extraneous considerations and remains the same at all times and under all conditions.

10. It has thus been shown by argument that आत्मा *i. e.*, individual spirit is possessed of the attributes of eternity, intelligence and blissfulness. This conclusion is corroborated by the authority of the Vedas, in as much as परब्रह्म, *i.e.*, the supreme spirit, is possessed of the same attributes, and the identity of self (*i.e.* the individual spirit) with the supreme spirit is proved in the Upanishads.

(तत्त्वमसि is the fundamental proposition of the Vedant philosophy. The sentence is analysed thus तत् त्वम् असि. Here तत् signifies the supreme spirit; त्वम् signifies the individual spirit; and असि is the connecting verb, signifying the identity of the two.

11. The question next arises whether this last attribute of आत्मा, *i. e.*, blissfulness, is clearly perceivable or otherwise.

If it is not clearly perceivable then one's surpassing love for self will not exist, because one can never love an object unless he perceives its excellence. It cannot be said therefore that it is not perceivable. If, however, it is clearly perceivable then it is inevitable that one should be completely absorbed in self and not have an inclination to be attached to other objects. Because all efforts are directed towards acquisition of happiness and when one acquires supreme bliss it is natural that he should be diverted from all such efforts. Having reached the end why need one care for the means? But this is not the case, as we find that everyone is engrossed in the objects of the senses. It follows therefore—that the attribute of blissfulness is not clearly perceivable. What then is the explanation? The explanation is that blissfulness though perceived is still not perceived.

12. It may naturally be asked how is it possible for a thing that is perceived to be at the same time not perceived? But that it is so will be clear from an illustration. Take a class of boys loudly recanting the Vedas. The father of one of the boys hears the recantation from outside the building; he hears his son's voice along with that of the other boys but cannot discriminate it. In this case it must be said that the father hears his son's voice, but not being able to distinguish it from that of others, the voices of all being blended together, it can be said also that he does not hear it. The same is the case with this attribute of आत्मा *viz.*, blissfulness; that is to say, though perceived it may still be said to be not perceived. What then is the explanation of this? The explanation is that in both cases there is an impediment which obstructs true knowledge.

13. This impediment may be defined to mean that which causes a person to ignore the reality of that which deserves to be recognised as existing and perceptible. When a thing really

exists and is perceptible but does not appear to be so, then the cause of this contrary impression is an impediment of the nature intended to be defined by the author.

14. Now what is the impediment which obstructs true knowledge, and which, in the case of the illustration above given, prevents the father of the boy recanting the Vedas along with others from discriminating his voice? In the latter case the combination of the voices of the several boys proves an impediment, while in the former case the impediment is अविद्या, *i. e.*, an illusion, which is eternal and which is the sole cause of all wrong impressions.

15. This अविद्या is derived from प्रकृति which is the source of the whole of this material world. In this प्रकृति is reflected the ब्रह्म (*i. e.* the all pervading supreme spirit) which possesses the attributes of intelligence and blissfulness. It is made up of the three primary qualities of सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् in equal parts and is of two kinds.

सत्त्व is the principle of goodness or purity. रजस् is the principle of activity. तमस् is the principle of darkness or ignorance.

16. The two kinds (of प्रकृति) are माया and अविद्या. When the principle of purity predominates and is unsullied by the revalence of the remaining two qualities then the प्रकृति is known by name of माया; and when that is not the case then the प्रकृति is called अविद्या.

The supreme spirit, reflected in the माया, controls the illusion (is not overpowered by it) and is called ईश्वर, possessing the attributes of omniscience, &c.

The supreme spirit, reflected in the अविद्या, is overpowered by it and is called जीव. The अविद्या being of various kinds, the जीव that is reflected in it also assumes different forms

24. It has been stated above (*vide* verse 17) that the जीव when it identifies itself with the कारण शरीर is styled प्राज्ञ. Now this जीव when it identifies itself with the सूक्ष्म शरीर receives the name of तैजस (तैजस means one possessed of तेजस्). In this body the internal organ अंतःकरण is the presiding organ and this being constituted of तेजस् the जीव who identifies himself with that body is styled तैजस). Similarly ईश्वर (defined in verse 16 above) when he identifies himself with the सूक्ष्म शरीर receives the appellation of हिरण्यगर्भ.

Now if both the जीव and ईश्वर identify themselves with the सूक्ष्म शरीर where lies the difference between the two? They differ in so far as जीव is the individual spirit (व्यष्टि) while ईश्वर is the collective aggregate spirit (समष्टि) of which the individual spirits are but the component parts.

The ईश्वर identifies himself with the subtile bodies all over the universe while the जीव identifies himself with only one.

25. The ईश्वर is समष्टि because he is conscious of the identity with himself of all the individual spirits that identify themselves with the several subtile bodies, while all the individual spirits being devoid of consciousness of their identity with ईश्वर are designated व्यष्टि.

26. So much for the सूक्ष्म शरीर. Next follows the स्थूल शरीर, *i. e.*, the grosser or the material body. In order that the जीव might experience happiness and misery, the ईश्वर again makes a fivefold combination from each of the five elements of ether, &c., in order to produce all objects from which happiness or misery is derived, such as food, drink, &c., as also the material bodies with the help of which the जीव experiences happiness and misery.

(The method by which the material body is produced, *viz.*, the process of five fold combination, is called पंचीकरण in the Vedant philosophy.)

27. Each of the five elements is first divided into two equal parts. One of these equal parts is again divided into four parts. There are thus five divisions : the first represents one half of the whole and the remaining four represent one-eighth each. Now one-half of the whole of each is combined with one-eighth of each of the remaining four. The elements thus formed contain portions of all the five elements and receive their names from that element which predominates in each. The elements in their unmixed state are subtile but they become material when thus transformed into a state of combination. The combination may be illustrated by a table as follows:—

Unmixed Subtile elements.	Mixed Material.
1 Ether	$\frac{1}{2}$ Ether + $\frac{1}{8}$ Air + $\frac{1}{8}$ Light + $\frac{1}{8}$ Water + $\frac{1}{8}$ Earth = 1 Ether.
1 Air	$\frac{1}{2}$ Air + $\frac{1}{8}$ Ether + $\frac{1}{8}$ Light + $\frac{1}{8}$ Water + $\frac{1}{8}$ Earth = 1 Air.
1 Light	$\frac{1}{2}$ Light + $\frac{1}{8}$ Ether + $\frac{1}{8}$ Air + $\frac{1}{8}$ Water + $\frac{1}{8}$ Earth = 1 Light.
1 Water	$\frac{1}{2}$ Water + $\frac{1}{8}$ Ether + $\frac{1}{8}$ Air + $\frac{1}{8}$ Light + $\frac{1}{8}$ Earth = 1 Water.
1 Earth	$\frac{1}{2}$ Earth + $\frac{1}{8}$ Ether + $\frac{1}{8}$ Air + $\frac{1}{8}$ Light + $\frac{1}{8}$ Water = 1 Earth.

28. Of these mixed elements is formed (by the command of ईश्वर) the ब्रह्माण्ड, i.e., the universe, together with the several worlds comprised in it, the things that are the objects of enjoyment and the appropriate material bodies. (The worlds comprised in the universe are fourteen in all. Of these seven viz., भूः, भुवः, स्वः, महः, जनः, तपः, and सत्यम् are above, and seven, viz., अतल, वितल, सुतल रसातल, तलातल, महातल, and पाताल are below. The ईश्वर, who receives the name of हिरण्यगर्भ when he identifies himself with the aggregate सूक्ष्म शरीर, is styled वैश्वानर (or विराट) when he identifies himself with the aggregate स्थूल शरीर.

29. Similarly the जीव who is known as तैजस when he identifies himself with the सूक्ष्म शरीर, is styled विश्व when he identifies himself with the individual material body. All Gods, human beings, beasts and birds come under this category. All these have their senses directed outwards and therefore are devoid of the knowledge of the true spirit who is within themselves.

30. The जीव resorts to the bodies of these human and other beings and has recourse to actions which are appropriate to such bodies with the view of deriving the available enjoyment from the objects of the senses. The effects of such actions they enjoy by resorting to the bodies of Gods and others. The experience of such enjoyment again impels them to have recourse to actions similar to those done before. Thus the जीव migrates from one body to another in quick succession and never experiences true felicity, in the same way as insects, falling into a whirlpool in a river, pass from one circle to another and are never at rest.

31. These insects, by force of their former meritorious actions, are released from this predicament by some person full of mercy and obtaining the shelter of a tree on the river bank repose in happiness.

32. Similarly the जीव attains to supreme happiness by differentiating the five sheaths or cases which successively make up the body which envelopes the spirit, which he is enabled to do by being the recipient of instructions from a preceptor who perceives the truth.

33. The five sheaths above referred to are :—अन्नमय, प्राणमय, मनोमय, विज्ञानमय and आनन्दमय. The spirit being enveloped in these sheaths forgets its original statue and becomes subject to the revolutions of birth and death.

(These sheaths are very appropriately called कोश from the analogy of the silkworm. The silkworm is over-powered

by the cocoon formed by the fibres created by itself, so these five sheaths overwhelm the spirit and prevent him from experiencing the felicity which is the result of realizing his identity with the all-pervading supreme spirit).

34. The material body स्थूल शरीर formed from the mixed material elements constitutes the अन्नमय कोश (*i.e.*, The sheath which is sustained by food). In the subtle body (सूक्ष्म शरीर) the five vital breaths (*viz.*, प्राण, अपान, व्यान, उदान, समान) which are formed from the रजस् parts of the five elements, together with the five organs of action (speech, hands, feet, anus and genital organs) constitutes the प्राणमय कोश (*i.e.*, the sheath which is made up of the vital breaths).

35. The five organs of perception, which are formed from the सत्व parts of the five elements, and the internal organ when in the condition of hesitation, *viz.*, मनस्, constitute the मनोमय कोश (*i.e.*, the sheath which is formed of मनस्). The same five organs of perception in conjunction with the internal organ when in the condition of resolution, *viz.*, बुद्धि, constitute the विज्ञानमय कोश (*i.e.*, the sheath formed of बुद्धि or knowledge).

36. In the कारण शरीर, *viz.*, अविद्या, the principle of purity (सत्त्व गुण) is sullied by the preponderating force of the other two principles (रजस् and तमस्). The principle of purity that is present here in a sullied state, together with the three conditions of happiness, *viz.*, प्रिय, मोद and प्रमोद constitutes the आनन्दमय कोश (*i.e.*, the sheath which is formed of a feeling of happiness). (The condition of happiness is called प्रिय when the happiness is the result of seeing an object that is beloved; it is called मोद when it is the result of the attainment of that object; and it is called प्रमोद when it is the result of actual enjoyment).

आत्मा on account of its identification with these several sheaths is apparently inseparable from them.

(It will thus be seen that of the five sheaths the first pertains to the स्थूल शरीर, the next three are connected with the सूक्ष्म शरीर and the last with the कारण शरीर).

37. By differentiating the individual spirit from the five sheaths by the processes of अन्वय and व्यतिरेक, which will be presently explained, one realizes that it possesses all the attributes of ब्रह्म and therefore becomes ब्रह्म, i. e., identifies himself with the Supreme spirit.

38. During the state of dreaming there is no consciousness of the existence of the material body but the presence of the spirit is experienced, as without the spirit it is not possible to have the consciousness of what occurs in a dream. It thus follows that in the state of dreaming there is the presence of the spirit and the absence of the material body. This co-existence of the spirit in all conditions is called अन्वय and the non-co-existence of the material and other sheaths with the spirit in certain circumstances is called व्यतिरेक.

39. Similarly in the state of sound sleep one is not conscious of the existence of the subtle body (लिंग शरीर) but the presence of the spirit is proved by the fact that after awaking everyone has the consciousness that during the state of sound sleep he was perfectly ignorant of everything and this consciousness is the result of previous experience and in that state there is no one else than the spirit to receive that experience (*vide* verse 5 above). This co-existence of the spirit with the कारण शरीर is called अन्वय and the non-co-existence of the लिंग शरीर with the spirit in the state of sound sleep is called व्यतिरेक. (It is thus clear that the spirit is present in all conditions while the material and subtle bodies are not present in certain states. It thus follows that while the spirit is eternal these two bodies are not).

40. The अवयव कोश is the material body and it has been shown above that the spirit exists without the material body

in certain conditions. It follows therefore that this अन्नमय कोश is not the spirit. It has also been shown above that the spirit exists without the subtle body in certain conditions. The three sheaths प्राणमय कोश, मनोमय कोश and विज्ञानमय कोश are connected with the लिङ्ग शरीर, and receive their different names on account of the difference in the quality and condition of their constituents, all of which together go to form the लिङ्ग शरीर (of verses 23, 34 and 35 above). It therefore follows that these three sheaths also are not the spirit.

41. The first four sheaths having been differentiated from the spirit (आत्मा) it now remains to differentiate the आनन्दमय कोश. As above stated (*vide* verse 36 above) this sheath is connected with the कारण शरीर. In the state of समाधि, *i. e.*, perfect absorption of thought into the one object of meditation, *viz.*, the supreme spirit, there is absence of the कारण शरीर, which is the same thing as perfect ignorance, but the presence of the spirit is experienced in that state. This co-existence of the spirit with the state of समाधि is called अन्वय, and the non-co-existence of the कारण शरीर with the spirit is called व्यतिरेक. It thus follows that in certain conditions the spirit does not co-exist with the कारण शरीर and as the आनन्दमय कोश is connected with the कारण शरीर, it must be said that in those conditions the spirit does not co-exist with the आनन्दमय कोश. The conclusion therefore is that this sheath also is not the spirit.

It has thus been shown that the spirit exists independently of the several sheaths under certain conditions. It is an axiom that whatever exists apart from certain other things is different from those things. It therefore follows that the spirit is different from the five sheaths.

42. In illustration of the same conclusion the author quotes the authority of the Kathopanishad, in which it is said that the individual spirit, when differentiated by processes of reasoning from the three states with which it appears identified by persons who are possessed of the requisite qualifications, in

the same way as the inner tender fibre of the मुंज kind of grass is stripped of its outer coverings, becomes परब्रह्म, i.e., the Supreme spirit.

43. The identity of the supreme with the individual spirit, which has so far been established by reasoning, is made quite clear by sayings like तत्त्वमसि and others, by the application of the process of eliminating attributes which are incongruous. (How this is done is explained in the following verses.)

44. The saying तत्त्वमसि consists of three words तत्, त्वम् and असि, and these the author proceeds to explain. The word तत् means 'that' and indicates ब्रह्म which is both the material and the instrumental cause of this universe. It is the material cause by reason of this whole of the creation having been the result of the reflection of the ब्रह्म in माया with the predominance of the principle of darkness or ignorance. It is the instrumental cause because the ब्रह्म when reflected in माया with the predominance of the principle of purity becomes the author of this creation.

45. The word 'त्वम्' means 'thou' and indicates the individual addressed as being the same ब्रह्म reflected in अविद्या in a condition sullied with the mixture of the principles of रजस् and तमस् with the principle of सत्त्व, and therefore contaminated with the tendency to cherish desires and to perform actions.

46. The purpose of the saying तत्त्वमसि is to indicate the eternal and omnipresent ब्रह्म possessed of the attributes of सत्, चित् and आनन्द, when separated from the threefold illusion, viz., (1) with the predominance of तमस्; (2) with the predominance of सत्त्व; and (3) with the mixture of the three: all the three conditions being inconsistent with each other.

47. The above may be explained by an illustration. Take a sentence like the following :—"This is that Devadatta". Here 'this' indicates the person present before the speaker at

a particular time and place : while 'that' indicates a person seen on a former occasion at a different place. Here the attributes of Devadatta, indicated by the words 'this' and 'that' so far as time and place are concerned are entirely inconsistent, as the time and place in the one case can never possibly coincide with the time and place in the other case. Ignoring therefore these attributes, the subject thereof is indicated by the above sentence. The individual is the same but the pronoun 'this' or 'that' is used to denote him according to circumstances of time and place. For the purpose of identification of the individual he must be stripped of these circumstances. (This is the process of eliminating attributes referred to in verse 43 above.)

48. In the same manner the saying तत्त्वमसि only indicates the eternal and omnipresent ब्रह्म possessed of the attributes of सत्, चित् and आनन्द, when it is separated from the bases of माया and अविद्या on account of which it receives the appellations of परमात्मा and जीवात्मा and is denoted by the pronouns तत् and त्वम्.

49. Now it may be asked whether the ब्रह्म which is indicated by the saying तत्त्वमसि is सविकल्प or निर्विकल्प. सविकल्प means that which is associated with some kinds of ideas and निर्विकल्प means that which is not associated with any kinds of ideas. If ब्रह्म is सविकल्प then it is not the real thing (सत्) because the Vedantis hold that whatever is capable of being described, indicated or perceived is different from the real thing (सत्) and if ब्रह्म can be associated with the ideas of being capable of being described and indicated, it is not the real thing (सत्). If it is निर्विकल्प, i.e., that which is not associated with any ideas, then it cannot be capable of being indicated or described, because the existence of these two properties together has never been heard of, nor is it possible.

50. Such an objection may be met by the counter-question whether the alternative (विकल्प) suggested is spoken of with

reference to निर्विकल्प or सविकल्प. If the विकल्प has reference to निर्विकल्प then there is a contradiction in terms. Because निर्विकल्प means that of which there is no विकल्प ; and to speak of विकल्प with reference to that which is free from विकल्प is a self contradictory statement. If the विकल्प has reference to सविकल्प then the argument leads to several inconsistencies and fallacies. सविकल्प means that which is accompanied by विकल्प and the first question is whether in the expression 'सविकल्प विकल्प' the word विकल्प has the same significance in both places or different. If the same, then the expression is reduced to the absurdity which is inherent in the expression "a person accompanied by himself." This fallacy is called आत्माश्रय. If different, then the difficulty arises of determining which of them is the principle and which subsidiary. This fallacy is called अन्योन्याश्रय. If it is urged that there is a third विकल्प quite separate from these two, from which the significance of these two may be determined then that leads to the fallacy of argument in a circle. If it is urged that this third विकल्प is the effect of a fourth one, that fourth one is the result of a fifth and so on, then there is absence of finality, a fault of reasoning called अनवस्था.

(N. B. This is more or less a quibbling of words used for the purpose of argument. The main fact is that ब्रह्म is a thing that is beyond the power of words to describe adequately and therefore any expression intended to indicate it is likely to be open to objections like the one above and they have to be met by mere quibbling.)

51. The above objection may be urged with equal force in the case of all descriptions of things coming under the category, of गुण, क्रिया, जाति, द्रव्य and संबंध. (Grammarians recognize four kinds of the meaning of words जाति, गुण, क्रिया and द्रव्य, and give गौः, शुक्लः, चलः and दित्यः as instances to illustrate these meanings. जाति exempli-

fied by गौ: which signifies the genus cow; गुण is exemplified by शुद्ध which signifies colour; क्रिया is exemplified by चल which signifies movement or action; and द्रव्य is exemplified by ह्ति which literally means a wooden elephant and therefore may be taken to signify a material object. संबंध, which has not been included in the above, means connection or joining together). For instance, to ascertain the existence of गुण we have recourse to a reasoning like this : Does गुण exist in that which is निर्गुण or does it exist in that which is गुणवत्; similarly to ascertain क्रिया we have recourse to a reasoning like this : Does क्रिया exist in that which is क्रिया रहित or in that which is क्रियावत् ? In both these instances there is a contradiction in terms in the first part, while in the latter part there is the fallacy of आत्माश्रय explained in the previous verse. The question then arises what is the correct explanation with regard to such objections. The reply is that all these attributes which are used to indicate things have reference to the form in which they appear, but the real substratum is the all pervading spirit.

52. So all expressions calculated to convey meanings like the above are mere creations of imagination when used with reference to the spirit which is independent of association with ideas as also freedom from ideas.

53. The author now proposes to explain the four stages of contemplation known as श्रवण, मनन, निदिध्यासन and समाधि.

The etymological meaning of the word श्रवण is 'hearing'. In the present case it means the hearing of sayings like तत्त्वमसि and realizing that they indicate the identity of the individual with the supreme Spirit.

The etymological meaning of मनन is 'consideration'. In the present case it means the consideration of the correctness of the reasoning by which the above identity is established.

54. The etymological meaning of निदिध्यासन is "profound and repeated meditation." In the present case it means the complete concentration of the mind directed towards that which is determined by श्रवण and मनन.

55. The etymological meaning of समाधि is "composing, concentrating." In the present place it means निदिध्यासन developed to the fullest possible extent. In this condition all idea of one's being a contemplator and also all idea of the process of contemplation gradually vanish, and the mind witnessing merely the object of its contemplation is as still as a lamp in a place sheltered from breeze.

56. It may be urged that in the state of समाधि there is no capability of grasping any ideas, and that therefore it is not possible to determine the object of contemplation. But it is not so. The idea of being absorbed in the supreme spirit, which is not distinctly perceived during the state of समाधि, is inferred from the fact that the person who awakes from that state has certain recollections regarding his condition in that state, and it is an accepted fact that there can be no recollection without previous experience. One only remembers that which he has experienced before.

57. In the state of समाधि all effort to form ideas is suspended. How then can there be the succession of ideas which lead to absorption into the Supreme Spirit? The reply is that this succession is the result of an effort made even before that state, assisted by the force of actions of a former birth and the habit acquired by frequent practice of समाधि.

58. God Krishna inculcated in Arjuna this same import in several ways in the discourse known as Bhagavatgita by means of sayings like the following : यथा दीपो निवातस्थो नैगते सोपमास्मृता, which means that समाधि is comparable to a lamp which does not flicker when in a place sheltered from breeze.

59. On account of समाधि the innumerable actions which are laid in store during the eternal succession of births and which await their time of bearing fruit, vanish, and pure religion, which helps to secure the destruction of the illusion and the realization of the identity of the individual with the Supreme Spirit, flourishes.

60. Those most versed in the practice of योग, which means abstract meditation, call this समाधि by the name of 'cloud of religion,' since it pours forth thousands of showers of nectar in the shape of pure religious ideas and deeds.

61 & 62. When by means of this समाधि all impressions and ideas are obliterated totally, and the store of actions meritorious and sinful is destroyed completely, the obstacles in the way of acquisition of true knowledge being removed, precepts like तत्त्वमसि lead to direct knowledge of the truth, which before was perceived indirectly, the direct knowledge thus produced being as clear and complete as in the case of a small fruit held on the palm of a hand.

63. Knowledge of ब्रह्म, derived from Vedic sayings like तत्त्वमसि explained by a preceptor, and which is still indirect on accounts of its having passed through only the two stages of श्रवण and मनन, is like fire enough to destroy all sin knowingly committed.

64. While the same knowledge similarly derived but which has become direct by having reached the two next stages of निदिध्यासन and समाधि acts like the midday sun and dispels the darkness of the ignorance which is the cause of the successive recurrence of births.

65. Having, in the manner above described, differentiated the real spirit from the five sheaths in which it is enveloped, and having concentrated his mind on that spirit by recognized methods, man becomes released from all ties which cause the

successive recurrence of births and before long reaches the highest state, *i. e.*, becomes ब्रह्म with the attributes of सत्, चित् and आनन्द.

CHAPTER II.

DIFFERENTIATION OF THE FIVE ELEMENTS.

1. The Supreme Spirit (ब्रह्म) which has been described in the Srutis as सत्, *i. e.*, real and अद्वैत, *i. e.*, alone by itself, or without a second, can only be definitely known by differentiating it from the five elements which proceed from it and with which it is identified (It is incapable of being grasped by itself as it is beyond the reach of speech and mind). Therefore this differentiation will now be proceeded with.

2. Sound, touch, form, taste and smell are the five peculiar properties of the five elements of ether, air, fire, water, and earth, respectively. These five properties are found in the five elements in the order of one, two, three, four and five; *i. e.*, in the first element only the first property is to be met with; in the second the first and second; in the third the first, second and third; in the fourth, the first, second, third and fourth; and in the fifth all the five. This is illustrated in the sequel.

3 & 4. The only property of ether is sound, as evidenced in reverberation. In air there are the properties of sound as well as touch; the property of sound is evidenced by the peculiar sound produced by the blowing wind; the property of touch is evidenced by a sort of sensation which is neither hot nor cold. In fire there are the properties of sound, touch, and form. The property of sound is evidenced by the peculiar sound produced by blazing fire; the property of touch is evidenced

by the sensation of heat; and the property of form by the light emitted by fire. In water there are the properties of sound, touch, form and taste. The first is evidenced by the bubbling sound produced by flowing water; the second by the sensation of cold; the third by fair appearance; and the fourth by its sweetness.

5 & 6. In earth there are all the five properties of sound, touch, form, taste and smell. The first is evidenced by a sort of crackling sound; the second by hardness; the third by the various colours; the fourth by sweetness, acidity, &c.; and the fifth by agreeable and disagreeable odours emitted.

So much for differentiation of the several elements according to their properties. Now let us proceed to the five organs of perception which result from these elements and therefore partake of their properties. These are the sense of hearing, sense of touch, sense of seeing, sense of taste and sense of smell.

7. These senses are located in the several parts of the material body known as ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose, and are capable of perceiving sound, touch, light, taste and smell respectively. These senses are very subtle and therefore their existence can only be inferred by their functions. Moreover they are all usually directed outwards, *i. e.*, are capable of perceiving things external.

8 & 9. It is stated above that these senses of perception are *usually* directed outwards. At times, however, they are able to perceive what passes within. Sometimes when the ears are shut one is able to hear the sound that is produced within the body by the vital breaths and by the fire which is supposed to be in the abdomen and which is supposed to perform the function of digestion. Similarly when one drinks water or gulps down a morsel of food he perceives the sensation produced by the passage of water and food. So also when one

shuts his eyes he perceives the darkness within, and in the act of eructation one perceives the taste and smell of what is drunk and eaten. From this it is clear that at times these senses have a perception of what exists within the body.

10. The functions of the five organs of action are (1) expression of thoughts, (2) taking hold of things, (3) motions, (4) excretion, and (5) experience of felicity. All actions of whatever sort, in the way of agriculture, commerce, service and other professions, fall under one or other of these classes.

11. These functions are performed respectively by organs known as (1) the organ of speech, (2) hands, (3) feet, (4) anus and (5) genital organs. These organs are located in the several limbs of the material body, *viz.*, the mouth, hands, feet, anus and the genitals.

12. The mind presides over all these ten organs, *viz.*, the five organs of perception and the five organs of action, and is located in the heart which resembles the lotus flower. It is called अंतःकरण, *i. e.*, the internal organ, because it is not able to operate on the external objects without the help of the several organs above noted.

13. When the several senses are directed towards their objects, it is the function of the mind to discriminate their qualities. सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्, *i. e.*, the principles of goodness or purity, activity and darkness or ignorance, influence it and direct its course.

14. Absence of worldly desires and appetites, forbearance, magnanimity and other virtues of the like kind are the result of the influence of the principle of purity ; passion, anger, avarice, exertion and others like these are the result of the influence of the principle of activity.

15. Want of energy, delusion, sleepiness and others like these are the result of the influence of the principle of darkness or ignorance.

16. The actions which result from the influence of the principle of purity are classed as meritorious or holy. Those which result from the influence of activity are classed as sinful. While those which are the result of the influence of the principle of darkness or ignorance fall under neither of those categories; time spent in them is life wasted in vain. The ego that identifies himself with all these conditions is commonly known to be the agent or doer.

17. That visible objects which are seen to possess the properties of the five elements such as sound, &c., should be composed of those elements is quite clear; but that the several organs should also be composed of the same elements is not equally clear and may be gathered from references to that effect in the Srutis and also by inference. In the Vedas there are sayings like “अन्नमयं हि सौम्य मनः आपोमयः प्राणस्तेजोमयी वाक्” which means that mind is अन्नमय, *i. e.*, composed of the elements of which all eatable things are formed, that the vital breaths are composed of the elements of water, that speech is composed of the element of fire. The process of inference is something like the following : These organs must be the result of the combination of the elements because they co-exist with the elements in the relations of अन्वय and व्यतिरेक. अन्वय means the presence of one thing along with a particular another and व्यतिरेक means its absence when that other is absent. A thing may be said to be produced from another whenever it co-exists with it in these two relations. For instance, a pitcher is said to be produced from clay because wherever there is the pitcher there is the clay and wherever there is no clay there can be no pitcher. Applying the same reasoning to the present case it follows that the organs are the result of the combination of the elements. It may be asked what authority is there for holding that the organs co-exist with the elements in the relations of अन्वय and व्यतिरेक ? The authority is to be found in the Chhândogya and other Upanishads in sayings like षोडशकलः सौम्य पुरुषः and others.

18. Having thus analysed the elements and their results the author proceeds to explain the import of the word **इदम्** (meaning this) in the Sruti **सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्** which is intended to convey the meaning that before the time of this creation there was one **सत्** (really existing) without a second, and which Sruti the author intends to explain in the following stanza.

The word **इदम्** indicates all the universe which is known by the aid of the eleven organs, by process of reasoning and by the help of the Sastras.

19. Before the evolution of all this universe there was present one, secondless, existence (**सत्**), and name and form did not exist. So says Áruni (*i. e.*, Uddalaka, the son of Aruna) in the Chhándogya Upanishad.

20. The author now proceeds to explain the import of the three words which form the sentence **एकमेवाद्वितीयम्**, and commences by illustrating the several kinds of differences between objects known as **स्वगत**, **सजातीय** and **विजातीय**. Leaves, flowers and fruit of a tree differ from each other but still they all pertain to the same tree and therefore the difference between them is known as **स्वगत**, *i. e.*, existing in oneself. Trees, as a class form a genus, but the several kinds of trees which form the species, differ from each other; this difference between the several kinds of trees is called **सजातीय**, *i. e.*, difference in species. The difference between trees and other objects such as stones, earth, &c., is called **विजातीय**, *i. e.*, difference of genus.

21. The question now arises—are such differences possible with respect to the one real existence **सत्**? The answer is that such possibility is provided against by the three words **एकम्**, **एव** and **अद्वितीयम्** which express respectively the senses of singleness, affirmation, and non-duality.

22. The one real existence (**सत्**) cannot be considered capable of exhibiting the first kind of difference (**स्वगत**)

because it is nowhere described as possessed of parts. Name and form cannot be said to be its parts because they did not exist before the time of this visible creation.

23. Name and form are only co-existent with creation. In other words this creation is nothing more than mere assumption of name and form. Name and form could not therefore have existed before the creation. It follows therefore that the one real existence (सत्) is like ether without parts; therefore the difference known as स्वगत is not possible with respect to it.

24. Then is the difference known as सजातीय possible with respect to सत्? No. Because for the purposes of this difference, it is essential that there should be something else than सत्, and this does not exist. Nothing differs from सत् except in name and form, the real सत् being the same in all.

25. Last it remains to be seen if the difference known as विजातीय is possible with respect to सत्. विजातीय means dissimilar, *i. e.*, belonging to a different genus. सत् means that which really exists and therefore the different genus must be that which is not सत्, *i. e.*, that which does not exist. To speak of difference from a thing which does not exist conveys no meaning. It is clear therefore that the difference known as विजातीय is not possible with respect to सत्.

It is thus proved that the one real existence सत् is positively single and without a second.

26. To establish this conclusion still more firmly the author proceeds to demolish the possible arguments of those that set themselves against it.

There are some with confused intellect who interpret the above Sruti differently and maintain that before this creation there was nothing.

27. Just as the senses of one who is drowned in an ocean get confused, so the intellect of these dissenters, hearing the

exposition of an eternal non-dual existence is unable to grasp it in the same way as it is able to grasp a thing which has a form and is therefore overpowered by fear.

28. Gaudáchárya has observed that those Yogis that are given to contemplating the Brahma as invested with some kind of attributes, such as form, &c., are extremely susceptible of being overpowered by fear if they place themselves in the state of abstract meditation in which the mind is devoid of all ideas and which is called निर्विकल्प समाधि.

29. Gaudáchárya has remarked in one of his Vártikas (explanatory treatises) that this abstract meditation, in which there is no particular object on which the mind is concentrated, is difficult to be achieved by all those that are in the habit of absorbing themselves in the contemplation of particular objects. Because such persons are overtaken by fancied fears. Just as children when left in a place where there is no body else take fright, when really there is no cause for fear, so these Yogis create fears by their own imagination when in the state of abstract meditation though there is no occasion for such fears.

30. Such being the fact these persons try to put a different complexion on the matter and resort to vain argument with the view of establishing that nothing existed prior to this visible creation. Such persons, who are really confused with respect to the supreme spirit (सत्) which is impossible to contemplate, are styled माध्यमिक by Sankaráchárya.

31. Sankaráchárya in one of his Vartikas has said that these followers of the teachings of Buddha, being actuated by the principle of तमस, i. e., ignorance, and being able to perceive things only by the process of inference, have foolishly arrived at the conclusion that an all pervading and eternal spirit does not exist.

32. If you maintain that nothing existed before this visible creation then this proposition involves a contradiction in terms. You connote existence of that which, you say, did not exist. The word 'existed' is capable of implying two senses. In one sense it may mean that 'nothing' is endowed with the attribute of 'existing'; and in another sense it may mean that 'nothing' is existence itself. In either case there is a contradiction in terms in as much as existence can in neither sense be connoted of nothing.

33. Such a proposition is similar to the assertion that darkness is the sun. In the latter case the sun neither possesses the attribute of darkness, nor is it darkness itself. In the same way existence and nothingness are self-contradictory. How then can you say that nothing existed?

34. If on the other hand you maintain that name and form have been attributed to nothing in the same way as name and form are attributed to ether and other elements that formerly existed in Brahma and are evolved out of it by the illusion known as माया, then we congratulate you on such a conclusion, because it perfectly coincides with ours.

35. If however you contend that the name and forms सत् may also be treated as unreal like the name and form of other things then you will have to indicate some other thing on which the illusion of the name and form of सत् can be said to rest; because an illusion is never observed without some base. This however you will be unable to do. That on which the illusion of सत् may be said to rest must come under one of the three classes of सत्, *i. e.*, really existing, असत्, *i. e.*, not existing, or जगत्, *i. e.*, the visible creation. It cannot be सत् because it is an absurdity to say that the illusion of सत् rests on सत्. For an illusion it is necessary that there should be things of which one is mistaken for another, as in the case of the idea of silver on a shining shell. It cannot be the second, *i. e.*, असत् because that

which does not exist at all cannot be the base of an illusion. It cannot be the third, because जगत् is itself produced from सत् and cannot be therefore the base on which the illusion of सत् may be said to rest.

36. In the foregoing stanza (32) it has been shown that the saying असत् आसीत्' (*i. e.* nothing existed) involves a contradiction in terms. Another kind of objection may possibly taken to the saying 'सत् आसीत्'. Now both the subject and the predicate of this sentence being derived from the root अस which signifies existence, it may be asked whether there is or there is not a difference between the senses conveyed by these two words. If the two words are assumed to convey different senses then such an assumption will interfere with the theory of non-duality. If there is no difference then the expression involves tautology.

Such a contention is met by the answer that tautology is not an objection worth considering as it is often to be found in many expressions that are ordinarily used.

37. To do a duty, to say a saying, to hold a holding are expressions in ordinary use and the saying in the Srutis, *viz.*, सत् आसीत्, is meant for those who are used to hear such expressions.

38. Objection may also be taken to the word 'अग्रे' in the Sruti 'सदेव सोग्येदमग्र आसीत्' in as much as that word implies a past period, while no limitation of time holds good in the case of the eternal ever existing spirit (सत् or ब्रह्म). The answer is that the word is used with the view of making the sense intelligible to a pupil who possesses the idea of time, and need not be suspected of implying a dual existence.

39. Objections and their answers have always to be couched in language that is capable of being interpreted to imply a dual existence. If language that is not liable to be

so interpreted has to be used then all objections and answers will be at an end, *i. e.*, perfect silence will have to be observed. All objections and answers must proceed on the assumption that there is the possibility of a difference in conception or understanding. But when one single non-dual existence is admitted then no language is capable of describing such a state and all argument must cease. An opponent who maintains a dual existence is not capable of understanding the position of the non-dualist unless he is disabused of his notion of duality, and in order to do this it is necessary that the non-dualist should address the dualist in his own language.

40. What remains when the state of non-dual existence is realized is described in the Srutis as some real thing which cannot be indicated which is perfectly motionless, which is impenetrable to the mind, which is neither light nor darkness, which is all absorbing, undefinable, and unperceivable by the senses.

41. It may be argued that the four elements of earth, water, fire and air, being composed of atoms which are destructible, can be understood to have an unreal existence, but how can one persuade himself to believe that ether has no real existence?

42. This objection is met by a counter-question as follows:—If you are able to conceive the existence of ether as indestructible, apart from all the rest of the creation, then why should you not conceive the one real existence as differentiated from ether.

43. It may further be argued that what is actually seen is as a rule admitted to exist. Accordingly if you maintain that ether apart from the creation is seen we reply that such a proposition is untenable for two reasons:—First because you will not be able to show that it is visible except with the help of light or darkness; and secondly such a proposition is in itself opposed to your own opinion that ether is not visible,

44. It may again be urged that this defect of being invisible exists also in the case of the one real existence. But it is not so. The one real existence (सत्) is experienced by us in a pure state differentiated from everything else, when we transfer ourselves to a condition of complete abstraction. It may further be asserted that in such a predicament there is possibly the conception of 'nothing'. But it is not so. The conception of nothingness is discarded in such a condition.

45. If you say that in such a condition of abstraction, *knowledge* of सत् is not possible, because knowledge is derived from the exercise of the function of the internal organ, while that organ ceases to work in the state of abstraction, we yield. Such a proposition does not in any way prejudice the main argument. Because सत् is intelligence itself, shining by its own light and does not stand in need of बुद्धि to make it known. How then can it be comprehended? When the mind is completely set at rest then the existence of this सत् is easily conceivable as witnessing the absence of the mind.

46. When all the functions of the mind cease the witness of that condition of tranquillity is perceived to be free from disturbance. Similarly सत् was in an undisturbed condition prior to the evolution of this Creation by the force of (माया) Mâyâ.

47. What is this Mâyâ (माया)? The inherent power of the one existence (सत्), which is devoid of any force by itself and the existence of which is inferred from the result produced in the shape of Creation, is called माया. Of this fire may be cited as an apt illustration. The burning power of fire does not exist independently of fire, nor is it to be perceived except from the burning sensation produced by it. The inherent power of a thing is never known before the result produced by it.

48. Now the question arises whether this inherent power of सत् is सत् itself or something distinct from सत्. It is not सत् itself, in the same way as fire and its burning power are not identical. If on the other hand it is assumed that it is distinct from सत् then the difficulty is to state what sort of existence it has.

49. If you say that that distinct existence is the same as 'nothingness', then the objection arises that 'nothing' has been described above (*vide* stanza 34) as the result of Mâyâ (माया) and therefore cannot be identical with it.

It therefore follows that Mâyâ is neither सत् nor असत्, *i. e.*, it is indescribable.

50 The same idea is conveyed in the Sruti which runs as follows:—नासदासीत्तत्रोसदासीत्तदानीं किं त्वभूत्तमः the meaning of which is that before the appearance of this creation there was neither सत् nor असत् but there existed तमस्, *i. e.*, ignorance or darkness (which is the same thing as Mâyâ).

It has just been said that 'there existed तमस्' which statement is calculated to invest Mâyâ with independent existence. But that is not the proper interpretation. तमस् is said to exist on account of its association with सत् but not independently of it.

51 It is thus clear that Mâyâ does not possess an independent entity in the same way as 'nothing' does not possess it (which has been proved before).

This may be illustrated by an example: We employ a servant and enter against his name in the accounts the emoluments that are to be paid to him. But it is not customary to make a separate entry of his 'working capacity' and to note wages against it.

52 It may be contended that the amount of wages rises if the working capacity of a workman increases, and that therefore the working capacity must be counted with. But this is not correct. The amount of wages does not depend merely on the working capacity but upon the work turned out with the help of this working capacity. However brave a warrior may be, or however strong a cultivator may be, their worth will be determined by the work actually done by them and not by the work they are capable of doing.

53 As a general rule the inherent force of a thing is not counted separate from the thing itself. As in the illustration in the previous stanza the result of such inherent force can be counted separate, but in the case of **माया** no such result really exists as it is all an illusion. There is therefore no ground for suspecting the existence of anything separate from **सत्** or **ब्रह्म**.

54 Again this inherent force of **ब्रह्म** i.e., **Máyá**, is not diffused throughout the whole of **ब्रह्म** but exists in a portion of it; in the same way as the property of being made into pots does not exist in all sorts of earth but in clay only.

55 It is said in the *Sruti* that the supreme spirit is made up of four parts: One part constitutes all the manifested creation, and the remaining three parts constitute the self-refulgent spirit. This indicates that **माया** resides only in one part of the supreme spirit.

56 Similarly in the *Bhagavad Gita* (Chapter X last stanza) Krishna indicated the same when he said to Arjuna that he, by merely a part of himself, pervades the whole of this universe.

57 Another *S'ruti* says that after occupying the whole universe there remains a portion of the supreme spirit of the size of ten fingers. Similarly in the *Vedanta Sūtras* of Vyas there is an aphorism (*Sariraka Sūtras* Book IV, Chapter IV, 19 Sūtra) which conveys the sense that what is manifested does not represent the whole of the supreme spirit, but that part of it is not manifested.

58 The supreme spirit being not susceptible of division, it may be asked how it is that the S'ruti speaks of *part* of the Supreme spirit. The reply is that the S'ruti resorts to this sort of exposition in order to make itself intelligible to one who enquires whether the inherent force of Máyá pervades the whole of the Supreme spirit or only a part of it, the object being to satisfy the enquirer.

59 The inherent force of Máyá residing in the one real thing (*i.e.* the Supreme spirit) makes it possible for the imagination to attribute different changes to that real thing which is unchangeable, in the same way as different colours serve to give ideas of different pictures on the same wall.

60 The first of such changes induced by Máyá is ether, which pervades all space. When it is said that ether exists it implies that the property of 'existing' which resides only in the Supreme spirit is transmitted to ether.

61 The one real existence (सत्) is possessed of the single property of 'existing', while ether possesses two properties. The property of 'space' does not reside in the one real existence (सत्), while it, along with the property of 'existing,' resides in ether.

62 Ether also possesses another property, that of conveying sound. This property also does not reside in the one real existence (सत्). Ether thus possesses the two properties of 'conveying sound' and 'existing'. It is thus clear that the one real existence (सत्) has one property only and ether has two.

63 It has been said in the preceding three stanzas that ether possesses the property of 'existence' which implies that the relation between आकाश and सत् is that of धर्मी and धर्म (धर्मी is one who possesses a property and धर्म is property). This however is inconsistent with the fact that आकाश is produced from सत्. This inconsistency is the result of the same inherent force (माया) which caused the evolution of ether

from the one real existence. This Mâyâ first creates ether, then brings about the identity of ether with the one real existence and ultimately effects the transposition of the functions of धर्म and धर्मि.

64 The truth is that ether is produced from सत्, but ordinary persons who are not able to see the truth, and logicians who draw their inferences by mere reasoning understand that ether possesses the property of existence. It is the legitimate function of Mâyâ to cause such confusion.

65 That a thing should appear as it is, is true knowledge; on the other hand, that it should appear otherwise is the result of a delusion. This is a well-known rule.

66. Judging by this reasoning it becomes clear that the form in which the one real existence (सत्) appears is the result of delusion caused by Mâyâ, and that this delusion is removed by pondering over the sayings contained in the S'rutis. Ether, which has been described as the product of सत् should therefore be looked at in this manner.

67. वियत्, i.e., ether, and सत्, i.e., the one real existence, are words that have distinct etymological significations and are therefore different from each other. Similarly their difference is also knowable from the difference in the extent of their pervasion : सत् pervades air and other elements while ether does not, and this marks the difference between the two.

68. The pervasion of सत् being more extensive than that of ether it follows that सत् is धर्मि, i. e., that which possesses attributes, and ether is merely a धर्म, i. e., an attribute. When सत् is separated from ether by the force of intellect it will be impossible to say that any thing remains of ether which can claim a separate entity.

69. If it is contended that ether is represented by space then the reply is that सत् having been separated from it what remains must be असत्, i. e., nonexistent or unreal. If

again it is urged that ether though different from सत् is still not असत् then such an assertion involves a contradiction in terms.

70. If it is further contended that ether exists to all appearances, then such an assertion is in perfect agreement with our argument. It is the essential function of Máya to make things appear what they are not. That which in itself is non-existent but appears to exist is unreal like elephants and other objects seen in a dream.

71. The difference between सत् and ether may be admitted to be similar to the difference that is perceived between a class and an individual, between the soul and the body, and between a substance and its attributes why should any one be surprized at this.

72. It may be urged that the difference in question though realized does not become firmly established in the mind. If so please say if this want of firmness is due to want of concentration or to want of conviction.

73. If the former, then try to secure concentration by abstracting the mind from other objects: if the latter, then try to secure conviction by having recourse to proofs adduced in the S'astras and by reasoning. Thus will the difference between सत् and ether be firmly established.

74. The difference between सत् and ether being once established by means either of abstraction or the help of S'astras and reasoning it will never be possible to mistake the one for the other: ether will be always understood to be unreal and सत् will not be understood to possess the properties of ether.

75. To one who possesses true knowledge ether appears to be void of real substance, while सत् appears devoid of the properties of ether, such as space, *i. e.*, all pervading and devoid of vacant space.

76. One who knows the truth, after having an established conviction that the supreme spirit is all pervading, wonders

at the delusion of him who holds that ether is really existent and who does not possess true knowledge of सत् as separated from everything else.

77. The unreality of ether and the reality of सत् having been thus established, the same process of reasoning may be applied in differentiating सत् from the remaining four elements, viz., air, water, light and earth.

78. It has been stated above (*vide* Stanza 54) that माया is not diffused throughout the whole of ब्रह्म but exists in a portion of it. Similarly ether is only a partial manifestation of माया, and air is supposed to exist only in a portion of ether. From this the relation of air to सत् will be apparent.

79. The four properties generally attributed to air are: शोष, *i. e.*, power of absorbing moisture ; स्पर्श, *i. e.*, touch ; गति, *i. e.*, motion and वेग, *i. e.*, velocity. These are the peculiar properties of air, but in addition it possesses also the properties of सत्, माया and व्योम, (*i. e.*, ether,) as will be seen from the following.

80. It is usual to use the expression 'air exists.' In this expression the property of existence is derived from सत्. When air is differentiated from सत् what remains is unreal, and this property of unreality is derived from माया. Similarly the property of sound in air is derived from ether.

81. It has been asserted above (Stanza 67) that सत् pervades air and other elements but ether does not; and now it is stated in the previous Stanza that sound, a property of ether, accrues to air. Does this not involve an apparent contradiction ?

82. The reply is that the meaning intended to be conveyed in Stanza 67 was that the chief characteristic of ether, viz., space, does not occur in other elements while in Stanza 81 it is said that the property of sound, which is not the main function of ether, accrues to air. How can there be any contradiction then ?

83. It may again be argued that if air when differentiated from सत् loses the property of real existence and becomes असत्, *i. e.*, non-existent, which is the characteristic attribute of माया, then similarly it cannot also be said to possess the characteristic attribute of माया, *viz.*, non-existence, in as much as being visible it is distinct from the invisible force of माया.

84. To this the reply is that in Stanza 80 above we have said that the attribute of माया which is to be found in the air is unreality, and this attribute belongs to माया whether it be in a visible or invisible state, *i. e.*, whether it be the force itself or its manifestation.

85. At present we are only concerned with the differentiation of सत् from असत् and where is the need of troubling ourselves with the differences that underlie असत्.

86. The conclusion is that portion of air which represents real existence is ब्रह्म, *i. e.*, supreme spirit, while all that remains of it is unreal, as in the case of ether dealt with above. After impressing upon one's mind for a long time this unreal character of air one should eschew all idea about its reality.

87. By a similar reasoning the unreality of fire also may be determined. It has been stated above in Stanza 78 that air is supposed to exist only in a portion of ether, and it may now be stated that fire exists in a portion of air. It thus follows that the extent of pervasion of air being smaller than that of ether, the extent of pervasion of fire is still smaller. These elements are supposed to envelope the universe and their extent is greater or less according to their precedence.

88. It is supposed that the extent of fire is one-tenth of that of air. It is stated in the Puranas that of the five elements each successive element is one-tenth in extent of the foregoing one.

89. The peculiar properties of fire are heat and light; and the attributes of those that have gone before, *viz.*, (1) सत्, (2) माया (3) आकाश and (4) वायु, are also to be found in it. These attributes are (1) existence, (2) unreality, (3) sound and (4) touch.

90. Fire is thus endowed with the attributes of सत्, माया, व्योम and वायु and is also possessed of its peculiar property being visible. One should by force of his intellect determine that, excepting what there is of सत्, everything else in fire is unreal.

91. Fire being differentiated from सत् and its unreality being determined, one should direct his attention towards water, the extent of which is supposed to be one-tenth of that of fire.

92. The properties of water derived from सत्, माया, आकाश, वायु, and वन्धि are existence, unreality, sound, touch and visibility. Its peculiar property is taste.

93. Now water also should be differentiated from सत् and its unreal character determined. Then there only remains the last of the five elements, *viz.*, earth, and its extent is supposed to be one-tenth of that of water.

94. As in the case of the other elements, earth possesses the properties of सत्, माया, आकाश, वायु, वन्धि, and आप, *viz.*, existence, unreality, sound, touch, visibility and taste. Its peculiar property is smell. Let earth also be differentiated from सत् by a process similar to that followed in the case of the other elements.

95. When the property of existence derived from सत् is separated, what remains of earth is unreal. One-tenth of this earth forms the universe. This universe is located in the centre of the element of earth.

96. In this universe there are fourteen divisions or regions which are inhabited by beings of different gradations.

97. When सत् is separated from the universe with its divisions and their bodied inhabitants, what remains is unreal though it may appear to be real.

98. When once the unreal character of the elements and their products and of माय is firmly established, the idea that सत् is without a second will never be displaced.

99. It may be urged that if this visible creation is known to be unreal there will be an end to all worldly dealings. This reasoning however is not correct. The separation of सत् from all the elements and their products and the determination of the unreality of the latter need not interfere with the actions that occurred in respect to them before such determination. Because for all practical purposes their functions remain unchanged.

100. The propounders of the Sāṅkhya (सांख्य) Kānāda (काणाद) and Bauddha (बौद्ध) tenets have by a variety of arguments shown how this creation, which they look upon as real, can be regarded as distinct from the spirit. We do not however make an attempt to refute their arguments.

101. It may appear improper that we should altogether disregard the arguments by which these controversialists establish the existence of the world as apart from the spirit. But as they have without hesitation shown no regard to our arguments regarding the non-duality of the supreme spirit, which are founded on the authority of the S'rutis, what harm can there be if we show a disregard to their arguments regarding a dual existence?

102. There is also an indirect but important advantage in disregarding all arguments regarding a dual existence. If there is a confirmed inclination to disregard such arguments, the idea of non-dual existence will become perfectly steady, and when that predicament is attained man is said to have reached the state of absolution even in life.

103. Nay, he is also absolved from re-birth, as stated by S'ri Krishna in the Bhagavat Gita (Chapter II, Verse 72) in which he says to Arjuna as follows:—Oh Pártha! This state of realizing the non-duality of the supreme spirit is called ब्राह्मि. Having once attained to it man does not incur the risk of being overpowered by ignorance. If one is in this state even in the end he secures complete absorption into the supreme spirit.

104. The words 'in the end' in the quotation from the Bhagavat Gita given above indicate the termination of the state of delusion in which the one real existence and unreal dual existence are confounded together through ignorance: and the termination of such a state means nothing else than the right appreciation of the difference between the two.

105. Or, those words might also be taken to convey the generally accepted meaning of separation of the vital airs from the material body. Delusion which disappears in such last moments does not reappear.

106. Whatever the physical condition of such a man in his last moments, whether free from disease or overpowered by disease, whether able to sit up or wallowing on the ground, whether conscious or unconscious, there is no likelihood of his being overtaken by delusion.

107. This may be illustrated by an example: just as a man who has learnt certain lessons during the day is perfectly unconscious of them in the state of dream or sound sleep but on the succeeding day finds his memory full of what he learnt before, so knowledge of truth, though obscured in the last moments by delirium, does not vanish.

108. Knowledge which is derived from proofs which are convincing does not vanish except when met by very powerful

arguments to the contrary. But there are no arguments stronger than those of the Vedānta philosophy.

109. Hence knowledge of one real existence based on Vedantic proofs is not likely to be dislodged even in the last moments. The result of differentiation of सत् from the elements is ineffable bliss or absolution.

CHAPTER III.

DIFFERENTIATION OF THE SUPREME SPIRIT FROM THE FIVE SHEATHS.

1. We now proceed to clearly differentiate the five sheaths, because the supreme spirit which is described in the Taittiriya Upanishad as residing in a cell (cf. यो वेद निहितं गुहायाम्) can only be known by analysing these five sheaths.

2. The cell which is spoken of in the Upanishad above referred to is no other than the succession of five sheaths, indicated in stanza (33) of the first chapter, which are situated one within another in proper order : within the material body which is known as the अन्नमय कोश lies the प्राणमय कोश, *i. e.*, the sheath which is made up of the vital breaths together with the five organs of action (speech, hands, feet, anus and genital organs); within it lies the मनोमय कोश which is made up of the five organs of perception and the internal organ मनस् ; within it lies the विज्ञानमय कोश which is made up of the same five organs of perception but united with the internal organ बुद्धि; and the innermost sheath is known as आनन्दमय, *i. e.*, consisting of a feeling of happiness.

3. The material body is known as अन्नमय कोश, because it takes its origin from the semen produced from food eaten by

the parents, and is also nourished by means of food. Now this कौश cannot be the spirit, because it did not exist before it originated in semen nor does it exist after death.

4. It may be argued that the fact that the material body is not eternal may be admitted but that it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the material body is not the spirit; for what harm can there be in supposing that the spirit also is not eternal? The reply is that such reasoning lands you in the two fallacies known as अकृताभ्यागम and कृतप्रणाश : the first implies the production of a result without previous action and the second implies the destruction of an action without the production of a result. Admitting that the material body is the spirit, it follows that the spirit like the body, did not exist in a previous birth, and therefore there existed nothing to account for the present birth which is actually experienced and cannot therefore be denied, *i. e.*, it leads to the admission that the present birth is without a cause. Again, if the spirit is not eternal, it follows that it will not exist in a future birth, and therefore there will be nothing to experience the result of the actions of the present birth which are accumulating day after day, *i. e.*, it leads to the admission that the actions of the present birth will be lost without producing any result. Therefore in order to keep clear of these fallacies it is necessary to admit that the material body, of which the beginning and end are clearly seen, is not the spirit which is eternal, *i. e.*, without beginning and end.

(Note. All actions are classified under three heads संचित प्रारब्ध and क्रियमाण. The first comprises the accumulations of previous births which have not begun to bear fruit; the second comprises those which have begun to bear fruit and the third fresh actions. The knowledge of the supreme spirit destroys all actions in the first and third categories; but those that have begun to bear fruit can only vanish when their results are actually experienced.)

5. Similarly the second sheath, प्राणमय कोश, which is nothing more than air, which filling the material body, gives it strength and actuates the several organs, is not the spirit, because it is devoid of the principle of intelligence.

6. The sheath which is known as मनोमय induces in man the delusion that the material body and all worldly effects, such as houses, wealth, &c, belong to him, and is affected by the several passions. This sheath being susceptible of change in the same way as the material body is not the spirit.

7. The sheath known as विज्ञानमय is represented by बुद्धि or intellect in which is reflected the intelligence of the supreme spirit. This intellect lies dormant during the state of sound sleep and pervades the whole body during the state of wakefulness. Being thus susceptible of change it is not the spirit.

8. It may be urged that there is no necessity to admit the existence of two sheaths मनोमय and विज्ञानमय, in as much as मनस् and बुद्धि are merely the different conditions of the same internal organ of perception, *viz.*, अंतःकरण. The reply is that though different conditions of the same organ they differ from each other in the same manner as करण, *i. e.*, an instrument differs from कर्ता, *i. e.*, an agent. The internal organ when it performs the function of an agent is called विज्ञान and when it performs the function of an instrument is called मनस्. The former is situated inside and the latter outside.

9. Now there remains the fifth sheath called आनंदमय. Its function is represented by a peculiar condition of the internal organ directed inwards, which is a reflection of that blissfulness which is an attribute of the supreme spirit, which is experienced when one is enjoying the fruit of his past meritorious actions, but ends in sleep as soon as the period of enjoyment is over.

10. This sheath also is not the spirit on account of its temporary character. That blissfulness of which the condition above indicated is a reflection is the spirit because it is eternal.

11. If for the several reasons above given the several sheaths cannot be the spirit, let them not be. We do not however know of anything beyond them.

12. The reply to the opponent, who contends in the manner indicated in the previous stanza, is that we accept the argument that what is experienced are the five sheaths and nothing else; but what is there to prevent the admission of the existence of that intelligence by the help of which you form a conception of these sheaths.

13. It may again be contended that if spirit existed apart from the five sheaths above denoted it must be experienced; but since it is not experienced it does not exist. The reply is that the spirit is intelligence itself and is not therefore an object of experience.

But why should not intelligence itself be an object of experience? The reply is that there is a complete absence of anything else besides the spirit which could be distinguished by the terms 'knower' and 'knowledge', and the spirit cannot become an object of knowledge.

But it may be that the spirit is not experienced, not because there is no 'knower' besides itself, but because it does not exist. The latter is not the case because its existence is shown (*vide* stanza 12 *ante*) to be indisputable, because there does really exist something by the help of which you form a conception of all the sheaths.

14. This may be further explained by an illustration. Substances which possess the different properties of sweetness,

acidity, &c., and which impart those properties to other substances when mixed with them, do not stand in need of receiving those properties from other substances, nor are there other substances which could impart those properties to them.

15. Just as in the absence of anything else to impart the properties of sweetness, acidity, &c., to sugar, lemon, &c., those substances possess those properties, so the spirit, though it may not be an object of experience, does not lose its character of being intelligence itself.

16. In support of this exposition the several sayings of the S'rutis may be quoted :—He shines by his own light He shines before all else. Everything else derives light from him who shines. By his light the whole world is illumined.

17. What else can serve to afford a knowledge of him by whose help everything is perceived. By what can any one know him who only knows. (As all knowledge proceeds from the spirit there cannot possibly be anything else which can serve to give a knowledge of the spirit.) It may be argued that this knowledge may be acquired by the mind. But that cannot be, as the function of the mind, which is acknowledged to be as an organ of knowledge, operates only so far as objects of cognition are concerned. The mind cannot be the means of affording knowledge of him on account of whom the mind possesses that function.

If it is urged that the spirit knows himself, then such a proposition involves the fallacy of the same thing being a subject and an object.

18. He knows every thing that is knowable, but there is no one else who knows him. The spirit is knowledge itself, quite separate from things known as well as unknown.

19. It may be argued that one can conceive things known and unknown but cannot conceive knowledge as apart from

them. The reply is that when one can conceive things known he impliedly admits the existence of knowledge, as without its help he could not have known those things. It follows therefore that the existence of knowledge must be admitted. If there is anybody who cannot by any means realize the existence of knowledge the S'astras are powerless to enlighten him, for he may be described as merely a clod of earth in a human form.

20. The argument 'knowledge is not realized' in itself involves a contradiction in terms. To say that one does not conceive knowledge is like expressing in articulate words a doubt whether one has a tongue or not. The mere fact that one is able to speak out articulately is a proof of the existence of his tongue, and it is merely shameful for him to doubt its existence. In the same manner that one is able to say that he does not realize knowledge argues the existence of knowledge in as much as without knowledge he would not be able to say that he does not realize it.

21. The existence of knowledge being once admitted the process of determining the supreme spirit (ब्रह्म) is clear. Eliminate all objects of knowledge and the abstract knowledge as separated from its objects is ब्रह्म. The realization of such knowledge is the realization of ब्रह्म.

22. It might be argued that if ब्रह्म can be determined by eliminating all objects of knowledge other than oneself from such knowledge, where is the necessity of dwelling on the separation of the five sheaths from the ब्रह्म, which is the subject matter of this chapter. The reply to such a contention is that the contingency of rebirth is not avoided except by a knowledge of ब्रह्म that is located inside oneself, and for the acquisition of such knowledge it is necessary to analyse the five sheaths. When by the process of reasoning above indicated it is determined that the five sheaths are not the spirit, then

what remains is the knowledge by the help of which this determination is made, and this knowledge represents the true self or the spirit.

It may further be contended that by discarding the five sheaths which are actually experienced we run the risk of inevitably coming to the conclusion that there remains nothing. To this it may be replied that it would be difficult to prove the nothingness of the knowledge that remains after the elimination of the five sheaths.

23. The existence of oneself can never be a matter of dispute. Everyone realizes his own existence and cannot deny it. When the existence of oneself becomes the subject of discussion who will act the part of an opponent ?

24. It may be replied that in such a discussion a person who denies his own existence will be an opponent. But against this it must be said that except when in a state of delusion no one would like to maintain his own non-existence. For the same reason the S'ruti rules such an opponent out of court.

25. The purport of the S'ruti alluded to in the previous stanza is to the effect that if one maintains that ब्रह्म is non-existent he thereby denies his own existence, in as much as his own self is nothing else than ब्रह्म. The upshot of the whole argument therefore is that although ब्रह्म may not be an object of knowledge its existence must nevertheless be admitted.

26. What then are the characteristics of ब्रह्म ? To such a question the reply is that ब्रह्म cannot be described by indication of characteristics. That which is neither like this nor like that is ब्रह्म. (Only those things which are objects of knowledge can be described. But, as above stated, the spirit is not an object of knowledge and therefore cannot be described).

27. The expression 'like this' can only be used with reference to things that are perceptible by the senses, while the expression 'like that' can be used with reference to things that are not perceptible. The spirit is not perceptible by the senses and therefore cannot be described by the first expression. Nor is the second expression applicable in its case as it is no other than oneself.

28. The spirit is unknowable and still present to oneself and is therefore said to shine by its own light. The attributes of **ब्रह्म** as given in the S'rutis are truth, intelligence and infinity, and these are present in the spirit.

29. The attribute of truth indicates the quality of eternal existence, and its presence in the spirit is proved thus: The whole of the objective world vanishes when one is in a state of sound sleep, or in a state of delirium or in a state of complete abstraction known as **समाधि**, and therefore the attribute of **सत्य** cannot be applied to the objective world. The absence of the objective world in the above conditions is however witnessed by the spirit, who must be assumed to exist in those conditions, as without it one would be unable to return to the normal condition. If it is urged that the spirit also may not be present in certain conditions, the question will arise 'who witnesses the absence of the spirit'? The reply must inevitably be that there is no witness. In the absence of such a witness it will not do to admit the absence of the spirit. It thus follows that the spirit is ever existing.

30. This may be illustrated thus:—Take for instance a house. You can remove from it everything that has an embodiment of form and then what remains is ether which has no form and which cannot be removed. Similarly one should eliminate from self everything that is capable of elimination, i.e., things that have a form, such as the physical

body, &c., and others which have no form, such as the organs of sense, &c., and what remains after this process of elimination is at an end is the ever-existing spirit who has witnessed that process of elimination.

31. It is stated in the foregoing stanza that what remains after the said process of elimination is the ever existing spirit. It may be contended that this is paradoxical in as much as nothing remains after everything that is felt or seen is eliminated. The reply is that if nothing remains after the process of elimination that nothing is the spirit. The difference only lies in the manner of expression. The ever existing spirit remains all the same. When the opponent says that nothing remains after the process of elimination, he clearly implies the existence of the knowledge of the absence of everything felt or seen, and this knowledge is the spirit. The existence of something which witnesses this process of elimination must be admitted under any circumstances and there is room for difference of opinion only in the way of indicating that something.

32. For the same reason the S'ruti eliminates all that is capable of elimination and indicates Brahma by that which cannot be eliminated, in the words 'स एष नेतिनेत्यात्मा,' which mean that the spirit is that which remains after elimination.

33. Everything that can be indicated in some way or other is capable of elimination. While that which cannot be so indicated is incapable of elimination and is the spirit or self.

34. The ever existent nature of ब्रह्म is thus established. The attribute of intelligence has already been clearly established above in stanzas 13 *et seq.*

35. It now remains to show that the spirit is infinite. Brahma has no limitation as regards space, because it is described in the S'rutis as all occupying. It has no limitation

as regards time, because it is described as ever existent. It cannot be said to be confined to certain things, because it is all pervading. The infinite nature of Brahma is thus threefold.

36. The infinity of Brahma is not established merely on the authority of the S'ruti. It can be proved by reasoning. The limitations of place, time and object are the creations of Mayà and therefore cannot have a real existence. They cannot therefore affect the infinite nature of Brahma. Again the identity of Brahma with the spirit (आत्मा) is maintained by the S'rutis. It thus follows that the spirit is infinite.

37. It may be argued that although Brahma may not suffer from limitations of place, time and material objects, it must suffer on account of the limitations imposed by the functions of ईश्वर and जीव ; and therefore it cannot be said to be completely free from limitations. To this the reply is that the only real thing is Brahma, possessing the attributes of truth, intelligence and infinity ; and it appears in the rôle of ईश्वर and जीव according to the different functions it performs.

38. The energy which cannot be described by words, which directs the exercise of the functions of all things, and, which lies inherent in everything commencing with the sheath known as आनन्दमय, is the energy of ईश्वर.

39. If the several functions of things were not properly directed by the force of this energy, the world would be confused on account of the several functions over-lapping one another.

40. This energy being a reflection of the intelligent spirit looks like intelligence itself and rules the universe. Brahma, when it is looked at in connection with this energy becomes ईश्वर.

41. Similarly ब्रह्म, when looked at in connection with the medium of the five sheaths, becomes जीव.

This may be illustrated by the example of one and the same person receiving the appellation of 'father' when his relationship with his son is considered, and that of 'grand-father' when his relationship with his grandson is considered. The same person is seen to perform two functions when viewed from different standpoints. In the same way ब्रह्म receives the appellation of ईश्वर when it is viewed in connection with माया and that of जीव when viewed in connection with the further ramifications of माया such as the five sheaths.

42. When the relationship to a son or a grandson is not under consideration then the functions of both father and grand-father cease. Similarly when the mediums of माया and पंचकोश are not under consideration then the functions of ईश्वर and जीव cease.

43. He who discriminates ब्रह्म in this manner by the elimination of the five sheaths becomes ब्रह्म himself, and as ब्रह्म has no birth he also is never born again, *i. e.*, he is freed from the troubles of birth.

CHAPTER IV.

Differentiation of Duality.

1. It is now proposed to differentiate the duality as represented by the creation of the ईश्वर from the duality as represented by the creation of the जीव. The result of such differentiation will be that the जीव will see clearly the bonds of its own creation from which it may endeavour to keep free.

2. It may be asked what authority is there for holding that ईश्वर does create the world. But such a question need not arise in the face of the sayings which are to be found in the several S'rutis.

In the Upanishad known by the name of श्वेताश्वतर it is said that माया is nothing else than प्रकृति, i. e., matter, and महेश्वर is मायी i. e., one whose chief characteristic is his connection with माया, and this मायी creates the world.

3. In the ऐतरेयोपनिषद् which forms part of the ऋग्वेद it is stated that before the creation of this world there existed merely the supreme spirit. This supreme spirit thought of creating and by the force of his thought created all these different worlds.

4. In the तैत्तिरीयश्रुति the creation of the world by ईश्वर is mentioned. It is stated there that ether, air, fire, water, earth, herbs, articles of nourishment and the material bodies all sprang in succession from that supreme spirit.

5. It is also said there that the supreme spirit entertained a desire to multiply. To enable him to accomplish this desire he observed penance and then he created the whole of the universe.

6. In the छान्दोग्य उपनिषद् which forms part of the सामवेद it is stated that in the beginning there was only the ever existing spirit; this spirit thought of multiplying and therefore created fire, water, articles of nourishment and the rest of the bodied creation of which there are three broad divisions viz., अंडज, जीवज, and उद्भिज (अंडज are creatures born from eggs-oviparous such as birds; जीवज or जरायुज are those born from the womb-viviparous; उद्भिज are those that sprout or germinate from seeds such as plants).

7. In the मुंडकोपनिषद् which forms part of the अथर्वणवेद it is stated that as sparks proceed from fire so the whole variety of creation, that having life and that not having life, proceeded from the imperishable spirit.

8-9. In the बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् of the वाजसनेय branch it is said that the world in its primitive condition was devoid of any

manifestation. It subsequently became manifest through the instrumentality of names and forms. These names and forms are to be seen in all the bodied creation, both male and female, from विराट, who was the first progeny of ब्रह्मा, down to ants, including मनु, human beings, cows, asses, horses, goats and sheep.

10. In all the S'rutis above quoted it is stated that ईश्वर pervaded all the bodied creation by assuming a peculiar form. When he performs this function he is called जीव from the fact of his supporting the vital airs.

11. This जीव is a combination of three factors. The first factor is the real intelligence चैतन्य on which the whole superstructure is raised ; the second factor is the लिंगदेह and the third is the reflection of the real intelligence in the लिंगदेह.

12. It may be asked why misery and ignorance should be found to overpower the जीव, if, as stated above, it is the ईश्वर himself who enters the creation in another form. The reply is that माया connected with महेश्वर possesses the power of infatuation in addition to the power of creation, and this माया infatuates the जीव and renders him incapable of knowing the truth.

13. The जीव being thus rendered helpless by infatuation identifies itself with the material body and experiences misery.

Thus has duality as represented by the creation of ईश्वर been briefly explained.

14. In that part of the Brihadāranyak which is known as सप्तान् ब्राह्मण, duality as represented by the creation of जीव is expounded. It is said there that the जीव created seven different kinds of food by force of knowledge and actions.

15. Of these seven, one is for human beings, two for Gods and three for the spirit. Such is the disposal of the seven kinds of food.

16. These seven varieties are as follows:—(1) grain (2 & 3) sacrificial rites performed on the new and full moon days; (4) Milk; (5) Mind; (6) Speech and (7) Vital airs. Of these the first is for human beings; second and third for Gods; third for beasts and the last three for the Spirit.

17. It has been stated above that this world is created by ईश्वर; the seven varieties of food mentioned above are not outside the world; it follows therefore that they are also the creation of ईश्वर, and it is therefore not correct to say that they are created by जीव. To such a contention the reply is that it is true that these seven varieties of food are really created by ईश्वर but जीव has invested them with different forms by making them the objects of his enjoyment through the instrumentality of his knowledge and actions. This knowledge and these actions may be either holy or unholy and will produce corresponding results.

18. It thus follows that the world, including the seven varieties of food abovenoted, appears under two different functions, *viz.*, (1) the creation of ईश्वर and (2) the object of enjoyment of the जीव. Such double function is ordinarily seen in the case of women who, though born of parents, serve their husbands.

19. For the purpose of creation of the world by ईश्वर the only instrument is his determination to do it, and such determination is a function of मायां. For the purpose of enjoyment of the world by जीव the only instrument is his determination to do it, and such determination is a function of the mind.

20. It may be objected that the things created by ईश्वर cannot have for the purposes of enjoyment by जीव a form different from that with which it is invested by ईश्वर and therefore there can be no creation by जीव. But this is not so. We find that jewels and other things created by ईश्वर, though

remaining the same in their original composition, are used in different ways according to the taste and inclination of the user. It will thus be clear that this difference in use is not a creation of ईश्वर but of जीव.

21. This may be further illustrated by an example. Suppose that there are three persons who see a jewel simultaneously. Two of them strive to possess it while the third is indifferent. Of the first two he who succeeds in getting it is rejoiced at his success, while the other is annoyed at his failure. The third, however, who views the efforts of both with indifference, is neither rejoiced nor annoyed.

22. Now in this case the same jewel has become a source of joy to one and of annoyance to another, while to the third person it is a source of neither. These three attributes therefore may be said to have been created by जीव. The jewel, divested of these attributes, is the creation of ईश्वर.

23. This may be further illustrated by another example. The same woman may be a wife in relation to her husband, a daughter-in-law in relation to her parents-in-law, a sister-in-law in relation to sisters-in-law, and a mother in relation to her children. The woman remains the same in all these relations, but she receives a different appellation when her different relations are considered. In this case the woman is a creation of ईश्वर and her several appellations in relation to different persons is a creation of जीव.

24. It may be argued that in the above illustration the ideas in relation to the same woman differ but there is no change in the form of the woman. The जीव therefore does not appear to have itself created any peculiarity in the physical features of the woman.

25. Such a contention is not correct. The different ideas that are formed regarding an object presuppose the existence

of peculiarities in the object itself, as it is impossible that ideas should arise without the existence of such peculiarities. In the present case the woman of flesh and blood remains the same in her relation to several persons but she assumes a different form in the eyes of her different relations, and this investiture with different forms is a function of the mind. The woman of flesh and blood is a creation of ईश्वर but the woman as represented by the different ideas of relationship is a production of the mind of जीव. Though the first remains the same, the second differs in relation to different persons.

26. It may be urged that when one is labouring under a delusion, or when he is dreaming, or when he is building castles in the air, or when he is feeding himself on mere recollections of the past, it may be correct to say that he is seeing things that have merely a mental form as distinguished from a material form because in all these conditions there exists no tangible material object. But in a state of wakefulness when one is actually seeing a thing in its material form it will not do to say that that thing has a separate mental form.

27. When such a contention is raised it may at once be admitted that there is a fundamental difference in the two sets of conditions in as much as the objects in question exist in a material form in one case while they do not in another. But at the same time it must be asserted that external material objects are not known unless the mind comes in contact with them. As soon as the mind comes in such contact, it for the time assumes a form similar to the object with which it comes into contact. This is the view held by S'ankarāchārya and Sures'varāchārya.

28. The illustration given by S'ankarāchārya in Upades'a-sāhari. are as follows:—Just as melted copper when poured into a crucible assumes the form of the crucible, so the mind when it contemplates particular forms or other objects

necessarily assumes the forms with which those objects are endowed.

29. In case the aptness of the above illustration is doubted on account of copper being a material object while the internal organ (बुद्धि) is immaterial, another illustration may be cited. Just as the light of the sun assumes the form of the object on which it falls, so the internal organ (बुद्धि) on account of its capability of knowing all objects assumes the form of the object with which it comes into contact.

30. The view taken by Sures'varāchārya is as follows :— Whenever any object comes in contact with the senses its knowledge is produced by this process : the centre from which all knowledge is produced is the reflection of the real intelligence in the internal organ (बुद्धि); from this centre proceeds all knowledge, that in the present case being the idea of the object perceived; this knowledge then approaches that object, and coming into contact with it assumes the form of that object.

31. It is thus established that all external objects have a double existence (1) material and (2) mental. Their material existence is realizable by the mind, while the mental existence is realizable by the reflection of the real intelligence referred to in the previous stanza (साक्षी).

32. It is this mental creation which enthrals the जीव. This becomes clear by the processes of अन्वय and व्यतिरेक. So long as there exists this mental creation there exist happiness and misery (this अन्वय) and so long as it does not exist, happiness and pain are not to be seen (this is व्यतिरेक).

33. This is illustrated by reference to the state of dreaming and of समाधि (i. e. perfect absorption of thought into one object of meditation). During a state of dreaming one is affected by happiness or misery by the working of

the mind, even though the external objects do not really exist, while in a state of perfect meditation, sound sleep and swoon, one is not so affected in spite of the existence of external objects.

34. A father, hearing a false report of the death of his son who is in a distant land, laments his death under the impression that his son is dead, though he is really alive.

35. On the other hand he does not lament so long as he does not hear of the death of his son, though he is really dead. It is thus clear that what causes one to be affected by happiness or misery is the creation of his own mind.

36. It may be argued that if all happiness and misery are the result of mental creation then all external objects must be said to be without purpose and the position will reduce itself to that maintained by the Buddhists and known as *विज्ञानवाद* (the theory of knowledge, according to which external objects do not really exist and are only conceived for the time being). Such a contention however is not correct, because from what has been said above it will be seen that according to our view the existence of external objects is essential for forming their mental conception and therefore there is a fundamental difference between our view and that of the Buddhists.

37. Or we may admit that all external objects are without purpose, as it may be argued that ideas may be the result of previous impressions and need not necessarily be dependent on the existence of external objects for the time being. But by such an admission we cannot be taken to fall in with the *विज्ञानवाद* of the Buddhists. Because the Buddhists do not even admit the existence of external objects, while we cannot deny the existence of the external world though we may admit that it is without purpose. Things, the existence of which is based on proofs, do not cease to exist simply because they are without purpose.

38. Admitting that the जीव is enthralled by conception of duality produced by the mind, then such a contingency can be provided against by controlling the workings of the mind. For achieving this object it is enough to practise योग (process of concentration of the mind) : where then is the necessity of the knowledge of ब्रह्म (supreme all pervading spirit)?

39. To such a question the reply is that by the practice of योग conception of duality ceases only for the time being. While the Vedant philosophy proclaims the theory that a total cessation of conception of duality is not possible without the knowledge of ब्रह्म.

40. It may be contended that knowledge of ब्रह्म is not possible unless all conception of duality is completely annihilated, that the duality as represented by the creation of ईश्वर is however admitted and therefore in the face of this duality the knowledge of ब्रह्म is not possible. Such a contention is met by the reply that for him who holds that only one thing really exists it is possible to discriminate the real non-dual ब्रह्म by knowing the unreal character of the creation of ईश्वर without its annihilation.

41. What is necessary is thus not the actual annihilation of the external world but the knowledge of its unreal character. That mere annihilation does not help towards securing the knowledge of ब्रह्म is evident from the fact that when the whole world is destroyed at the end of certain periods, knowledge of ब्रह्म is not made possible simply by the non-existence of the duality as represented by the external world, in the absence of teachers who could initiate into such knowledge and books which explain the methods of such initiation.

42. Thus the duality as represented by the creation of ईश्वर not only does not act prejudicially in regard to the

knowledge of ब्रह्म but is on the contrary beneficial, in as much as the existence of teachers and books helps to secure that knowledge. Moreover such duality cannot be annihilated. In these circumstances what harm is there if you allow it to remain? Why need you cavil at it?

43. The duality created by the जीव is of two kinds: (1) शास्त्रीय, *i. e.*, that which is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the dictates of recognized works of Vedant; and (2) अशास्त्रीय, *i. e.*, that which does not fall under that category. Conception of duality of the first kind must be cherished until one attains the knowledge of truth, while that of the second category must be eschewed.

44. The mental creation so far as it is necessary for practising the recognized methods of securing a knowledge of ब्रह्म (*viz.* श्रवण, *i. e.*, hearing, मनन, *i. e.*, contemplating निदिध्यासन, *i. e.*, repeated meditation, &c.) represents duality of the शास्त्रीय order. As soon as truth is known this conception of duality must be dismissed. Such is the command of the S'rutis.

45. The S'rutis in which the above maxim is laid down purport to be as follows:—As intelligent person who really desires to know the truth should study the S'astras and practise the methods therein laid down, and having known the supreme spirit should leave them aside, just as one leaves a firebrand after the object researched for is found.

46. In another place it is said that an intelligent person, who is for acquiring true knowledge, should study all works and having gained his object leave them off; just as one throws off the husk after gathering the grains of corn.

47. A third S'ruti says that a wise man after knowing the supreme spirit should settle his ideas in that direction. He should not then devote his time to the study of mere volumes

of words, because such a study simply conduces to bring about fatigue without any benefit.

48. A fourth S'ruti enjoins that we should know only the supreme spirit and should cease from talking of other things. A wise man should restrain his sense of speech and mind.

The drift of the above and similar other S'rutis is quite plain.

49. Duality which is अन्नाख्य is of two kinds: (1) Violent and (2) Dull. Desire, anger and other passions belong to the first kind, while hallucinations of the mind which conduce to building castles in the air belong to the second.

50. In order to acquire true knowledge it is necessary to get rid of both these kinds of duality before knowing the truth. According to the S'rutis शम, *i. e.*, absence of passion, and समाधि, *i. e.*, absorption of all thought or complete cessation of the working of the mind, are counted among the means of acquiring knowledge of the supreme spirit.

51. It may further be stated that these kinds of duality should also be avoided after acquisition of knowledge, in order to secure final liberation in the present state of life (जिवन्मुक्ति). One who is bound hand and foot by the troubles of desire, anger, &c., can never be liberated.

52. It may be said that we are quite satisfied with the cessation of rebirths after death and that it does not matter if liberation during the present state of life is not secured, and that therefore there would appear to be no harm in indulging in desires, as soon as knowledge is acquired. To such a contention it may be replied that if your attachment to desires, &c., is so strong that you are not willing to get rid of them during your present life then you may go a step further and say that you are quite content with attaining to the heavens (स्वर्ग) in a future birth and that it does not matter if there is no cessation of future births at all.

53. If you reply by saying that you are not satisfied with attainment of heavens (स्वर्ग) because the comforts that are available there are susceptible of increase and decrease, then why not abandon all desires which in themselves are an embodiment of all that is evil.

54. It may again be contended that so long as such turbulent desires as prove an impediment to the knowledge of truth are abandoned there would be no harm in indulging in such of them as are of a milder type and are of use in worldly dealings. To such a contention the reply is as follows:—

If even after knowing the truth, you do not abandon desires, &c., altogether, there is a chance of your transgressing the bounds of propriety of action and indulging in improper acts.

55. It may again be contended that in the case of one who has known the truth no harm would result if he were to indulge in improper acts. To this the reply may be given in the words of Sureswaráchárya who says in his नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिः— If one who has known the non-dual truth or ब्रह्म indulges in acts without regard to propriety then he may also feed himself upon impure things. What difference would there be then between philosophers and dogs?

56. The position of such a person becomes ridiculous, because before the attainment of the knowledge of ब्रह्म he differed from mental tortures, which were the result of desires, passions, &c., and now he has to bear the brunt of public ridicule from all sides. What a fine spectacle this of a person who has known the truth !

57. Pray, therefore, do not desire to reduce yourself to the level of a boar after you attain to the knowledge of ब्रह्म. Free yourself from all the faults that mind is heir to, such as desires, passions, &c., and make yourself worthy of reverence like god.

58. In works that deal with methods of securing absolution it is clearly laid down that the way to get clear of desires and passions lies in seeing the defects of things which are the objects of such desires and passions. You should therefore secure happiness by investigating these methods.

59. In stanza (49) above it is stated that duality as created by जीव and which falls under the category of अशास्त्रीय is of two kinds (1) violent and (2) dull. Desire, anger and other passions come under the first kind, while hallucinations of the mind belong to the second. In the foregoing stanzas the necessity of abandoning desires and passions before and after knowing the truth is made clear. Now after all this argument one may admit the necessity of abandoning these desires and passions, *i.e.*, the duality of the अशास्त्रीय class which is termed violent; but what harm can result from indulging in the duality of the 'dull' kind, *viz.*, hallucinations of the mind which conduce to building castles in the air. To such a contention the reply is that such duality though not directly harmful is indirectly the root of all evil. This is explained in the Bhagavat Gita.

60. In verse 62, Chapter II of that book it is said that by mere contemplation of worldly objects one gets attached to them. Such attachment eventually creates a desire for their acquisition, and this desire leads to irritation if it is not accomplished. This is thus the result of what was originally mere contemplation.

61. One is able to gain the mastery over this state of mental hallucinations by abstract meditation or concentration of the mind, *i. e.*, समाधि of the निर्विकल्प kind, in which the meditation does not recognize a distinction of subject and object, of the knower and the known. निर्विकल्प समाधि in its turn can be gradually achieved by meditation of the सविकल्प kind, *i. e.*, that in which the distinction between subject and object, between the knower and known is recognized.

62. Abstract meditation (समाधि) however presupposes the practice of योग, which means a cessation of the workings of the mind. But what if one cannot practise such योग? For such a person the remedy lies in repeated utterance of the word ओम्. It is however a necessary condition that he should have known beforehand the identity of the supreme with the individual spirit, that his mind should be free from contamination that accrues from passions and desires, and that he should be in the habit of residing in a secluded place.

63. When all its working is stopped the mind rests still just like a dumb person who is devoid of all operations of speech. The nature of this state is described in various ways by Vasishtha in his advice to Rama. The following two stanzas will furnish an indication of the views held by Vasishtha.

64. If one is able to accomplish a complete annihilation of the visible world by satisfying himself that whatever is seen does not really exist, then he would experience the supreme bliss that is said to result from absolution.

65. A deep study of all the works that deal with the अद्वैत doctrine, and long discussion on the subject lead to the conclusion that no condition is superior to that in which the mind is quite still and all its workings such as passions and desires are stopped.

66. If ever the mind gets ruffled through force of acts done in a former birth which must bear their fruit, then it is liable to be set right again immediately by dint of practice.

67. One whose mind is never ruffled can hardly be called ब्रह्मविद् with propriety. The term ब्रह्मविद् signifies "One who knows ब्रह्म" and therefore strictly speaking is liable to convey the idea of a distinction between the knower and the known. Sages completely conversant with वेदान्त philosophy say that a person whose mind is never ruffled is ब्रह्म itself, and therefore it cannot be correct to call him ब्रह्मविद्.

68. This is also what Vasishtha says in his advice to Rama. He who is completely free from all idea of his knowing ब्रह्म as also of his not knowing it and remains by himself as intelligence itself, is ब्रह्म and not ब्रह्मविद्.

69. This highest form of final liberation during the present state of life (जिवन्मुक्ति) is attained by keeping clear of all duality as represented by the creation of जीव. That duality is therefore in this chapter differentiated from duality as represented by the creation of ईश्वर.

CHAPTER V.

EXPLANATION OF THE FOUR PRINCIPAL SAYINGS THAT FORM THE BASIS OF VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY.

1. It is now proposed to explain the meaning of the four principal sayings contained in the Vedas in order to prove the identity of ब्रह्म and आत्मा. The four sayings are 'प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म,' 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि,' 'तत्त्वमसि' and 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म'. The first occurs in the ऐतरेयारण्यकोपनिषद् which forms part of the ऋग्वेद and is explained as follows:—

That is called प्रज्ञान on account of which one is able to see objects by the organ of sight, to hear by the organ of hearing to smell by the organ of smelling, to speak out by the organ of speech, to experience the taste of that which is sweet and not sweet by the organ of taste.

2. That one intelligence which pervades gods, human beings, lower animals and all the elements and which is the sole cause of their creation, existence and destruction is ब्रह्म. It thus follows that the प्रज्ञान mentioned in the previous stanza is identical with ब्रह्म in general, and it further follows that the प्रज्ञान in an individual also is ब्रह्म.

3. The second saying 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' occurs in the Brihadā-ranyakopanishad which forms part of यजुर्वेद and is explained as follows :—The supreme spirit which is unaffected by limitations of time, space and object receives the designation of अहम् when viewed in connection with the material body in which it remains and shines on account its of being reflected in बुद्धि. This material body is endowed with the capability of acquiring knowledge by certain means.

4. The word ब्रह्म in this sentence indicates the supreme spirit unaffected by limitations of time, space and object. The word अस्मि indicates the identity of अहम् and ब्रह्म, *i. e.*, the individual and supreme spirit. It thus follows that individual spirit is one with the supreme spirit.

5. The third saying तत्त्वमसि occurs in the छांदोग्य उपनिषद् which forms part of (Sāma Veda) सामवेद and is explained as follows :—

The word तत् indicates that one nondual thing, devoid of name and form, which existed before the creation of this world and exists even after the creation in an unaltered state.

6. The word 'त्वम्' indicates the only real element in an individual which is quite distinct from the three bodies स्थूल, सूक्ष्म and कारण and the several organs of sense and which witnesses their operations.

The word 'असि' indicates the identity of तत् and त्वम्.

The meaning of the whole sentence thus is : 'Thou art that'—and signifies the identity of an individual self with the one real thing.

The identity thus established may be experienced by those who are seriously inclined to seek it.

7. The fourth saying 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' occurs in the Atharvana Veda and is explained as follows :—

By the word 'अयम्' is indicated the property of shining by one's own light and being ever present, *i. e.*, the use of the word अयम् indicates that the spirit is not a thing that can be known, nor is it a thing which is either visible or invisible, which means that the spirit is knowledge itself and is ever present.

By the word आत्मा is indicated the individual spirit which is quite separate from all the material elements commencing with अहंकार and ending with देह and is at the same time their substratum and their witness.

8. The word ब्रह्म indicates that real thing which forms the substratum of the whole of the visible creation. This ब्रह्म is intelligence itself shining by its own light and being also all pervading is identical with आत्मा.

CHAPTER VI.

ILLUSTRATION BY COMPARISON WITH A PAINTING.

1. Just as in the case of a piece of canvass on which a painting has been drawn four different conditions are observed, so in the case of the supreme spirit are observed four conditions.

2&3. The four conditions in the case of a painting are (1) धौत the condition of whiteness in the original state of the canvass; (2) घटित the condition of being made smooth by rubbing with paste; (3) लांछित the condition of having lines drawn over it and (4) रंजित, the condition of different colours being introduced into it. Similarly in the case of the spirit the four conditions are चिद्, अन्तर्यामी, सूत्रात्मा, and विराट्.

4. The original condition of the supreme spirit is that which is known as चिद् which signifies intelligence itself.

The supreme spirit when united with or working with माया is known as अन्तर्यामी. The supreme spirit, when representing the aggregate of the subtile bodies (समष्टि सूक्ष्म शरीर) is known as सूत्रात्मा. It is known as विराट् when it represents the aggregate of the gross or material bodies (समष्टि स्थूल शरीर).

5. Just as on a canvass different objects are painted, so on the substratum of the supreme spirit rest the whole lot of created objects, animate and inanimate, high and low, from the highest deity known as ब्रह्मा down to the meanest grass.

6. The painting may have on it some human forms clothed in different garments. These garments, which are merely the creation of the painter's brush, are no other than the canvass on which the painting is drawn and do not possess the real qualities of that stuff which they represent.

7. Similarly the supreme spirit is the substratum—the ground work—of the whole creation. The individual objects in this creation which resemble the supreme spirit and are therefore identified with it are known by the appellation of जीव. It is these objects known as जीवि which undergo transformation through different births, while the supreme spirit remains immutable.

8. Just as ignorant people believe that the colours which are painted on the garments which are merely the creation of the painter's brush really belong to the canvass on which the painting is drawn, so people who are not able to distinguish the supreme spirit from the objects which are identified with it consider that the transformations to which the जीवि is subject are undergone by the supreme spirit.

9. Just as in the case of a painting garments are shown in the case of human beings and not for the mountains, rivers, &c., which are painted along with human beings. So there

is no likeness of the supreme spirit observable in inanimate objects in the creation like earth, stones, &c.

10. The illusion, by which one feels that the succession of transformations or existences to which the जीव is subject is real and not illusory and that it is the function of the supreme spirit and not of the जीव, is what is called अविद्या, *i. e.*, absence of knowledge or ignorance. This अविद्या disappears when विद्या, *i. e.*, knowledge, comes on the scene.

11. The question naturally arises what is this विद्या? This विद्या is nothing more or less than to know that the succession of transformations or existences is a function of जीव which is merely a reflection of the supreme spirit. This विद्या is acquired by thoughtful deliberation and careful analysis.

12. It is therefore essentially necessary that one should always distinguish between जगत्, *i. e.*, world or visible creation, जीव, *i. e.*, reflection of the supreme spirit and परात्मा, *i. e.*, the supreme spirit. The जगत् and जीव having been by careful analysis eliminated as unreal there remains in the end the supreme spirit only.

13. The elimination of जगत् and जीव above referred to will not be effected by simply not realizing their existence; in other words—want of realization of their existence does not constitute the sort of elimination which is necessary for realizing the true nature of the supreme spirit. What is necessary is that the unreal character of जगत् and जीव should be determined or ascertained. If this were not so absolution or मोक्ष would be every easy of attainment in a state of sound sleep or swoon. When one is enjoying sound sleep he is not conscious either of the existence of the outer world or even of the जीव itself; and the same is the case if one has fainted away. Now the highest goal of the Vedant philosophy is the attainment of मोक्ष or absolution which is nothing more than a thorough experience of the unreal character of every thing

else than the supreme spirit. If it were enough to be merely ignorant of the जगत् and जीव to attain the मोक्ष, then the highest goal would be within easy reach. But it is not so ; and what is necessary is to arrive at a definite conclusion by analysis and deliberation that जगत् and जीव are unreal.

14. Similarly it is necessary to determine definitely the real character of the supreme spirit. For this purpose it is not indispensable that one should absolutely forget the world. If it were so then what is called जीवन्मुक्ति would not be possible. जीवन्मुक्ति means final liberation in the present state of life, *i.e.*, a state in which one attains absolution by means of direct knowledge while yet the operations of the material body are going on. This term is used as distinguished from विदेहमुक्ति which means absolution accompanied with separation from the material body.

15. विद्या or knowledge acquired by deliberation and analysis is of two kinds (1) परोक्ष indirect and (2) अपरोक्ष direct. All deliberation and analysis is at an end as soon as direct knowledge is acquired.

16. If one knows from the Vedas or from his preceptor that there exists such a thing as the supreme spirit (ब्रह्म) that knowledge is indirect or परोक्ष. But if he realizes that he himself is nothing but ब्रह्म then that knowledge is direct or अपरोक्ष and is otherwise known as साक्षात्कार, *i. e.*, realization of one's identity with the supreme spirit.

17. This साक्षात्कार secures instant absolution from succession of births or transformations. For the accomplishment thereof it is proposed to determine the true nature of the supreme spirit.

18. चित् or intelligence is of four sorts or denominations, *viz.*, कूटस्थ, ब्रह्म, जीव and ईश. The चित् which is one and the same everywhere receives these four distinct denominations in

the same way as the same ether or आकाश is known as घटाकाश, महाकाश, जलाकाश and अन्नाकाश.

19. The all pervading ether or आकाश receives the name of घटाकाश when its pervasion is circumscribed by the size of a jar or other material object enclosing space ; and immense space which is free from all such limitations and in which the clouds planets, and stars move is known as महाकाश. Take a jar and fill it with water. The jar encloses some space and therefore contains आकाश. Over that आकाश rests the water that is poured into the jar. Placing this jar in an open place you will find that on the surface of the water there is a reflection of the sky above with the clouds and stars. This reflection is called जलाकाश.

20. In the महाकाश are seen clouds. The clouds hold water, and the आकाश which is reflected in that water is known as अन्नाकाश.

21. Now this अन्नाकाश is not directly visible but its existence can be inferred. Clouds are formed of vapour and this vapour is water itself in another form. It follows therefore that clouds contain particles of water and as it is a property of water to present a reflection, it can be easily conceived that the particles of water present in the clouds also present a reflection of आकाश and the आकाश so reflected is अन्नाकाश.

22. Having explained the four kinds of आकाश which are taken to illustrate the four states of चित् or intelligence, it is now proposed to explain those four states in their proper order. The चित् or intelligence is known by the name of कूटस्थ when it is considered in relation to the स्थूल and सूक्ष्म bodies. That portion of चित् on which the conception of these two bodies rests is called कूटस्थ. The word कूट indicates the top (some interpret कूट to mean the blacksmiths hammer,) of a mountain which remains unchanged and undisturbed in spite

of atmospheric changes, and hence कूटस्थ means immutable, uniform and perpetually the same.

23. This कूटस्थ is covered over by बुद्धि and चित् or चैतन्य is reflected in this बुद्धि. This reflection is called जीव. It is styled जीव from the fact of its holding the vital airs. It is this जीव that is subject to succession of births.

24. In the illustration above given घटाकाश corresponds to कूटस्थ and जलाकाश to जीव. As in the case of जलाकाश the original ether in the jar is completely covered over by the ether reflected in the water in the jar, so the original कूटस्थ is completely covered over by जीव, and therefore whatever changes the जीव is subjected to are attributed to the कूटस्थ. This erroneous notion of identity is what is called अन्योन्याध्यास in the Vedanta philosophy.

25. The जीव does never discern or recognize the separate existence of the कूटस्थ. This ignorance is without any known beginning and is called मूलविद्या.

26. From this ignorance or अविद्या result two kinds of illusions which are known as आवृत्ति and विक्षेप. That illusion by which the जीव says that the existence of the कूटस्थ is not felt and that the कूटस्थ does not exist is known by the name of आवृत्ति, the meaning of which word is 'covering over' or 'concealment.'

27. It may be asked how is the existence of ignorance and the illusions resulting from it proved. The reply is that they are actually experienced by people and therefore no other proof is required. If a person who is ignorant of the existence of कूटस्थ, is asked by one who knows it, whether he knows the कूटस्थ, he will reply immediately that he does not know. When he confines his reply to saying this much only he may be said to give expression to his experience of ignorance or अविद्या; but when he proceeds to say that he does not feel the existence of कूटस्थ and also that कूटस्थ does not exist

then he may be said to give expression to his experience of the illusion known as आवृत्ति or आवरण. अविद्या and आवरण being thus distinctly experienced there is no need for further proof in support of their existence.

28. It may be argued that ब्रह्म or supreme spirit being intelligence itself shining by its own light, it is not possible that it should co-exist with ignorance or अविद्या, in the same way as light cannot co-exist with darkness. In the absence of अविद्या there will be no आवरण and विक्षेप. When these illusions do not exist then all knowledge or ज्ञान becomes futile or purposeless. The purpose of knowledge is to dispel ignorance and the illusions resulting from it, and when no such ignorance and illusions exist then knowledge is without a function. When knowledge becomes purposeless it follows that all the writings or शास्त्रs which expound the acquisition of knowledge are for nothing. But all this chain of argument is destroyed by experience pure and simple. When a thing is actually experienced it is perfectly useless to argue that its existence is improbable.

29. If further, it is argued that no reliance can be placed on self-experience, then how can a logician arrive at a correct conclusion? For determining the truth according to methods of logic the help of experience is essential, but if experience is not to be relied upon then the whole process of logical reasoning becomes useless.

30. If logical reasoning is necessary for determining the correctness of one's experience then we have no objection to resorting to logical reasoning but such reasoning must follow the lead of experience, and all absurd reasoning must be avoided.

31. It has been said above (stanza 27) that the existence of अविद्या and आवृत्ति are proved by actual experience and it should be determined by the help of this experience

that the co-existence of कूटस्थ with अविद्या and आवरण is quite possible.

32. If the co-existence of कूटस्थ with अविद्या and आवरण be not possible then who will experience the illusion of आवरण? That अविद्या and the resulting illusion आवरण are experienced does not admit of doubt, and for the purposes of experience it is absolutely necessary that the कूटस्थ चैतन्य must exist. The co-existence of कूटस्थ with अविद्या and आवरण follows therefore as a matter of course. The question may then be asked what is it that cannot co-exist with अविद्या and आवृत्ति? The reply is that it is विवेक, (*i. e.*, knowledge which enables one to distinguish reality from illusion,) which cannot co-exist with अविद्या and आवृत्ति. This can be verified by reference to the condition of a तत्त्वज्ञानी, *i. e.*, one who has known the reality.

33. It has been stated above (*vide* stanza 26) that two kinds of illusions result from अविद्या, *viz.* (1) आवरण and (2) विक्षेप. The first, *i. e.*, आवरण having been explained, it is now proposed to deal with the second, *i. e.*, विक्षेप. विक्षेप is the same as अध्यास or अध्यारोप, which signifies the act of attaching or attributing erroneously the properties or predicates of one object to another. In stanza (24) above the erroneous identification of जीव with कूटस्थ is referred to and this erroneous notion of identity, which was there called अन्योन्याध्यास, is here termed विक्षेप and is explained and illustrated in the following stanzas. It has been stated above (stanza 22) that the portion of चित् or all pervading intelligence, on which the conception of the स्थूल and सूक्ष्म bodies rests, is what is known as कूटस्थ चैतन्य. The conception of these two bodies is also accompanied by the conception of बुद्धि. This बुद्धि being transparent gives out the reflection of the कूटस्थ चैतन्य which is circumscribed by the स्थूल and सूक्ष्म bodies. This reflection is called चिदाभास or जीव. Now the

presence of अविद्या and आवरण leads one to identify this चिदाभास with the real चिद् or कूटस्थ चैतन्य. This is explained by the illustration of a pearl oyster shell. A person seeing such a shell from a distance fancies, on account of its property of shining whiteness, that it is silver. He completely ignores the shell and is possessed by the notion that it is silver. So the कूटस्थ is completely ignored and चिदाभास is in the front.

34. The aptness of the illustration of शुक्ति and रजत, *i. e.*, pearl oyster shell and silver is further explained thus:—A person sees a pearl oyster shell and on account of its brilliancy fancies that it is silver. Now the real notion should have been as follows:—“what is seen is a pearl oyster इयं शुक्तिः अस्ति.” Instead of this the notion is as follows: “What is seen is silver इदं रूप्यम् अस्ति.” Now comparing the two sentences which express these two notions, it will be seen that the words ‘what is seen’ and ‘is’ are common to both, *i. e.*, there is no doubt in both cases that something is seen and there is also no doubt that it exists. The only mistake is about the real nature of what is seen. Similarly the ideas of ‘self’ and ‘real existence’ which belong to कूटस्थ are seen to appertain to the चिदाभास during the continuance of विकल्प, the two corresponding notions being स्वयं कूटस्थोऽस्मि and स्वयं महमस्मि.

35. In the case of an oyster shell which is mistaken for silver the blue colour of its exterior and its triangular shape are not open to observation. Similarly in the case of the कूटस्थ its properties of being unsusceptible and being possessed of felicity are inherent in the कूटस्थ itself and are not imparted to चिदाभास.

36. In the illustration of pearl oyster the notion that takes the place of the real substance is that of silver. Similarly in the case of कूटस्थ the चिदाभास or जीव which is identified with it receives the name of अहम्, *i. e.*, ego.

37. In the illustration of pearl oyster the person who observes it contracts the mistaken notion of its being silver. The notion that he sees something is quite correct, but the notion that it is silver is altogether extraneous to the real object and is therefore incorrect. Similarly in the case of कूटस्थ one really sees his own self but he contracts the incorrect notion that what he sees is अहम् or ego.

38. In the illustration of pearl oyster the notion stands thus :— इदं रूप्यमस्ति (This is silver). In this notion the ideas conveyed by the words 'this' and 'silver' are not identical. They differ in so far as the former is capable of more extensive application while the latter is of limited application. Similarly in the case of the कूटस्थ the notion stands thus :—स्वयं महमस्मि (self is ego) and in this notion likewise the ideas conveyed by the words 'self' and 'ego' differ in the same manner.

39 & 40. That the idea conveyed by the word स्वयम् (self) is of more extensive application than that conveyed by the word अहम् (ego) may be illustrated by an example. It is usual to use the word स्वयम् along with the first, second and third person and this itself shows that स्वयम् which is applicable to all the three persons is of more extensive application than अहम् which is applicable to the first person only. देवदत्तः स्वयम् गच्छेत् is a sentence which means that Devadatta may go himself and thus shows that स्वयम् or self can be used for the third person. त्वंस्वयं वीक्षस्व—thou mayest see thyself is a sentence which shows that स्वयम् may be used for the second person. अहं स्वयं न शक्नोमि I myself am not able—indicates that स्वयम् may be used in the first person. The same is the case with the word इदम् which may be applied to any thing that is indicated, as for instance 'इदं रूप्यम्' (this silver) इदं वस्त्रम् (this cloth).

41. But admitting the difference between the signification of the words स्वयम् and अहम् it may be asked what connection has it with the कूटस्थ आत्मा ? The reply is that the idea conveyed by the word स्वयम् is identical with the कूटस्थ.

42. It may be contended that the idea conveyed by the word स्वयम् or स्वस्व merely excludes that of being anything else and does not indicate कूटस्थ. If so this contention is favourable to us, in as much as we maintain the identity of कूटस्थ and आत्मा. What is predicated of स्वयम् and स्वस्व also applies to आत्मा, and कूटस्थ and आत्मा being identical, the meaning that is attributed to स्वयम् or स्वस्व is acceptable to us.

43. It is generally understood that the words स्वयम् and आत्मा are synonymous and therefore they are never used together. It follows therefore that the sense of exclusion that is conveyed by स्वयम् is also conveyed by आत्मा.

44. It may be argued that the word स्वयम् is sometimes used in conjunction with inanimate objects, as in the sentence घटःस्वयं न जानाति, *i. e.*, a pitcher itself has no knowledge, and that therefore it will not be correct to say that the ideas conveyed by the words स्वयम् and आत्मा are identical. The reply is that the argument in question need not interfere with the identity of स्वयम् and आत्मा, in as much as आत्मा or the supreme spirit is also present in inanimate objects.

45. The distinction of 'animate' or 'inanimate' does not rest on the presence or absence of आत्मा or supreme spirit, because the supreme spirit pervades the whole creation both animate and inanimate. The distinction rests on the presence or absence of susceptibility to present a reflection of the supreme spirit through the medium of बुद्धि, *i. e.*, those objects which possess अंतःकरण or बुद्धि in which the चिदाभास is reflected are known as चेतन or 'animate,' while those that do not possess अंतःकरण or बुद्धि and therefore are not capable of presenting such a reflection are known as अचेतन or inanimate.

46. Just as all animate creation is originated by illusion and rests on the कूटस्थ, so all the inanimate creation is also originated by illusion and rests on the कूटस्थ. The illusion of all this creation both animate and inanimate would not be possible without the base of the कूटस्थ, it being a fundamental principle that there can be no illusion without something real on which it rests, *e. g.*, there can be no illusion of silver without the pearl oyster; there can be no illusion of mirage without the rays of the sun, there can be no illusion of the snake without the real existence of the rope, &c.

47. It has been stated above (stanza 39) that the words स्व or स्वयम् is applicable in all the three persons. Similarly the words तत् and इदम् are also equally applicable in all cases. From this one may be inclined to infer that as स्वयम् is synonymous with आत्मा so तत् and इदम् must also be identical with आत्मा.

48. But such an inference will not be correct. Because the words तत् and इदम्, being applicable in all cases, are also applicable to आत्मा and therefore cannot be identical with आत्मा. They are used as qualifying pronouns in the same way as qualifying adjectives such as good, bad, &c., are used, as for instance: तत् आत्मत्वं, इदम् आत्मत्वम् or सः आत्मा, अयम् आत्मा, *i. e.*, that आत्मा and this आत्मा. Qualifying words cannot be identified with or be co-extensive with those they qualify, and therefore तत् and इदम् cannot be आत्मा.

49. This discussion regarding तत् and इदम् not being आत्मा is however merely by the way. The main topic of discussion here is विशेष, *i. e.*, erroneous identification of स्वयम् and अहम् and to this the author now reverts.

It is generally known and does not admit of doubt that the words तत् and इदम्, स्व and अन्य, त्वम् and अहम् are counterparts of each other and each conveys a signification which is quite opposed to that of the other.

50. The counterpart of अग्न्यता is स्वयम् which is the same as कूटस्थ आत्मा. The counterpart of स्वम् is अहम्, and this ego, which is the same as चिदाभास, is erroneously identified with आत्मा.

51. The distinction between अहंता and स्वस्व or between अहं and स्वयम्, *i. e.*, between जीव and कूटस्थ, is as clear as that between silver and the pearl oyster with which it is identified and what accounts for their erroneous identification with one another is delusion.

52. This erroneous identification of जीव with कूटस्थ or of अहम् with स्वयम् is what is called तादात्म्याध्यास. The word अध्यास by itself means superimposition or attribution and तादात्म्य means the property of being absorbed or identified: the whole expression thus signifies attribution of identity. As stated in stanza (25) above this erroneous notion of identity is created by ignorance or अविद्या. Being thus the result of ignorance it disappears with its cause, *i. e.*, when अविद्या or ignorance vanishes this अध्यास, which is produced by it, also disappears.

53. The statement made above, *viz.*, that अध्यास disappears with अविद्या, however requires some qualification. It has been stated in stanza (26) above that two kinds of illusions result from अविद्या, *viz.*, आवरण and विक्षेप. Now these illusions may be said to vanish with the dawn of knowledge only so far as they are the result of अविद्या. But when other causes have to be counted with as factors then the result will be modified to the extent of the operation of those causes. Thus the material body, which is the result of अविद्या combined with the operation of the actions of former births or कर्म, does not vanish immediately after the dawn of knowledge but lasts till the force of कर्म is spent.

54. The conclusion above stated is likely to be regarded as incorrect in as much as it involves the assumption that even after the disappearance of the material cause its effect

lasts some time longer. But in this we are supported by the तार्किक school, i. e., those who base their conclusions on mere तर्क or inference. They hold that an effect lasts for a moment even though its material cause has disappeared. Why then should not our conclusion be correct in accordance with the same theory.

55. Now it may be argued that the तार्किकs hold that an effect survives its cause only for a moment, while the material body may last for years after the dawn of knowledge, and therefore the theory of the तार्किकs cannot be invoked by us in support of our conclusion. To such an argument the reply is that the measure of a 'moment' is to be judged by the kind of cause and effect concerned. When the तार्किकs speak of an effect surviving a cause for the space of a moment they use of the word 'moment' to signify a very small portion of a day. But the material body being the result of a delusion continued in a succession of births, the 'moment' for which the result survives its cause must be measured accordingly. Taking into consideration the length of time over which the delusion has spread, it involves no inconsistency to maintain that the result in this case may survive the cause for years together. A further illustration of this theory may be found in the revolutions of the wheel of the potter which continue for a long time after the rod which causes motion is removed.

56. The तार्किकs generally base their conclusions solely on inference and do not care to see if those conclusions derive any support from other quarters and therefore their conclusions are not correct. From this it should not be argued that our conclusions are vitiated simply because we call in the support of a theory of the तार्किकs. Our conclusions have also the support of श्रुति, practical illustration and the experience of the learned. For those that like us argue on the

strength of all these sources of information, there need be no occasion to doubt the correctness of their conclusions.

57. But let this matter of exposing the faults of the reasoning of the तार्किकs rest here, and let us revert to the main subject of discussion. Our argument has advanced to the stage of admitting as proved the erroneous identification of the कूटस्थ and its reflection the जीव, otherwise known by the terms स्वयम् and अहम् respectively.

58. It may naturally be asked why it is that this delusion, which leads to the erroneous identification of जीव with कूटस्थ, is not ordinary discovered. The reason is that all persons—those that have received no special education and are only equipped with common sense derived from worldly dealings, as also those who have received a training in particular branches of knowledge—consider, themselves as competent to understand anything and foolishly ignoring the bearings of the श्रुति depend solely on the strength of their reasoning and the wealth of illustration and thus wander away from the truth.

59. There are some who do not ignore the S'ruti (श्रुति) but interpret it without regard to what may have gone before and what may follow, and thus shamelessly arrive at conclusions calculated to support their own theories but not borne out by the context.

60. The लोकायतs, or those who hold materialistic doctrines and those who are not capable of understanding anything are prepared to believe in the existence of that only which is perceptible by the senses and therefore hold that the whole conglomeration of things commencing with the कूटस्थ and ending with the material body (स्थूलशरीर) is the आत्मा or the spirit.

61. In support of their thesis these materialists cite quotations from the S'rutis. In the Vedas there occurs the

following saying:—**सवाण पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः** which purports to convey the meaning that the **पुरुष** or **आत्मा** is essentially the same as the **अन्नमयकोश**, one of the five sheaths dwelt upon in Chapter III, or the sheath which results from the nutriment derived from the food we eat. Similarly in the S'rutis Virochana, the son of Pralhâda is made to say in one place as follows:—**आत्मैव देहमयः** which purports to mean that **आत्मा** is essentially the same as the material body.

62. Another school of materialists holds that **आत्मा** is quite separate from the material body, in as much as the material body is destroyed as soon as the **जीवात्मा** makes it exit therefrom.

63. According to this school the different senses as separated from the material body are the **आत्मा**. They arrive at this conclusion from the fact that all acts and movements proceed from the sense of ego which is present to all. The use of such expressions as 'I speak,' 'I go,' 'I hear,' &c., which is common, is cited in support of this view.

64. To such a proposition it may be objected that the several organs of sense cannot be **आत्मा** in as much as they are inanimate. This objection is met by these materialists by saying that in the S'rutis there are passages which purport to be a quarrel or dispute between the several organs of sense. The fact of such a quarrel proves that they are animate and because they are animate they are **आत्मा**.

65. Another school which goes by the name of **हैरग्यगर्भ** maintains that the vital airs or **प्राण** are **आत्मा**. So long as there are vital airs life does not become extinct, even though the several organs of sense such as eyes, &c., cease to perform their functions.

66. Even during the condition of sleep the vital airs are present. The supreme importance of vital airs is dwelt

upon in the Vedas, where also the प्राणमय कोश, *i. e.*, the sheath consisting of the vital airs is expatiated upon at great length.

67. Another school, in whose opinion the mind is all important is not satisfied with this reasoning and maintains that the mind or मनः is the आत्मा. The प्राण or the vital airs are clearly not capable of feeling the sense of enjoyment or suffering, and the fact that the mind is so capable leads them to the conclusion that मनः is आत्मा.

68. There are certain texts which are quoted in support of this theory. One of them is मन एव मनुष्याणां कारणं बन्ध मोक्षयोः which means that the ideas of bondage and freedom are all traceable to the mind. Similarly there is described in the S'rutis the mental sheath or मनोमय कोश in the following words:—

तस्माद्वा एतस्मात्प्राणमयादन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः *i. e.*, different from the sheath of vital airs (प्राणमय कोश) is the mental sheath (मनोमय कोश) which is further inside.

69. Others, *viz.*, the Bauddhas, assert that the intellect or बुद्धि is आत्मा. All the workings of the mind can be clearly traced to the intellect; they do not think therefore that it is correct to hold that mind is आत्मा and therefore go further inside and stop at the विज्ञानमय कोश or the intellectual sheath.

70. It is stated above that the workings of the mind can be traced to the intellect, and this is thus explained. अंतःकरण or the internal organ of sense divides itself into two senses, according to the different functions of which it is capable. These two functions are: (1) अहंत्वृत्ति, *i. e.*, the idea of self or ego, and (2) इहंत्वृत्ति, *i. e.*, the function of realizing the existence of something different from the ego. Now विज्ञान or intellect corresponds with the idea of ego, while मनः represents the second function.

71. Now it is clear that the second function, *viz.*, realization of something different from one self, *i. e.*, the external

world, is the effect of the first function, *i. e.*, the idea of ego. It is the common experience of all that without one knowing himself he cannot know the external world.

72. The common experience is that this idea of ego rises and vanishes at every moment. It follows therefore that विज्ञान which corresponds with the idea of ego is transitory. This विज्ञान is also स्वप्रकाश, *i. e.*, capable of shining by its own light, in as much as it is not a thing to be conceived by the help of something else.

73. In the Vedas it is stated that the विज्ञानमय कोश is आत्मा. The following are the passages in point: तस्माद्वा द्वा एत स्मान्मनोमयादन्योऽत्र आत्मा विज्ञानमयः । विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते ।

All the succession of birth and death, happiness and misery, &c., is attendant on the आत्मा sheathed in this विज्ञानमय कोश.

74. Another school of Bauddhas hold that विज्ञान is not आत्मा, in as much as विज्ञान is transitory like the lightening, a cloud or the twinkling of the eye. They moreover are not able to think of anything else which can be said to be आत्मा and therefore they maintain that nothing or शून्य is आत्मा.

75. They cite the following words in the S'ruti in support of their theory:—असदेवेदमय आसीत् which means that all that now appears was, before the creation of the world, nothing. In their opinion all knowledge and everything that is the subject of knowledge is mere illusion.

76. This theory is untenable in as much as there can be no illusion without a real basis to rest upon. In order that there may be the illusion of a snake on a rope it is necessary that the rope should really be there. Similarly in the case of the illusion of silver on an oyster shell, there would have been no illusion if the shell had not been there. So also in the case of the illusion of the mirage there would be no illu-

sion of water if the rays of the sun had not been there. Now the appearance of this world cannot be denied, but if it is contended that it is an illusion, that illusion must have for its base something real and cannot have been founded on 'nothing' which, these theorists maintain, is their आत्मा. It follows therefore that आत्मा is something really existent and not 'nothing'. Moreover even for the theory of nothing being taken as आत्मा it is necessary to admit the existence of some one who realizes this idea of 'nothing'. For the realization of an idea it is inevitable to admit the existence of आत्मा in the form of intelligence, and this is implied in the mere fact of the idea being expressed.

77. In the opinion of the Vaidikas, *i. e.*, those who believe only in the truth of what is said in the Vedas, the आनन्दमय कोश, which is quite distinct from the विज्ञानमय and which is situated further inside, should be recognized as आत्मा.

78. So much for the different opinions prevailing regarding the character of आत्मा. There is also difference of opinion as to the size or proportions of आत्मा. In the opinion of some आत्मा is अणु or minute; others hold that he is infinite; while some maintain that he is of a middle size. The several disputants maintaining these different theories base their contentions either on texts from S'rutis or on argument.

79. Those that go under the designation of Antarâlas (आन्तरालः) say that आत्मा is अणु or minute because it pervades the minutest arteries or veins of the body, some of which are as minute as the thousandth part of a hair.

80. The S'rutis testify to the minuteness of आत्मा in hundreds and thousands of texts, such as अणोरणीयान् (minuter than the minutest particle or atom) एषोऽणुः (He is minute) सूक्ष्मात्सूक्ष्मतरं (more minute than the minute).

81. Another text of the S'rutis describes the जीव to be as minute as the ten thousandth part of the tip of a hair.

82. Those that go by the name of Digambara (दिगंबराः) maintain that आत्मा is neither minute nor infinite but of a middle size. They arrive at this conclusion from the fact that the spirit pervades all parts of the body from head to foot. They also cite the following text of the S'ruti-आनखाग्रं प्रविष्टः (pervading all parts including the tips of the nails).

83. If may be objected that this theory is inconsistent with the notion which is favoured by the S'rutis that आत्मा pervades even the minutest veins of the body. For if it is of a middle size it is impossible that it should enter such veins—.To this they reply that pervasion through the minutest veins becomes possible by means of the minutest parts or limbs of the middle sized आत्मा in the same manner as the body may be said to be covered by a coat simply by the arms being thrust into the sleeves.

84. It may again be objected that if आत्मा is of a determined middle size it is incapable of pervading bodies that are very small and bodies that are very large. To this they reply that the आत्मा being made up of parts, these parts diminish or augment according as the size of the body is small or large. The theory of आत्मा being middle sized is thus according to them established.

85. But then the admission of the theory that आत्मा is made up of parts will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it is perishable, as for instance an earthen pitcher; and if आत्मा is admitted to be perishable then such an admission lands us into a position in which there follow कृतनाश and अकृताभ्यागम. कृतनाश means the destruction of that which is done. The rule is that every action must have its effect and

its destruction means that its effect should be lost. If आत्मा is perishable then all the merits and sins committed by the जीव in a particular birth vanish without bearing their fruit and this is कृतनाश. Similarly अकृताभ्यागम means accession of something which is not the fruit of anything done before. If आत्मा is perishable then the particular predicament in which the जीव is placed in a particular birth cannot be attributed to actions of a former birth but must be treated as purely accidental. That any reasoning should land one into these two positions is enough to declare its unsoundness.

86. It follows therefore that आत्मा is neither minute nor middle sized but infinite. It is all pervading like ether and incapable of division, and this view has the support of the S'rutis.

87. Having thus established the infinite nature of आत्मा the author proceeds to determine its characteristic of intelligence. On this head also there is difference of opinion. Some say that it is devoid of intelligence; some maintain that it is full of intelligence; while others hold that it partakes of both.

88. The followers of प्रभाकर and the तार्किकs declare that आत्मा is not intelligence. According to them आत्मा is an elementary substance like ether. The property of ether is sound and similarly the property of आत्मा is intelligence. Thus in their opinion आत्मा is like the other elementary substances, *viz.*, पृथ्वी (earth) आप् (water) तेजस् (light) वायु (air), आकाश (ether), काल (time), दिक् (directions) मनस् (mind), and it only differs from others on account of its peculiar property of intelligence.

89. They say that, along with the peculiar property of intelligence आत्मा also possesses other properties such as desire, hatred, action, virtue, vice, happiness and misery. The

impressions derived from these properties are also reckoned by them among the properties of आत्मा.

90. When आत्मा comes in contact with मनस् or the mind by force of the actions performed in a former birth, then these properties exhibit themselves. In the state of sound sleep such contact does not occur and therefore these properties lie dormant.

91. Admitting that आत्मा is not intelligence itself, how is it that it appears to be intelligence possessed of. To such an objection they reply that he is himself not intelligence but his peculiar property of intelligence makes him चेतन. The other qualities of desire, hatred, &c., also contribute to make him चेतन. He is responsible for good and evil actions and also enjoys happiness and suffers miseries.

92. As the happiness and misery that one experiences in this world are traceable to actions of a former birth and it is usual to say that आत्मा lives for experiencing such happiness and misery, so by the force of actions in this life a desire may be produced for another life in another world.

93. The apparent transmigration of आत्मा in spite of his all pervading nature is thus possible. The portion of the Vedas which deals with कर्म or actions and their results bears testimony to the correctness of this view. This is the way in which these theorists argue.

94. According to their view आनन्दमय कोश is itself the आत्मा. This sheath is the innermost of the five and is the only one which remains in the state of sound sleep in which the presence of intelligence is indistinct. Intelligence and several others mentioned above are, according to them, merely the properties of this आत्मा.

95. The followers of Kumarila Bhatta, the author of explanations of Purvamimansa (पूर्वमीमांसा) assert that आत्मा is

characterized by intelligence as well as want of intelligence. They hold that knowledge or intelligence is in certain conditions, *e. g.*, a state of sound sleep, covered over or obscured by ignorance or want of intelligence. In such a condition the presence of knowledge or intelligence is inferred from the fact that after awaking one does possess certain recollections, and this indicates the presence of intelligence or knowledge.

96. A man who awakes from sleep has an idea that during the state of sleep he was without any consciousness, and this idea is not possible unless the man has actually experienced that want of consciousness.

97. That intelligence does not altogether disappear in the state of sound sleep can be supported by a Vedic text which says:—*नहिद्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते-अविनाशित्वात्*, *i. e.*, the sight or intelligence of the seer or *आत्मा* does never vanish, because it is indestructible.

It therefore follows, according to them, that *आत्मा* is both devoid of intelligence or light and full of intelligence or light like the firefly.

98. *आत्मा* being without parts, *i. e.*, being entire or all pervading, cannot be said to be possessed of both these attributes. Therefore the followers of the Sâṅkhya *सांख्य* tenet maintain that *आत्मा* is full of intelligence only.

99. The recollection that one has of unconsciousness or want of intelligence during the state of sound sleep is accounted for by the explanation that that unconsciousness or want of intelligence is an indication of *प्रकृति*, *i. e.*, the material cause of the world, consisting of the three primary qualities of *सत्त्व*, *रजस्* and *तमस्*. This *प्रकृति* is always susceptible of change. The object of the Sâṅkhyas in setting forth this conception of *प्रकृति* is to account for the ideas of

thralldom and liberation which work upon the Purusha who is really all intelligence.

100. Now आत्मा is not susceptible of being inseparably associated with anything material and therefore प्रकृति and पुरुष must always remain totally distinct. Consequently it does not stand to reason that the conception of प्रकृति should have been started for the purpose above indicated. This contention is met by the answer that the ideas of suffering, enjoyment, thralldom or liberation are attributed to the पुरुष on account of his not being distinguished from प्रकृति. It is also on this account that the Sāṅkhyas, like the Tārkikas, hold that individual spirits or जीवs are many.

101. प्रकृति is described in the S'ruti as the cause of this world ulterior to महत्तत्त्व, in these words:— 'महत्तत्त्वमस्य प्रकृतिरिति श्रुतिः'. Similarly पुरुष is described as unsusceptible of association in the words 'असंगो हि.'

102. Having indicated the difference of opinion that exists regarding the character of जीव it is now proposed to do the same regarding ईश्वर. He who directs the operation of प्रकृति during its association with पुरुष is called by the followers of the योग doctrine. The S'rutis say that this ईश्वर is quite distinct from and superior to जीवs.

103. There are texts in the S'rutis which describe the ईश्वर as the ruler of प्रधान, which represents equality of the three qualities of सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् as also of क्षेत्रज्ञs, i.e., the जीवs and also as गुणेश, i. e., the administrator of the three qualities. ईश्वर is also similarly described clearly in the अन्तर्यामिनिब्राह्मण portion of the Brihadāraṇyakopaniṣad.

104. Even as regards ईश्वर there is great dispute between the followers of several schools, who resort to different methods of argument for supporting their own assertions and for confirmation even cite quotations from S'rutis according to their own lights.

105. According to Patanjali ईश्वर is a superior kind of पुरुष who is quite free from क्लेश, कर्म and विपाक and also from the resulting impressions. Of क्लेश there are five sorts known as अविद्या (ignorance) अस्मिता (egotism) राग (liking for a particular object) द्वेष (dislike) and अभिनिवेश (attachment). कर्म is of three sorts, *viz.*, शुक्ल, *i. e.*, pure or meritorious कृष्ण, *i. e.*, dark or sinful and शुक्ल कृष्ण, *i. e.*, a mixture of both. विपाक is of three kinds, *viz.*, जाति, *i. e.*, birth, आयुः *i. e.*, life and भोग, *i. e.*, enjoyment or suffering.

Like the जीव, ईश्वर also is not susceptible of association and is intelligence itself.

106. This ईश्वर is, inspite of these attributes of his, an administrator or a dispenser. This function is justified by the fact of his being styled in the S'rutis a superior kind of पुरुष. If this function were not admitted there would follow a confusion in the dispensation of the results of actions *viz.*, बन्ध and मोक्ष, *i. e.*, bondage and absolution.

107. This administrative function of ईश्वर, who is incapable of contracting any attachment, is accepted by the S'rutis, as is evident from texts like the following:—

भीषास्माद्वातः पवते भीषोदेति सूर्यः

भीषास्मादग्निश्चेन्द्रश्च मृत्युर्धावतिपचमः

which means that it is through fear of him (ईश्वर) that the wind blows and the sun rises; fire and God Indra also are afraid of him and so is death afraid of him. Moreover such an acceptance does not involve any impropriety on account of the main distinction between जीव and ईश्वर which is the freedom of the latter from क्लेश, कर्म and विपाक.

108. It may be argued that जीव also is असंग, *i. e.*, not susceptible of contracting an attachment, and therefore it should also be free from क्लेश, कर्म and विपाक; there can thus be no distinction between जीव and ईश्वर. To such an argu-

ment the reply is that though जीव in itself is as free as ईश्वर, still, coming in contact with बुद्धि, the जीव, is incapable of discriminating its true nature and thus contacts susceptibility to क्लेश, &c., as has been explained in stanza (100) above.

109. The Tárkikas attribute three properties to ईश्वर, viz., ever present knowledge, ever continuous action and ever present desire. According to them ईश्वर is not असंग *i. e.*, unsusceptible of association, in as much as if, he were असंग, it would be improper to attribute to him the power of governing or administering the world.

110. According to them the peculiarity or distinctive feature of ईश्वर, as contrasted with जीव, consists in the ever present nature of the properties attributed to him. In the S'rutis ईश्वर is described with such epithets as सत्यकम, सत्यसंकल्प, &c., *i. e.*, one whose desire is never frustrated.

111. In the above reasoning of the Tárkikas there is one defect which cannot be cured. Holding as they do that ईश्वर possesses ज्ञान and other attributes in an ever present condition it would follow that creation would go on for ever. To avoid this defect another school of thinkers holds that हिरण्यगर्भ, as representing the aggregate of the लिंग शरीर of the whole creation, is ईश्वर.

112. The importance of हिरण्यगर्भ is described at great length in the portion of the S'rutis known as उद्गीथ ब्राह्मण. It may be argued that the fact of ईश्वर, according to this view, being represented by लिंगदेह will make him come under the category of जीव. But it will not be so, because he will be free from कर्म, &c., which are the distinctive characteristics of जीव and which result from ignorance.

113. Another school of thinkers raise an objection to the above theory by saying that लिंगदेह is nowhere seen to exist without the स्थूलदेह, and they hold that the whole material creation is ईश्वर. Thus in their opinion ईश्वर is the embodiment

of all the visible creation, having heads and other limbs on all sides.

114. Persons holding that the visible creation represents ईश्वर quote in support of their theory texts from Sruti like the following, 'सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः' (पुरुष or ईश्वर has thousand heads, &c.) 'विश्वतश्चक्षुः' (Having eyes in all directions).

115. Another school goes still further. They object to the above thesis on the ground that if the mere fact of having hands and feet on all sides would constitute the whole connotation of ईश्वर, then species of vermin or reptiles possessing that qualification would enter into the category of ईश्वर. They therefore hold that God Brahma only, who possesses four faces is ईश्वर and none else.

116. This last view is advanced by persons who approach God Brahma for securing progeny. The S'rutis contain the text 'प्रजापतिः प्रजाअसृजत' (Prajapati or God Brahma created the whole creation) and this is cited by them.

117. The Bhāgavats or the worshippers of विष्णु say that ब्रह्मा cannot be the supreme ईश्वर because he was born from the lotus that sprang from the navel of विष्णु and has therefore received the appellation of 'lotus born' and hence they arrive at the conclusion that विष्णु is ईश्वर.

118. The S'aivas or worshippers of S'iva who put their faith in certain texts of their sect hold that S'iva is ईश्वर and not Vishnu, because the latter was not capable of ascertaining the position of the feet of the former.

119. Those who delight in following the tenets of the worshippers of गणपति say that he is ईश्वर because he is superior to S'iva in as much as the latter was obliged to worship the former before he could destroy the three cities of gold, silver and iron created by the demon Maya.

120. Similarly worshippers of other deities, possessed with pride of their own tenets, maintain that their respec-

tive deities are ईश्वर. In doing so they depend upon the मंत्रs, *i. e.*, incantations which are supposed to be powerful for good and evil; upon अर्थवाद, *i. e.*, texts extolling the merits and capabilities of their deities; and upon कल्प, *i. e.*, treatises which explain the uses of incantations, &c.

121. There are thus numerous thinkers of different types, commencing with those who attribute to ईश्वर the property of all-pervasion and ending with those who deify inanimate objects. To the latter class belong those who make the अश्वत्थ (holy fig tree) अर्क (sun plant) वंश (bamboo) and other trees their deities.

122. Such being the divergent views regarding ईश्वर, the question naturally arises which is the most acceptable of them all. The reply is that to those who are actuated with the desire to have a correct notion on the subject and who are prepared to form their conclusions with the help of reasoning and the texts contained in the S'āstras, only one conclusion is possible, and that will now be clearly explained.

123. The text from the S'rutis that is relied on for the purpose of arriving at such a conclusion is as follows:—मायां तु प्रकृति—विद्यात् मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्—which means that माया should be recognised as प्रकृति or the material cause of the universe and ईश्वर should be known as the instrumental cause thereof, working with and supporting the material consisting of माया. The whole creation, animate and inanimate, represents parts of this ईश्वर.

124. Any correct conclusion regarding ईश्वर ought to follow the above text, and then it is not likely to clash with any of the views previously set forth.

125. What then is the characteristic of माया? The reply is that माया is ignorance itself, and so it is defined in the

Upanishad known by the name of नृसिंह तायनीय. Again it may be asked what ground is there for such an assertion. The reply is that according to the S'ruti, अनुभव or actual experience is the foundation for such an assertion. This experience of ignorance is present to all.

126. There is a text in the S'ruti which runs as follows : 'जडमोहात्मकं तच्च,' which means that the characteristics of माया are जडत्व and मोह. As it appeals to the experience of all, young and old, it is also characterized by the S'rutis as अनंत, i. e., infinite.

127. The characteristic of जडत्व is seen in objects that are devoid of intelligence, such as earthen jars, &c. The popular definition of मोह is that condition in which बुद्धि or intellect becomes incapable of working.

128. Viewing from the standpoint of popular conception, the above characteristics are experienced by all. But if this is so the question may be raised that माया is not likely to be removed or displaced by knowledge of reality, just as the fact of an earthen jar being seen cannot be upset by the knowledge that it is unreal. The reply to such a question is that the above is only a popular conception. The conception that is formed by a comprehensive review of the several authorities is that the nature of माया cannot be indicated. This receives support from the text of the S'ruti which runs as follows 'ना सदासीत् नो सदासीत्' meaning that it was neither unreal nor real.

129. It cannot be called unreal because its presence is felt; at the same time it cannot be called real because the S'ruti denies the existence of anything else than the spirit. The S'rutis have indicated that माया is deserving of no consideration in as much as it as a rule vanishes when knowledge or विद्या comes on the scene.

130. Thus the conception of **माया** differs according to the standpoint from which it is looked at. It may thus be said to be of three kinds. (1) From the standpoint of the S'rutis and in the light of knowledge it is worthless because unreal; (2) By inference drawn from several texts it is indescribable; (3) according to popular conception it is real.

131. Just as, with reference to a picture drawn on canvass, the figures thereon appear to exist or not exist according as the canvass is unrolled or folded up; so **माया** serves to show the world as existent or non-existent according as that **माया** has full play or disappears.

132. Similarly **माया** may be said to be both **अस्वतंत्र**, *i. e.*, not capable of acting without the help of something else, or **स्वतंत्र**, *i. e.*, capable of so acting. It is **अस्वतंत्र** in as much as its presence cannot be felt or experienced without the substratum of this spirit. It is **स्वतंत्र** in as much as it has the power of producing a delusion, by which the supreme spirit, who is not susceptible of any attributes, is represented as possessing them.

133. It is by the force of this **माया** that the whole creation appears in the place of the supreme spirit who is not liable to change and not susceptible of attributes; and by the same force **जीव** and **ईश** are created, representing the reflection of the supreme intelligence through the medium of बुद्धि or intellect.

134. The most wonderful thing is that **माया** creates this world, &c., without affecting the कूटस्थ or the supreme spirit, who is not liable to change and therefore cannot be said to have undergone change. This may appear strange, but there is nothing strange in the case of **माया**, whose chief function is to bring about events which do not ordinarily occur.

135. Just as water, fire and stone have respectively the peculiar properties of being liquid, being hot and being hard ; so the capability of bringing about impossibilities is peculiar to माया and is not derived from anything else.

136. This माया is a sort of jugglery ; seeing the results of that art one is apt to be astonished or wonderstruck, but this condition only lasts so long as the juggler is not seen. As soon as he is known the results are known to be unreal and the wonder ceases. Similarly as long as one does not know ईश्वर, so long is he struck with wonder at the workings of माया, but afterwards this feeling vanishes, because he comes to the determination that what inspired wonder was unreal.

137. But all such questions or doubts regarding the creation are very proper in the case of those who, like the Naiyāyikas, (नैयायिक) hold that the world is real. But with respect to those who wage the medium of माया, such questions or doubts are not proper, because the reality of माया itself is questioned or made the subject of doubt by the Vedantin.

138. If it is argued that it is unobjectionable to meet a doubt by raising another, then the Vedantin also can raise a further doubt and there will be no end of them. The reasonable course is to suggest a solution of a doubt and not to raise a counter-doubt.

139. The workings of माया are simply astonishing, and they are themselves the subject of doubt. It therefore behoves intelligent persons to seek with perseverance for their solution.

140. It may be urged that the question of solution arises after a doubt is ascertained, and that the nature of माया itself has yet remained to be determined. If so let the nature of माया be determined. For this purpose it will suffice to know the nature of the delusion caused by jugglery with which all people are acquainted.

141. With respect to all feats of jugglery the common understanding is that they are **माया** or delusion, which is defined as that which cannot be accounted for but which is distinctly seen or felt.

142. This definition applies in the case of the creation, which is distinctly seen or felt but cannot be accounted for. Judging impartially, therefore, one is forced to the conclusion that the **जगत्** or world is a delusion.

143. All the arguments ever advanced by learned men to account for the creation evince a certain amount of ignorance in respect to some things, and therefore their conclusions cannot be accepted as correct.

144. Some of the questions to which these opponents are unable to furnish a reply are as follows:—How is it possible for mere semen to produce the material body with all its organs, &c? How does life spring up there?

145. If it is retorted that such is the peculiar property of semen, then the question will naturally follow ‘How should you have ascertained this property?’ The usual modes of ascertaining properties of things are those called **अन्वय** and **व्यतिरेक**; and the reply that it is the property of semen to produce the results indicated in the foregoing stanza, does not stand this test, in as much as that assertion does not hold good in the case of semen communicated to a woman with a sterile womb.

146. Pursued by such questions one must in the end confess his ignorance. It is therefore that the great style this world a magical feat.

147. What can be more magical than that semen, entering the uterus, should develop the several limbs such as hands, feet, head, &c., should acquire vitality, and gradually pass through the different stages of life like childhood, youth,

and old age, and be capable of seeing, eating, hearing, smelling, going and coming.

148. What is seen in the animal kingdom is also observed in the vegetable kingdom. That a huge tree should spring from a microscopic seed is equally magical. One should therefore satisfy himself by concluding that all this is the working of **माया**.

149. Those who, like the **Tárkikas**, are proud of their capability to explain the phenomena in this creation should be referred to the refutation of their arguments made by **Harshamishra** and others.

150. The commonly accepted notion is that things which are inconceivable should not be subjected to the test of argument. This creation is such that its composition is beyond the reach of the intellect.

151. One should conclude that the cause which has such creation as its effect is **माया**. The presence of this **माया** is experienced during the condition of sound sleep, during which no other experience is gained.

152. Just as a tree may be said to be in the seed, so the experiences received during the conditions of wakefulness and dream have their root in this condition of sound sleep. It follows therefore that all impressions which are the cause of the whole creation are centred in this **माया**.

153. In all such impressions received through the intellect the supreme intelligence forming the substratum of everything is reflected. This reflection is what is called **चिदाभास** and represent **ईश्वर**. This reflection, like the **मेघाकाश** referred to in Stanza (21) *ante*, is not distinctly discernible and its existence may therefore be inferred.

154. This reflection is more clearly perceivable when **माया**, which is the cause of all creation, becomes transformed into **बुद्धि** along with the reflection which now represent **जीव**.

All impressions or वासना being of the same nature as intellect the inference that these वासना should present a reflection of the supreme intelligence representing ईश्वर is natural. Just as water in a pitcher presents a reflection of the sky and this leads to the inference that water contained in a cloud must also present a similar reflection, so बुद्धि having presented a clear reflection of the spirit, a similar reflection in the वासना is also inferred.

155. It is stated in the S'rutis that माया creates जीव and ईश by means of such reflection and they correspond to the जलाकाश and मेघाकाश explained before. Just as in the case of जलाकाश the reflection of the sky is clear so, in the case of जीव, चित्, is clearly reflected in बुद्धि. Similarly in the case of मेघाकाश the reflection is not clear but has to be inferred from the capability of water to receive a reflection, and so in the case of ईश the reflection of चित् in the वासना is only a matter of inference, in as much as वासना are of the same nature as बुद्धि.

156. In the illustration of मेघाकाश, मेघ corresponds to माया, the drops of water in the मेघ or cloud correspond to the वासना or impressions derived from the intellect; and the reflection of the sky in the drops of water in the clouds corresponds to the reflection of चित् or चिदाभास.

157. There are texts in the S'rutis which purport to show that the चिदाभास, or reflection of supreme intelligence, to which माया is subservient, is the ईश्वर, who is also described as मायी (controlling the माया) अन्तर्ग्रामी (pervading everything) सर्वज्ञ (all-knowing) and जगद्योनि (source of the universe).

158. Speaking of the आनंदमय sheath, which is connected with the condition of sound sleep, the S'ruti says that that is ईश्वर. The ईश्वर recognized by the Vedas is thus the आनंदमय sheath. (It has been stated above that ईश्वर is the reflection

of चित् in the वासना, and as the आनंदमय sheath is nothing else than such a reflection it is called ईश्वर.)

159. It may be objected that this position is not tenable because the properties of omniscience, &c., are not possessed by the आनंदमय sheath. But such an objection should not be raised—firstly because the meaning conveyed by the texts contained in the S'ruti does not deserve to be disputed and secondly because everything is possible for माया.

160. In confirmation of the above text from the S'rutis it is now proposed to show that the आनंदमय sheath possesses the properties attributed to ईश्वर. This आनंदमय sheath creates all the things that are seen during the conditions of wakefulness and dreaming, and as no one is capable of undoing this creation, it deserves the appellation of सर्वेश्वर.

161. In the आनंदमय sheath rest all the वासना which originate the intellectual operations of all animate beings. The whole creation is thus subservient to these वासना and hence the appellation of सर्वज्ञ.

162. It may be asked that if this property of सर्वज्ञत्व is possessed by the आनंदमय sheath why its existence is not felt. The reason is that वासना not being the object of direct perception this property is also of like nature. Knowledge is however a function of all intellects, i. e., बुद्धि and as these latter are the effects of वासना, omniscience may be inferred in the case of वासना.

163. The property of अन्तर्यामित्व is proved from the fact that this आनंदमय कोश is situated inside all the rest and controls their working. It also pervades the inanimate creation and regulates it.

164. In the बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् there is a section called अन्तर्यामी ब्राह्मण. The whole of this serves to support the assertion that ईश्वर as represented by the आनंदमय कोश possesses

the property of अन्तर्यामित्र. One text therefrom purports to say that this ईश्वर resides inside बुद्धि or intellect; that it is not in a position to be observed by बुद्धि, which constitutes its physical body; and that at the same time it controls its working.

165. As threads which constitute the material cause of a piece of cloth co-exist with it; so this ईश्वर being the material cause of the creation is present everywhere.

166. It may be asked that if this ईश्वर is present everywhere why is his presence not felt accordingly. The reply is that he is situated innermost of all and therefore his presence is not felt at all the stages. Thus the twisted threads make up a piece of cloth and therefore may be said to be inside of it. The untwisted minute threads may be said to be inside the twisted ones. These stages must end somewhere and there ईश्वर may be inferred to exist.

167. It is only the first few stages in this process that can be seen, and ईश्वर being situated innermost is invisible and his existence must be determined by the help of reasoning and the texts of the S'ruti.

168. Just as when threads are made into a piece of cloth that cloth is said to be an embodiment of those threads, so the whole creation being a manifestation of ईश्वर may be said to be an embodiment of him.

169 & 170. Just as the piece of cloth must manifest the condition of contraction, expansion or movement experienced by the threads of which it is made and cannot be independent of them in the least degree; so the whole creation doubtless receives its impress from the changes exhibited by the ईश्वर according to the वासना which actuate him.

171. In the Bhagvat Gita (Chapter XVIII, verse 51) it is stated that ईश्वर resides in the heart of all created beings, making them pass mechanically through several stages and lives by means of his माया.

172. The author now proceeds to explain the particular significance of the principal words in this text.

By the word सर्वभूत are meant the विज्ञानमय कोश located in the hearts of the created beings. The material cause of all these विज्ञानमय कोश being ईश्वर, any change or affection in him is seen through all the beings.

173. The word यन्त्र in the text from Bhagvat Gita indicates the several material bodies with their component parts. The process of identification of self with them is indicated by the word आरुढ. The word भ्रामयन् means 'causing revolutions,' the revolutions being the result of the tendency of beings to actions of all sorts proper and improper.

174. It now remains to explain what is meant by 'causing revolutions by means of माया.' All actions are traceable to the विज्ञानमय कोश of which ईश्वर is the material cause, and therefore all the changes wrought by ईश्वर by his inherent force may be said to be the revolutions caused by means of माया.

175. This is also the meaning intended to be conveyed by the words 'अन्तर्यमयति' contained in the S'ruti quoted above in Stanza (164). This reasoning should also be applied in the case of earth, &c., i.e., all inanimate creation.

176. In illustration of the position that all actions proceed from ईश्वर another text is quoted which runs as follows:—
"I understand what is right conduct but are not inclined to follow it. Similarly I understand what is wrong but do not desist. I follow the directions of some indescribable one who resides in my heart and regulates my actions".

177. The position taken in the text quoted above is calculated to lead one to suspect that, if all actions proceed from ईश्वर, there is no scope left for human exertion. But such is not the case, in as much as ईश्वर also takes the form of human exertion.

178. This view need not conflict with the assertion previously made that ईश्वर furnishless the impulse for all actions. Accepting that function in the case of ईश्वर one is led to the knowledge that one's own-self is not susceptible of association, all exertions being the working of ईश्वर.

179. That such a knowledge leads to absolution is testified to by S'ruti and Smriti. As to the weight to be attached to the sayings in the S'ruti and Smriti it is sufficient to say that ईश्वर has himself said that they are his commandments.

180. The text of the S'ruti commencing with the words 'भीषास्माद्वातःपवते, &c., indicates [that the commandments of ईश्वर are calculated to inspire fear. This tends to prove the supreme domination of ईश्वर as distinguished from the function of regulating the actions of all beings.

181. There are two texts in the S'ruti which respectively indicate the external and internal control exercised by ईश्वर over the creation. The first is 'एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने', &c., which means that the sun and moon obey the commands of this imperishable one, i. e., ईश्वर. The second is 'अन्तःप्रविष्टः शास्ता संजनानाम्' which means that he (ईश्वर) entering inside all beings controls their actions.

182. 'This ईश्वर is the origin from which the world springs forth' is a text from S'ruti which may aptly be quoted after what has preceded. This function of ईश्वर can also be inferred from a text from the Smriti which purports to say that the creation and destruction of the world proceed from ईश्वर. The words 'creation' and 'destruction' in this text are taken to mean respectively 'manifestation' and 'disappearance'.

183. This process of manifestation will be clear by reference to the illustration of a painting on the canvas. So long as the canvas is folded the several figures 'thereon are not visible but when it is spread out they are expos-

ed to the view. Similarly all the impressions of past deeds of beings remain stored up with ईश्वर at the time of प्रलय (a cyclical period of destruction of the world) and in order to allow those deeds to bear fruit ईश्वर again creates the world, *i. e.*, manifests that which had remained concealed with him.

184. Similarly when the purpose for which the manifestation takes place is ended, *i. e.*, when the past deeds of beings have borne their fruit, ईश्वर absorbs the whole world or makes it disappear within himself or in other words destroys it, in the same way as the canvas, when folded, does not display the figures thereon.

185. These processes of creation and destruction may be compared respectively with day and night, condition of wakefulness and condition of sound sleep, opening and shutting of eyes, the state in which the mind is not disturbed by any ideas or thoughts and the state in which one is building castles in the air.

186. It has been said above that ईश्वर is the material cause of the world (उपादान कारण). Now उपादान कारण is of three sorts (1) आरंभ, (2) परिणाम and (3) विवर्त. Taking the instance of a piece of cloth, the उपादान कारण is threads, and as the effect shows an alteration in form from the cause, this comes under the category of आरंभ. ईश्वर cannot come under this class because he has no second and therefore there is nothing different from him. Taking the instance of curd resulting from milk, the condition of effect shows a difference from the condition of the cause. Milk is liquid and sweet but the curd is solid and acid. In this case the cause comes under the category of परिणाम. ईश्वर cannot come under this class because he is not made up of parts and therefore is not susceptible of change in condition. He therefore comes under the last category, the distinguishing charac-

teristic of which is absence of any real change in the cause but mere appearance of it on account of delusion. For instance, a piece of oyster shell is mistaken for silver, or a piece of rope is mistaken for a snake. In both these cases there is no real change in the material, but the observer, through misconception produced by a variety of causes, perceives otherwise. The Naiyayikas (नैयायिक) are the advocates of आरंभवाद. The Sankhyas (सांख्य) and some sects of उपासक are advocates of परिणामवाद. The Vedantins (वेदांती) uphold the विवर्तवाद.

Because ईश्वर possesses the powers of manifestation and absorption it cannot for the reasons above set forth, be argued that there is room for आरंभवाद and परिणामवाद.

187. It may be asked how it is possible for ईश्वर to be the material cause of both the animate and inanimate creation. The reply is that ईश्वर himself being made up of माया (which is जड) and चिदाभास (which is a reflection of supreme intelligence,) his former constituents enter into the composition of the inanimate creation, and the latter into that of the animate creation.

188 & 189. It may again be objected that Sureshwarāchārya the author of the Vartikas has said that the supreme spirit (परमात्मा) and not ईश्वर, is the cause of the inanimate (or material) and animate (or intelligent) creation: of the former through the medium of माया, the chief characteristic of which is complete absence of intelligence, with the help of भावना (impressions created by actions) ज्ञान (contemplation of deities, &c.) and कर्म (meritorious and sinful actions): and of the latter, by reason of his intelligence.

190. To such an objection the reply is that the quotation from Sureshwarāchārya refers to that stage of argument at which the mistaken identification of ईश्वर with ब्रह्म, similar to the identification of जीव with कूटस्थ, is established.

191. The grounds for the view put forth in the previous stanza are as follows:—

The S'ruti says that ether, air, fire, water, earth, plants, food substances and material bodies arose out of ब्रह्म, the distinguishing characteristics of which are that it is real, it is knowledge itself and it is infinite.

192. From this at first sight it looks as if ब्रह्म or the supreme spirit is the real cause of this world, and that ईश्वर, who is the real cause, but who has no real existence, being merely a reflection of the supreme spirit, really exists. In other words, the property of reality which belongs to the supreme spirit is transferred to ईश्वर, while the function of creation which belongs to ईश्वर is transferred to the supreme spirit (ब्रह्म). This result is not possible except on the supposition that a mistaken identification of the two (अन्योन्याभ्यास) has taken place as in the illustration of शुक्ति and रजत, and रज्जु and सर्प. And the manner in which Sureshvaracharya has interpreted the text quoted in the previous stanza leaves no doubt that he has proceeded on the assumption of this अन्योन्याभ्यास.

193. This identification, which is caused by illusion or mistaken impression, corresponds to that in the case of canvas in its pure state which is identified with that presented to the eye after being starched and panited over.

194. As dull persons are not able to distinguish between मेघाकाश and महाकाश, so those who judge of things as they are presented to them at first sight consider ब्रह्म and ईश्वर to be identical.

195. In order to arrive at the correct drift of Vedic texts it is necessary to give due consideration to उपक्रम, उपसंहार, अभ्यास, अपूर्वता, फल, अर्थवाद, and उपपत्ति. उपक्रम means the commencement, and उपसंहार the conclusion. It is usual to indicate the subject, proposed to be treated at the commence-

ment of an Upanishad or portion of S'ruti and also to state at the conclusion what has been treated : all matters coming at the intermediate stages do not in themselves form the main subject but only find place by way of illustration or argument to elucidate the main subject. It is thus clear that in order to know correctly the intention of a particular text it is necessary to look to the commencement and conclusion.

अभ्यास means reiteration. It is usual to repeat the conclusions which it is proposed to establish in order to inculcate them on the minds of readers.

अपूर्वता means peculiarity or novelty. The characteristics of the supreme spirit are peculiarly its own and do not admit of illustration by reference to other things, and in order to indicate this it is necessary to dwell on this peculiarity.

फल means the result expected to be achieved by the processes indicated.

अर्थवाद means illustrative remarks mentioning the good likely to result by observance of processes indicated and the evil likely to result from omission. It is necessary to discriminate between what is said merely for the sake of emphasizing the advantages of following a particular precept from what the precept itself inculcates.

उपपत्ति means apt illustration also adequate argument.

Now, judged by the light of all these, the sense intended to be conveyed by the S'rutis is that ब्रह्म or the supreme spirit is not susceptible of any attachment or association and that ईश्वर, who constitutes the reflection of the supreme spirit in माया and who also rules the माया, creates the world.

196. In treating of ब्रह्म the S'rutis commence with saying that it is real, that it is knowledge itself and that it is infinite, and end with describing it as that of which all speech stops short, *i. e.*, beyond the power of description. This

leads to the conclusion that ब्रह्म is not susceptible of attachment or association.

197. The S'ruti which indicates the function of ईश्वर as a creator runs as follows :—

अस्मान्मायो सृजते विश्वमेतत् ।

तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया सन्निरुद्धः ॥

The meaning of which is that ईश्वर controlling माया creates this world, while जीव is overpowered by माया.

198. Having thus established that ईश्वर in the form of आनन्दमय कोश is the cause of the creation, it is now proposed to state how the work of creation proceeded.

This ईश्वर bethought him of becoming manifold, and thus became transformed into हिरण्यगर्भ, in the same way as sound sleep turns into a state of dreaming.

199. The S'ruti contains texts some of which describe creation of the world in a certain order, as for instance, ether first, then air, then fire, then water and then earth, &c.; while some describe the simultaneous creation of all. Both these views are therefore acceptable and both are capable of illustration from actual experience, as by the example of the state of dreaming.

200. The constitution of हिरण्यगर्भ is as follows: He pervades the whole creation in the same way as threads run through a whole piece of cloth. He is known as सूक्ष्मदेह, *i. e.*, & having a subtle body, and represents collectively the sum of the individual subtle bodies which go to make up the जीव creation, on account of his identifying himself with all of them. He is moreover endowed with the forces of इच्छा (desire) क्रिया (action) and ज्ञान (knowledge).

201. While in this condition of हिरण्यगर्भ the whole creation appears indistinct, just as it looks when seen in the morning or evening twilight, being absorbed in light darkness.

202. To take the illustration of a piece of canvas, which has been cited in stanza 2 at the commencement of this chapter: the canvas after it is rubbed over with starch is marked all over with black lines. Similarly the body of ईश्वर in his capacity of controller of माया is marked by the लिंगशरीर of the whole creation, the लिंगशरीर being made up of the elements previous to the process of पंचीकरण.

203. To take a third illustration, the world in the हिरण्यगर्भ condition is like a tender offshoot of corn that has germinated or like a tender plant that is sprouting.

204. The next step from this indistinct हिरण्यगर्भ condition is the विराट् condition, in which the whole creation is distinctly and clearly visible. Turning to the illustrations cited in the foregoing three stanzas this transition from the condition of हिरण्यगर्भ to that of विराट् corresponds (1) to the world passing from indistinct twilight into the full light of the sun, (2) to the piece of canvas having the indistinct black lines over it filled with appropriate colours; and (3) to the plant bearing fruit.

205. This विराट् condition of ईश्वर is described in the chapter on विश्वरूप in part II of the Yajurveda, as also in the पौरुषसूक्त, which forms part of the Upanishad named चित्ति of the तैत्तिरीयाशाखा of the Yajurveda. The whole creation, commencing with god Brahma and ending with the meanest blade of grass, is known to represent the several parts of the body of ईश्वर in the विराट् condition.

206-208. Thus all, including ईश्वर in the condition of अन्तर्यामी, ईश्वर in the condition of हिरण्यगर्भ, ईश्वर in the condition of विराट्, gods Brahma, Vishnu, Rudra, Indra, Agni, Ganesh, Bhairava and Mairāla, goddess Mārīka, the demigods and demons, all human beings—Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras, all lower animals—cows, oxen, horses, deer, birds, &c., all trees like the several kinds of figtree, mango, &c., and plants like those of barley, rice and ordinary grass, water,

stones, earth, wood, cutting and digging instruments—all these are themselves ईश्वर and, if worshipped, will render adequate return.

209. The return will always correspond to the kind of worship offered. The degree and kind of return depend upon the form in which ईश्वर is worshipped and the nature of worship offered.

210. But absolution or मुक्ति will only result from a knowledge of the real spirit ब्रह्म, in the same way as the condition of dreaming will not end until one attains to the condition of wakefulness.

211. The comparison made with the condition of dreaming in the foregoing stanza is quite appropriate in as much as the whole creation, animate and inanimate, representing ईश्वर and जीव in their several transformations, when viewed with reference to the ब्रह्म which is alone by itself, is as unreal as what is seen in a dream.

212. It may be asked how ईश्वर and जीव, which are essentially identical with ब्रह्म, can be said to come within the term 'creation'. The reply is that both the आनन्दमय and विज्ञानमय-कोश, which respectively represent ईश्वर and जीव, are the creations of माया and they in their turn create the rest of the world.

213. For which portion of the creation, is ईश्वर responsible and for which is जीव responsible? The reply is that the creation of ईश्वर is described in the Sruti commencing with the text 'सईक्षत लोकावुसृजा' and ending with the text 'एतया द्वाराप्रापयत.' The first text relates to the desire to create the world and the second relates to his penetration into it. The creation of जीव is described in the Sruti commencing with the text 'तस्य त्रय आवसथाः' and ending with the text 'स एतमेव पुरुषं ब्रह्म ततमपश्यत्' In other words the creation of जीव consists of several operations and transactions occurring between the condition of wakefulness and the final absolution.

214. It being thus clear that ब्रह्म is the only real thing and that ईश and जीव are unreal, the question naturally arises why should disputants keep quarrelling regarding their nature. The reply is that they have no conception of ब्रह्म which is alone by itself and is incapable of attachment or association with any kind of attributes and therefore in vain indulge in quarrel relating to जीव and ईश who are the creations of माया.

215. It may be contended that such disputants deserve to be cured of their ignorance and directed towards the correct path, but in our opinion that would be trouble wasted. Our attitude is always that of approval in regard to such as have arrived at the truth and that of pity for those who have not reached that point. But we decline to enter into controversy with persons, who have wandered away from the right path, some of whom though endowed with learning, have no faith in the Sastras, some have neither learning nor faith, while some though devoid of learning are endowed with faith but yield to the cravings of their inclinations and do not follow the course prescribed by the Sástras.

216. Commencing with those who worship grass, bricks, &c., and ending with the followers of योग—all are alike in error regarding the real nature of ईश्वर; while others, commencing with लोकायत (materialists) and ending with सांख्य, are in error regarding the real nature of जीव.

217. The reason why we say that they are in error is that they do not know the real ब्रह्म which has no second. Whence then can they have absolution or even happiness?

218. Among such deluded people there may be grades of qualification and those higher in the scale are likely to experience, happiness on account of their comparative position. This may be so, but it has no concern with those that have arrived at the truth, in the same way as one who has

awakened from a dream is not affected by the position of either a king or a beggar in which he found himself while in the condition of dreaming.

219. For these reasons those who desire absolution should not direct their intellectual efforts towards arriving at a settlement of disputes concerning the nature of जीव and ईश. They should devote their thoughts to consideration of the supreme spirit ब्रह्म and should acquire a correct knowledge thereof.

220. If discussion regarding the nature of जीव and ईश are thought deserving of consideration for the reason that such consideration is necessary in order to arrive at a correct knowledge of ब्रह्म, then by all means have resort to it only as means to an end, but do not get helplessly overpowered by it.

221. The Sāṅkhyas hold that जीव is असंग, *i. e.*, unsusceptible of association or attachment, चित् *i. e.*, intelligence itself and विष्णु, *i. e.*, all pervading. The Yogis attribute the same qualities to ईश्वर. It might perhaps be argued that these positions accord with our (Vedantins') view, the words तत् and त्वम् in the sentence तत्त्वमसि and inference in as much as they correspond with what is purposed to be ultimately indicated by may be drawn that we have no difference with them.

222. But this would not be correct. The main point of difference is that those schools maintain that there is real distinction between जीव and ईश while we maintain their identity. According to those schools the words तत् and त्वम् convey different senses. This position does not accord with our conclusions. The use we made of them was for establishing the identity of the apparently different things indicated by them.

223. Our object in examining the functions of जीव and ईश is to dispel the misconception of those who being overpowered by ignorance consider that जीव and ईश differ from each other.

224. The appropriateness of the illustration of घटाकाश, महाकाश, जलाकाश and अन्नाकाश cited before is thus made quite evident.

225. In that illustration जलाकाश and अन्नाकाश entirely owe their existence respectively to the presence of जल, *i. e.*, water and अन्न, *i. e.* clouds, while घटाकाश and महाकाश, (but for which जलाकाश and अन्नाकाश would not have existed,) are quite free from such dependence.

226. Applying the conclusions arrived at with reference to the illustration, to the main subject, it will be seen that ईश as represented by the आनन्दमयकोश and जीव as represented by the विज्ञानमयकोश owe their existence entirely to माया and बुद्धि respectively, while ब्रह्म and कूटस्थ (but for whom the आनन्दमयकोश and विज्ञानमयकोश would not exist) are free from such dependence.

227. The fact that we have cited the opinions of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools in arriving at our conclusions regarding the functions of ईश and जीव may be considered by some as proof of our acquiescence in the tenets of those schools. If so they might as well infer that we identify देह (material body) with आत्मा (supreme spirit) from the fact that while dealing with अन्नमयकोश we had occasion to speak of देह.

228. What then are the points of difference between Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Vedānta? The Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools both hold that the several जीव are quite distinct from each other, and that the world has a real existence. The Yogis hold further that ईश्वर is quite distinct from जीव and जगत्. If both these schools are prepared to take leave of

these tenets, there will be complete agreement between them and the Vedantins.

229. It might be argued that if by the mere knowledge that जीव is असंग, *i. e.*, not susceptible of association or attachment, absolution is secured, then there is no necessity of striving after the knowledge of अद्वैत, *i. e.*, non-duality. But such a conclusion would not be correct in as much as such freedom from attachment is not possible without the knowledge of अद्वैत.

If जीव by merely knowing that he is असंग, *i. e.*, unsusceptible of association, is satisfied that the goal has been attained, then it may as well rest satisfied by taking it for granted that all the objects of enjoyment such as garlands, sandalwood ointment, &c., are not liable to vanish.

230. That is as much as to say that the objects of enjoyment can in no way be considered eternal and similarly it is not possible for जीव to be unsusceptible in the face of the existence of जगत् and ईश with which it is intimately connected.

231. That impossibility is further explained as follows: Even when the unsusceptible nature of जीव is known the force of माया will bring about associations similar to those existing before such knowledge has been attained. Moreover जीव is controlled by ईश्वर. Being thus under the influence of both माया and ईश्वर how is it possible for जीव to achieve absolution?

232. It may be argued that attachment or association and control referred to above are the result of अविवेक, *i. e.*, want of discrimination, that this अविवेक is liable to be removed by correct knowledge or discrimination and therefore by acquiring this knowledge the unsusceptibility of जीव remains unaffected and the achievement of absolution becomes possible. But such an argument will perforce

land the Sankhyas into an acceptance of the theory of **माया** which is advanced by the Vedantins.

233. It may be argued that the Sankhyas and Yogis maintain that the several **जीव** are distinct from each other and not one, in order to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the actual difference in the condition of the several **जीव**, some being in a state of bondage while some attain to absolution, and that such explanation is not possible if the **अद्वैत** theory, or theory of non-duality, of the Vedantins is accepted. To such an argument it may be replied that **माया** is capable of doing that, and therefore it is not necessary to maintain the distinctness of the several **जीव**.

234. The chief characteristic of **माया** is that it brings about impossibilities; **माया** is thus endowed with capabilities which ordinarily do not exist together. It may perhaps be urged that the trammels of bondage may be understood to be unreal but absolution must be admitted to be real. Such a contention would not be correct, as S'ruti does not tolerate the reality of either bondage or absolution. Absolution (**मोक्ष**) is as illusory as bondage (**बंध**).

235. The S'ruti says that really speaking there is nothing like destruction or generation: the condition of being, affected by happiness and misery; the different stage of a **साधक** *i.e.*, a person who is given to reading and hearing the Sâstras with a view to know the truth, of a **मुमुक्षु**, *i.e.*, a person who is earnestly desirous of absolution and has therefore gone through all the preliminaries, and of a **मुक्त**, *i.e.*, one who has achieved absolution by overstepping the bounds of ignorance, are all a myth.

236. **माया** is like a **कामधेनु**, *i.e.*, a cow which yields everything that is desired. **जीव** and **ईश्वर** are like the two calves of this cow. How much soever they may suck the milk of duality from that cow, the real non-duality remains unaffected.

237. It may be argued that जीव and ईश्वर being the products of माया and therefore unreal, it can be understood that the distinction between them is also unreal, but कूटस्थ and ब्रह्म being real, the distinction between them must be real. To such an argument the reply is that the distinction between कूटस्थ and ब्रह्म is one of name merely. From the illustration of आकाश that has been previously cited it will be seen that it is never possible to separate घटाकाश from महाकाश.

238. That non-dual reality which is stated to have existed before the creation of the world, in the text of the S'ruti सदेव सोम्येदमग्रआसीत्, exists even this day and will continue to exist in the future and even after attainment of absolution. The question then naturally arises why, if such is the fact, do people not realize it. The reply is that माया has deluded all people, who being overpowered by ignorance set their minds on things that are not real.

239. It may be argued that those who speak of the illusory nature of the world and its dealings, and the reality of the non-dual principle, are themselves seen engaged in wordly affairs and therefore there is no use of the knowledge of truth, the pursuit of which we are advocating. But such contention would not be correct. Because persons who have acquired knowledge of truth, though they may by force of former actions be engaged in wordly dealings, will not exhibit that attachment which existed before the acquisition of such knowledge.

240. The ignorant, i. e., those who are devoid of the knowledge of truth and do not care to pursue it, have the firm conviction that everything connected with this world and the next has a real existence, and that the one true principle advocated by the Vedantin is not only inconceivable but is non-existent.

241. Those who have acquired the knowledge of truth are clearly seen to entertain quite a different view: in their opinion the one principle only is real and that the world and its dealings are unreal. The result is that according to their respective convictions a ज्ञानी thinks himself free from all trammels while an अज्ञानी fancies himself tied down by worldly bonds.

242 & 243. It might possibly be contended that this non-dual principle is only indirectly known from the S'āstras but that there is no direct knowledge thereof. This contention however is not correct in as much as the presence of such principle is directly perceived in the shape of चित्, i. e., intelligence or power of perception, by means of which all the senses perform their functions.

It might next be contended that the perception of this principle, if admitted, is only partial and not entire. Such a contention may be met by the counter-contention that all things other than the non-dual principle are also perceived partially, and therefore this defect of partial perception is common to both dual and non-dual things and therefore in that respect one has no superiority over the other. If then with such a defect you can look upon द्वैत as proved why then with a similar defect should you not be prepared to conclude that अद्वैत is also proved?

244. The opponent of the Vedantin contends that अद्वैत is that which is not द्वैत and therefore the two cannot co-exist: द्वैत is directly perceived and therefore अद्वैत cannot be so perceived. Such a contention may be met by the counter-contention that, admitting that the two cannot co-exist, by similar reasoning the conclusion will follow that द्वैत can have no place when the perception of अद्वैत is present in the form of knowledge. The similarity of reasoning may be made more explicit thus. द्वैत and अद्वैत

cannot co-exist: अद्वैत is perceived when one's senses perform their functions, and therefore at that time द्वैत cannot exist. द्वैतवादी is thus defeated by his own argument. He however does not admit that there is similarity between the two positions because, says he, the second position is wrong in as much as actual experience shows that knowledge does co-exist with द्वैत.

245. This last argument is met by saying that द्वैत is unreal in as much as it is the result of माया or illusion. Such being the case, what remains in the end is the one real principle which shines by its own light.

246. One should come to the conclusion that the whole world, the construction of which is inconceivable, is mere माया or illusion, and what is real is अद्वैत or the one non-dual principle.

247. If, after arriving at the conclusion that अद्वैत is what is real, one is over again led into the belief that द्वैत is real, then the remedy is to strive again to arrive at the correct conclusion (cf. S'árirabháshya Chapter IV). What labour does such a process involve?

248. The question may be asked how often should this process be repeated. Such a question implies impatience and vexation. That will not, however, do in the case of search after अद्वैत, because that search must continue until one attains to direct knowledge (अपरोक्ष ज्ञान) and such attainment averts all evils. Such impatience and vexation one may rightly feel in case of pursuit of द्वैत.

249. It may be argued that even after acquisition of direct knowledge one is troubled with hunger, thirst, &c., and therefore the attainment of such knowledge cannot be said to avert all evils. One who argues thus ought to discriminate whether such troubles affect the spirit or the ego who is identified with the spirit. Who will deny that they affect the ego and not the spirit?

250. If these troubles seem to affect the spirit on account of the identification of the spirit with ego, then you must guard against such identification and always try to be on the correct lines.

251. If the error of identification is likely to recur unexpectedly on account of firm impressions on the mind of past actions, then one must constantly resort to analysis and discrimination and should make his conclusions firm.

252. Let it not be said that the unreality of द्वैत, to be arrived at by discrimination, is a mere matter of argument and cannot be actually experienced. The mysterious composition of the world is a matter of actual experience and therefore it follows that its unreality must also be a matter of actual experience.

253. From the above reasoning it might be urged that whatever is of mysterious composition, is unreal, and चित् or intelligence being of mysterious composition it would follow that it is also unreal. But this argument is not correct, From the reasoning in the previous stanza it is not to be concluded that द्वैत is unreal merely because it is of a mysterious composition. The presence of another factor is also necessary and that is that it should be ephemeral. When a thing is of mysterious composition and ephemeral at the same time, then it might be safely concluded that it is unreal. We do not say that चित् is of a composition which is not mysterious, but it is not ephemeral, it is ever lasting or eternal.

254. The question then may naturally be asked what proof is there for the assertion that चित् is eternal. For a thing to be eternal or नित्य it is necessary that it should never have been non-existent. The non-existence of चित् has never happened and has not been experienced by any one and therefore चित् is नित्य. Such is however not the

case with द्वैत. The non-existence of द्वैत is experienced by चित्; *e. g.*, in a state of sound sleep in which चित् is existent, द्वैत which is experienced in the condition of wakefulness or dreaming, is non-existent.

255. द्वैत, being non-existent before, is thus created in the same way as pots are made of earth. Being thus created, its creation is nevertheless inconceivable and therefore it is unreal or illusory like a magical performance.

256. It has thus been shown that चित् is directly perceived, and that the unreality of द्वैत is perceived by चित्. Is not contention that अद्वैत is not directly perceived (*vide* stanza 242 above) thus a contradiction in terms?

257. It may be asked why some persons even though knowing these facts are still not quite satisfied with the conclusions arrived at. To such a questioner we put the counter-question why the followers of the materialistic doctrine, like चार्वाक, पामर and others, though of cultivated minds, consider that the material body is आत्मा.

258. If you reply that the materialists are misled by want of sufficient discrimination which is the result of a defective intellect, then we say that the same cause accounts for the dissatisfaction of the Vedantins above referred to. These persons could not have understood the real drift of the S'âstras.

259. The result of the knowledge of reality is thus described in the S'ruti:—

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदिश्रिताः ।

अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते ॥

which means that when all the desires located in the heart of a person who is bent upon attaining absolution disappear by reason of his acquiring the knowledge of the reality and thus getting rid of the identification of the self with the material

body, then he who was mortal on account of such identification becomes immortal, and even while the material body lasts becomes identified with ब्रह्म or the supreme spirit.

If you say that such results are only described in the S'ruti but are never actually experienced, then we say that consideration of other S'rutis will show that these results are actually experienced.

260. As an instance the following sentence may be cited:—

यदा सर्वे प्रभियंते हृदयग्रन्थयः

which indicates a condition in which all the ties of the heart are snapped or broken. In this sentence the word हृदयग्रन्थि is used to indicate all desires and affections. Now this snapping of the ties of the heart clearly points to the state in which the erroneous identification of the ego with self is at an end and as this state is a matter of actual experience, the contention referred to in the foregoing stanza cannot hold.

261. The word काम is ordinarily known to denote the several kinds of desires: what then is the propriety of describing them as ties of the heart? To such a question the reply is that the word काम is here used to indicate not merely the kinds of desires but to indicate those desires only which are the result of identification of self with ego for want of proper discrimination.

262. If without such identification one is able to see his egotism separate from his self, then no harm will result even if he has thousands of desires, the reason being that the ties of his heart have been snapped and therefore the desires are not the result of identification of self with ego.

Note S'ankarâchârya has thus described the threefold nature of this identification of self with ego. This identifi-

cation is of three kinds.—(1) सहज; (2) कर्मज; (3) भ्रमज. The identification of चिदाभास with the ego is called 'सहज' because it is born along with it. The birth and death of ego corresponds with the birth and death of चिदाभास which is the reflection of चित् in बुद्धि or intellect. The identification of ego with the material body is called कर्मज because such identification is the result of the प्रारब्ध actions of former births, i. e., such actions as are about to bear their fruit. It is the experience of all that so long as one is alive he is conscious that he is a human being, &c., but as soon as the material body vanishes, on account of the exhaustion of the force of actions of former births, the identification of ego with that body also vanishes. The identification of ego with the intelligent and all seeing spirit or चित् is called भ्रमज, because it is the result of delusion produced by ignorance. As soon as ignorance and delusion disappear and the real spirit is known, then such identification does not occur and one ceases to say that he does a thing, that he enjoys happiness or suffers pain. It is quite possible that the first two may be observed in a person who has acquired the knowledge of the reality but the third will not be found.

263. It may be argued that in the absence of identification of self with ego it is impossible that any desires should arise. But this is not correct. Even when the ties of the heart are snapped, desires are quite possible on account of sins of former births which are about to bear fruit. In illustration of this the author asks his opponent in argument to look to himself and tells him that his want of conviction in spite of his knowledge of the real position is the result of heavy sins.

264. The चित् or the spirit is not in the least affected by desires and affections which are solely connected with ego, in the same way as it is not affected by the diseases of the

material body or by the springing up or dying of trees and other similar objects.

265. If you say that चित् being unsusceptible its nature is never liable to change and therefore even before the ग्रन्थिभेद or snapping of the ties of the heart, चित् must have remained in the condition described in the foregoing stanza, then we accept your conclusion and have no quarrel with you—that is also our conclusion, and it is this condition which we call ग्रन्थिभेद. We would warn you against not losing sight of this position, and congratulate you on your having attained such a position.

266. The ignorant do not realize this position, and it is this ignorance which is described by us as ग्रन्थि and nothing else. The difference between the ignorant and the knowing is simply that the first is bound up with these ties of the heart while the second has snapped them.

267. Whether you take the condition of activity or inactivity there is no difference between the constitutions of the ignorant and the knowing so far as देह (material body) इंद्रिय (the senses) मनः (mind) and बुद्धि (intellect) are concerned. The difference lies in the former identifying the self with ego and thus subjecting himself to evils from which he should be free while the latter realizes the correct position and thus remains unaffected.

In the text the words ब्राह्म्य and श्रोत्रिय are used. The first indicates a person belonging to any of the first three castes of ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय and वैश्य whose thread ceremony has not been performed until the ages of 16, 22 and 24 respectively and who thus is not initiated into the Vedas. The second word indicates a person who has been so initiated and has thereafter studied the Vedas in all their branches and is acting according to religious precepts.

268. The difference between an illiterate and a learned man lies in the one having studied the Vedas and the other having remained ignorant of them. But there is no

difference so far as their eating and drinking operations are concerned. The same reasoning holds good in the present instance.

269. The snapping of the ties of the heart (ग्रन्थिभेद) which is seen in the case of a person who has acquired knowledge is thus described in the Bhagavadgita. Such a person is not disgusted with impending evils nor does he cherish any desire for the enjoyment of pleasures which have passed off. He is just like a person who is neutral and has no interest in either one or the other.

270. If you argue that the above quotation from the Bhagavadgita simply indicates how a person who is indifferent should act and that it is not an authority on the subject of ग्रन्थिभेद, then we retort by saying that taking your interpretation to be correct, the word 'like' in the expression 'like a person who is neutral' would become meaningless. The fact that the word 'like' is used indicates that the text is intended to describe the condition of one the ties of whose heart are snapped, by comparing it with that of an उदासीन (neutral) person.

If again you say that persons who acquire knowledge become physically incapable of any sort of action and therefore it is no wonder that they are inactive, then it is as much as to say that what he has acquired is no knowledge but a physical disease !

271. Those highly talented persons who consider that knowledge of reality is merely a sort of consumption must indeed be admitted to possess a very clear intellect ! To them nothing is impossible !

272. If you say that in the Puráns it is stated that Bharat and others used to remain quite inactive and this circumstance proves that inactivity is a necessary result of knowledge, then we ask why should you have deemed the

authority of the Puráns sufficient to enable you to form your conclusions : have you not heard of the text in the Śruti which says that one who has acquired knowledge indulges in all sorts of actions like those of eating, playing and enjoying the company of women, without being affected by them, *i. e.*, he never loses sight of the fact that all the actions are merely the functions of the senses and cannot affect the spirit and he never identifies the two.

273. Bharat and others never remained without food, &c., just like wood and stone. But they remained indifferent being afraid of contracting association with worldly objects.

274. In this world the amount of one's troubles and miseries corresponds to the amount of his associations. One who is free from all associations enjoys happiness. Therefore one who desires happiness should avoid all associations.

275. Not understanding the secret of the Śástras a fool says all sorts of things. Let a fool's conclusions be what they may, we now proceed to state our conclusions.

276. Absence of worldly desires (वैराग्य), knowledge of reality (बोध) and cessation of worldly actions (उपरम) are the helpmates of one another. Generally they go hand in hand, but sometimes they are seen separated.

277. The cause (हेतु), the nature (स्वरूप) and the result (कार्य) of these three differ, and therefore with the help of the analysis of the Śástras one should understand the correct distinction between them.

278. Taking them in their order, the हेतु or cause of वैराग्य, or absence of worldly desires, is दोषदृष्टि, *i. e.*, one's seeing the miseries attendant on worldly life even from the stage of conception to that of death. When one begins to see that everything connected with worldly affairs is fraught with pain and misery that is the origin of वैराग्य.

The स्वरूप or nature of वैराग्य is जिज्ञासा, i. e., a desire to resign everything worldly.

The कार्य or result of वैराग्य is अदीनता, i. e., disinclination to ever again revert to worldly affairs with a real desire for enjoyment. By force of actions in former births it is possible that riches, &c., may shower their favours upon such a person but he is not beguiled by them nor does he look upon them as desirable acquisitions.

These (cause, nature and result) are peculiar to वैराग्य.

279. The हेतु or causes of बोध, or knowledge of reality, are श्रवण, मनन and निदिध्यास. श्रवण means hearing or study of the S'ástras; मनन means reflection or meditation; and निदिध्यास means repetition of the process of meditation. A text in the S'rutis runs to the effect "आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोत व्योमन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः" which shows that these three processes are at the root of knowledge.

The स्वरूप or nature of बोध is discrimination of कूटस्थ ब्रह्म or the spirit which is real from the ego or अहंकार which is unreal and with which it is erroneously identified.

The कार्य or result of बोध is non-recurrence of the identification of self with the ego.

280. The हेतु or causes of उपरम, or cessation of wordly actions, are यम, नियम, आसन, प्राणायाम, प्रत्याहार, धारणा, ध्यान and समाधि. These form the eight different stages of abstract contemplation. यम and नियम mean the observance of certain moral and religious duties which serves as a sort of training ground for controlling the mind. आसन means the different kinds of posture laid down in the Yoga S'ástra. प्राणायाम means control of the vital airs, that condition in which the processes of breathing in and breathing out are regulated. प्रत्याहार means the control of the several senses with a view to prevent them from performing their proper functions.

धारणा means concentration of the mind on a particular object. **ध्यान** means contemplation in which there is no knowledge of anything besides the thing contemplated. **समाधि** means that condition of contemplation in which there is perfect absorption of thought. This **समाधि** is of two sorts, **सविकल्प** and **निर्विकल्प**. **सविकल्प समाधि** is that in which there is the consciousness of the object contemplated, consciousness of oneself as the contemplator and consciousness of the process of contemplation. These three together, *viz.*, **ध्येय**, **ध्याता** and **ध्यान** are technically known as **त्रिपुटी**. **निर्विकल्प समाधि** is that which is without such consciousness.

The **स्वरूप** or nature of **उपरम** is the cessation of the workings of the intellect and the mind.

The **कार्य** or result of **उपरम** is the cessation of worldly actions.

Such is the distinction between **वैराग्य**, **बोध** and **उपरम**.

281. Of these three **बोध** or knowledge of reality is the chief, because it is directly instrumental in securing absolution (**मोक्ष**). **वैराग्य** and **उपरम** are its auxiliaries.

282. That all these three qualifications should be found in a state of highest development in one single individual is but the result of vast store of merit laid by in successions of previous births. Otherwise, on account of the sins of previous births, one or other of these three is occasionally found absent.

283. For him in whom **वैराग्य** and **उपरम** have been fully developed but **बोध** is wanting, there is no absolution (**मोक्ष**). He only attains to higher spheres by force of his merits.

284. On the other hand one, in whom **बोध** or knowledge has attained to perfection but the other two are wanting, is sure of achieving absolution. But he does not enjoy freedom from pain resulting, from worldly dealings, *i. e.*, he does not

become जीवन्मुक्त. In the absence of वैराग्य and उपरम which have the power of producing a cessation of all desires and thus counteracting the workings of the mind, रजोगुण and तमोगुण remain predominant and the सत्त्वगुण is put in the back ground, and therefore he experiences pain and pleasures from the worldly objects with which he comes into contact.

285 & 286. The highest stage of development of वैराग्य or absence of worldly desires may be said to be reached when one looks upon the highest attainable worldly sphere, viz., ब्रह्मलोक, with the same regard as that for straw. Similarly the highest stage of development of knowledge or बोध may be said to be reached when one can identify his own self with ब्रह्म or the supreme spirit to the same extent as he identifies his self with the material body during the state of ignorance (अज्ञान). In the same way the highest state of उपरति or cessation of worldly actions may be said to be reached when during the state of wakefulness one is as forgetful as in a state of sound sleep.

All other stages should be judged by the highest standard indicated above.

287. Even persons who have acquired knowledge may be found evincing different degrees of susceptibility to mental and bodily affections or afflictions as the result of actions of former births which must bear fruit (प्रारब्ध). But this circumstance ought not to mislead those who are learned in regard to the truth of the thesis that knowledge results in absolution.

288. Let them be as the actions of their former births make them. Real knowledge is one in all of them and the resulting absolution is the same in all cases—That is how the position really stands.

289. Reverting to the illustration of a painting, the sum of all the arguments is that the whole world is a kind of painting drawn on the canvass of the self or the supreme spirit.

Just as when the paint is removed there remains merely the cloth which is the only real stuff, the pictures of human beings, mountains, trees and rivers thereon being merely the creation of the painter's art, so the world should altogether be set aside as a mere delusion created by **माया** and what remains is the real spirit.

290. Those wise persons who constantly study this chapter, though they may see this picture of the world, will not be beguiled into considering it real as they were before studying it.

CHAPTER VII.

Explanation of the condition of complete satisfaction or satiety in which there is nothing left to be desired.

The chapter opens with a quotation from the S'ruti, the meaning of which is as follows :—

1. If **पुरुष**, *i. e.*, **जीव** or the individual were to realize that he is himself one with the supreme spirit, then there would be nothing left to be desired, nor would there be any motive to be satisfied, and he would cease to consider himself troubled with evils which really appertain to the material body.

2. In this chapter it is proposed to analyse the drift of the above S'ruti, and such analysis will bring out clearly the nature of the satisfaction or satiety experienced by a **जीवनमुक्त**, *i. e.*, a person who has attained to absolution even while he is living.

3. The word **पुरुष** is first explained and as a preface to that explanation the origin of the world is chiefly indicated.

It is said in the S'rutis that **माया** creates the **जीव** and **ईश** by means of the power of reflection which is inherent in it.

जीव and ईश have thus no real existence but are illusory, and they in their turn have created all the rest.

The term माया in this place denotes the प्रकृति or the material cause of the world, constituting the three qualities of सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् and endowed with the reflection of the supreme spirit or intelligence. In chapter I, stanzas 15-17, it has been stated that this प्रकृति, according to the pure or impure state of the सत्त्वगुण, receives the denominations of माया and अविद्या respectively. The reflection in माया is known as ईश्वर and the reflection in अविद्या is known as जीव.

4. This stanza occurs as No. 213 in the last chapter, and its meaning is thus given there :—

The creation of ईश्वर is described in the S'ruti commencing with the words “सईक्षत लोकानुसृजा इति” and ending with the text “एतया द्वारा प्रापयंत” The first text relates to the desire to create the world, and the second relates to his penetration into it.

The creation of जीव is described in the S'ruti commencing with the text “तस्यत्रय आचसथाः” and ending with the text “स एतमेव पुरुषं ब्रह्म ततमपश्यत्”, in other words the creation of जीव consists of several operations and transactions occurring between the first condition of wakefulness and the final abolition.

5. The word पुरुष occurring in the S'ruti quoted at the commencement of this chapter indicates जीव. As has been explained in the last chapter this जीव represents the reflection, in the intellect, of the immutable and unsusceptible spirit which forms the foundation on which the superstructure of all illusions is raised through erroneous identification of the unreal with the real.

6. It may be asked if it would not be enough to understand the word पुरुष to indicate the mere reflection of the spirit or कूटस्थ चैतन्य through बुद्धि or intellect which is a crea-

tion of माया, and why it is necessary to incorporate along with the illusion of reflection the substratum or अधिष्ठान on which that illusion is founded, the अधिष्ठान being कूटस्थ चैतन्य. To such a question the reply is that it is only when जीव is understood in the sense of reflection of चित् accompanied by चित् itself that it can be capable of attaining absolution (मोक्ष) or स्वर्ग, &c. Mere चिदाभास or reflection of चित् by itself would not be so capable. The phenomenon of an illusion without a substratum of truth is never possible.

7. Whenever there is an illusion there is a conjunction of something real with something unreal. Taking the illustration of an oyster shell shining like silver, the illusion of silver is made up partly of the attributes of the shell and partly of the attributes of silver. Similarly what really exists is कूटस्थ चैतन्य and through the medium of माया this कूटस्थ चैतन्य becomes जीव. So long as this product of माया is looked upon as real, one is inspired with the notion that he is liable to go through a succession of births and deaths.

8. When, however, the illusion is broken through and the कूटस्थ चैतन्य only is looked upon as the real and principal thing, then one is inspired with the notion that he is himself the real spirit and unsusceptible of association.

9. It may be argued that the position taken in the foregoing stanza is incorrect in as much as it leads to the inference that the कूटस्थ आत्मा is the object of identification, while in fact it is not so, and that it is not proper that कूटस्थ should be identified with ego or अहंकार. To such an argument the reply is that the word अहम् is used in three senses : One is principal and two subordinate.

The position may be explained thus : In the last stanza it is stated that when one breaks through the illusion and recognizes the reality of the substratum on which the illusion rested, then he realizes thus अहं चिदात्मा असंगश्चास्मि—

which means "I am the spirit and am unsusceptible of association." Now taking the words as they are, they are capable of bearing the interpretation that the ego or अहम् is identified with the spirit. The spirit however is admitted to be असंग, *i. e.*, incapable of being associated with anything and therefore it is also incapable of being associated with ego. The identification implied by the words अहमस्मि (I am) cannot therefore be correct. This difficulty is got over by explaining that the word अहम् is capable of three different meanings.

10. The word अहम् taken in its principal or conventional sense indicates the reflection of the spirit (आभास) as identified with the कूटस्थ or the spirit itself. All ignorant persons who do not distinguish between the spirit and its reflection conventionally use word अहम् in that sense and therefore this sense of अहम् may be designated as principal or conventional.

11. When कूटस्थ and आभास are distinguished and the word अहम् is used to indicate either of them, then these senses of the word अहम् may be designated as असुख्य or secondary. These senses are secondary because it is only the तत्त्वविद्, *i. e.*, one who knows the truth, who uses them with these different significations in his ordinary and philosophical dealings.

These secondary senses are further explained in the two following stanzas.

12. A philosopher when he uses the word अहम् (I) in every day conversation in such sentences as 'I go,' &c., he desires to indicate by the word 'अहम्' the चिदाभास, *i. e.*, the reflection of the spirit as distinguished from कूटस्थ or the spirit.

13. When on the other hand he speaks philosophically and uses such expressions as असंगोऽहम्, चिदात्माऽहम् (I am unsusceptible of association, I am spirit itself) then he indicates by the word अहम् the spirit, or कूटस्थ as separated from चिदाभास or reflection of spirit.

14. Further objection like the following may be taken to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing stanzas:—

The expression 'असंगोऽस्मि, *i. e.*, I am unsusceptible of association, indicates a knowledge of such unsusceptibility, and the question naturally arises 'who derives this knowledge?' Is it the कूटस्थ or the चिदाभास? कूटस्थ being unsusceptible of any association, such knowledge cannot be predicated regarding it. It follows therefore that it is चिदाभास that is capable of being possessed of knowledge or of being ignorant. But then how is it possible for mere आभास or reflection which has no real existence to have any knowledge like that indicated by the expression 'कूटस्थोऽस्मि,' *i. e.*, I am कूटस्थ or the spirit?

15. The objection above argued does not constitute a defect in the argument and is very easily answered. A reflection has no existence apart from the object of which it is a reflection, and therefore all the attributes seen to be possessed by it belong to the original object. Similarly चिदाभास being a reflection of कूटस्थ cannot exist apart from it and the properties that are observed in the चिदाभास are the properties of कूटस्थ. आभास being unreal, what remains is the चित् or कूटस्थ which is real spirit.

16. It may again be argued that चिदाभास being unreal the knowledge of its identity with कूटस्थ which is attributed to it must also become unreal. Who will say 'no' to such an argument? It is quite in keeping with our conclusion that everything beside and beyond the कूटस्थ is unreal. Take the illustration of a rope which when observed through insufficient light looks like a serpent. One who is possessed of the idea that it is a serpent may very likely feel that the rope is making movements like those of a serpent. But to one who knows for certain that it is a rope and not a serpent the idea of movements like those of a serpent will not commend itself.

17. We however cannot accept the thesis that because such knowledge is unreal therefore it is not of any use in preventing the succession of births and deaths. Such knowledge though unreal is quite efficacious in preventing the succession of births and deaths (संसार) which is itself unreal. It is the common saying that an offering should be like the deity to which it is offered. If the deity is unreal it should be satisfied by an offering which is also unreal.

18. The word पुरुष, used in the S'ruti quoted in the first stanza of this chapter, thus indicates the चिदाभास as unseparated from कूटस्थ. And the meaning intended to be conveyed by the text is that पुरुष should acquire the knowledge of his identity with कूटस्थ by distinguishing the unreal ego or चिदाभास from the real कूटस्थ.

19. The two words 'पुरुष' and 'अस्मि' used in the S'ruti having been explained, it is now proposed to explain the word अयम्. All worldly persons entertain, beyond all doubt and contradiction, the idea that their material body is their self, as being and they use the word अयम् to indicate the material body identical with their own self. The word अयम् is thus used in the S'ruti to determine that the knowledge of identity with कूटस्थ should be as certain as that of the identity of the material body with self.

20. In support of the position taken in the previous stanza an extract from the work of S'ankarâchârya known as उपदेशसाहस्री (i.e., a thousand precepts) is cited, which means that a person who arrives at the knowledge that he is कूटस्थ, as sure and certain as the knowledge which a worldly person has regarding the identity of the material body with self, obtains absolution without his wishing for it, the fact being that his ignorance, which is the cause of recurrence of successive births, vanishes and the necessary result is absolution.

21. It may be urged that the word 'अयम्' used in the S'ruti is intended to indicate that the कूटस्थ is directly visible, as

in the expression 'अयम्घटः,' *i.e.*, this pitcher or pot, which indicates the pot which is present before one's eyes. Such interpretation we allow, in as much as चैतन्य, *i.e.*, intelligence or spirit having the capacity to shine by itself is ever visible.

22. Although the spirit is ever visible or अपरोक्ष, it is capable of being looked upon as both परोक्ष and अपरोक्ष and as ज्ञान and अज्ञान, as in the illustration of दशम or the tenth person in a gathering of ten persons.

23. Suppose ten persons to be travelling together in a body. After crossing a river they take it into their heads to count their number just to ascertain if all of them had safely crossed the river. The person who counts the rest neglects to count himself and thus they are all confused with the idea that one of them is missing. In this case though each person who counts arrives at the number 'nine' he misses the fact that the person counting is himself the tenth person.

24. Each one of them, though himself the tenth, is possessed with the idea that the tenth is not seen and therefore does not exist. This delusion is the result of ignorance and is known by the name of आवरण.

25. Having got firm hold of the idea that the tenth does not exist, he concludes that he was drowned in the river and begins to cry aloud bewailing his companion's loss. These lamentations, &c., are also the result of ignorance and are known by the name of विक्षेप.

26. While these men keep crying, it happens that a respectable acquaintance whose word can be relied upon arrives there, and knowing the cause of their grief he assures them that they are ten in number. This assurance is accepted by them in the same manner as one accepts the assurance given in the Śruti regarding the existence of स्वर्ग or the heavens and other similar spheres. The knowledge regarding the

existence of the tenth person which is derived from this assurance may be called **परोक्ष** or indirect.

27. In corroboration of his assurance the new comer counts their number and thus shows that each one of them who has hitherto counted their number was the tenth person. Realizing the truth of this demonstration each one is rejoiced and leaves off crying. The knowledge in this case may be called **अपरोक्ष** or direct.

28. Now, taking this illustration, it will be seen that there have been seven distinct stages from **अज्ञान** or ignorance to **तृप्ति** or complete satisfaction. These seven stages are :— (1) **अज्ञान**, *i. e.*, ignorance, (2) **आदृति** or **आवरण**, *i. e.*, delusion resulting from ignorance on account of which one denies the existence of what really exists; (3) **विक्षेप**, *i. e.*, the condition such as that of misery, &c., resulting from ignorance; (4) **परोक्षज्ञान**, *i. e.*, indirect knowledge; (5) **अपरोक्षज्ञान**, *i. e.*, direct knowledge; (6) **शोकापगम**, *i. e.*, cessation of grief; (7) **तृप्ति**, *i. e.*, complete satisfaction. Similarly these seven stages may also be observed in the case of **जीवन** or **चिदाभास** in regard to the **चिदात्मा** or the spirit.

29. **जीव** or **चिदाभास** being wholly absorbed in worldly affairs does not know that he really is the **कूटस्थ आत्मा** or the immutable spirit shining by itself. This is the stage of **अज्ञान** or ignorance.

30. When there arises the question as to what is **कूटस्थ** and where he is, the **जीव** replies not only that he does not see **कूटस्थ**, but that **कूटस्थ** does not exist. This is the state of **आवरण** or delusion. The **जीव** believes that he acts, enjoys happiness and suffers misery. This condition is **विक्षेप**.

31. He hears from some one on whose word he can rely that there really does exist the **कूटस्थ**. This knowledge regarding **कूटस्थ** is **परोक्ष** or indirect. Subsequently by study of the sub-

ject, by constantly recurring to it and pursuing it, and finally by the kindness of a capable instructor he realizes that his ownself is कूटस्थ. This knowledge is अपरोक्ष or direct.

32. The जीव then becomes freed from all misery, resulting from his thinking himself the actor, sufferer, &c. This is the stage known as शोकापगम, *i. e.*, cessation of grief. Then follows the stage of तृप्ति, *i. e.*, complete satisfaction or satiety—a sort of feeling that one has done all that was to be done and acquired all that was desired.

33. These seven conditions, *viz.*, अज्ञान, आवृत्ति, विक्षेप, परोक्ष-ज्ञान, अपरोक्ष ज्ञान, शोकनिवृत्ति and तृप्ति are those experienced by चिदाभास or जीव and not by कूटस्थ. Bondage and absolution, to which the जीव becomes subject, are related to these conditions. Thus the first three, *viz.*, अज्ञान, आवृत्ति and विक्षेप cause bondage, while the last four, *viz.*, परोक्षज्ञान, अपरोक्षज्ञान, शोकापगम and तृप्ति cause absolution.

35. अज्ञान, or ignorance, is that condition in which one is quite indifferent regarding the real truth and is simply content with saying that he does not know. In this condition there is complete absence of any attempt at knowledge of truth.

36. Then follows the stage in which the thinking faculty is aroused, but on account of misdirection, *i. e.*, on account of failure to follow the guidance of S'âstras and indulgence in unwarranted reasoning, he is further away from the truth than before, and maintains that the truth is not seen and even it does not exist. This is the result of आवृत्ति, or delusion.

37. The चिदाभास with its material (स्थूल) and subtile (सूक्ष्म) bodies is itself विक्षेप. It is the cause of bondage, of succession of births and deaths, and of all the misery resulting from the thought that it acts, enjoys or suffers.

38. It has been said before (*vide* stanzas 28 and 34 above) that all the seven conditions beginning with अज्ञान and ending

with **दुःख** are experienced by **चिदाभास** or **जीव** ; while according to the foregoing stanza **चिदाभास** itself is **विक्षेप**, from which it must follow that **चिदाभास** cannot exist during the first two conditions of **अज्ञान** and **आवरण**. **विक्षेप** being the result of the first two conditions of **अज्ञान** and **आवरण**, it cannot be said to exist in the first two stages, and as **विक्षेप** and **चिदाभास** are identical, it follows that **चिदाभास** has no existence during the stages of **अज्ञान** and **आवरण**. This being so, **अज्ञान** and **आवरण** cannot be the conditions of **चिदाभास**, and therefore the position that all the seven conditions are experienced by **चिदाभास** is untenable, and it would follow that these two conditions are experienced by **चित्** or **आत्मा** itself and not by **चिदाभास** or **जीव**. **चित्** or **आत्मा** is, however, immutable and therefore not susceptible of experiencing these conditions, and it must be maintained that these two conditions, like the remaining ones, belong to **चिदाभास** and not to **चित्**. The difficulty indicated above is got over as follows.

39. It is correct to say that **विक्षेप** itself did not exist in the first two stages of **अज्ञान** and **आवृत्ति**, but prior to the manifestation of **विक्षेप**, there must exist the impressions or **संस्कार** of which **विक्षेप** is the product, just as a tree, prior to its becoming manifest in that form, exists in the state of seed. This being so, there is no inconsistency in saying that **अज्ञान** and **आवृत्ति** are the conditions of **चिदाभास** or **विक्षेप**.

40. It may be urged that **ब्रह्म** being the substratum of everything, it is easy to understand that these two are the conditions of **ब्रह्म**, and therefore, leaving aside this plain reasoning where is the necessity of referring to unmanifested impressions (**संस्कार**) of **विक्षेप** and thus attributing those conditions to **विक्षेप**? A simple objection to such a reasoning is that it covers more ground than necessary. **ब्रह्म** being the substratum of everything, there is no reason why only two conditions should be attributed thereto: all the seven conditions may by the same reasoning be attributed to it.

41. This may perhaps be met by saying that from the nature of the last five stages it is clear that they relate to चिदाभास or जीव, but such is not the case with the first two.

42. We, however, do not see why this should be so. The first two stages also in which there occur the admission of ignorance and the denial of the existence and conception of ब्रह्म, appear equally enough to be the conditions of जीव.

43. If अज्ञान is not a condition of ब्रह्म, it may be asked why previous writers on the subject have said that ब्रह्म is the आश्रय, i. e., the resting place of अज्ञान. The reply is that they have used the word आश्रय in the sense of अधिष्ठान. What they have maintained is that अज्ञान is not possible but for the substratum of ब्रह्म, it being well known that a delusion is not possible unless there is something real at the bottom on which the superstructure of delusion is raised.

When we say that अज्ञान is a condition of जीव and not of ब्रह्म, we imply that it is an attribute of जीव.

44. So much to show the nature of the first three conditions, which produce bondage. The next two conditions are instrumental in cutting off those bonds and securing a state of absolution.

With the dawn of knowledge, indirect as well as direct, अज्ञान or ignorance perishes, and consequently disappear also both kinds of आदृति or delusion, viz., that which makes one say that कूटस्थ is not visible, as also that which makes one say that कूटस्थ does not exist.

45. Indirect or परोक्ष knowledge helps in removing the delusion that कूटस्थ does not exist. Direct or अपरोक्ष knowledge helps in removing the delusion that कूटस्थ is not visible.

Learning from reliable books or preceptors that कूटस्थ does exist, he who formerly denied its existence is prepared to admit its existence ; and subsequently when he realizes that he himself is कूटस्थ he no longer says that कूटस्थ is not visible.

46. As soon as the delusion is destroyed and one realizes that he himself is कूटस्थ, the idea that he is जीव disappears, and as soon as he takes leave of that idea he no more attributes to himself the functions of acting, enjoying and suffering, and consequently all misery that is implied by the word संसार ceases.

47. With the cessation of all worldly misery one begins to feel that he has achieved absolution for ever, and thus derives unfettered satisfaction on account of non-recurrence of misery.

48. At the commencement of this chapter we quoted a text from the S'ruti आत्मानं चेद विजानीयात्, &c., and proposed to give an explanation thereof. The foregoing discussion regarding the seven conditions experienced by जीव may therefore be looked upon as a digression by some persons. But really it is not so. The purpose of that text from the S'ruti is to indicate the fifth and sixth conditions described above viz. अपरोक्षज्ञान (direct knowledge) and शोक निवृत्ति (cessation of misery) and with the view of making the explanation complete we have thought fit to deal with all the seven conditions.

49. The word अयम् used in the S'ruti indicates that the knowledge is direct (*vide* stanza 21 above). This might lead to the inference that ब्रह्म is only the subject of direct and not of indirect knowledge. In order to show that it is also the subject of indirect knowledge the following explanation is given.

अपरोक्ष or direct knowledge may be so either (1) on account of its subject, i. e., ब्रह्म being capable of shining by its own light without the assistance of anything else, or (2) on account of the intellect being able to have a direct perception of it.

50. When there is परोक्ष or indirect knowledge, the property of shining by its own light (स्वप्रकाशता) is possessed by ब्रह्म

in the same degree as when the knowledge is अपरोक्ष or direct. In the stage of indirect knowledge, as the existence of ब्रह्म is accepted on the authority of S'ástra so also may its peculiar property of स्वप्रकाशता.

51. It may be asked how it is possible for ब्रह्म, which is never separable from anything, to be the subject of indirect knowledge. The reply is that though ब्रह्म is not separable still its knowledge, when not connected with direct perception, may be the subject of indirect knowledge. Knowledge is indirect so long as one, instead of saying that he is ब्रह्म, simply says that ब्रह्म exists. It may perhaps be said that this indirect knowledge is merely a delusion. If so we should like to know the grounds for this statement. These grounds may possibly be as follows:— (1) that the assertion 'ब्रह्म exists' is such as can be proved to be false by bringing forward a proposition which is quite the reverse of it; (2) that the assertion 'ब्रह्म exists' does not give any definite idea regarding it; (3) that ब्रह्म being the subject of direct knowledge should not be spoken of as the subject of indirect knowledge; (4) that the main property of ब्रह्म being प्रत्यक्षत्व, i.e., direct visibility, the assertion ब्रह्मास्ति, (i.e., ब्रह्म exists) makes no reference to that property.

Assuming that these four grounds are advanced in support of the position that indirect knowledge of ब्रह्म is a delusion, the author proceeds to consider them in their proper order.

The first ground does not hold because the position 'ब्रह्म exists' is not disturbed by any contradictory proposition.

52. If it could be shown that ब्रह्म does not exist, then the proposition 'ब्रह्म exists' would certainly turn out to be false. But we are able to get no reliable proof of non-existence of ब्रह्म and therefore the proposition 'ब्रह्म exists' must remain uncontradicted.

53. The second ground does not stand because the mere fact that an assertion does not give a definite idea of the thing indicated is not enough to warrant its being stamped as delusion. If such reasoning were admitted to be sound, then it would follow that the proposition 'स्वर्ग or heaven exists' would prove to be false because it simply indicates in general terms the mere existence of स्वर्ग and gives no further definite idea regarding it.

54. Turning to the third ground it must be said that indirect knowledge of a thing which can be the subject of direct knowledge is not delusion. It is certainly wrong to say that a thing which can be seen is one that can not be seen, but it is not wrong to say that under certain circumstances knowledge regarding a thing which can be the subject of direct knowledge is indirect, because in speaking of such knowledge we do not attribute invisibility to a visible thing. The assertion is 'ब्रह्म exists' and not that ब्रह्म is परोक्ष. In making such an assertion the position taken is that of indicating merely the existence of ब्रह्म, and for want of any definiteness the knowledge of mere existence is called परोक्ष, and such knowledge does not detract from the property of अपरोक्षत्व which peculiarly belongs to ब्रह्म. परोक्ष knowledge is just a stepping stone to अपरोक्ष and not antagonistic to it.

55. The fourth ground is that the assertion 'ब्रह्म exists' shows that we recognize ब्रह्म but ignore its character of अपरोक्षत्व or direct visibility, and therefore the indirect knowledge implied by that assertion is a delusion. If such reasoning were correct then it would follow that when one sees a घट or pitcher his knowledge regarding it is also a delusion for the simple reason that his knowledge does not cover all the component parts of the pitcher. The mere fact of knowledge being defective regarding certain peculiarities of a thing is not therefore enough to make that knowledge as unreal as a delusion.

Our use of the illustration of a pitcher may possibly lead to the enquiry that चट being made up of parts it is possible that some parts may be known and some remain unknown. But ब्रह्म is not made up of parts and therefore it is wrong to speak of its knowledge exclusive of some of its peculiarities. This may however be answered by saying that ब्रह्म, though in itself निरंश, *i. e.*, devoid of parts, appears to be सांश, *i. e.*, possessed of parts, on account of the properties erroneously attributed to it, and which it is the object of all knowledge to prove to be false.

56. It may be asked what are these attributed properties which have to be shown as false? The reply is असत्वांश and अभानांश, *i. e.*, the properties of non-existence and invisibility. The first is proved to be false as soon as one has indirect knowledge or परोक्षज्ञान; and the second is proved to be false when one has direct knowledge or अपरोक्षज्ञान.

57. In the illustration previously given (of ten persons crossing a river and missing the tenth) the knowledge regarding the existence of the tenth person, which was derived from the assurance given by a reliable person, though indirect, is still quite correct. Similarly indirect knowledge regarding the existence of ब्रह्म is also correct. The delusion or आवरण caused by ignorance in both cases is the same.

58. Indirect knowledge or परोक्षज्ञान being derived from the assurance given in reliable texts, it may be asked what leads to अपरोक्ष or direct knowledge. The reply is that such knowledge is also derived from texts; only one must give the matter a deep thought. There is a text in the S'ruti to the effect 'आत्मा ब्रह्म'. This text if considered carefully and carried to its conclusion will lead to a definite indication of the identity of self with ब्रह्म, in the same way as occurred in the illustration when each one of the ten persons was assured that he himself was the tenth person.

59. In the illustration, when the assurance was given by a reliable person that the tenth was not lost, he was asked who was the tenth person? He replied that each one that asked the question was the tenth person. Each one thus began to count the number inclusive of himself and may thus remember that he himself is the tenth person.

60. The knowledge that he is the tenth being the result of the assurance given by a reliable person, accompanied by the operation of careful counting, is not likely to be disturbed under any circumstances. Whether he counts himself along with the other nine, either in the beginning, middle, or end, he is satisfied that the rest are nine and he is the tenth. The knowledge thus confirmed and never likely to be contradicted is direct knowledge or अपरोक्षज्ञान.

61. Similarly one is first able to have an indirect knowledge of the existence of ब्रह्म or spirit from such texts as सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्, and subsequently by the help of such texts as तत्त्वमसि he is able to realize the identity of his own self with ब्रह्म.

62. This knowledge of identity, when once acquired, does not change, whether the self is taken in its relation to any of the five sheaths (पंचकोश, i. e., अन्नमय, प्राणमय, मनोमय, विज्ञानमय, and आनन्दमय). The direct (अपरोक्ष) nature of this knowledge is thus established.

63. It may be asked what is the authority for saying that indirect knowledge is first acquired from texts merely and that direct knowledge follows from perusal of texts accompanied by a process of analysis and contemplation. The reply is that तैत्तिरीय and other S'rutis are our authority. In old times a certain sage named (भृगु) Bhrigu, son of (वरुण) Varuna, approached his father with a prayer to know the supreme spirit (ब्रह्म), and he was instructed of as follows:—
यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत्प्रयंत्यसि संविशन्ति

तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद् ब्रह्म: meaning that ब्रह्म from which is produced all the creation and being produced is sustained in a living state, and to which it returns being wholly absorbed into it you should know it ब्रह्म.

From this instruction Bhrigu derived an indirect knowledge of ब्रह्म, gathered from its function of creation, sustenance and absorption as described above. Subsequently by a careful analysis of the several sheaths (पंचकोश) he was able to acquire a direct knowledge by which he realized the identity of ब्रह्म with his own self.

64. In this instance Bhrigu's father did not communicate to him the text तत्त्वमसि (That ब्रह्म art thou). How then should he have acquired direct knowledge? The reply is that though the particular text implying the identity of ब्रह्म with self was not communicated, yet he was put on the track of analysing the several sheaths (कोश), which analysis eventually led him to the knowledge of the identity of ब्रह्म with self.

65. After giving a repeated thought to the several sheaths (कोश) known as अन्नमय, प्राणमय, &c, he came to know that the last sheath, viz., आनन्दमय, represented the true character of self, and thus realized that it possessed all the properties (लक्षण) of ब्रह्म.

66. ब्रह्म is सत्यं (really existent) ज्ञानं (knowledge or intelligence itself) and अनन्तं (infinite). The properties or attributes of ब्रह्म are of two sorts : (1) तदस्थ लक्षण and (2) स्वरूप लक्षण. The first class indicates such attributes as are only visible at times. The second class indicates attributes by which a particular object is distinguished or known. For instance, to describe a certain house as one having a crow sitting thereon is to indicate an attribute that will not be always present: and such attributes are known as तदस्थ लक्षण. On the other hand to describe that house as having certain architectural peculiarities is to indicate attributes that will

be present so long as the house exists and such attributes are known as स्वरूप लक्षण. Taking the case of ब्रह्म, the attributes indicated in stanza (63) above, *viz.*, the functions of creation, preservation and absorption are the attributes of the first class; while the attributes indicated in the beginning of this stanza belong to the second class.

These attributes having been mentioned to Bhrigu, he was further told that ब्रह्म is known to be enveloped in the midst of a cave. He was then made to realize that the five sheaths (कोश) represented that cave and thus it was demonstrated to him that what lay beyond the innermost sheaths was ब्रह्म.

67. The above episode of Bhrigu forms part of the तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्. The छान्दोग्य उपनिषद् also contains a similar episode concerning Indra.

Indra derived indirect knowledge of the spirit from the texts of the S'ruti like the following:—य आत्माऽपहतपाप्माविजरा विमृत्युर्विशोकः which describes आत्मा or the spirit as one who is free from sin, not susceptible of being old, not liable to die and free from grief. He was afterwards inspired with a desire to have direct knowledge and therefore approached God Brahma four times with that view.

68. Similarly in the ऐतरेयोपनिषद् indirect knowledge of ब्रह्म is first indicated by such texts as आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाय आसीन्नान्यत्किञ्चन मिषत्, which means that in the beginning आत्मा existed alone by itself and nothing else having an active character. Then follows the text स ईक्षत लोकां ब्रुवृज इति, which means "That आत्मा contemplated the creation of the world." Then follows a description of the condition in which आत्मा appeared after its transformation. The जीव after experiencing all the miseries resulting from ignorance eventually realizes that fact, and then ultimately, with the help of the precept प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म, accompanied by deep thought, knows that the intelligence or knowledge which works in himself is ब्रह्म itself.

69. All the texts of the S'rutis, other than those known as महावाक्य, which deal with this subject are calculated to induce indirect (परोक्ष) knowledge of ब्रह्म. While all the texts known as महावाक्य, when their import is carefully analysed and inculcated in oneself, are calculated to secure direct (अपरोक्ष) knowledge.

70. It may be asked what authority is there for saying that an understanding of the texts known as महावाक्य induces direct (अपरोक्ष) knowledge. The reply is that it is so stated in the वाक्यवृत्ति of S'ankarāchārya, and therefore there can be no difference of opinion on that head.

71. The explanation given in the वाक्यवृत्ति is as follows:—

The word त्वम् in the महावाक्य (तत्त्वमसि) is used to indicate that बोध residing in अन्तःकरण which appears to serve as a sort of support for the idea of egoism and also for the use of the word अहम्. This may be further explained thus: The word त्वम् indicates जीव, which is nothing more or less than ब्रह्म or supreme spirit or intelligence reflected in अन्तःकरण (internal organ of sense or intellect). But for this reflection there would be no occasion for the idea of egoism (अहम्) nor for the use of that word. For that part of the creation which has no अन्तःकरण there can be no reflection of चित् and therefore no occasion for the perception of egoism. The reflection of चित् in जीव is thus confined to the अन्तःकरण and is a sort of आलंबन or support for the idea of egoism and also necessarily for the use of the word अहम्.

72. The word तत् in the same text (तत्त्वमसि) indicates ईश्वर, of whom माया forms the उपाधि, who is the cause of this universe, who possesses the qualifications of omniscience, &c., who is the subject of indirect knowledge, and whose peculiar characteristics are सत्यत्व, ज्ञानत्व and अनंतत्व, (i. e., real existence, knowledge or intelligence and infiniteness).

73. The words त्वम् and तत् having been explained, it remains to make out the meaning of the whole sentence. The meaning is clear. The word त्वम् being the subject, the meaning of the sentence is 'Thou art that.' This indicates identification of the जीव or individual self with ईश or the universal self. But at the outset there arises a difficulty. If the two are identical, then the attributes of the two should correspond. That is however not the case. The जीव indicated by the word त्वम् is प्रत्यक्ष or directly knowable, while ईश is परोक्ष or indirectly knowable. Similarly जीव is only a part like other parts existing separately, while ईश is a complete whole in himself. The attributes of both are thus quite contradictory, and it is at first difficult to see how they can be identical. The difficulty is however got over by resort to the process of interpretation known as लक्षणा.

74. For a sentence to convey a meaning four requisites are necessary. (1) आकांक्षा, (2) योग्यता, (3) तात्पर्य and (4) सन्निधि-आकांक्षा indicates that the several parts of the sentence should be such that the meaning conveyed by one is incomplete without the other. योग्यता indicates certain connection between the different parts of the expression. तात्पर्य indicates the occasion for the use of the words in the expression. सन्निधि means that the several parts should be pronounced without breaking the continuity or sequence, as it is impossible for any meaning to be conveyed if the several parts are uttered at long intervals. Similarly a word or sentence may possess two significations: (1) वाच्यांश and (2) लक्ष्यांश. The first indicates a meaning that can be arrived at by a literal interpretation; while the second indicates a meaning that is intended to be conveyed and which is arrived at by reference to context and other processes of interpretation. लक्षणा is one of such processes. It is of three sorts; (1) जहत् (2) अजहत् (3) जहदजहत्. The first जहत् (also known

as जहस्त्वार्थ) is that in which the primary or original sense of a word disappears, *e. g.*, गंगायां घोषः. Now this expression literally means a cowshed situated on the Ganges. The shed indicated is not however on the river itself but on one of its banks. In this case the word गंगायां loses its primary sense and is interpreted to mean a bank of the Ganges. The second अजहत् (also known as अजहस्त्वार्थ) is that in which the primary or original sense of a word does not disappear but the word is used elliptically, *e. g.*, श्वेतो धावति. The first word here literally indicates merely 'one who is white' and is interpreted to mean a white horse. In this instance the word श्वेत does not lose its primary sense but is used to indicate a particular thing possessing the property of श्वेतत्व or whiteness. The third जहदजहत् is that which partakes of the character of both.

For the interpretation of the text तत्त्वमसि, the लक्षणा that is to be resorted to is that of the third kind, which is also known as भाग लक्षणा or भागत्याग लक्षणा. For instance, in the sentence सोऽयं देवदत्तः (meaning this is that Devadatta) a person that is standing in front is identified with one seen on a former occasion. For the purposes of this identification what is essential is that the individual should be the same. It is immaterial if other distinguishing marks such as dress, &c., seen on a former occasion, are not present on this occasion.

75. Now some might perhaps question the necessity of resorting to लक्षणा for the interpretation of this text. They may say that there are many expressions which can be interpreted without resort to this process; *e. g.*, the expressions गामानय (bring the cow) नीलसुगन्धुत्पलम् (blue and fragrant lotus), &c., are capable of being interpreted by reason of their possessing the requisites of आकांक्षा, योग्यता and सन्निधि, explained in the beginning of the foregoing stanza. The meaning

that is conveyed by the first expression गामान्य is technically known as संसर्गार्थ, *i. e.*, a meaning conveyed by two words being associated with one another in a particular relation. The meaning that is conveyed by the second expression नीलमुत्पलम् is technically known as विशिष्टार्थ, *i. e.*, a meaning conveyed by nouns qualified by certain adjectives. Neither of these can be adopted in determining the meaning of the text तत्त्वमसि. There is a consensus of opinion among all learned men that text must be interpreted to convey the idea that ब्रह्म constitutes in itself a peculiar essence or intelligence of unbroken continuity.

76. That intelligence which is observed to be present in individuals as witnessing the operations of बुद्धि, &c., is possessed of the properties of oneness and blissfulness. Similarly the supreme spirit having the characteristics of oneness and blissfulness is peculiarly possessed of the property of intelligence which shines in individuals.

The purpose of this stanza is to indicate the identity of the individual and the supreme spirit by means of व्यतिहार, a process of establishing identity by eliminating differences.

77 & 78. When the identity of the individual with the universal spirit is thus fully realized, then the idea that the individual (त्वम्) is not the supreme spirit will vanish immediately and similarly the notion that the ब्रह्म indicated by the word तत् is only the subject of indirect knowledge will disappear. It may be asked what follows from this? The reply is that, after the above process is gone through, there remains the directly perceptible intelligence or knowledge, having purely the characteristics of complete blissfulness.

79. Such being the case, those who hold that the texts known as महावाक्य only impart an indirect knowledge of the supreme spirit indeed furnish brilliant proof of their capability of understanding the conclusions of the Śāstras!

80. It may perhaps be argued that, whatever may be the conclusions of the S'āstras, common reasoning suggests the inference that all texts (*e. g.* those which assert the existence of स्वर्ग or heaven) are only capable of imparting indirect knowledge. Such argument, however, is not correct, in as much as an exception is found in such texts or sentences as दशमोऽसि (thou art the tenth person) in the illustration of ten persons erroneously lamenting over the loss of one of their party. In explaining that illustration it has been shown that the assurance conveyed by the words दशमोऽसि had the effect of producing direct knowledge.

81. In the text तत्त्वमसि it is proposed to identify the जीव or individual self with ब्रह्म. In doing so, it is admitted that the knowledge of त्वम् is direct and that of तत् is indirect. But when you assert that the texts known as महावाक्य are only capable of producing indirect knowledge, you naturally turn into indirect knowledge that knowledge which was admittedly direct. Such reasoning is indeed very forcible !

82. There is a popular saying that a capitalist, in wishing to increase his capital by the accumulation of interest, loses the very capital. Luckily for us your reasoning has proved the truth of the above saying.

83. It may perhaps be said that जीव, who represents intelligence reflected in the internal organ (अन्तःकरण) deserves to be directly known, because अन्तःकरण serves as the उपाधि or the medium; that such is however not the case with ब्रह्म; for ब्रह्म there is no उपाधि or medium; and therefore it cannot be अपरोक्ष or capable of being directly known.

84. But that is not so. The knowledge that जीव is identical with ब्रह्म is not possible without some medium. It is thus clear that such knowledge has an उपाधि or medium. When knowledge has an उपाधि it also follows that the thing to be known cannot be without an उपाधि. Such

उपाधि is not done away with until the जीव is freed from the material body and is absolved from future births.

85. If both जीव and ब्रह्म have an उपाधि it becomes necessary to indicate the distinction between their respective media. Association with and dissociation from अन्तःकरण constitute the respective media of the two. There is no other distinction.

86. Now it may be urged that association with अन्तःकरण, being a certain existent condition, can be understood to constitute a medium or उपाधि, but dissociation from अन्तःकरण cannot be so understood, as the condition thereby indicated is one of non-existence. To this the reply is as follows:—Just as a certain existence, *e.g.*, association with अन्तःकरण in the present instance, can be a medium or उपाधि, so why cannot its absence, *e.g.*, dissociation from अन्तःकरण in the present instance, be a medium or उपाधि ?

That one is a positive and the other a negative condition is clear, but that difference is not sufficient to make one fit to be a medium and the other unfit to be a medium. If there are two chains one of gold and another of iron, the fact of their being made of different metals does not make any difference in their fitness to be called 'chains'.

Madhusudan Swami, in his treatise called अद्वैतसिद्धि, gives the following definition of उपाधि:—यावत्कार्यमवस्थायि भेद हेतु उपाधि:—उपाधि is the cause of difference between two things which lasts so long as the effect lasts. Taking the cases of जीव and ब्रह्म, जीव differs from ब्रह्म on account of its association with अन्तःकरण. This association of जीव with अन्तःकरण is thus the cause of difference, and moreover, as this association lasts till the effect, *viz.*, direct knowledge of the identity of the two, is produced, it satisfies the definition of उपाधि. Similarly ब्रह्म differs from जीव on account of its dissociation from अन्तःकरण. This dissociation is thus the cause of difference and thus becomes an उपाधि.

87. In corroboration of the view that negation, in the same way as assertion, serves as the उपाधि of ब्रह्म by the fact of its being the means of conveying the knowledge of ब्रह्म, it may be stated that S'ankarâchârya and others hold that the Vedanta treats of ब्रह्म by two methods, viz., (1) Elimination, i.e., indicating what it is not and (2) Direct assertion.

The word तत् indicates ब्रह्म and therefore अतत् indicates all that is not ब्रह्म, i.e., the illusion of the universe. Now the first method of describing ब्रह्म is that by which everything coming under the category of अतत् is excluded as not satisfying the definition of ब्रह्म by such expressions as नेति. The second method is to indicate the positive characteristics by which ब्रह्म may be known, e. g., to say that ब्रह्म is सत्यम् (really existing) मूज्ञान (knowledge itself) अनन्तम् (infinite).

88. It has been said above that one of the methods by which the Vedanta treats of ब्रह्म is that of elimination. From this it would follow that in the text अहं ब्रह्म whatever is implied by the word अहम् would be eliminated and therefore there would be no chance of identification of the individual with the supreme spirit. Such a contention however is not correct, because the process of elimination applies only to whatever does not constitute the spirit. The word अहम् implies not only the unreal ego, but it implies also the spirit circumscribed in the material body, and what is eliminated is the ego, leaving the circumscribed spirit to be identified with the all-pervading spirit. This process of partial elimination is what has been before explained under the name of भागलक्षणा or जहदजहल्लक्षणा.

89. When अन्तःकरण is eliminated what remains is intelligence itself. Then by realizing the drift of the text अहंब्रह्म it is known that the intelligence which was first perceived through the medium of अन्तःकरण is identical with the supreme spirit or intelligence.

90. It may perhaps be objected that the individual self, being possessed of the property of shining by its own light, cannot be said to be capable of being acted upon by बुद्धि or intellect. But that is not so. The individual self, although shining by its own light, is acted upon by बुद्धि in the same way as other objects: otherwise it would be impossible to know that the self is possessed of such property. The ancient expounders of Vedānta have indeed given a warning against the acceptance of the thesis that self is capable of being acted upon by बुद्धि but in interpreting this dictum of theirs it must be remembered that by बुद्धि they did not wish to indicate the intellect merely but the reflection of चित् in the intellect. They have admitted that the spirit is subjected to the operation of धी वृत्ति, *i. e.*, it is वृत्तिव्याप्य, but they have objected to the opinion that the spirit is also subjected to the operation of फल (न चिदाभास) *i. e.*, it is फलव्याप्य.

91. In the case of objects other than the self such as a jar, &c., what occurs is that they are acted upon both by intellect (बुद्धि) and the reflection of intelligence in the intellect (चिदाभास). बुद्धि or intellect when it acts upon another object serves to dispel ignorance regarding it, while the reflection of intelligence (चिदाभास) serves to give a correct idea of that object.

92. Now in the case of self or spirit it is essential that it should be acted upon by बुद्धि or intellect in order that ignorance may vanish, but the spirit being intelligence itself there is no use of its being acted upon by the reflection of intelligence.

93. This may be illustrated by an example. To know certain objects that are lying in the dark it is necessary that one should have eyes to see as well as a light to show. But to know a lighted lamp it is enough to have eyes.

94. Even admitting that the spirit is acted upon also by the reflection of intelligence, the result will be that the reflection will be absorbed in the intelligence itself, but will not as in the case of other objects have an appreciable effect.

95. The incapability of being acted upon by the reflection of intelligence which we have asserted above in the case of ब्रह्म is based upon the following text which occurs in the उपनिषद् known by the name of अमृतबिन्दुः—

निर्विकल्पमनंतं च हेतुदृष्टान्तवर्जितम्
अप्रमेयमनादि च यज्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते बुधः

In the above text ब्रह्म is described by various attributes one of which is 'अप्रमेयम्' which indicates that it is not acted upon by the reflection of intelligence. Similarly in the उपनिषद् known by the name of कठवल्ली the following text occurs :— मनसैवेदमाप्तव्यं नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन; and this indicates that ब्रह्म has to be acted upon by the intellect or बुद्धि.

96. In stanza (48) above it has been pointed out that the text आत्मानं चेद् विजानीयात्, &c., purports to indicate the attainment by जीव of two conditions, viz., अपरोक्ष ज्ञान (direct knowledge) and शोकनिवृत्ति (cessation of grief). Now the question is what is the extent of direct knowledge indicated there ? The kind of knowledge indicated there is that which consists in identifying the individual self with ब्रह्म, after determining the properties thereof.

97. It is true that direct knowledge is thus derived from texts known as महावाक्य if properly understood. But that is not enough; the knowledge thus derived is evidently not lasting. Otherwise Vyāsa and S'ankarāchārya would not have urged the necessity of constant repetition of the process of hearing, contemplation, &c.

98. S'ankarāchārya in his treatise known as वाक्यवृत्ति advises that until the sense conveyed by the text अहं ब्रह्मास्मि

is indelibly impressed upon the mind one should constantly resort to श्रवण, मनन, &c., and should also practise the control of the mind.

99. Various causes lead to the distraction of the mind even after direct knowledge is derived from texts. The *first* is that the texts are numerous and therefore one finds it difficult to put all his faith in one text only. The *second* is that the knowledge thus derived is not of the kind that is experienced ordinarily and therefore one is often led to doubt its correctness. The *third* is that one is often overpowered by thoughts which are not consonant with that knowledge. There are several others of like nature and they point to the necessity of practising all processes which will contribute to confirm that knowledge.

100. The S'rutis prescribe the observance of different rites for different kinds of sacrifices and the rites also differ according to the objects intended to be accomplished. This circumstance is likely to lead one to infer that in the Upanishads also there may be different ways prescribed for attaining different objects. But that is not so, and in order to fix this idea firmly in the mind it is necessary to resort to श्रवण.

101. It may naturally be asked what is श्रवण. श्रवण is the process by which one arrives at the conclusion that all the Upanishads, when properly construed in regard to their several parts, viz., those relating to the introduction of the subject, those dealing with its explanation and amplification, and those which comprise its summing up, tend to establish the identity of the universal with the individual self.

102. Bádaráyana and S'ankaráchárya have treated of श्रवण satisfactorily in the first chapter headed 'समन्वय' of their Sutras and Bháshya respectively. In the second chapter they treat of मनन which indicates the process by which one

is enabled to determine the real character of the subject, by means of arguments which satisfy the intellect and which refute all possible objections.

103. Just as on account of impressions which are strengthened by the succession of births, the idea of the material body, &c., being identical with the spirit recurs again and again, so does the idea that the world is real.

104. This is what is called **विपरीत भावना**, *i. e.*, an idea contrary to reality. This idea disappears when one concentrates his mind. This concentration is attained by the worship of symbolic deities even before one acquires the knowledge of the reality.

105. The worship of symbolic deities has for this reason been touched upon in works which treat of **ब्रह्म**. To such as have not practised this concentration before, it is attainable by **ब्रह्माभ्यास**, *i. e.*, contemplation of **ब्रह्म**.

106. What constitutes **ब्रह्माभ्यास**? The wise understand **ब्रह्माभ्यास** to mean the contemplation of **ब्रह्म**, its discussion with others, mutual interchange of ideas regarding it, and the exclusion of all other thoughts.

107. The S'ruti has it that one who is gifted with the attributes necessary to enable him to detach himself from worldly pursuits and who is at the same time desirous of attaining **absolution**, after once acquiring the knowledge of the real spirit, should try to concentrate his mind on the spirit. He should not indulge in either thinking or talking of anything else, because that only results in fatigue unaccompanied by any real good.

108. This view receives confirmation from the Smriti also. In the Bhagawadgita—Chapter IX, stanza 22, S'ri Krishna says that he takes care, in all respects, of those who devote themselves to him heart and soul and do not divert their thoughts to any other quarter.

109. The drift of the texts from S'ruti and Smriti quoted above is to inculcate the necessity of concentrating the intellect on the spirit and thus gradually reduce the possibility of the rise of विपरीत भावना, *i. e.*, thoughts which are not consonant with the spirit.

110. This विपरीत भावना may be defined as follows :—The idea regarding a particular thing which is quite different from the real nature of that thing is विपरीत भावना. For example father, mother, &c., can never be one's enemies, and to regard them as such is विपरीत भावना.

111. Now, आत्मा or the spirit is quite different from the material body. In the same way this universe is a mere illusion. To think that आत्मा is identical with this material body and that this universe has a real existence is विपरीत भावना.

112. This विपरीत भावना vanishes with the dawn of knowledge. It is therefore necessary that one should constantly impress upon his mind the fact that आत्मा is quite distinct from the material body and that the world is an illusion.

113. It may be asked whether the process, indicated in the foregoing stanza, of inculcating the distinctness of आत्मा from the material body and the illusory character of the world, has to be repeated at stated times, just as is the case with the repetition of मंत्र *i. e.*, incantations, or the contemplation of God in a particular form.

114. The reply is that there is no limitation of this process, the result of the process being directly perceptible as in the case of the operation of taking food. One who is hungry never waits for a particular hour, as one does who has to repeat a मंत्र.

115. One who is hungry may either satisfy his hunger by eating or may divert himself by other means without eating. So also without sitting regularly to dine he may at his pleasure consume morsels of food while walking or lying down. Somehow or other he desires to satisfy his hunger and for doing that he need not be bound by regulations.

116. But the case is different with repetitions of incantations, &c. Incantations have to be repeated under certain regulations. If one does not repeat मन्त्र he is sinful. So also if he repeats them but not according to the regulations, then by change of accent or letter he runs the risk of drawing misfortunes on himself.

The incantations or मन्त्र may be defective either on account of omission or change of proper accent or on account of change of letter. With such omission or change it fails to convey the intended meaning and brings destruction on the person for whose behoof it is repeated, just as was the case with the मन्त्र which, being repeated in the wrong way, produced the result of making इन्द्र the enemy of वृत्र.

117. Now this विपरीत भावना, *i.e.*, idea contrary or opposed to reality, is just like hunger in the illustration. Its effect is directly perceptible in the shape of misery, and just as hunger has to be satisfied without any regard to limitations of time or place, so this idea must be got over under any circumstances, and there is no rule limiting the practice of that process to particular time or place.

118. What then is this process? It has already been indicated above, *vide* stanza 106, as consisting of repeated contemplation, discussion, &c. For such complete absorption in ब्रह्म there are no specific conditions, similar to those prescribed in the case of ध्यान, *i. e.*, contemplation of a personal God.

119. What is ध्यान? ध्यान indicates that process of contemplation in which the idea of a particular image or idol is constantly kept before the mind, without the intervention of anything else. In such a process, endeavour is made to keep the mind, which is extremely fickle, under very great restraint.

120. In the Bhagavad Gita, Arjuna is represented to have said to God S'rikrishna that the mind is admittedly very

fickle ; it overpowers a person : it is too powerful to be brought under control : and its attachment, when once formed, is impossible to dissociate : and for these reasons its control is as difficult as that of the wind.

121. Similarly Vasishtha has also said that the control of the mind is more difficult than the undertaking to quaff off the sea, to dislodge the mountain Meru, and to devour fire.

122. In the matter of this contemplation and discussion of the spirit or ब्रह्म, one's activities are not circumscribed like those of a person who is chained to a particular spot. On the contrary one derives great amusement by reading and hearing of episodes recorded in history, which furnish apt illustrations to serve as guides, just like the amusement derived from a dramatic representation.

123. The reading and hearing of such episodes will not interfere with the profound meditation of ब्रह्म, in case the main fact that the spirit or आत्मा is not material but is intelligence itself and that all the world is unreal is steadily kept in view.

124. But the same would not be the case with other worldly dealings. If one were to follow agricultural or commercial pursuits, or were to earn his livelihood by service, or were to engage oneself in studying rhetoric and logic : these occupations are likely to interfere with the meditation of ब्रह्म because they are not conducive to the recollection of the reality in the spirit.

125. It does not follow from this that one who wishes to keep the spirit or ब्रह्म steadily in view must also desist from the operations of eating, drinking, &c.; that is not necessary because the two can be carried on simultaneously. Moreover even if it is admitted that the operations of eating, drinking, &c., do interfere with the contemplation of ब्रह्म, the interference is not absolute but only temporary, and after a while one will be reminded of the process of contemplation.

126. A mere temporary forgetfulness is not calculated to upset the tenor of mind previously contracted. What is to be feared most is the encroachment of ideas contrary to reality. Such ideas do not find time to establish themselves during a condition of temporary forgetfulness.

127. For one who follows other pursuits there is no time to give thought to that which is real. On the contrary the following of other pursuits being directly prejudicial to the practice of contemplation, the reality is perforce lost sight of.

128. There are texts in the S'rnti which in one place enjoin the knowledge of the spirit and inculcate desistance from all talk that does not pertain thereto. In another place it is said that one should not exercise his speech by talking much, because such exercise merely serves to fatigue the organ of speech without producing any real good.

129. If any one urges that these other pursuits are on the same footing as the operations of eating and drinking he may be asked whether these pursuits are in his opinion as essential to life as eating and drinking and therefore he persists in giving equal weight to both.

130. It may be asked how it was that King Janaka, who was admittedly a great philosopher, administered a kingdom. The reply is that the impressions of direct knowledge (अपरोक्ष ज्ञान) derived by Janaka were indelible, and therefore he did not run the risk of losing those impressions by indulging in other pursuits. If you are prepared to say that you also belong to the same category then you are quite at liberty to do likewise. You may then study logic or practise agriculture.

131. It may be asked why it is that persons like Janaka, whose conviction of the unreal nature of the world is firm, still live a wordly life. The reply is that they are obliged to live that life by force of such of their actions of former births as are in the state of bearing fruit and are technically known

as प्रारब्ध. The force of such actions disappears only after the result is produced, and therefore it is necessary even for philosophers to live a wordly life so that the force of प्रारब्ध may spend itself. But the difference between ordinary persons and philosophers is that the former trouble themselves by the ideas of happiness and misery while the latter remain completely unaffected.

132. The fact that even philosophers are not able to keep free from the effects of प्रारब्ध need not necessarily lead to the supposition that they are thus even likely to commit acts which are not consonant with their wisdom. Or, where is the harm even in admitting this possibility, for who can prevent the प्रारब्ध actions from bearing their fruit?

133. The प्रारब्ध actions of both philosophers and others bear fruit by the same rules. The only difference between the two is that the philosopher, on account of his knowing the real state, is not afflicted by what he suffers, while an ordinary person is pained because he is devoid of that knowledge.

134. This may be illustrated by an example. Suppose two persons are travelling together, and both are equally fatigued. One of them knows that their destination is not very distant and therefore walks with agility. While the other not having that knowledge feels quite dejected and helpless.

135. One who has perfectly realized the identity of his self with the supreme spirit is never upset by ideas antagonistic to that conclusion. Why then will he take upon himself the troubles and afflictions which really pertain to the material body?

136. It being determined that this world is of the nature of an illusion, the subject as well as the objects of desire vanish. In their absence all trouble and affliction cease, having nothing to feed upon, in the same way as a lamp ceases to give light when the oil is exhausted.

137. Take for instance a city of a class of demi-gods produced before the eye by a process of magic. One who knows it to be such never desires to possess anything from this unreal city. Not only that, he also laughs at the idea and would have nothing to do with such things.

138. Thus one, who is able to discriminate between the real and the unreal, not only feels no attachment for enjoyments which merely present a pleasing appearance, but, having in view their deceptive character, positively discards them.

139. These wordly possessions are ever a source of trouble. Take wealth for instance. There is trouble in acquiring it; there is also trouble in preserving it. It causes pain when lost, as also when spent. Wo then to wealth which is a source of trouble all through !

140. Next let us see what a woman really is. A woman is nothing more than a doll of flesh, with several limbs moving mechanically. She is made up of sinews, veins, bones and glands. What is there in her which is charming or beautiful ?

141. These and such others are the defects of these worldly things, which are set forth exhaustively in acknowledged works. If one were to think of them incessantly, how is it possible for him to drown himself in misery ?

142. Even a person who is troubled by hunger does not desire to eat poisonous food. It is not strange therefore that one whose hunger has been completely appeased by freely partaking of savoury dishes and who has also the capacity of knowing that a particular food is poisonous will not desire to partake of it.

Applying this illustration to the subject matter under discussion, it follows that one who knows the unreal character of worldly things will not pursue them even when he is troubled by desires. *A fortiori* one who has such knowledge and at the same time has no desires will never pursue them.

143. If by force of actions of former births (प्राक्कृत) such a person is swayed by a desire for worldly enjoyment, then he enjoys the worldly things not with relish but sorrowfully, like a person who is impressed for labour.

144. Men are often found who have acquired a knowledge of the unreal character of this world and are possessed of faith, but nevertheless, having to remain in their families and thus having to follow worldly pursuits, are constantly troubled with the thought that the force of their former actions has not yet been spent.

145. It is said above that persons who have acquired knowledge are *troubled* with the thought that the force of their former actions has not yet been spent. From this it may be argued that such persons still remain capable of being *troubled*, which is inconsistent with the condition of knowledge. But it must be remembered that the pain that such persons feel is not for insufficiency of enjoyment of the things of this world, but on the contrary is on account of want of cessation of such enjoyment, for which they have acquired complete indifference. The pain that is felt for absence of worldly enjoyments is traceable to delusion, while the pain here referred to is the result of knowledge.

146. One who has acquired knowledge and is thus inspired with the feeling that all worldly pursuits are painful indulges in them to such small extent as is absolutely necessary for the requirements of his प्राक्कृत कर्म. While on the other hand a worldly man will not be satisfied even with an interminable lease of enjoyment.

147. It is said in the Puranás that a desire is never satisfied by its fulfilment, but is on the contrary intensified, in the same way as fire is not extinguished by an offering but is more inflamed.

148. When a thing is partaken of with the knowledge that it possesses certain defects, one is soon satisfied with it, i.e., he

thinks that he has had enough of it. As an illustration it may be stated that if a thief is associated with, with full knowledge of his character, he does not act with you like a thief but becomes a friend.

149. To one who has controlled his mind by the practice of योग, even a little enjoyment of worldly things without any of its ramifications appears a great deal, because he looks at it from the point of view of its being fraught with evil.

150. This may be illustrated thus:—A king who is released from imprisonment will be satisfied with the possession of even a single village. While one who has never been captured nor even attacked by others, will not think much of a whole kingdom.

151. It may be asked how it is possible that actions known as प्रारब्ध will create a desire for worldly enjoyment when one has known the evils that are concomitants of such enjoyment, and when such knowledge is ever present.

152. The reply is that it is quite possible, as will be seen from what follows. Of the प्रारब्ध actions there are three classes :—इच्छाप्रारब्ध ; (2) अनिच्छाप्रारब्ध ; and (3) परेच्छाप्रारब्ध.

153. When a person knowing the evil consequences of his actions is impelled to them he is swayed by इच्छाप्रारब्ध, i.e., that प्रारब्ध which creates इच्छा or desire. As instances may be cited the cases of diseased persons partaking of unwholesome food, persons committing theft, and persons having illicit intercourse with the wives of a king. In all these cases persons are driven to do forbidden things by the force of प्रारब्ध in the face of their conviction that they are bringing calamity upon themselves.

154. The results of this प्रारब्ध cannot be prevented even by ईश्वर. To this effect are the words of God S'rikrishna addressed to Arjuna in the Bhagavadgita.

155. Stanza 33 of Chapter III of that book conveys the following sense :—Even a person who has acquired knowledge acts according to the inclinations resulting from actions of former births. All being thus swayed, what will the control of any sort avail ?

156. This is corroborated by another authority which says :—If it was possible to change the course of events which has been previously marked out, then kings नल, राम and युधिष्ठिर would not have suffered all the afflictions they did.

157. The fact that even ईश्वर is not able to ward off the results of प्रारब्ध need not detract from his function of universal control. Because the very law by which such inevitable results are produced is laid down by ईश्वर,

So much for the first sort, *viz.*, इच्छाप्रारब्ध.

158. Now as regards the second, it is gathered from the questions and replies of Arjuna and Krishna that अनिच्छा प्रारब्ध does exist. These questions and answers are as follows.

159. Arjuna asks (*vide* stanza 36 of Chapter III of the Bhagavadgita)—Oh Krishna by whose prompting does a person, though himself unwilling, is driven as if by force to act sinfully ?

160. S'rikrishna answers (stanza 37 *ibid*):—The prompter is काम, *i. e.*, passion which sometimes develops into क्रोध, *i. e.*, anger, both of which are born of the quality of रजस, *i. e.*, the element of action. Both are all devouring and prompters of sinful actions. Know them to be the enemies in this case.

161. Again in Stanza 60 of Chapter XVIII of the Bhagavadgita S'rikrishna says to Arjuna :—Oh son of Kunti ! Thou art bound hand and foot by your own कर्म or actions, which are born along with thyself. Thou art utterly helpless, and therefore though not really wishing to do a thing, thou wilt do it thoughtlessly in spite of thyself.

162. Now it remains to refer to the last sort, *viz.*, परेच्छाप्रारब्ध. Though one may not be himself willing to do a thing, but at the same time is not unwilling to do it, and does it out of regard for the feelings of others, though such action may involve happiness or misery, then such action is the result of परेच्छाप्रारब्ध.

163. From what has just preceded it is clear that even persons who have acquired knowledge are not free from इच्छा, *i. e.*, desires, which are the result of प्रारब्ध कर्म. That being so, it may perhaps be said that such conclusion is inconsistent with the S'ruti text किमिच्छन्कस्यकामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् given at the commencement of this chapter. This text apparently implies that a person who has acquired the knowledge of his identity with the supreme spirit is free from desires. But the text should be interpreted to mean *not* that he has no desires but that his desires are such as have no potency and will therefore not make him miserable, just like seeds which, being parched, lose all power of germination.

164. Seeds, when parched, continue to be seeds but they lose their property of germination. The desires in the case of a person who has acquired knowledge are of that nature. The unreal nature of the objects of desire having been known, no misery on their account is possible.

165. If such is the case why not avoid all difficulty by maintaining that a person who has acquired knowledge is altogether free from desires? But that will not do in as much as it is a fact that even such a person has to endure certain sufferings as the result of प्रारब्ध. Just as parched seed though incapable of germination is still serviceable as food, so the desires of a ज्ञानी though incapable of producing great misery are still enough to produce small sufferings.

166. The effects of प्रारब्ध कर्म are exhausted merely by the sufferings endured, and misery is not an essential element.

It may then be asked what is the cause of misery. The reply is that misery is caused by the delusion under which all objects of desires are looked upon as real though they are illusory.

167. On account of such delusion ignorant people cherish the wish that their enjoyments should never cease but on the contrary should increase year after year and that no impediments should obstruct their progress. Such people fancy themselves blessed on account of such enjoyments.

168. A remedy for this delusion lies in understanding that what is not to happen will not happen and what is to happen will not be avoided. Such knowledge is calculated to destroy the effects of the poison of anxiety, and to remove delusion.

169. Sufferings are the common lot of both the knowing and the ignorant but the latter feel miserable on account of delusion while the former do not. The reason is that the latter feed themselves on the contemplation of impracticable and unreal things and thus bring untold misery on themselves.

170. On the other hand, one who has acquired knowledge is conscious that all objects of enjoyment are illusory and therefore he finds no interest in them. Thus though actually in a certain state of suffering or enjoyment he does not interest himself in them. Whence then can there be misery?

171. How is it possible for one to take interest in the delights of this world or to be affected by its miseries, when he actually sees that the world is as unreal as a dream or magical performance, that it appears at one moment and vanishes at the next, and that its composition is such as surpasses all conjecture.

172. It is true that when one realizes that the dealings of this world are like a dream or a magical performance he

will not be interested in them, but the question is how is this state to be attained. The way to do it is as follows :—One should, when awake, first picture to himself vividly what he has seen in a dream and then carefully and constantly think over the conditions of dreaming and wakefulness.

173. He should then for a long time realize that the two conditions are similar in all respects. The enjoyment or suffering in both cases is only for the time being, in both cases the end is unpleasant, and both of them are liable to vanish. He then should abandon all idea of reality regarding the condition of wakefulness. Then he will cease to take interest in worldly dealings, as he did before.

174. For one who never forgets that this universe, on account of its inconceivable composition, is like a magical performance, what chance is there of any harm from enjoyments or sufferings which are the result of प्रारब्ध.

175. The function of knowledge is to determine the illusory nature of the universe and not to do away with the enjoyments or sufferings resulting from प्रारब्ध. On the other hand the function of प्रारब्ध is to yield enjoyments and sufferings to the जीव who is responsible for that प्रारब्ध, but it does not concern itself with the reality or otherwise of the worldly objects.

176. Thus the co-existence of विद्या or knowledge and प्रारब्ध, i.e., the results of actions that are in a condition to bear fruit, is not impracticable for the simple reason that their functions are different. As an illustration may be cited the enjoyment derived from witnessing a magical performance notwithstanding the fact that it is known to be an illusion.

177. प्रारब्ध can be said to be opposed to विद्या only on the supposition that in order that its results may take place it first establishes the reality of the world. It is necessary

that the प्रारब्ध actions must bear fruit. There is no difference of opinion on this head. The difference occurs only with respect to the real or unreal nature of the universe. Knowledge means the realization of the unreal nature of the universe and if this universe is proved to be real for the purposes of प्रारब्ध then the opposition between knowledge and प्रारब्ध may be taken as established. But the mere fact that the प्रारब्ध must bear its fruit does not necessarily involve the admission that the wordly objects in connection with which the sufferings and enjoyments take place are real.

178. In the condition of dreaming there is complete enjoyment and suffering with the help of objects which do not really exist. Similarly sufferings and enjoyments are quite possible during the state of wakefulness with the help of objects which are not real.

179. Again knowledge or विद्या will be taken to have destroyed प्रारब्ध if it can be shown that it (विद्या) obliterates the whole universe. Because when the universe disappears, nothing remains on which प्रारब्ध can act and therefore it must also vanish. But the fact is not so. What knowledge (विद्या) accomplishes is that it leads to the determination of the unreal nature of the universe. But when a thing is known to be unreal it need not necessarily disappear.

180. Just as when a magical performance is witnessed the spectators actually see the different feats though at the same time they know that they are a mere illusion. So a knowledge of the unreal nature of the universe is not inconsistent with deriving pleasure and pain from worldly objects.

181 & 182. It may be urged that the S'ruti contains many texts which purport to say that when one realizes the identity of the whole external world with his own spirit, then in that condition no action is possible ; then there is no one who can

see, there is nothing by which he can see, and there is nothing to be seen ; and similarly with reference to senses of touch, smell and speech. Such being the case it is clear that the rise of knowledge presupposes the obliteration of all distinction between self and the outer world, and that the rise of knowledge is not possible otherwise. How then is it possible for one who has acquired knowledge to feel pleasure or pain ?

183. To meet this argument it may be stated that in aphorism No. 16 of section 4 of Chapter 4 of Brahma Sutras it is very clearly stated that the texts from the S'rutis cited above are capable of being interpreted to refer either to the condition of sound sleep or to that of absolution, and not to the condition of those who have simply acquired knowledge. All action ceases either when one is in sound sleep or when he is मुक्त, i. e., absolved from trammels of birth and death and freed from the material body.

184. If the meaning of the texts in question were not limited as above indicated, it would not have been possible for sages like Yājñavalkya to be the instructors of knowledge. If it was admitted that such sages were capable of worldly dealings then they could not be possessed of the knowledge of reality and therefore could not be the instructors of that knowledge. On the other hand if it was maintained that they were not capable of worldly dealings then it would follow that there was no possibility of their knowledge being imparted to their pupils and thus all transmission or communication of knowledge would be hopeless.

185. It might be argued that the ज्ञान (knowledge) which sages like Yājñavalkya and others possessed when they imparted instruction to others was परोक्ष ज्ञान and not अपरोक्ष ज्ञान, because they were in that condition capable of worldly dealings. In the state of abstraction known as निर्विकल्प समाधि all worldly dealings cease and therefore such abstraction is

अपरोक्ष ज्ञान. If this position is taken as correct, then why should not sound sleep also be taken as अपरोक्ष ज्ञान, because in that condition also all worldly dealings cease.

186. To this it may be replied that during the condition of sound sleep there is no knowledge of self and therefore sound sleep cannot be अपरोक्ष विद्या. If so then the argument reduces itself to this :—that knowledge of self is what can be properly styled विद्या, and not merely the obliteration of the external world.

187. It may further be contended that obliteration of the external world and knowledge of self together constitute विद्या and that only one of them without the other is not entitled to be styled विद्या. If so then inanimate objects like a pitcher, &c., must be said to possess half the qualifications which go to constitute विद्या, because they have no consciousness of the external world.

188. Nay, this absence of consciousness in the case of material objects cannot be equalled in firmness even by such absence in the case of men devoted to abstract contemplation, because their concentration is likely to be disturbed by the noise of mosquitoes and similar distractions !

189. To avoid such an absurdity the obvious conclusion is that knowledge of self alone is विद्या, and we congratulate our opponent on his arriving at it. It may be urged that such knowledge is not possible when the mind is in an impure condition and that therefore it requires to be controlled by artificial means. To this we do not object. They may be resorted to according to one's pleasure.

190. Such control of mind is desirable from our point of view also. Because it assists in bringing about a knowledge of the unreal character of the universe and the real character of self. Such knowledge becomes possible when the impurities of the mind are washed by processes of control.

The conclusion therefore is that a person who has acquired knowledge does possess desires but they are not of the same type as those of one who is ignorant, and this is the drift of the portion of the S'ruti quoted in the first stanza of this chapter, *viz.*, किमिच्छन्, &c.

191. In the S'ástras there occur sayings which are apparently contradictory, but which are capable of reconciliation by putting different interpretations on the term राग 'desires' which occurs in them. There is one saying which is to the following effect :—

रागोलिंगमवोचस्य चित्तव्यायाम भूमिषु ।

कुतः शाद्वलता तस्य यस्याग्निःकोटरे तरोः ॥

meaning :—desire for things coming within the range of the mind is an indication of absence of knowledge; how is it possible for a tree which has fire within its hollow to remain green ?

This saying indicates that possession of desires is inconsistent with the possession of knowledge. There is another saying which runs as follows :—

शास्त्रार्थस्य समाप्तत्वान्मुक्तिः स्यात्तावता मुनेः ।

रागादयः सन्तु कामं नतद्भावोऽपराध्यते ॥

meaning :—a proper understanding of the real drift of the S'ástras accompanied by the necessary practices is enough to secure absolution; it does not matter if desires, &c., remain; their presence will do no harm.

This saying indicates that absolution is attained by knowledge, in spite of the presence of desires, &c., *i.e.*, possession of desires is quite consistent with possession of knowledge.

Now the way to reconcile these two sayings is to interpret the term राग 'desires, &c.,' to mean strong desires, &c., *i. e.*, addiction or attachment, in the first case, and to mean 'mere

semblance of desires, &c.,’ in the second case. Thus what is objected to in the first saying is attachment or addiction, and what is held as allowable in the second is semblance of desires, not real desires, &c.

192. So much for the meaning of the words ‘किमिच्छन्’ in the S’ruti quoted at the commencement of this chapter. Now turning to the words ‘कस्यकामाय’ it may be said that they are used with the view of indicating that there really exists no one who enjoys or suffers, just as the words ‘किमिच्छन्’ are used to show that there is nothing real to desire, the whole universe being an illusion. आत्मा or the spirit is not susceptible of enjoyment or suffering as he is असंग, *i.e.*, not susceptible of any association.

193. It is emphatically asserted in the S’ruti that the attachment that is seen to exist in the several relations such as those of man and wife, father and children, &c., is not for the sake of the object of such attachment but for the sake of the pleasure derived by the spirit or self.

194 & 195. If that is so then it follows that it is the spirit or self who enjoys or suffers. Then the question arises whether it is the कूटस्थ, or the चिदाभास or a combination of both, that enjoys or suffers. Taking these in their order, it may be stated at once that कूटस्थ being unsusceptible of association is not capable of enjoyment or suffering. भोग signifies the change that results from identification with the sensations of pleasure and pain. If it is maintained that कूटस्थ is भोक्ता then it amounts to saying that he is विकारी, *i. e.*, susceptible of change. The term कूटस्थ in itself signifies immutability. To say that कूटस्थ is विकारी is thus clearly contradictory.

196. Now let us see if चिदाभास can be विकारी. चिदाभास is a reflection of चित् or intelligence in बुद्धि or intellect. This बुद्धि is विकारी or susceptible of change and on account of this nature of बुद्धि it is natural to infer that चिदाभास also is विकारी.

But further consideration will show that चिदाभास has no existence by itself. It is after all an आभास or illusion and as no illusion is possible without a substratum of reality, it is not possible to separate चिदाभास from its substratum of कूटस्थ, to allow of the sensations of pain and pleasure being attributed to it

197. Therefore it is the combination of कूटस्थ and चिदाभास that is ordinarily deemed capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. But this theory is not correct in as much as it is not consonant with the conclusions arrived at in the S'ruti, wherein this combination of कूटस्थ and चिदाभास is carefully analysed and in the end what remains as the substratum of truth is कूटस्थ.

198. In the Brihadáranyakopanishad (बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्) it is stated that when King Janaka asked Yājñavalkya to describe the nature of आत्मा or spirit, he commenced with the विशानमय आत्मा and after further analysis reduced it to the spirit which is unsusceptible of association.

199. Similarly in the Aitareyopanishad (ऐतरेयोपनिषद्) and other places whenever there is a discussion regarding the nature of आत्मा or the spirit, the combination of कूटस्थ and चिदाभास is first analysed and the former is in the end shown to be real.

200. If then there is no one who is capable of experiencing the sensations of pleasure and pain, how is it that the whole animal world has the firm conviction that such sensations are real and not illusory. The reply is that the जीव attributes to itself the reality of the कूटस्थ, and thus looking upon all pleasure and pain as also real is never inclined to leave that notion.

201. Now this जीव cares for the worldly connections, such as those of husband, wife, &c., not for the sake of those connected with him but for his own sake. It is this popular

notion that is well indicated by the S'ruti texts referred to in stanza (193) above.

202. But then what is the object of alluding to this popular notion ? The object is to divert attention from the worldly objects and to direct it to self as one experiencing pleasure and pain from such objects.

203. In the Purans there occurs a verse which conveys the following meaning :—

Oh God ! while I am contemplating you, let my devotion be as firm as the attachment of ignorant and thoughtless person to worldly objects.

204. In this way one who desires to attain absolution tries to divert his mind from all worldly objects and concentrates it on the self, who is popularly supposed to experience pleasure and pain, and then he entertains a desire to know that self.

205. Just as an ignorant person is ever careful regarding his objects of enjoyment such as garlands, sandal ointment, wife, clothes, gold &c., so one who is **मुमुक्षु** i. e., desirous of attaining absolution, ever keeps his eye on the self as **भोक्ता**.

206. Just as one who desires to excel over others in learning, entirely devotes himself to the study of drama, poetry and similar works in the department of literature, as also to the study of logic and other branches of learning, so one who desires to attain absolution should devote himself entirely to the contemplation of self.

207. Just as one who is desirous of reaching the **स्वर्ग** and similar other worlds, resorts to the practice of **जप** i. e., repetition of prayers and **उपासना** i. e., religious needitation, and performs sacrifices, having full faith in their efficacy ; so one who desires to attain absolution should put all his faith in self.

208. Just as a योगी tries to acquire concentration of the mind by means of exercises which entail very great labour, with the object of being the possessor of supernatural powers known as the eight सिद्धि which are :—

अणिमा लघिमा प्राप्तिः प्राकाम्यं महिमा तथा ।

ईशित्वं च वशित्वं च तथा कामावसायिता ॥

अणिमा = Power of becoming more minute than the smallest atom

लघिमा = Power of contracting one's proportions and becoming more active than the wind

प्राप्ति = Power of acquiring any and everything in the universe simply by thinking of it

प्राकाम्य = Power of penetrating by force of one's will the whole of the universe from the highest to the lowest object

महिमा = Power of expanding one's proportions to any magnitude

ईशित्व = Power of creating the universe by force of will

वशित्व = Power of making everyone and everything in the universe subservient to one's will

कामावसायिता = Power of suppresing one's passions.

So one who desires to attain absolution should concentrate his mental powers on self.

209. From the illustrations given in the foregoing stanzas it is to be gathered that the power of discrimination of a बुद्ध becomes free of all divergent elements by constant practice, just as the skill or capacity of the persons taken as exemplars in the above illustrations is augmented by unremitting study.

210. One who endeavours to discriminate the real nature of self and the function of experiencing pleasure and pain by the processes of अभ्यास and व्यतिरेक will be able to determine that in all the three conditions of waking, dreaming and

sound sleep, self, though witnessing those conditions, is free from all association or attachment.

211. The processes of अन्वय and व्यतिरेक may be explained thus: The term अन्वय indicates coexistence *i. e.*, the presence of a particular thing where another exists; as for example wherever there is smoke there is fire. The term व्यतिरेक indicates the absence of one of them when another is absent; as for example wherever there is no fire there is no smoke. These processes may be applied as follows in the present instance: Whatever is seen or experienced in the three conditions of waking, dreaming and sound sleep is peculiar to that condition and is not seen or experienced in another. This is the experience of all. It will thus be clear that self is present in all these three conditions, but any one of them is not present in the other, and therefore what is seen or experienced in any of these conditions cannot be said to be co-existent with self. Every thing besides self is therefore evanescent, and eliminating that from what is looked upon as भोक्तृ there remains merely the self.

212. What is stated above not only accords with common experience but is corroborated by the S'ruti which proclaims that whatever is seen or experienced by the self does not accompany it when it passes from any one condition to another, whether it be happiness resulting from meritorious actions or misery resulting from sins.

213. One is absolved from all bondage when he realizes that his self is that spirit which lends possibility to all the ramifications like the conditions of waking, dreaming, sound sleep &c.

214. Another S'ruti says that one should consider that self is the same in all the three conditions of waking, dreaming and sound sleep. One who discriminates that the self is thus distinct from any particular condition is no subject to recurrence of irths.

215. Self is intelligence itself pure and simple, says another text. Its attribute is supreme blissfulness. It is independent of the three elements which are involved in all considerations of pleasure or pain in the three conditions of waking, dreaming and sound sleep, viz. (1) भोग्य, *i. e.*, things which give pleasure or pain (2) भोक्ता, *i. e.*, one who experiences that pleasure or pain and (3) भोग *i. e.*, the experience of such pleasure or pain. Moreover, being independent of these elements, it witnesses those operations.

216. The real position being thus analysed the question arises who is भोक्ता, *i. e.*, who experiences pleasure or pain? The reply is that that function pertains to चिदाभास. *i. e.*, the reflection of intelligence or spirit, otherwise known as विज्ञानमय, and who is susceptible of having these experiences of pleasure or pain.

217. This चिदाभास is, however, merely an illusion. It is so stated in the S'ruti and is also borne out by experience. The whole universe is said to be an illusion and this चिदाभास coming within it also partakes of its illusory nature.

218. This चिदाभास altogether disappears during the conditions of sound sleep, swoon, &c., and such disappearance is witnessed by the self. The illusory nature of चिदाभास being thus determined, it constantly serves as help to the discrimination of the real nature of self.

219. The real nature of self and the illusory nature of चिदाभास being thus determined, one does no longer cherish any liking for the pleasures of the world. Who that is on the point of death and is made to lie on the bare floor will entertain a desire to be married?

220. Nay, after acquiring such knowledge, he is ashamed to act as formerly when he thought that he himself experienced all pleasure and pain. Now he bears such pleasure and pain as the result of the actions of his former births, feeling

ashamed like a person whose note has been cut off, and is troubled with the thought that his former actions should still not be exhausted.

221. When चिदाभास is thus ashamed of attributing to itself any susceptibility to pleasure or pain it is quite improbable that it will attribute that property to the spirit that is not capable of such susceptibility.

222. The intention of the S'ruti is to emphasize the conclusion that neither कूटस्थ nor चिदाभास are as a matter of fact susceptible of pleasure or pain, and therefore the words कस्य कामाय are meant to indicate without doubt the illusory nature of the idea of such susceptibility. That being the case it follows that there is no room for uneasiness.

223. The शरीर or body is known to be of three sorts (1) स्थूल, *i. e.*, the material body (2) सूक्ष्म, *i. e.*, the subtle body and (3) कारण, *i. e.*, the body which constitutes the cause of the other two. Such being the case, each body has necessarily its peculiar troubles.

224. The troubles of the material body are the innumerable diseases resulting from the three humours known as वात, पित्त and कफ. Emitting stench, ugliness, inflammation and fracture are also some of the causes of misery.

225. The troubles of the subtle body are काम, *i. e.*, desire, क्रोध, *i. e.*, anger, &c., and ज्ञान्ति, *i. e.*, peace of mind, शान्ति, *i. e.*, resignation, &c. Both these sets are styled 'troubles' because the first give pain by their presence and the second by their absence.

226. The trouble peculiar to the कारण शरीर is rather obscure and therefore difficult of comprehension. This trouble is indicated by Indra in the eighth chapter of the छांदोग्य उपनिषद्. Indra says to his preceptor Prajapati as follows:—While in "the condition of sound sleep, which represents कारण शरीर, I

“am neither conscious of myself nor of the external world” and feel almost lost. This state of ignorance is the cause of “future miseries.” From this it may be inferred that ignorance constitutes the trouble peculiar to the causal body.

227. These three sorts of troubles are the necessary properties of the three sorts of bodies. Such being the case, when they cease the bodies also cease to exist.

228. The connection between these troubles and the three bodies is as inseparable as that between the cloth and the thread of which it is made, the blanket and the wool and the pitcher and the clay.

229. Now looking to the चिदाभास itself, it is not susceptible of any sort of trouble. चित् or intelligence is known to possess the property of light and no other ; and as चिदाभास is merely a reflection of चित् it must possess similar properties.

230. Thus चिदाभास being unsusceptible of any sort of trouble, it follows *a fortiori* that the साक्षी or कूटस्थ is also unsusceptible.

The question then arises how are such exclamations as ‘I feel pain,’ &c., to be explained ? The reply is that they become possible because चिदाभास identifies itself with the three bodies by the force of अविद्या, i. e., absence of knowledge.

231. Thus चिदाभास attributes reality, which is the peculiar property of intelligence or the supreme spirit, to itself along with the three bodies स्थूल, सूक्ष्म, and कारण, and then fancies that these three bodies with their peculiar troubles represent its own condition.

232-233. During this condition of mistaken identification this चिदाभास, like a pater familias, fancies that he himself is troubled when really speaking the trouble pertains to the three bodies. Just as a paterfamilias unnecessarily feels troubled when any of the members of his family, such as son,

wife, &c., suffer, so चिदाभास feels troubled on account of the troubles of the bodies.

234. When, however, after the acquisition of knowledge he is able to distinguish the कूटस्थ, चिदाभास and शरीर, he gets rid of the delusion by which he was led to identify himself with the bodies ; nay, he even realizes that he is चिदाभास, *i. e.*, a reflection of चित् and not चित् itself, and is thus engrossed in the contemplation of the कूटस्थ or the real spirit. How will he then attribute to himself the troubles which pertain to the bodies ?

235. The fact that delusion produces misery and correct knowledge gives relief may be illustrated by an example. What is really a piece of rope is taken to be a serpent and this delusion puts the observer to flight. But when the thing that caused so much fear is known to be a piece of rope and the idea of its being a serpent disappears, the man not only feels relief but repents of his folly in having become afraid of a rope.

236. The चिदाभास thus submits itself entirely to the साक्षी or कूटस्थ, as if apologizing for the properties of susceptibility to pleasure and pain, &c., which were erroneously attributed to कूटस्थ, just as a person who prefers a false charge against another tenders an apology, which constitutes as it were a penance for the wrong done.

237. Just as a person who is observing penance for some oft repeated sins resorts to the process of bathing, &c., again and again ; so the चिदाभास does penance for its sins by constantly contemplating the साक्षी or कूटस्थ.

238. Just as a prostitute, having a disease in her private organ is ashamed of indulging in freaks of dalliance in the presence of one who knows her disease, so the चिदाभास is ashamed of attaching any importance to itself.

239. Just as a Brahmin who was captured by Mlechhas but has been restored to his caste by the observance of penance never again mixes with the Mlechhas : so the चिदाभास never again associates itself with things pertaining to the bodies.

240. Nay, the चिदाभास is not satisfied with this much. He further tries to imitate the कूटस्थ in its behaviour, just as an heir apparent, with a view to qualify himself for the duties of administration follows in the foot-steps of his father.

241. An heir apparent eventually presides over a kingdom. What does चिदाभास gain by imitating the ways of कूटस्थ? The condition which चिदाभास attains is described in the following S'ruti :—सयोहवैतत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति नास्या-
ब्रह्मवित्कुले भवति तरति शोकं तरति पाप्मानं गुहाग्रन्थिभ्यो विशुक्तोऽमृतो भवति,
which means that he who realizes this supreme spirit is identified with it. No one in his family will be devoid of the knowledge of ब्रह्म. He overcomes all grief and sin. He is released from the confinement of the five sheaths (कोश) and is no more subject to death.

Realizing the drift of this S'ruti the चिदाभास, becomes wholly absorbed in the supreme spirit and has no other knowledge except that of ब्रह्म.

242. The चिदाभास desires a complete annihilation of itself and a merging in the कूटस्थ, in the same way as persons desiring a godly state destroy themselves by entering into fire or resort to similar other methods like throwing oneself from a rock, drowning oneself in the Ganges, &c.

243. Just as a person bent upon self-destruction by ordeals of fire, &c., does not cease to be a human being until the physical body is reduced to ashes, &c., so the चिदाभास does not lose that character until the force of his प्रारब्ध actions is spent.

244. It may be asked how it is possible that जीव having got rid of its ignorance, which was the cause of its identifying itself with the body and thus feeling misery and happiness, can still be subject to the feelings and emotions experienced during the state of ignorance. To this question a reply may be conveniently given by means of an illustration. When a rope is mistaken for a serpent the delusion produces tremor, &c. When the delusion disappears and the real character of the rope is known, the tremor, &c., does not disappear immediately but by slow degrees. Moreover if the piece of rope is again thrown in a dark place there is the possibility of its again being mistaken for a serpent.

245. Similarly even when knowledge is acquired, happiness and misery, which result from प्रारब्ध actions, do not cease immediately but by degrees, and while thus experiencing happiness and misery the चिदाभास is likely to think that it is a mortal being.

246. It may be supposed that this reversion of delusion is likely to interfere with the knowledge already acquired. But such is not the case. This repetition of error is not enough to destroy the knowledge of reality previously acquired. Acquisition of real direct knowledge during one's lifetime constitutes जीवन्मुक्ति, and that means nothing more or less than a correct knowledge of facts. Now such knowledge may occasionally be obscured, but when one is restored to his right mind the facts will again present themselves. When the S'ástras ordain a certain kind of व्रत or observance, it is required to be kept up constantly and any dereliction is supposed to undo all that has been done before. जीवन्मुक्ति however is not a व्रत and therefore any slight aberration is not calculated to do away with the knowledge of facts one acquired.

247. Reverting to the illustration given in stanza 23 *et seq* of this chapter, the person who is himself the tenth person

laments for the loss of the tenth companion and in the agony of grief strikes his head against the ground. But when he knows the fact that he himself makes up the complement of ten, he immediately abstains from lamenting but nevertheless the bruise that he has received on his forehead disappears by slow degrees after about a month.

248. It may be asked if even after acquisition of knowledge the delusion of worldly life is likely to recur what is the good of जीवन्मुक्ति? The reply is that the acquisition of मुक्ति makes, one forget the miseries resulting from प्रारब्ध, just as the joy resulting from knowledge that all the ten of the company are alive makes them forget the pain of the bruise on the forehead.

249. It has been said above that जीवन्मुक्ति is not a व्रत and therefore it is not essential that it must last without interruption. What is necessary is that whenever the delusion recurs it should be dispelled by constant thought, just as a person who has taken some preparation of mineral substances eats food as often as he feels hungry during day.

250. If the results of the प्रारब्ध actions cannot be warded off even by acquiring knowledge what then is the remedy? The remedy is to suffer them and thus to annihilate them, just as the person in the illustration who suffers a bruise on his forehead cures it by application of medicine.

251. This chapter commences with the text from the S'ruti आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयात्, &c. In stanza (48) that S'ruti is interpreted to indicate the two conditions of जीव, viz., अपरोक्षज्ञान and शोकनिवृत्ति. In the foregoing stanzas the condition of जीव known as शोकनिवृत्ति has been described. This represents the sixth of the seven conditions mentioned in stanza (33). तृप्ति is the seventh or the last.

252. Now there is तृप्ति also in the enjoyment of worldly objects, but that तृप्ति has its bounds because there always remains a desire to have something else. The तृप्ति that results

from the acquisition of direct knowledge (अपरोक्ष ज्ञान) is on the contrary boundless. While in this state one is completely satisfied because he feels that he has accomplished all that was to be accomplished, and has attained all that he desired to attain.

253. Formerly he had much to accomplish in three distinct directions. For the purposes of this world he had to follow a particular avocation and earn wealth, &c. For the purposes of the next world he had to perform sacrifices and do certain penances. For attaining absolution he had to resort to the processes of श्रवण, नमन and निदिध्यास. Now all worldly desires are no more and the supreme bliss of realizing the identity of self with intelligence or the spirit is ever present. Nothing therefore remains to be done.

254. He thus always feels satisfaction by constantly keeping in view his former state and the present want of having any thing to accomplish.

255. Let those who are ignorant and therefore miserable indulge in worldly pursuits with the desire of having sons, acquiring wealth, &c. I am full of supreme joy. With what object will I care for worldly pursuits ?

256. Let those who are desirous of attaining to the other worlds may perform the necessary ceremonies and penances. I pervade all the worlds. How and wherefore shall I undergo all that trouble.

257. Let those who are entitled to it follow the pursuit of explaining the meaning of the S'ástras and teaching the Vedas. I am not so entitled because all my actions have ceased.

258. It may perhaps be pointed out to me that my actions cannot be said to have ceased in as much as I indulge in operations like sleep, begging, bathing, answering calls of

nature, &c. To this my reply is that I neither desire these operations nor perform them. If others think that I perform them they are quite welcome to such a notion. How do their notions affect me?

259. For illustration may be taken a cluster of red berries known as गुंजा. On account of their colour some persons may look upon them as fire. But this fact is not enough to impart to that cluster of berries the power of burning things that come in contact with it. Similarly, I do not really partake of the attributes of a worldly man simply because other people assign them to me.

260. Let those who have not grasped the real situation take the trouble of having the explanation of the S'āstras. Why should I, who have known the truth, do likewise? Let those who doubt their power of retaining the conclusions which they have formed after hearing the S'āstras, resort to the process of contemplating them over and over again. I am free from doubt and therefore I do not do likewise.

261. He who is likely to fall again into the delusion of considering that the material body is identical with the spirit may resort to the process of निदिध्यास, i.e., repeated meditation. I am not subject to such a delusion. What then is the necessity for meditation in my case?

262. It is true that I act like other human beings and it may be asked how should I do so without being subject to the delusion above referred to? The reply is that this is the result of impressions which have been contracted from a series of previous existences without there being any such delusion.

263. When the force of प्रारब्धकर्म is spent all further action will cease. So long as that force remains unspent, the dealings will not cease even though there may be constant meditation.

264. He who thinks that these worldly dealings are a great obstruction in his way may resort to meditation in order to minimize the obstruction. For myself I look upon these dealings as perfectly harmless. Why then should I resort to meditation ?

265. Since I am not susceptible of **विक्षेप**, *i. e.*, disturbance of the equilibrium of the mind, there is no necessity of **समाधि**, *i. e.*, concentration of the mind. **विक्षेप** and **समाधि** are functions of the mind which by nature is susceptible of change. So far as I am concerned, this mind has been completely obliterated and therefore I am not affected by its functions.

266. It may be urged that I should resort to **समाधि** with the view of experiencing its results. I reply by saying that in my present state I am continuously experiencing the satisfaction which results from **समाधि**. In fact that very satisfaction constitutes my existence. There is no room therefore for any satisfaction resulting from **समाधि**. With me the conviction is firm that all that was to be done has been done and all that was to be accomplished has been accomplished.

267. Let my dealings be according to my **प्रारब्ध**. It matters very little to me if they look like those of ordinary persons or like those dictated by the S'ástras or something quite different from either. So far as I am concerned I have no connection with those dealings.

268. Or, though I have accomplished everything, I may act according to the methods laid down in the S'ástras just with the object of guiding other people to the right course. What harm will that do to me ?

269. Let my body be engaged in actions like worship of gods, bathing, answering calls of nature, begging alms, &c. Let my speech be employed in repeating the **प्रणव मंत्र**, *i. e.*, **ओंकार** and in reading the best portion of the Vedas, *viz.*, **उपनिषद्**.

270. Let my intellect contemplate God Vishnu, or let it be absorbed in the delight resulting from realizing the ब्रह्म. Myself am the witness of all these processes. I neither perform them nor cause them to be performed.

271. Such being the case where is the room for any dispute between those who advocate action and myself who have known the truth. Our functions are as apart from each other as the eastern from the western ocean.

272. The advocate of (कर्म) actions concerns himself with the body, the speech and the intellect and not with the spirit that witnesses all the actions. While one who has acquired knowledge concerns himself with the unsusceptible nature of the spirit and with nothing else.

273. Thus do so-called ज्ञानी (those who profess to have acquired knowledge) and कर्मी (those who advocate action) quarrel among themselves like two deaf persons, each of whom does not understand what the other says. Wise people seeing them thus quarrelling simply laugh at them.

274. Let the philosopher who has acquired a knowledge of the spirit, whom the man of actions does not realize recognize that spirit as ब्रह्म. What does the man of actions lose by that?

275. Similarly a philosopher has come to know that body, speech, intellect, &c., are unreal, and therefore he does not seriously concern himself with them. The man of actions, however, not having this knowledge, may act with their help. What does the philosopher lose by that.

276. If it is urged that a ज्ञानी having no use of actions he should not be up to them, then we ask a counter-question why should he be inactive? If you say that inaction tends to the acquisition of knowledge, then we say that action is necessary for a person who desires to acquire knowledge.

277. It may be urged that one who has acquired knowledge cannot have a *desire* to acquire knowledge, and there-

fore his action is not justifiable. This may be met by saying that for the same reason there is no occasion for him to resort to inaction which secures knowledge. The fact is that knowledge which has resulted from a thorough examination of accepted authorities and which is confirmed by self-experience is never likely to be obliterated and does not stand in need of practices like प्रवृत्ति (action) and निवृत्ति (inaction).

278. Neither अविद्या (ignorance) nor the illusion resulting therefrom have the power to obliterate knowledge once acquired, since they both have already been annihilated by the dawn of knowledge.

279. It may be argued that, though ignorance may have disappeared, the illusion resulting from it, namely the world, is perceived by the senses, and therefore it may still have the capability of interfering with knowledge. To this the reply is that the illusion, of which the true character is known, though perceived by the senses, is not capable of interfering with true knowledge. A rat even when alive is not able to kill a cat. How then will it be possible for a dead rat to do it?

280. What ground is there for saying that one who did not die even under the operation of the most powerful missile like पाशुपतास्त्र will die when his body is pierced by a pointless arrow?

281. बोध, i.e., knowledge, has had a tough fight with ignorance, aided by a variety of delusive notions resulting therefrom, and has in the end achieved success. Subsequently by constant contemplation its position has been strengthened. How then is it possible that it will now be displaced?

282. Ignorance and the delusions resulting therefrom having been killed by knowledge are now mere corpses. Knowledge has no more anything to fear from them. On the contrary they testify to its glory.

283. Therefore one who never loses knowledge of the sort above described is affected neither by प्रद्वत्ति or निद्वत्ति which are functions of the body.

284. It is quite right for one who has not acquired knowledge to urge the necessity of action (प्रद्वत्ति), in as much as action is necessary to secure attainment of स्वर्ग, *i. e.*, heavens or अपवर्ग, *i. e.*, absolution.

285. If one who has acquired knowledge has to live among such people, then out of regard for his surroundings he is obliged to conform himself to their ways by doing all actions by his body, mind and speech.

286. But when he is surrounded by people who are desirous of knowing the truth, then he may for their enlightenment denounce their actions and may also desist from similar actions.

287. It is proper that one who has acquired knowledge should out of pity act like those who are ignorant, just as the father of an infant child conforms to the whim of the child with the view of coaxing it.

288. A father when abused or beaten by an infant child is not only not hurt or offended but on the contrary indulges the child.

289. Similarly a philosopher, whether censured or praised by the ignorant, does not return their taunt or applause, but behaves in a manner suitable to their understanding.

290. It is the duty of the philosopher to behave in such a manner as will tend to induce a desire to acquire knowledge in an ignorant person. When one has acquired knowledge there is nothing left for him to do beyond preaching his gospel to the ignorant and thus awakening them to correct action.

291. Being satisfied that he has done all that was to be done, and also feeling satisfaction at having obtained all that was

to be aimed at, he incessantly indulges in that sense of satisfaction in the manner described in the following stanzas.

292. Blessed am I that possess a direct knowledge of the eternal spirit that is within me ! Blessed am I that clearly realize the bliss that results from such knowledge !

293. Blessed am I that do not feel the miseries which are attendant upon worldly pursuits ! Blessed am I whose illusion has been thoroughly dispelled !

294. Blessed am I who have now nothing left to do ! Blessed am I who have now attained all my desires !

295. Blessed indeed am I ! What is there in this world to compare to my sense of satisfaction ? Twice, thrice, four times blessed am I !

296. Truly this is a sure result of my meritorious deeds ! Blessed is myself who originally achieved the deeds of which this is the result !

297. Blessed is that science of philosophy by studying which I have attained to this state ! Blessed is the preceptor from whom I received instruction which led to this satisfaction ! Oh the knowledge and the bliss resulting therefrom !

298. Those wise persons who study this chapter continuously will also derive incessant satisfaction by diving in spiritual bliss.

CHAPTER VIII.

INDICATION OF THE कूटस्थ SPIRIT.

1. It is now proposed to explain what is indicated by कूटस्थ. To commence with, the illustration of the sun reflected on a wall through a piece of glass is taken. When we see a wall in a room which admits sun's light, the sun covers the whole wall without any medium. Now suppose that a

piece of glass is exposed to the rays of the sun to admit of the rays being reflected through the glass on a wall, then this wall which is already lighted by the sun also holds a reflection of the sun, and thus represents the condition of the body, which, though illumined by the कूटस्थ is also lighted by the जीव reflected through बुद्धि.

2. Now looking at the wall covered with a number of reflections of the sun through pieces of glass, it will appear that the several spaces not covered by such reflections are covered by the ordinary light of the sun. This ordinary light shines even when the reflections disappear.

3. Now applying the illustration to the subject under discussion, it should be clearly known that, between the several workings of the intellect (बुद्धि) through which the कूटस्थ is reflected in the body, there are intervals, and there are also occasions when the workings of the intellect cease altogether; during such intervals and during such periods of cessation, there exists the light of the कूटस्थ, and this should be clearly discriminated.

4. Take, for instance, a pitcher that is seen. Now with respect to the knowledge regarding this pitcher the functions of चिदाभास and कूटस्थ may be thus distinguished. When a pitcher is seen the intellect takes the form of that pitcher, and the intelligence or spirit that is reflected in the intellect (बुद्धि) during this process only serves to give an idea of the form of that pitcher which is seen before oneself. But this function differs from the function by which the knowledge of the pitcher is derived, and this function peculiarly belongs to the spirit or intelligence, i. e., the function of knowing belongs to ब्रह्म and the function of indicating the particular form belongs, to बुद्धि.

5. It may be asked that if a pitcher is *known* only by ब्रह्म what is the necessity of बुद्धि. The reply is that without the

medium of intellect the knowledge of a pitcher does not exist, *i.e.*, there exists the general knowledge but not the knowledge of the pitcher. But with the medium of the intellect the pitcher is known. Knowledge as the function of ब्रह्म is the same in both cases but the only difference is that in the first case there is no knowledge of a particular form, which exists in the second case.

6. It may be asked how it is possible for an object to be both known and unknown. The reply is that the words 'known' and 'unknown' are taken here with a peculiar significance. Knowledge here signifies that condition of the intellect in which it is preceded by the चिदाभास, *i.e.*, reflection of intelligence, and which may be compared to a pole tipped with a steel point. It is on account of the चिदाभास that बुद्धि grasps the things that come within its range. The absence of this चिदाभास means अज्ञान or want of specific knowledge. Thus all objects of knowledge, *e. g.*, a pitcher, may be said to be both specifically known and unknown with reference to the presence and absence of चिदाभास.

7. It might be urged that in the absence of चिदाभास, *i.e.*, in the condition in which a pitcher is अज्ञात, *i. e.*, not known, it may be correct to hold that the presence of ब्रह्म is necessary to account for the realization of that condition. But in the condition in which a pitcher is ज्ञात or known the presence of ब्रह्म is not necessary, in as much as चिदाभास does the work of bringing about a realization of that condition. The object of this stanza is to meet this contention. If the presence of ब्रह्म is necessary for realizing that a certain object is not known, why should it not be necessary for realizing that it is known? It is equally necessary, in both cases. The conditions of not knowing and knowing last only for the time that the चिदाभास is abstracted from or directed to a particular object, and therefore if the presence of ब्रह्म in one case is admitted, it must also be admitted in the other.

8. It may further be contended that just as the process of not knowing produces the condition of want of knowledge, so for the condition of knowledge mere बुद्धि or intellect is sufficient and that there would be no necessity for चिदाभास. The reply is that knowledge is not possible merely with the help of बुद्धि without the चिदाभास. In what respect is बुद्धि without the चिदाभास different from substances like clay, &c., which can be given any number of forms ?

9. Mere clay before it is made into a pitcher is never known as a pitcher and called as such. Similarly a pitcher to which बुद्धि is directed unaccompanied by चिदाभास cannot be an object of knowledge.

10. It is thus clear that the condition of knowing is the result of the contact of चिदाभास with a particular object, *e.g.*, a pitcher. It may now be asked why is it necessary to interpose a चिदाभास when there is the चैतन्य itself of which चिदाभास is a mere reflection. The reply is that the intelligence represented by ब्रह्म does not constitute that kind of medium which is necessary to secure the condition of knowing. In all conditions of knowledge there are three factors *viz.*, प्रमाता, प्रमेय and प्रमाण. प्रमाता is one who knows ; प्रमेय is that which is to be known ; and प्रमाण is that which makes the प्रमेय known to the प्रमाता. Now the specific knowledge of all objects is the result of this process and therefore it is necessary to interpose the चिदाभास as a medium which serves to produce such knowledge. Intelligence, *i. e.*, चैतन्य, exists even before this specific knowledge is derived, and it does not possess the quality of imparting specific knowledge.

11. There is a वार्तिक (explanatory precept) of Sureshvarāchārya which purports to say that that particular संविद or knowledge, which by general concurrence serves to make known all external objects, is the चिदाभास that is intended to be indicated and for which there is the authority of Vedant philosophy.

12. The drift of the above वार्तिक is to indicate that for the production of specific knowledge ब्रह्म or चैतन्य is not enough but something similar to it, viz., चिदाभास. This receives corroboration from the fact that S'ankarāchārya in his उपदेशसाहस्री makes a clear distinction between ब्रह्मचित्, i.e., the intelligence (चैतन्य) known as ब्रह्म and its फल or result, i. e., चिदाभास.

13. It is thus clear that it is चिदाभास which serves to produce the specific knowledge of a pitcher. But the presence like the absence of this specific knowledge in its turn is realized by ब्रह्म.

14. The intelligence or चैतन्य serves to lend light to all, including intellect, चिदाभास, and the objects of knowledge. But चिदाभास only serves to give a specific knowledge of one object at a time, viz., that object which it occupies.

15. Thus all things known are the objects of two kinds of knowledge, viz., (1) the knowledge that results from चिदाभास or specific knowledge and (2) knowledge that results from ब्रह्म which is general. Now this intelligence (ब्रह्म चैतन्य) described above is styled अनुव्यवसाय (meaning knowledge of knowledge) by the school of thinkers known as तार्किक, i. e., logicians.

16. The difference between चिदाभास and ब्रह्म may be illustrated from the words used to indicate an impression. When a pitcher is seen, to say अयं घटः (this is a pitcher) is the result of the operation of चिदाभास; to say विज्ञातः घटः (this pitcher is known) is the result of the operation of ब्रह्म.

17. Just as चिदाभास and ब्रह्म have been distinctly indicated, as shown above, with reference to external objects, so they should be discriminated with reference to the internal.

18. चिदाभास pervades all ideas and emotions such as egoism, desire, anger, &c., in the same way as fire remains latent in heated iron.

19. As heated iron is only capable of making its own existence felt and not that of anything else; so all ideas ac-

accompanied by चिदाभास are only capable of making themselves felt.

20. All ideas occur in proper succession and separately from each other. All of them vanish during the condition of sound sleep, swoon or समाधि, *i. e.*, complete abstraction.

21. During the time the ideas are present it is the चिदाभास that presents itself. But that intelligence which presents itself during the intervals between the succession of ideas and during conditions in which ideas are absent, being unsusceptible of change, is called कूटस्थ.

22. It has been said above that in the case of ideas regarding external objects there is a double intelligence that acts on them. The first is the ever present intelligence or ब्रह्म चैतन्य and the second is the reflection of that intelligence through intellect or बुद्धि. This double intelligence is alike seen to act in the case of several emotions which work within ourselves. This double intelligence serves to indicate more clearly the existence of intelligence during the time the emotions do their work than during their intervals.

23. It has been stated above that all external objects which are subjected to the operation of the intellect present two conditions, *viz.*, ज्ञात and अज्ञात, *i. e.*, known and unknown, and both these conditions are known to कूटस्थ. This, however, is not possible in the case of emotions, because they cannot be said to be either known or unknown in the sense in which external objects are. The conditions of ज्ञात and अज्ञात are the result of the operation of ज्ञान and अज्ञान respectively. The वृत्ति or emotions being themselves particular forms of knowledge, they cannot be said to be subject to the operation of ज्ञान, and therefore cannot be said to be ज्ञात. Similarly they cannot be अज्ञात, because it is they that serve to destroy अज्ञान.

24. Now चिदाभास, being a reflection of चैतन्य, presents a double intelligence, but being subject to birth and destruction

it is called अकूटस्थ, while the intelligence itself which is not susceptible of change is called कूटस्थ.

25. The previous writers on Vedānta like S'ankarāchārya have indicated the character of कूटस्थ in all places in terms like अन्तःकरणतद्चित्साक्षी चैतन्यविग्रहः आनन्दरूपः सत्यः, *i. e.*, one witnessing the workings of the mind, one who is intelligence itself, one whose form is bliss and one who is real.

26. Similarly they indicate चिदाभास when they say that आत्मा, *i. e.*, the spirit, आभास, *i. e.*, its reflection or चिदाभास, and आश्रय, *i. e.*, the medium through which the reflection takes place, all these three are known by शास्त्र, *i. e.*, texts which propound the कूटस्थ, *e. g.*, मनसः साक्षी, बुद्धेः साक्षी (meaning one who witnesses the workings of the mind, one who witnesses the workings of the intellect) and those which speak of चिदाभास, *e. g.* रूपंरूपप्रतिरूपोबभूव (meaning that the spirit assumes the forms of the medium through which it is presented); as also by युक्ति, *i. e.*, by process of reasoning, such as that by which कूटस्थ is known as unsusceptible of change and चिदाभास is known as susceptible. Taking the illustration of the reflection of the face in the mirror it may be said that आत्मा, आभास and बुद्धि correspond to the face itself, its reflection and the mirror respectively.

27. It may perhaps be asked what is the necessity to suppose the existence of चिदाभास, when कूटस्थ as comprised in बुद्धि may be able to migrate from one world to another in the same way as ether comprised in a pitcher. In other words, if the theory of चिदाभास is pressed with the view of making the succession of births and deaths possible, then it appears superfluous, in as much as the result, which it is desired to account for, is likely to be achieved by कूटस्थ itself when circumscribed by बुद्धि.

28. To such a question the reply is that कूटस्थ, which is not susceptible of any association, does not become जीव

simply by its being circumscribed. If that were so then कूटस्थ as circumscribed in earthen pots, walls, &c., would also be entitled to be called जीव.

29. It may be urged that the above argument will not hold good in as much as बुद्धि on account of its character of clearness does not resemble a wall. Such a contention may be met by asking how does the quality of clearness affect the act of circumscribing which alone is referred to in the 27th stanza.

30. When a person has to buy corn, the quantity will not be affected whether measured by means of a measure made of wood or a shining metal, so long as the capacity is the same.

31. If it is admitted that though the quantity measured is the same, the peculiarity of the measure of metal is that it presents a reflection, then you are forced to admit that बुद्धि also on account of its clearness presents a reflection which is called चिदाभास.

32. What is आभास ? आभास means an imperfect presentation of the form and qualities of an object. प्रतिबिम्ब or reflection is only another word for आभास. This reflection looks like the original object but is devoid of its attributes.

33. Now looking to चिदाभास in the light of this interpretation it will appear that it is devoid of the properties of the original, viz., चैतन्य, in as much as it is susceptible of association and is also liable to undergo change. The appearance that it presents being a kin to that of the original, it is called चिदाभास.

34. It may perhaps be urged that आभास cannot have a separate existence from बुद्धि in as much as it does not exist without the medium of बुद्धि. If so, you may as well say the same of बुद्धि or intellect with respect to your material body.

35. If on the authority of the शास्त्र you admit that बुद्धि or intellect exists even when the material body vanishes, then

that S'āstra also indicates चिदाभास as distinct from बुद्धि *vide* texts in the तैत्तिरीय उपनिषद् which relate to the penetration of चिदाभास in the material body.

36. If you say that चिदाभास penetrated the material body along with बुद्धि, then the reply is that it is not so, as is clear from the ऐतरेय उपनिषद् in which it is stated that आत्मा apart from बुद्धि first contemplated penetration and then penetrated.

37. Having made the image of man ईश्वर thought that it would not be possible for the material body with all its senses to fulfil its function without the vital energy. He therefore entered the body through the skull which he broke open at the point where its several parts met. Having thus entered, he experiences the several conditions of life.

38. If you ask how it is possible for the spirit to enter, when it is unsusceptible of any association, then I will ask the counter-question how it is possible for him to create the world under similar circumstances. If you say that the function of creation is merely the result of माया, then the same may be said of the function of penetration. Being connected with माया, both the functions are equally evanescent.

39. This spirit coming in contact with the material body and the several senses, which are the result of the five elements assumes the function of जीव, and this function ceases when the material body with its senses, &c., ceases to exist. This has been clearly stated in the S'ruti texts which contain the discourse between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyi.

40. The S'ruti text, which runs 'अविनाशी वा अरेभ्यमात्माऽनुच्छिस्तिधर्मः' meaning that this spirit is one which never vanishes and that its property is indestructibility, gives the distinguishing features of कूटस्थ. The reason of its indestructibility is its असंगत्व, i. e., unsusceptibility of association, and this unsusceptibility is indicated by the words 'मात्राऽसंसर्गत्व

which mean that the spirit is not capable of being affected by contact with the material body and its associates.

41. It has been stated in stanza (39) above that the spirit in its character of जीव ceases to exist when the material body, the senses, &c., cease to exist. And it may perhaps be urged that the text on which that statement is based is not consistent with the text which purports to say that the material body when devoid of जीव vanishes but not so the जीव. This difficulty is got over by explaining that the latter text is intended to indicate the transmigration of the जीव from one body to another and is not intended to convey the sense that the जीव is never susceptible of complete destruction.

42. It may again be contended that if जीव is susceptible of destruction it is not likely that it will ever realize its identity with ब्रह्म which is not susceptible of destruction. But this contention is not correct. It is true that two inconsistent properties cannot simultaneously be possible in the case of any object but the existence of each of them is possible in the absence of the other.

43. This may be made clear by an illustration. A person standing at a long distance is taken to be a pillar, because his features are not visible. Going near him his real condition is made out. Thus the false idea of the object seen at a distance being a pillar is dispelled by the knowledge that he is a human being. Similarly the idea of ego which constitutes जीव is dispelled when the real nature of self, *viz.*, that it is ब्रह्म, is recognized.

44. This position, *viz.*, that the सामानाधिकरण्य, *i. e.*, two properties being attributed to one and the same substance, in the present instance does not imply the simultaneous attribution of two incompatible properties, but the existence of one in the absence of the other: this position is also clearly stated by Sures'varáchàrya in his treatise known as नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धि. Let us therefore accept the same position.

45. In the text of the S'ruti 'सर्वे खल्विदं ब्रह्म' it will be seen that identity is established between the world and ब्रह्म. In this case it is not possible for that which is perishable to be that which is imperishable and therefore instead of interpreting the simultaneous attribution of the two inconsistent properties it is correct to say that the second finds place when the first disappears. So in the case of the proposition अहं ब्रह्म the सामानाधिकरण्य of जीव and ब्रह्म should be interpreted to be not a simultaneous attribution of the two properties but the attribution of one after the disappearance of the other.

46. In the work known as विवरण the author (S'ri Prakāṣa-tma muni) has striven hard to establish that the सामानाधिकरण्य in question is not of the kind above referred to. From this it may perhaps be urged that the reasoning in the foregoing stanzas is not correct. But it is not so. The position maintained by the author of विवरण is on the understanding that the identity proposed to be established is *not* between जीव and ब्रह्म but between कूटस्थ and ब्रह्म.

47. In the विवरण and other works a regular identity is established without resorting to the process of elimination in order to show that कूटस्थ, which is indicated by the word त्वम् in the text तत् त्वमसि, is the same as ब्रह्म.

48. What we wish to indicate by the term कूटस्थ is that intelligence on which rests the illusion known as जीव and which is associated with the body, the senses, the mind, &c.

49. Similarly we wish to indicate by the term ब्रह्म that all pervading intelligence which is described in the उपनिषद्, and on which rests the illusion known as the universe.

50. There is no occasion to doubt the probability of the illusion known as जीव resting on the कूटस्थ. Because when the illusion of the whole universe rests on ब्रह्म, जीव which is but a part of the universe also rests on a portion of it.

51. The distinction indicated by the words तद् and त्वम् is only due to the difference in the extent of the illusion, *viz.*, the universe and its part, but the intelligence or spirit on which this illusion rests is really one.

52. In the case of an illusion it is always necessary that it should present some of the properties of that on which it rests as also some properties which are its own. Now let us see if the चिदाभास, which we have called an illusion, satisfies this test. It is seen to possess the properties of egoism, which it has derived from बुद्धि or intellect, as also the capability of knowing, which belongs to the spirit or intelligence, and thus it can safely be called an illusion.

53. The condition in which one is unable to discriminate the intellect (बुद्धि), the चिदाभास or जीव and the आत्मा or the spirit, and in which one is unable to account for the creation of the universe, is clearly an illusion, and it is this illusion which receives the name of संसार, *i. e.*, succession of births and deaths.

54. He who discriminates the nature of intellect, &c. (indicated in the foregoing stanza), may be said to know the reality and thus to have attained absolution. Such is the axiom of the Vedanta philosophy.

55. Such being the case, the absurd reasonings of the logicians, who ridicule the theory of delusion and the consequent enthrallment of the जीव, should be set at rest by counter-reasonings similar to those indicated in S'ri Harsha Miśra's work known by the name of खंडन खंड खाय.

56. Having dealt with the texts in the S'rutis which deal with the discrimination of the कूटस्थ from intellect, &c., the author proceeds to quote texts in the Puráns in support of his position.

In the S'aiva Puráns it is stated that God S'iva is the witness of all feelings and emotions when they arise ;

that he witnesses also the state of non-existence of these feelings and emotions before they arise ; he is present when there is a desire to acquire knowledge and also in the condition in which one feels that he is devoid of knowledge or perception.

57 & 58. God S'iva is also described as सत्य, *i. e.*, having a real existence, by the fact of his being the foundation on which the structure of illusion is raised. He is चित्, *i. e.*, intelligence itself, by the fact of his serving to give life to the insentient material creation. He is आनन्द, *i. e.*, bliss itself, from the fact that he is the object of affection or love, in as much as he constitutes our own-self, than which nothing is dearer to us. He is also all-pervading from the fact that he makes the knowledge of everything else possible, and moreover he is connected with everything.

59. In the works like सूतसंहिता and others God S'iva is thus described as pure spirit or कूटस्थ, devoid of the functions of जीव and ईश्वर, alone by himself without a second and shining by his own light.

60. Both जीव and ईश्वर are unreal, in as much as it is stated in the S'ruti that माया creates them by means of reflection. The only difference between them and the rest of the material creation is that they are capable of presenting a reflection on account of their brightness just like a piece of glass, while the rest are not so, just like clay.

61. Now it may be asked why, if the whole universe is a creation of माया, should जीव and ईश only be bright and thus admit of reflection, while the rest of the creation is not so. The explanation is simple, and may be furnished by means of an illustration. Both (मन) mind and (देह) the material body are the products of the nourishment received from food but the first is cleaner than the other. Similarly जीव and ईश though productions of माया have turned out brighter than the rest of the creation.

62. It may be said that brightness like that of a piece of glass is intelligible in the case of जीव and ईश but how can there be any intelligence? The reply is that appearance of intelligence in them becomes possible from the fact that they receive their light from intelligence itself. If may again be urged that if both जीव and ईश are the products of माया it is improper that they should have the appearance of intelligence. To this argument the reply is that nothing is difficult of accomplishment in the case of माया which is omnipotent.

63. Even our sleep produces जीव and ईश possessed of intelligence in the condition of dreaming. What cause is there for wonder then that माया should create them?

64. It may be argued that ईश like जीव being admitted to be the product of माया, it will follow that the properties, *e. g.*, limited knowledge, &c., which belong to जीव, will also have to be attributed to ईश. But this need not necessarily be so, in as much as माया can endow the ईश्वर with properties like omniscience, &c. If माया can create ईश्वर why should it be difficult to endow him with such faculties?

65. It may perhaps be asked why कूटस्थ also should not be the product of माया, when जीव and ईश are so. The reply is that there is no authority which supports such a conclusion.

66. Throughout the whole of the Vedant the reality of कूटस्थ is, on the contrary, announced, and nothing else is allowed to share its character of reality.

67. The task that we have assigned to ourselves is to give an exposition of what is contained in the S'ruti. Nothing that we say is purely based on a logical inference. There is no room therefore for the logicians to pick holes in our argument.

68. In these circumstances he who is desirous of absolution should avoid all such erroneous argument and seek the sup-

port of the S'rutis. In the S'ruti it is demonstrated that माया creates जीव and ईश.

69. The limits of the functions of जीव and ईश are also definitely laid down. The creation commencing with ईक्षण (in the S'ruti स ऐक्षतलोकानुसृजे) and ending with प्रवेश (in the S'ruti तमह आविशत्) falls within the province of ईश्वर. While जीव is responsible for all the conditions signified by the term संसार, viz., states of waking, dreaming and sleep, and the state of bondage and absolution.

70. कूटस्थ on the contrary is ever unsusceptible of any contact or association and there is no possibility of its being affected one way or the other. This fact ought to be fully impressed on the mind.

71. The real fact is that कूटस्थ is not capable of any limitation, nor is he subject to creation ; neither is he enthralled by worldly delusion, nor is he one striving to get free from such trammels ; he is neither one who is desirous of absolution nor one who is absolved.

72. If this be so why should the S'rutis have dealt with जीव, ईश and जगत् ? The reply is that कूटस्थ is not one that can be described by speech or grasped by the mind, and therefore in order to give an idea thereof the S'rutis resort to an explanation of ईश, जीव and जगत्.

73. Sureśvarāchārya has said that whatever method serves to explain the nature of कूटस्थ to men with different capabilities is desirable in itself, and the several sayings in the S'rutis are to be viewed in this light.

74. It is only those who are dull of intellect and who are not able to grasp the drift of the S'rutis as a whole, that get bewildered. While one who is endowed with discrimination understands the whole and swims in the sea of delight.

75. He is convinced that the all-pervading ether of intelligence cannot in the least be affected by the showers in the

shape of the worlds which the cloud of माया may pour forth; i. e., just as the आकाश is not affected by the showers poured forth by the clouds, so चैतन्य or intelligence neither gains nor loses by the workings of माया such as the creation of the universe, &c.

76. He who constantly studies the exposition of कूटस्थ in this chapter, ever shines like कूटस्थ.

CHAPTER IX.

MEDITATION.

In the present chapter it is proposed to show that it is possible to attain absolution by merely meditating over the reality, when on account of dullness of intellect it is not found possible to get it by direct knowledge resulting from the processes indicated in the Vedānta philosophy and which have been alluded to in the foregoing chapters.

1. A person is absolved from these worldly ties even by mere meditation of the reality, just as one reaches the desired object in a state of delusion which is संवादी, i. e., eventually leading to the goal. Therefore in the latter portion of the तापनीय उपनिषद् several processes of meditation are mentioned.

2—6. Now what kind of delusion is that known as संवादिभ्रम? This may be illustrated by an example. Suppose there are two reflections seen at a distance—one is the reflection of a light from the window of a house and the other the reflection of a jewel. Two persons happen to see these reflections and both of them mistake the reflections for real jewels and run to catch them. Neither of the reflections being real jewels both are equally the subjects of a delusion but still the results of their several attempts are different. The man running towards the reflection of the lamp eventually reaches the lamp and not the jewel, but his companion who runs to-

wards the reflection of the lamp eventually reaches the jewel. Now the delusion of the person who mistakes the reflection of the lamp for a jewel is called **विसंवादिभ्रम**, while the delusion of the person who mistakes the reflection of the jewel for the jewel itself is **संवादिभ्रम**.

7. The above illustration has references to facts as perceived directly by the senses. The same reasoning applies to matters of inference and matters mentioned in S'ástras. The case of inference may be illustrated thus : A person sees some vapour at a distance. He fancies that it is smoke and taking his stand on the accepted rule 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire' he infers the existence of fire. He goes to the place and by mere accident sees fire there. This delusion is **संवादिभ्रम**.

8. The following will illustrate the case of what is mentioned in the S'ástras :—The S'ástra mentions the purifying properties of the water of the Ganges. Suppose a person who has only the water of the Godavari fancies that it is the water of the Ganges and therefore sprinkles it for purification. His object of securing purification is gained, and the delusion under which he acts is **संवादिभ्रम**.

9. Similarly if a person, who is prostrated by typhoid fever, dies while, in a state of delirium, he is invoking the name of नारायण, he goes to heavens. This is also an instance of **संवादिभ्रम**.

10. These instances, based on proofs of the senses, on inference, and on sayings of the S'ástras may be multiplied infinitely in illustration of **संवादिभ्रम**.

11. If this were not so, how should clay, wood and stones serve as deities ? Or how should women and others be fit to be worshipped in the light of fire ?

Earth, wood and stones are in themselves no deities, but because they are looked upon as such, their worship results in good expected from deities, by the reasoning of **संवादिभ्रम**.

Again in पंचाग्नियोग it is stated that woman, man, earth, rain, heavens, all represent the deity of fire and their worship results in attainment of ब्रह्मलोक, i. e., world of God Brahma. In this case also the result follows by the reasoning of संवादिभ्रम.

12. In short संवादिभ्रम is that delusion in which with an incorrect knowledge of a particular thing a desired object is gained by mere accident.

13. Just as this संवादिभ्रम, being itself a delusion, contributes to the acquisition of something valuable, so the contemplation of the principle of ब्रह्म contributes to the attainment of absolution, as indicated in stanza 1 above.

14. In the foregoing stanza contemplation of the principle of ब्रह्म is recommended, but it may perhaps be asked whether such contemplation presupposes the existence of knowledge or its absence. If knowledge is admitted to exist, then, that being the final end and aim, the prescribed contemplation becomes unnecessary. Again if such principle is not known, then its contemplation would be impossible. This dilemma, however, is very easily got over. When we prescribe the contemplation of the principle of ब्रह्म we do admit the existence of knowledge but such knowledge is indirect. Such indirect knowledge is first obtained either from books or from teachers. Knowing in this manner the nature of the principle of ब्रह्म, which is ever existent and uniform, one should contemplate its identity with his own-self.

15. In the present instance 'indirect knowledge' amounts to a general knowledge (derived from शास्त्र) that the principle of ब्रह्म exists, without any direct perception of that principle, similar to the knowledge regarding the forms of deities like विष्णु, &c.

16. Although one learns from the शास्त्र a detailed description of the forms of the deities, still the fact that the deities

themselves have never been actually seen makes that knowledge indirect.

17. It may perhaps be argued that such indirect knowledge of deities, by reason of its not being accompanied by actual demonstration of its object, may not be true knowledge at all but a mere delusion. But that would not be correct. Mere indirectness is not enough to make that knowledge a delusion. What is necessary to make it a delusion is that the object of knowledge must be fictitious. In the present instance the deities are not fictitious, in as much as their existence is demonstrated by authoritative texts.

18. Similarly it is known from the S'āstras that ब्रह्म is possessed of the attributes of सत्, चित् and आनन्द, but this gives no direct knowledge, and therefore from the mere authority of the S'āstras one is not able to realize what ब्रह्म is.

19. The knowledge by which one is able to determine the characteristics of ब्रह्म purely by the authority of the S'āstras, though indirect, is still real knowledge and not merely a delusion.

20. In the texts of the S'ruti known as महावाक्य (*vide* chapter V) ब्रह्म is described as the subject of direct knowledge. Where then is the necessity of उपासना? The reply is that though the texts referred to lead to direct knowledge, still such knowledge cannot be acquired by persons who are not able to distinguish between जीव and ब्रह्म, whose identity is inculcated in those texts.

21. As long as the delusion of identifying the material body, &c., with the spirit prevails, so long will man, on account of dulness of his intellect, be incapable of realizing the identity of the spirit that is within him with the universal spirit.

22. It may perhaps be argued that the illusion above referred to may also interfere with the acquisition of indirect

(परोक्ष) knowledge. But it is not so. One who is gifted with faith and will look into the S'ástras will acquire an indirect knowledge of Brahma. The direct illusion on account of which the spirit is identified with the material body does not interfere with indirect knowledge of the identity of the individual and the universal spirit.

23. The fact that one actually sees a stone in an image does not interfere with the indirect knowledge that ईश्वर exists in that image. Who ever disputes that the images said to represent God Vishnu are not that God ?

24. It may be said that persons who have no faith will not believe in the existence of God in a piece of stone, but these cases of the faithless do not deserve to be cited here, in as much as in all observances laid down in the Vedas it is only the faithful that have any concern.

25. Indirect knowledge may result from a statement made only once by a person whose veracity is unimpeachable. Similarly the idea of the existence of god in images does not require very great analysis.

26. The question may then be asked, if this be so why is it that the S'ástras contain such extensive dissertations on the subject ? The reply is that कर्म, *i. e.*, action, or observance of forms and उपासना, *i. e.*, devotion, are dealt with at length in the S'ástras in order to determine the correct line of conduct. The subject matter is scattered in different places on the Vedas and no single individual is able to state definitely the correct conclusions and hence the necessity for the S'ástras to deal with the matter.

27. The conclusions of the S'ástras are indicated in works like कल्पसूत्र on the authority of authors like जैमिनि. With their help a person who is disposed to take things on faith is able to commence practice without having to waste his time in determining the correct direction.

28. The methods of practising devotion are described in the works compiled by sages like Vasishtha. Those persons who are not capable of forming their own conclusions may learn those methods from their spiritual preceptors and then practise devotion.

29. Let those who desire to determine the drift of the texts of the Vedastry to form their own conclusions. But the practice of devotion can merely be learnt by following the advice of those authorities that are known to be reliable.

30. Such is however not the case with realization of identity with ब्रह्म. That is never attainable without deep thought and careful analysis and by the mere guidance of reliable authorities.

31. Want of faith only interferes with the acquisition of indirect knowledge, which does not stand in need of thought and analysis. What interferes with the acquisition of direct knowledge is want of thought and analysis.

32. If even after deep thought and analysis the identity of self with the supreme spirit is not realized directly, then the process of thinking and analysing must be repeated until such direct knowledge is acquired.

33. If even after such repeated thought and analysis direct knowledge does not result until the approach of death, then the object will surely be accomplished in the next birth after the obstructions which lie in the way of such direct knowledge are gradually removed.

34. In Sutra (aphorism) No. 51, Chapter III, Part 4, of the work of Vyāsa it is stated that direct knowledge is attainable either in this or next birth. The S'ruti also indicates direct knowledge as that which many, though striving to acquire, may not attain in this life.

35. Sage Vamadeva, while lying in the womb of his mother perceived the dawn of direct knowledge, on account of repeated thought devoted in previous birth. Such results are also seen in the case of ordinary studies.

36. It happens sometimes that a particular verse or passage in a book, though committed to memory a number of times, is not retained that day, but next day without referring to the book one is able to think it out simply with the assistance of impressions left by the study of the previous day.

37. Just as everything, *e. g.*, agricultural produce, foetus in the womb, &c., attains development only gradually, so the contemplation of the spirit also develops into perfection in course of time.

38. Suresvarácharya in his Vártikas has well explained that a person in spite of repeated thought does not know the truth on account of obstacles of three kinds. The purport of some of the Vártikas is given in the following stanzas.

39. The question having been asked why knowledge, which did not result before, made its appearance subsequently, the reply was that it was on account of the disappearance of the obstacles. These obstacles are of three sorts, *viz.* (1) past, (2) future and (3) present.

40. For this reason a person who repeats the Vedas and has also mastered their meaning does not secure absolution. This is illustrated in the S'rutis by the example of persons who walk on the ground in which a golden treasure is stored, but not knowing where to find it will never get it.

41. First as to past obstacles. There is a popular story that a certain person was very fond of his she-buffalo. Later in life he gave up his worldly pursuits and became an ascetic. While then pursuing a course of hearing explanations of philosophical truths from his preceptor, he was unable to

grasp the truths simply because his fondness for his she-buffalo interfered with his concentration of mind.

42. The preceptor, seeing this state of distraction of his hearer, tried to explain the truth by adverting to his fondness for that very she-buffalo. He showed that the spirit resided as much in the she-buffalo as in himself. In this way the cause of distraction was removed and real knowledge was the result.

43. The obstacles which come under the second class, *viz.* 'Present,' are (1) attachment to material objects, (2) dulness of intellect or understanding, (3) ill directed argument leading to misinterpretation of texts ; (4) clinging obstinately to the belief that the spirit is susceptible of suffering grief and enjoying happiness. Any one of these is sufficient to interfere with the acquisition of real knowledge.

44. The obstacles of this sort are likely to be removed by resorting to proper measures like द्धम (concentration of the mind on a particular object) द्धम (abstraction of the senses from external objects) उपरति (that condition of the mind in which the mind is independent of external objects) तितिक्षा (suffering miseries without complaint and without trying to counteract them) श्रद्धा (faith in the truthfulness of S'ástras and of the advice given by the preceptor) and समाधि (incessant direction of the intellect towards the spirit, without allowing the mind to have its own way) and by the processes known as श्रवण (hearing an explanation of the texts of S'ástras) मनन (deliberating over what is heard) and निदिध्यास (repeating the process of contemplation). In this way, when the obstacles are removed, one enjoys the felicity resulting from realization of the identity of self with the supreme spirit.

45. Now as regards the third class of obstacles, *viz.*, future, there is no limit of time within which they may disappear. The obstacles of this class are those connected with प्रारब्ध

actions, which are the cause of the succession of births and which are never annihilated without bearing their fruit. In the case of Vámadev these obstacles disappeared in one birth, while for Bharata it took three births to get free of them.

46. In the sixth chapter of the Bhagavad Gita it is stated that persons who are not able to maintain a continuity of thought until the final beatitude is attained may pass through a number of births before the obstacles in their way are removed. But from this it should not be inferred that the thought that was already devoted to consideration of the spirit would go to waste.

47. Such persons at the end of a birth attain to worlds which are allotted to meritorious beings, on account of the thought devoted by them to the consideration of the true principle, and after enjoying the blessings appertaining to those worlds he returns to this world and if he has some desires yet to satisfy, is born in the family of persons who are pure and possessed of wealth.

48. If however all his desires are satisfied and there is nothing worldly for him to look forward to, then on account of the thought previously devoted by him to the contemplation of the real truth he is born in the family of persons who practise योग and are gifted with a clear intellect. This however is very difficult to obtain.

49. He then gets back all those impressions that he contracted in the previous birth and again enters on his previous search for truth. Hence such a birth is difficult to get.

50. By the force of the practices of the previous birth he is in spite of himself directed towards that course. Being thus after successive births thoroughly prepared, he finally attains absolution.

51. Another obstacle of this last sort is as follows: In case a Yogi is strongly inspired with the desire of attaining:

to the happier worlds like ब्रह्म लोक, and, trying to check that desire, practices his contemplation, he will never realize the truth.

52. Such a person, while in the world of Brahmá, attains absolution along with God Brahmá at the end of the period known as कल्प, as will be seen from the following extracts

वेदान्ताविज्ञानमुनिश्चितार्थाः सन्यासयोगायतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः

ते ब्रह्मलोके तु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्तिसर्वे ॥

ब्रह्मण सह ते सर्वे संग्राप्ते प्रतिसंचरे

परस्यान्ते कृतात्मानः प्रविशन्ति परं पदम् ॥

the purport of which is as follows:—Those who have controlled their senses by abandoning all worldly pursuits, who have rightly determined the truth by knowledge of Vedanta, and whose soul is purified—they, while in the world of Brahmá are absolved at the time of the final destruction.

53. The case of persons who do not attain absolution even when they are practising contemplation owing to certain obstacles has thus been stated. But there are some whose actions of previous births prevent them even from practising contemplation. The Ś'rutis refer to the supreme spirit as one who is not accessible to the ears of many.

54. If owing to extreme dulness of intellect or the absence of facilities for acquiring a knowledge of the supreme spirit, one is unable to practise contemplation, he should constantly worship the spirit.

55. The worship of the spiritual principle, which is not capable of being invested with forms or properties, is not impossible. The essential feature of worship is the continued direction of faith and this is equally possible in the case of the spirit invested with forms and properties and that of the supreme spirit without form and property.

56. It may perhaps be urged that worship of ब्रह्म is not possible because it does not come within the range of speech

and mind. If so the same objection will hold good even in the matter of acquiring knowledge regarding it.

57. If it is possible to acquire the knowledge that ब्रह्म is beyond the power of speech, mind, &c., then why should it not be possible to worship it with the same idea.

58. It may be contended that if ब्रह्म is admitted to be susceptible of worship it will follow that it is possessed of some attributes. If that is so, then the same conclusion will follow when it is said that ब्रह्म is susceptible of being known.

It may again be maintained that ब्रह्म is not directly the object of knowledge, but that its knowledge is derived by the process of definition known as लक्षणा. If so then let ब्रह्म be worshipped in the same manner.

59 & 60. It may again be urged that in the S'ruti there are texts like the following 'यश्मनसानमनुते येनाहुर्मनोमतं तदेव ब्रह्मत्वं विद्धि नेदंयदिदमुपासते', which mean that ब्रह्म is not that which can be contemplated by the mind, but which constitutes the function of the mind and therefore know that to be ब्रह्म and not that which is worshipped by the people : and thus the S'rutis may be said to declare that ब्रह्म is not capable of being worshipped. If this be so, we will quote texts like the following 'अभ्यदेवतद्विदितादथोविदितादधि' which means that ब्रह्म is not capable of being known as it is other than what is known and not known. Therefore the extent to which it is capable of being worshipped may be taken to be the same as that to which it is capable of being known.

61. If you say that in the case of ब्रह्म the capability of being known is not real but merely conventional, why should not the same be said regarding its capability of being worshipped? If you say that the knowledge of ब्रह्म is merely a function of the intellect, then the same may be said of worship.

62. You may perhaps ask why we are so particular in illustrating the merits of worship. We will retort by asking

why you are so much against it. If you say that worship does not deserve any consideration for want of authority we will say that it does, in as much as there are several texts in the S'rutis which support it.

63. In the Upanishads known by the names of उत्तर तापनीय, ब्रह्म, काठक माण्डूक्य, &c., the worship of the निर्गुण ब्रह्म is spoken of.

64. The method of this worship is indicated in Sures'varāchārya's work named पञ्चीकरण.

It may be objected that this worship may serve as the means of acquiring knowledge only and not absolution. If so the objection is quite agreeable to us.

65. It may again perhaps be argued that it is usual to worship deities having forms and qualities but not the spirit without form and property. Even if this argument be admitted, the absence of worshippers cannot affect the principle above established.

66. Even the worship of सगुण ब्रह्म results in the attainment of happiness in succeeding births, and therefore some foolish persons, desiring to secure results in this birth, may resort to the practice of incantations, which are calculated to confer superhuman powers. Persons desiring to achieve results with still less trouble may practise agriculture and similar pursuits. It does not follow, however, that, because a particular class of persons consider it advantageous to follow a particular course, the higher and more difficult courses are useless; nor are they on that account abandoned by those who practise them.

67. We will let alone those who persist in the pursuit of wordly follies and turn to the elucidation of the worship of ब्रह्म. This being one and the same everywhere, the several attributes predicated of ब्रह्म in the several treatises may be summarized as follows.

68. The attributes predicated of ब्रह्म are both positive and negative. The positive attributes, *e. g.*, those indicated in the texts “ तत्रानंदो ब्रह्म ” “ विज्ञानमांनद ब्रह्म ” “ नित्यः शुद्धोऽबुद्धः सत्यो शुक्तो निरंजमः विभुरद्वय आनंदः परः प्रत्यगेकरसः ” &c., are collectively referred to by Vyās in Sutra 11—Chapter III, Section 3.

69. The negative attributes, *viz.*, अस्थूलमनण्वन्ह्रस्व यत्तददृश्यं मप्राह्यम शब्दम स्पर्शम रूपम ध्वयम् have been similarly indicated by Vyās in Sutra 33, Chapter III, Section 3.

70. Now if it be objected that it is not proper to treat of the attributes of ब्रह्म in a treatise that purports to be an exposition of ब्रह्म as that which is not susceptible of any attributes, then we will content ourselves with saying that the blame attaches to Vyās and not to me.

71. If however you are satisfied that what is said by Vyās is not inconsistent with the ordinary acceptation of the term निर्गुण, in as much as there is no mention of images like those of the sun which are described as having golden hair, &c., then such satisfaction is quite welcome.

72. If you say that the positive and negative attributes above referred to merely describe ब्रह्म and do not affect its spirit and therefore ब्रह्म cannot be worshipped, then we meet you by saying that you may worship the principle as indicated by the attributes.

73. Those who desire absolution worship the spirit, which is described in the S'rutis by positive and negative attributes, and which is made up of uniform essence, as being indential with their own selves.

74. What then is the difference between knowledge and worship? The difference is that knowledge has reference to the thing itself which is the subject of knowledge, while worship has reference to the frame of mind or ideas of the worshipper.

75. Knowledge is the result of continued and deep thought. When this process is so far developed as to make the result inevitable, then even a contrary desire will not be efficacious in preventing the issue. The mere appearance of knowledge destroys wholesale the reality of worldly matters.

76. The dawn of knowledge is looked upon as the end and aim of thinking. It is accompanied by a state of constant satisfaction. This state is what is called *जीवन्मुक्ति*, *i. e.*, attainment of absolution during a life-time. Having attained this condition one has duly to await the exhaustion of the force of *भारव्य* actions.

77. For purposes of worship, a process of reasoning is not necessary. Without it, one may put faith in the advice of persons whom he regards as reliable and contemplate the object of worship, without allowing his contemplation to be diverted by other thoughts.

78. Such contemplation should proceed until one forgets the mistaken identity of his own self with the material body, &c., and identifies himself with the object of worship. Thereafter he should continue in the same condition.

79. This kind of identification may be illustrated by an example. In the Chhândogya Upanishad, Chapter IV (छांदोग्य उपनिषद्), it is mentioned that a celibate Brahmin who was given to the worship of the vital airs (प्राण) by the process of *संवर्ग* asked for alms, while revolving in his mind the identification resulting from his process of worship. The story runs thus :—There was a king named S'aunnak on account of his being the son of S'unak, and also called Kápeya on account of his tracing his ancestry to the sage Kapi. There was also another king named Abhipratdri, a son of Kakshasena. On one occasion while they were just about to commence taking their meals, a celibate person priding himself upon his knowledge of *ब्रह्म* asked them for food. The two kings desiring to

know the stuff of which the mendicant was made refused to give him food. He then explained to them that he was a worshipper of *ऋषि*, which is possessed of great power and which is capable of absorbing within itself several other functions of several other elements and the senses which rule the material body: that the mortals are not able to realize this deity: that the food which is eaten every day is created for the sake of this *ऋषि*, and that if they declined to give him any food they only acted against that deity.

This story aptly illustrates the complete identification of the worshipper with the object of worship.

80. The difference between knowledge and worship has been stated above (*vide* stanza 74). It has also been stated in stanza 75 that knowledge once acquired cannot be kept off even if one desires to keep it off. Worship on the other hand depends on the will of the worshipper. Its existence, non-existence, or transformation depend on the will of the worshipper. It is therefore necessary that identification with the deity, after it is once accomplished, should be constantly kept in view.

81. One who studies Vedas with his heart and soul repeats the process even in his dream, on account of the constancy of his devotion. So also one who devotes himself to the repetition of prayers repeats them in his dreams for the same reason. Similarly one who worships a deity with contemplation should constantly direct his mind to the object of his worship. So much so that he should worship even in dreams.

82. By eliminating all notions which conflict with the contemplation of one's object of worship, and by resorting to constant contemplation, one even dreams of his object of worship by mere force of association.

83. It may be asked how it should be possible for a person to incessantly follow the pursuit of meditation, when he has to suffer the consequences of his प्रारब्ध actions. The reply is that even under this disadvantage he will no doubt be able to carry on his contemplation constantly, if his interest in that process is exceedingly keen, just as a vicious man indulges his vile propensities with ardour.

84. An adulteress, although outwardly engaged in the duties of her household, internally ruminates over the pleasure resulting from cohabitation with her paramour.

85. Her household duties are not totally interfered with by this abstraction. They go on but mechanically.

86. It is true that a woman whose thoughts are thus abstracted does not altogether manage her household duties as well as a woman who is solely devoted to them.

87. Similarly one who is devoted to contemplation of the deity may partially attend to worldly affairs, though not satisfactorily. A philosopher on the other hand having known the truth may to all appearances satisfactorily attend to them, because his philosophy does not clash with the management of those affairs.

88. For one who has known that all the world is an illusion and that the real nature of self is intelligence, what objection can there be to the management of worldly affairs ?

89. The pursuit of worldly affairs does not necessarily rest on the belief that the world is a reality and not an illusion, and that the nature of self is not spiritual but material. What it requires is the means by which it can be kept going.

90. Then what are these means ? Mind, speech, the material body and all external objects such as houses, fields, wealth, &c., are the materials with which the worldly affairs are carried on. One who knows the truth does not annihi-

late all these the moment he acquires knowledge though he realizes their illusive nature. How then should he have no worldly dealings ?

91. It may be said that one who knows the truth, though unable to annihilate the external world, should completely subdue his mind. But if he does so he may deserve to be called a *ध्याता*, i. e., one who contemplates a deity, and not a knower of truth. Let us take for instance a pitcher. One who has come to know what the pitcher really is, is never known to subdue his mind in order to be in possession of that acquired knowledge.

92. It may perhaps be argued that a pitcher, being a material object, is clearly visible and therefore it is not necessary to resort to the process of subduing the mind in order to retain possession of the knowledge regarding its nature: that *ब्रह्म* however is not material and therefore, for purposes of knowing it, it is necessary to subdue the mind. To this argument the reply is that if a pitcher once seen is ever present to the mind, there is no reason why the supreme spirit which shines by its own light should not be similarly ever present to the mind, after being once known.

93. You may perhaps say that the fact of the spirit having the property of shining by its own light would make no difference in regard to the knowledge respecting it : in order that the nature of the spirit may be known it is necessary that it should be covered by the intellect : the intellect however is fickle and therefore the covering process must be constantly repeated if knowledge is desired.

Now if this be true in the case of *ब्रह्म* it must be equally true in the case of other things which are the subject of knowledge.

94. You may again say that in the case of the knowledge of external objects like a pitcher it is enough if they are

covered by the intellect once only, and subsequently whenever there is any occasion to make its use there is no necessity to repeat the covering process for knowing the pitcher. If so we maintain that the same is the case with the knowledge of ब्रह्म.

95. Having once determined the nature of the spirit, a philosopher is able, whenever he wishes, to speak of it, to think of it, and to meditate over it.

96. You may say perhaps that a philosopher is likely to lose touch of the affairs of this world, if he were to give himself up to meditation like one who is given to worship. If so we accept that position, with this reservation however that the result in question has been brought about by meditation and not by knowledge.

97. The meditation of ब्रह्म is merely optional and not essential, because it is knowledge which secures absolution, and it is so proclaimed in the S'ástras.

98. It may perhaps be said that a philosopher is likely to mix in worldly affairs if he does not give himself up to meditation. If so we reply that he is quite welcome to mix in worldly affairs. What harm is there if he does ?

99. You may perhaps say that we go too far when we conclude that such behaviour on the part of a philosopher is not calculated to prove prejudicial. If so we will ask you to state what is the limit which would suit the dealings of a philosopher. You may say that the limit is that which is determinable by the rules laid down in the S'ástras. If so we will reply by saying that those rules apply to persons who are groping in ignorance and not to the philosopher who has known the truth.

100. All rules of conduct apply only to him who sets some store on his caste, on the nature of the pursuits followed by him, and on his condition in life.

101. One who has known the truth is firmly possessed of the notion that the different conditions set forth in the foregoing stanza belong to the material body by force of the illusion of **माया**, and that they do not affect the spirit, the essence of which is knowledge or intelligence.

102. He, whose desires or attachments are totally annihilated and who thus becomes possessed of the purest knowledge, is practically absolved, whether he does or does not practise the process of abstraction known as **समाधि**, and whether he does or does not perform the duties prescribed by the **S'ástras**.

103. He whose mind is free from all desires has no concern either with abstinence from all actions or with the pursuit of particular actions. He has nothing to do either with abstraction of mind (**समाधि**) or with repetition of incantations.

104. How can desires have any place in the mind, when it has been unequivocally decided that the spirit is not susceptible of any association and that everything else than spirit is but a delusion resulting from **माया** ?

105. Such being the case there is no possibility of one who has known the real truth attaching himself to any object; much less is there the risk of his getting addicted to any.

106. The doings of a child are not controlled by rules of conduct and therefore there is no transgression of such rules, in its case. *A fortiori* a philosopher, who looks upon all rules whether of commission or omission, in the same light, is never likely to be guilty of transgressing them.

107. If you say that rules of conduct do not apply to a child because it is quite ignorant, and that the same argument cannot hold good in the case of a philosopher, then we meet you by saying that one who knows the truth is equally exempt from the operation of those rules because he knows everything. All rules apply only to those who are possessed

of a little knowledge but not to those who are either totally ignorant or in full possession of true knowledge.

108. It will not be correct to say that he is a philosopher who has the power to inflict misery or confer favours on others. Such powers are the result of penances and not of knowledge.

109. It may perhaps be said that sages like Vyàs and others, who possessed real knowledge, had also the power to inflict misery or confer bliss. That however does not prove anything. Penance is necessary both for the acquisition of miraculous powers as well as for the acquisition of knowledge. But that which serves in the first case will not do in the second.

110. He who performs both kinds of penance acquires miraculous powers as well as knowledge. Those who practise only one of them acquire the fruit which is appropriate to it.

111. It may be said that a philosopher who acts in disregard of prescribed rules of conduct, and who does not possess the powers which are to be acquired by peculiar penances, is likely to be scoffed at by ascetics who follow the prescribed rules. That may be so. No one is free from this risk. Even these persons who scoff at a philosopher are scoffed at by those who are day and night given to the satisfaction of the cravings of the senses.

112. Perhaps you may say that there is nothing wrong even in ascetics taking care of their food and clothes procured by begging, in order to satisfy their simple wants. If so that would be a wonderful kind of asceticism indeed, full of disregard for the things of this world !

113. If you say that those who follow the rules of conduct prescribed for particular stages of life need not mind the scoffing of fools, then similarly he who has known the truth need not mind the scoffing of persons who pride upon their following the prescribed rules of conduct but who confound the material body with the spirit.

114. Having said so much with regard to the questions that cropped up incidentally, the author resumes the thread of his argument from stanza (90). The acquisition of knowledge thus does not immediately annihilate the senses, &c., which subserve the worldly dealings. It is therefore quite possible for a philosopher to carry on properly worldly pursuits such as the administration of a kingdom, &c.

115. You may say perhaps that a philosopher having realized the unreal nature of worldly objects cannot have any liking for worldly pursuits. Very well—let him not have a liking, but nevertheless he has to live a course of life which results from his *प्रावृत्तिकर्म*, partly engaged in contemplation and partly in worldly affairs.

116. A worshipper however cannot afford to act as he pleases. He must always resort to meditation of the deity. His identity with the spirit has been established not by analysis and conviction but as a make-belief, in the same way as his identity with deities like Vishnu, &c.

117. That which results from meditation disappears as soon as meditation ceases. The identity with the supreme spirit being real in itself and knowledge having merely served as a means of making it known, that identity does not vanish simply because knowledge ceases.

118. Knowledge is merely the means of making the *ब्रह्म* known. Knowledge does not create *ब्रह्म*, which is eternal. A thing which is real does not cease to exist simply because there is no means of making it known.

119. Perhaps you may say that in the same way a worshipper also is in reality the supreme spirit. In that case there is no reason why you should stop there. You might go further and say that ignorant persons and even beasts are in reality the supreme spirit.

120. It must be admitted that there is a common defect in the case of both the ignorant and the worshipping classes, *viz.*, absence of true knowledge, which comes in the way of their attaining their goal. Why then should we advocate उपासना or worship? The reply is that we assign it only a relative preference, as being superior to other means, in the same way as begging is said to be better than starving.

121. Observance of religious practices is better than mere pursuit of worldly affairs, which is the lot of the ignorant. Worship of a god invested with certain attributes is better than mere religious practices. Better than such worship is the contemplation of a deity having no attributes.

122. By this process, the nearer you approach direct knowledge the greater is the superiority over the preceding stage. Contemplation of a deity without attributes gradually develops into direct knowledge of ब्रह्म or the supreme spirit.

123. In the delusion known as संवादिभ्रम the right thing is obtained in the end. Similarly contemplation by gradually developing into perfection is turned into direct knowledge at the time of absolution.

124. It may perhaps be said that in the case of the delusion known as संवादिभ्रम the right thing is attained at through the medium of a delusion. We have no objection to say the same thing of contemplation, which serves as the medium of securing direct knowledge.

125. You may perhaps say that in this way the worship of an idol or the repetition of a मंत्र may also be looked upon as the causes that may lead to direct knowledge. If so, we do not object. It must be noted however that the stage of meditation of deity without attributes is superior to the other two in so far as it is nearer to the final goal.

126. When such meditation is fully developed, it becomes **सविकल्प समाधि**, *i.e.*, that condition of abstraction in which there is cognizance of the existence of the object of meditation, the person meditating and the process of meditation. Thus gradually and without much trouble one attains to the condition known as **निर्विकल्पसमाधि**, *viz.*, that condition of abstraction in which there is absolute identify of the meditator and the object of his meditation and the cognizance above referred to is totally absent.

127. By being able to accomplish this, one's self is for the time realized as identical with the supreme spirit, which is not susceptible of any attribute. When endeavour is made to secure a frequent repetition of this condition, one is able to secure real direct knowledge with the help of texts known as **महावाक्य**, *e.g.*, **तत्त्वमसि**, &c.

128. Then all the attributes of the supreme spirit described in the S'āstras are quickly grasped by his intellect without any necessity of discussion. These attributes are immutability, unsusceptibility, qualities of being eternal and self-refulgent, oneness and fullness.

129. The practice of **योग** is recommended in the **अमृतविन्दु** and other Upanishads with the same object. In this way the worship of a deity without attributes is superior to worship of idols, in as much as it is nearer the final goal.

130. Those who leave aside this means and resort to pilgrimage, repetition of **मंत्र**, &c., place themselves in the category of the person who throws away a piece of sweatmeat and commences to lick his hands.

131. You may say perhaps that the same remark would apply to persons who, leaving aside the direct road to knowledge, resort to worship and meditation. If so, we admit it. We do not prescribe worship and meditation in the case of persons who are capable of knowing the real truth by analysis

and thinking. They are prescribed for those who are not so capable.

132. Knowledge of the truth by means of analysis and thinking is not possible in the case of persons whose mind is distracted by a thousand and one things such as passions, worldly occupations, &c. For them योग is the chief thing. It serves to destroy the conceits which eclipse the intellect.

133. For those whose minds are not so distracted, but whose knowledge of self is merely obscured by ignorance, continuous thought and process of analysis known as सांख्य become quickly efficacious.

134. This is corroborated by the authority of the Bhagwad Gita *vide* Chapter V, stanza 5. It is stated there that what is obtainable by सांख्य is also obtainable by योग. He who looks upon both as leading to one and the same goal understands the S'āstra correctly.

135. In the S'ruti also there is a text which states that the supreme spirit which is the cause of this world can be known by सांख्य and योग. In the works dealing with these two, whatever is irreconcilable with the S'ruti should be set down as spacious and therefore not really coming within their sphere.

136. He, whose practices of worship and contemplation have not become perfect in this life, stands the chance of securing absolution after knowing the real truth either at the time of death or after going into the region known as ब्रह्मलोक.

137. In the Bhagvad Gita—Chapter VIII, stanza 6—it is stated that the idea which takes hold of the mind at the last moment of separation of the जीव from the material body, shapes the form which the जवि assumes in the next birth. There is also a text in the प्रभोपनिषद् which says that the जीव goes forth from the material body with that which is thought of at the last moment.

138. The acceptance of this theory does not conflict with our argument. The future birth being determined by the impressions that are present at the last moment, it follows that one who has practised the meditation of निर्गुण ब्रह्म will in his last moments have present before him the same idea, just as the person who practises the worship of सगुण ब्रह्म is confronted with similar ideas.

139. It may perhaps be objected that according to the argument in the foregoing stanza a person is likely to secure निर्गुण ब्रह्म but not absolution. The reply is that the acquisition of identity with the supreme spirit which is eternal and unsusceptible of association is only another name for absolution, which practically is nothing more than the attainment of one's proper condition. For illustration the case of संवादिभ्रम may be cited. This is technically भ्रम or delusion but really it serves to lead one to correct knowledge.

140. It may perhaps be said that contemplation of निर्गुण ब्रह्म being merely a mental process cannot be efficacious in securing absolution. The reply is that that process is instrumental in securing knowledge which disperses ignorance, in the same way as the worship of सगुण ब्रह्म secures a conviction regarding the power of the deity in the matter of securing salvation, and eventually leads to salvation, as described in the लघुजाबालोपनिषद्.

141. That the contemplator of निर्गुण ब्रह्म attains absolution is seen from the तापनीय उपनिषद्, in which the condition reached by such a person is described some what as follows :— He has no desires ; all his desires have left him ; he becomes quite independent of his material body and his senses ; he is reduced to the condition of ब्रह्म in which there is no sensation of fear, &c.

142. It might perhaps be contended that if absolution could be secured by worship and contemplation then that would

conflict with the text नान्यःपन्था विद्यतेऽमनाय (there is no other road to absolution except knowledge). But this contention is out of place because we maintain that by strength of worship knowledge is produced. Thus there would be no contradiction with the text above quoted.

143. In the तापनीय उपनिषद् it is stated that absolution is secured by उपासना which is practised without the desire of securing any worldly ends. For him who practises उपासना with such a desire the attainment of the world of God Brahma is ordained, as will appear from the प्रश्नोपनिषद् which deals with the questions asked by king S'áibya.

144. In the प्रश्नोपनिषद् it is stated that he, who contemplates the supreme being with the help of the three letters which go to form the word ओम्, is carried to the world of god ब्रह्मा. While there, he is able to realize the supreme spirit as evolved from the हिरण्यगर्भे who constitutes the corporate essence or समष्टि form of the creation.

145. Sage Bâdarâyana has in one of his aphorisms (अप्रतीकालंबनाश्रयति) stated that for one who practises contemplation with the object of gaining a particular end the reward is residence in the world of God Brahma, and he has based his conclusion on the reasoning known as तत्कृतुन्याय, which means that every one secures results in keeping with his desires.

146. Having gone to the world of Brahma, such a person secures a knowledge of the truth by means of the capability resulting from the worship or contemplation of निर्गुणब्रह्म previously practised by him. Thus he does not revert to the succession of birth and death but is absolved at the end of the period known as कल्प along with God Brahma.

147. Almost all the processes of worship or contemplation by means of प्रणव or ओंकार, indicated in the Vedas, are निर्गुण. In a few places they are described as सगुण.

148. In the ग्रन्थोपनिषद् it is stated that, in reply to सत्यकाम, sage पिप्पलाद described the ओंकार as representing both the further and the nearer ब्रह्म, *i. e.*, निर्गुण and सगुण.

149. In the उपनिषद् known by the name of कठवल्ली it is stated that God Yama, in reply to the question of नचिकेतस, said that the fulfilment of one's desires depends upon the direction which the desires take.

150. From what has been said above it will thus be clear that he who properly performs उपासना of निर्गुण ब्रह्म attains to the supreme spirit either in this life, or at the time of his death, or after going into the world of God Brahma.

151. This is also stated clearly in the A'tma Gita wherein it is said that one who is incapable of knowing the truth by deep thought and analysis should constantly worship or contemplate the spirit.

152. In the आत्मगीता it is further stated :—If by such constant contemplation one is unable to realize the presence of the supreme spirit, then he should without any misgiving concentrate his mind on me (*i. e.* the deity). Then in course of time I am sure to yield his desires by identifying myself with his thoughts and experiences.

153. Just as there is no other remedy than digging in order to get at a treasure which is deeply buried, so in order to reach me there is no other remedy than constant thought of oneself.

154. I am as it were the treasure. The material body is like the stones or debris which conceals that treasure. The mind is the ground in which the treasure lies concealed. For digging this ground the intellect serves as a sort of pickaxe. Thus after removing the obstacles in the shape of the material body, &c., and after clearing the mind, one is able to secure me.

155. Even if one is not able to realize the truth after some practice, he should continue to think that his own self is identical with ब्रह्म or the supreme spirit. By means of contemplation one realizes the presence of the deity in objects like stone, wood, &c., where it really did not exist before. Why then need there be room for doubt regarding the realization of the supreme spirit which is ever present and all pervading.

156. If one does not practise contemplation even when he sees that by such practice the erroneous idea regarding the reality of the material body disappears gradually, then what difference can there be between him and a beast ?

157. In conclusion it may be stated that, after getting rid of the mistaken identity of self with the material body, if one should practise contemplation and thus realize the oneness of the spirit, he would not partake of the mortal nature of the material body and become one with the supreme spirit in this very life.

158. He who studies this chapter well will be free from all doubts and will be inclined to devote himself to the constant contemplation of ब्रह्म or the supreme spirit.

CHAPTER X.

ILLUSTRATION BY COMPARISON WITH A LAMP IN A MUSIC HALL.

Now we enter upon the chapter known as नाटकदीप or illustration by comparison with a performance on a stage.

1. He, who at first was the great spirit full of bliss and was alone by himself, subsequently transformed his own self into the creation, by means of the indescribable power possessed by him and which is known as माया, and, having thus formed the creation, penetrated it, and in this individual to assumed the name of जीव.

2. Now this spirit is known by the material environment in which it resides. It is known as God when residing in first class bodies like those of Vishnu, &c., while it is known as mortal when it resides in the lower order of bodies.

3. By passing through a succession of births one is inspired with a desire to think of himself. By this process of thinking the illusion known as **माया** will disappear and then there will remain merely the self.

4. The end of knowledge is absolution. Absolution implies the existence of certain bonds which require to be cut off. What then are these bonds? Now the spirit is in itself full of bliss and is alone by itself. When by coming into contact with matter it assumes the properties of matter then the loss of blissfulness and oneness constitutes the kind of bonds from which absolution has to be secured. Thus absolution is nothing more than restoration to the original condition of pure spirituality.

5. Now this restoration to original condition is effected by thought and analysis, and therefore the necessity of thought and analysis is quite clear. It may perhaps be urged that in the Bhagvad Gita it is stated that King Janaka and others reached their goal purely by means of actions and therefore actions are the only means of reaching the goal and not merely thought and analysis. To such an argument the reply is that the bonds which are the result of want of thought and analysis cannot be got rid of by any means except thought and analysis. Actions only serve to purify the mind and thus help the process of thought and analysis. In these circumstances one should devote his thought constantly to the analysis of the natures of **जीवात्मा** and **परमात्मा**, i. e., the individual and the supreme spirit.

6. Now **जीव** represents the reflection of the spirit in the intellect of individuals. The chief characteristic of **जीव** is that

he identifies himself with the material body and takes upon himself the function of doing and suffering. His chief instrument is the mind. This mind acts both internally and externally by turns.

7. The internal process, which indicates the ego, has reference to the function of doing and suffering. The external process, which indicates the external objects, has reference to all the objects on which the mind acts.

8. The function of the mind is simply to act on external objects in a general way. The special properties of those objects, such as their smell, form, taste, touch, and sound are comprehended separately by the respective senses having that peculiar capability.

9. The परमात्मा or the supreme spirit is known in the Vedanta philosophy by the term साक्षी or the witness. This साक्षी is made up of intelligence itself and thus has the power of acting simultaneously on the जीव, his function of doing and suffering and the several objects which are grasped by the senses.

10. It is this साक्षी who makes it possible for one to have at once and the same time the experience derived from the senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. As an illustration may be cited a lamp in a dancing or music hall,

11. That lamp furnishes light without distinction to the lord for whose gratification the dancing takes place, as also to the rest who form his company, and the dancing girl herself, Nay, the lamp continues to give light in the absence of any of these persons.

12. In the same manner the साक्षी acts on the ego, the intellect and also the objects which are grasped by the absence and also continues to exercise his intelligence in the absence of any of these to act upon.

13. It may perhaps be said that it is the बुद्धि or intellect which acts upon all objects and thus produces knowledge and therefore there is no necessity to urge the existence of a साक्षी. But this argument will not be correct in as much as बुद्धि or intellect has by itself no power to produce knowledge. It is as insentient as any of the material objects. This intellect becomes capable of having its full play when it is illuminated by the light of intelligence derived from the कूटस्थ who is ever shining.

14. To revert to the illustration:— The ego is the lord for whose entertainment the dance is performed. The objects of the senses are his companions. The intellect is the dancing girl and the senses are the persons who play on the instruments which form the accompaniments of the dance. The साक्षी or the witnessing spirit is the lamp which illuminates the scene.

15. Just as the lamp without moving from its own place furnishes light to all parts, so the साक्षी from its unchangeable position is capable of acting on everything whether situated inside or outside.

16. The words 'inside' and 'outside' used above have no reference to the साक्षी but relate to the material body. Things outside the body are the objects of the senses. The resident within is the ego.

17. It may be observed that in order to receive the impressions derivable by the internal and external senses the intellect is frequently on the move, and not the साक्षी. It is therefore incorrect to attribute to the साक्षी the movements which appertain to the intellect on which the साक्षी acts.

18. This may be made clear by an illustration. Suppose the rays of the sun were to enter the house through a window. If a person were to hold his hand against the rays and move it backwards and forwards, the rays would appear to be dancing although really there has been no motion in them.

19. Similarly the साक्षी though remaining in its own place and not moving inside or outside, appears to move by reason of the movements of the intellect.

20. The place of the साक्षी is neither inside nor outside. These expressions apply to the intellect. The साक्षी remains where he is even when the intellect and the senses cease to perform their functions.

21. It may be urged that when the senses cease to perform their functions there is no possibility of any idea being formed of the region over which this साक्षी sheds his light, and therefore to fix the place of the साक्षी by saying that 'he remains where he is' is absurd. If so, we have no objection to admit that the साक्षी is not restricted to a particular place. Again it may be asked why should the spirit be described in the S'rutis as all pervading and all seeing if he is beyond all considerations of space? The reply to this is that these expressions are used with reference to the ideas that are formed in the mind regarding him. Really speaking he cannot be described by any attributes.

22. The attribute of being the witnesser of everything (साक्षी) is also given to the spirit with reference to the intellect. This साक्षी is inside or outside or everywhere according as the intellect thinks of him and he is accordingly described.

23. This साक्षी is not within the reach of either the speech or the intellect. He however acts upon everything which comes within the reach of the intellect.

24. You may perhaps ask how this साक्षी, who is not within the reach of speech or intellect can be comprehended. To this question we reply that there is no necessity for you to trouble yourself with any effort in that direction. When the unreal nature of everything besides the spirit is determined then all ideas and thoughts will fade away and there will remain behind only the spirit.

25. It may be true that the spirit remains after everything else has faded, but you may perhaps require some demonstrative proof of this result. If so we say that such proof is not wanted, because the spirit shines by its own light and cannot be illustrated with the help of anything else. If however some authority is required in support of this view then you may approach your preceptor and learn the S'ruti from him.

26. If you think that this freedom from all thoughts and ideas is not possible, then you may make yourself thoroughly subservient to the intellect and with its help experience the presence of the साक्षी either within or without yourself.

CHAPTER XI.

FELICITY DERIVED FROM ABSTRACTION.

The first five chapters of this work are termed विवेक meaning differentiation; the next five are termed दीप meaning light, *i. e.*, illumination or illustration. The last five are termed ब्रह्मानन्द meaning spiritual felicity. In each of these last a different kind of felicity is described.

1. Now I will proceed to describe the nature of spiritual felicity. When that is known one is freed absolutely from all the evils of this and other worlds, and becomes happy.

2. Many texts from S'rutis & Smritis can be cited in support of this view. The purport of a few of them is as follows:—(1) One who has acquired a knowledge of ब्रह्म attains to the supreme spiritual condition; (2) One who has acquired a knowledge of the all-pervading spirit transcends all grief; (3) This spirit is the essence, *i. e.*, felicity itself; (4) Having got this spiritual essence one enjoys felicity not otherwise.

3. When one realizes his identity with the supreme spirit then he becomes perfectly fearless. If however there is the slightest defect in this feeling of identity then he is liable to be troubled by fear.

4. Even the deities represented by wind, sun, fire, rain (Indra) and death, though in their former births they knew what was right and practised it, still failing to perfectly realize their identity with the supreme spirit are obliged to perform their present functions through fear of that spirit.

5. One who has experienced the blissful nature of the supreme spirit does not suffer any trouble from fears either physical or mental. The cares which are stored up as the result of actions of preceding births and which cause pain to one who has no direct knowledge of the supreme spirit, do not affect him who has such knowledge.

6. All actions, meritorious as well as sinful, are looked upon by him as unreal and he is constantly engaged in contemplating the spirit. He even looks upon his past actions as if they were nothing else than the spirit.

7. It may perhaps be said that the S'âstra lays down that previous actions will not vanish until their force is spent, such actions there must be many during the succession of previous births, and therefore it is not possible to remain unaffected by them simply by looking upon them in the light of the spirit. To this contention a reply may be given in the words of the Mundakopanishad in which it is said that as soon as the supreme spirit, who is even further than the highest deities, is directly realized the false notion of identity of the spirit with matter disappears; all doubts regarding the distinct nature of their functions are solved; and all the actions lose their force.

(The actions originate from ignorance and with the dawn of knowledge they are bound to vanish.)

8. Only he who has acquired a direct knowledge of the supreme spirit gets rid of the succession of births and deaths. There is no other way of achieving that result. When the supreme spirit who shines by his own light is known, all the bonds are severed. With the cessation of misery there is an end of births and deaths. This is what is stated in the अज्ञेताधत्तरोपनिषद्.

9. In the कदोपनिषद् it is stated that one who is completely self-possessed and has thus acquired knowledge of the supreme spirit gets rid of the sensations of pleasure and pain even in this life. In the याज्ञवल्क्य ब्राह्मण it is stated that such a person is never affected by either the commission or the omission of meritorious or sinful acts.

10. These and similar texts from S'rutis, Smritis and Puranas, which are many, have proclaimed that the knowledge of the supreme spirit is accompanied by annihilation of misery and production of bliss.

11. Bliss is of three sorts, viz., (1) ब्रह्मानन्द the bliss experienced by direct realization of the supreme spirit; (2) विद्यानन्द the bliss resulting from knowledge and education generally; and (3) विषयानन्द the bliss resulting from enjoyment of worldly objects. Of these the ब्रह्मानन्द is first discussed.

12. In the तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् it is stated that Bhrigu, the son of Varuna, heard from his father the definition of ब्रह्म. Varuna said to his son as follows:—Try to obtain a knowledge of that from which all the creation is produced, which sustains it when produced, and to which it returns or in which it is absorbed in the end: that is ब्रह्म. Bhrigu then proceeded to ascertain it by analysing the several sheaths or कोश in which the जीव is enveloped. He found that the first four viz., अन्नमय, प्राणमय, मनोमय and विज्ञानमय did not satisfy the definition and therefore rejected them. Coming to the last he found that it did satisfy the definition and therefore determined that he आनन्दमय कोश is ब्रह्म.

13. Let us see how आनंद satisfies the definition of ब्रह्म above given. It will suffice if it is shown that the three conditions of production, sustenance and absorption have reference to आनंद. As to production it is well known that conception is the result of pleasure experienced at the time of the population of males and females. When born, the whole of the creation is sustained by the pleasure derived from the enjoyment of worldly objects. As for absorption it is enough to mention the condition of sound sleep during which there is a complete cessation of action and there is only the experience of the original blissful state. It is thus beyond doubt that ब्रह्म is bliss itself.

14. This conclusion is also corroborated by reference to the छान्दोग्य उपनिषद्. In the seventh chapter of that Upanishad is given some conversation between Sanatkumar and Narad, the purport of which is as follows :—

Before the elements and the resulting creation, the whole was one uniform spirit. The distinction between things to be known, the persons who know, and the act of knowing was then non-existent. It is admitted that such distinction usually vanishes at the time when this world comes to an end.

15. Now let us see what these ज्ञाता, ज्ञान and ज्ञेय signify. ज्ञाता, or one who knows, is no other than the spirit clothed in the covering of the intellect *i.e.*, the जीव in its function connected with the intellect. ज्ञान is the reflection of the spirit as represented by the mind. ज्ञेय means things to be known, *i.e.*, all things which are to be comprehended by the senses. All these cannot from their very nature have existed before the creation of the world.

16. Where these three conditions do not exist, there the spirit in its complete state and without a second is realized. This occurs during the state of concentration known as समाधि.

or during the state of sound sleep or during the state of delirium. Similarly the spirit in its unique and complete condition exists before the creation.

17. It may perhaps be urged that the fact of the spirit being in a complete state does not necessarily imply the property of blissfulness. To this contention the reply is that when once Narada was extremely disconsolate Sanatkumar told him that one who is complete is blissful and that bliss is not to be found in what is incomplete and subject to the three conditions of ज्ञाता, ज्ञेय and ज्ञान.

18. The cause of Narada's grief was that he even after studying the five Vedas with the Puranas and various Shâstras did not know himself.

19. Before one studies the Vedas he is troubled by the three classes of miseries known as आधिभौतिक, *i. e.*, proceeding from the elements, आधिदैविक, *i. e.*, proceeding from divine wrath and आध्यात्मिक, *i. e.*, mental. Afterwards there comes first the misery of having to undergo labour for purposes of study; secondly the misery resulting from having forgotten what was once learnt; thirdly the pain of being despised by a superior student; and fourthly the misery of being infested with pride of his own attainments.

20. Thus do I grieve, oh learned sir. Do take me across this grief. So addressed, Sanatkumar told Nârada that termination of grief was synonymous with bliss.

21. What, then, is this bliss ? You may perhaps say that happiness is found in the various worldly enjoyments and therefore bliss, which is synonymous with the termination of grief, can be easily attained. But that is not the case. All the happiness derived from worldly enjoyments is surrounded by thousands of miseries and thus is practically grief itself. It was in this sense that Sanatkumar's words were addressed to Narada when he said that there was no bliss in that which

was incomplete and subject to the three conditions of ज्ञाता, ज्ञेय and ज्ञान.

22. Admitting that there is no happiness in the condition of incompleteness or duality, it may be urged that there is no happiness even in the condition of completeness or freedom from duality. If it is maintained that happiness does exist in that condition then that will necessitate the admission that such happiness is experienced and when it is admitted that there is the feeling or enjoyment of happiness that involves the admission of the three elements, *viz.*, one who enjoys, that which is enjoyed and the act of enjoyment—which is an admission inconsistent with completeness or freedom from duality.

23. To such an argument our reply is as follows:—We do not object to the contention that there is no happiness in the condition of completeness (अद्वैत) because that would be equal to admitting that happiness is something separate from अद्वैत. Our argument is that अद्वैत is happiness itself. You may then enquire what is the test by which this can be determined. But our reply is that this condition of अद्वैत is self-refulgent, *i. e.*, it shines by its own light and is felt by itself. Therefore it does not stand in need of other proofs of its existence.

24. You may perhaps demand some proof of this quality of self-refulgence. We will retort by saying that your own question is proof of it. Your contention is that there is no happiness in the condition of non-duality. In saying so you only entertain a doubt regarding existence of happiness but you evidently admit the existence of the condition of non-duality. This condition has evidently been realized by you without proof and therefore no further argument is necessary.

25. Perhaps the above mode of reasoning may not satisfy you. You may retort by saying that you do not admit the existence of non-duality but that you are simply proceeding on the basis on which our argument rests and pointing out its error. If so then please say what existed before the duality which you advocate.

26. The condition existing before duality must be one of the following three:—(1) One of non-duality; (2) Or one of duality; (3) Or neither of the two. The third condition is not possible as everything in the world comes under one of the first two categories. Again the second condition also cannot be said to exist, because it is absurd to say that duality existed before duality. It thus follows that the first condition is the only possible one.

27. It may perhaps now be contended that the existence of non-duality is only proved by argument and is not supported by experience. If so we will ask our opponent to say if the argument by which he considers non-duality to have been proved is capable of illustration or not. It must either be one or the other and cannot be neither.

28. You say that non-duality has not the support of experience, and if you further say that the argument by which you accept it as proved is not capable of illustration, you only make yourself ridiculous, because argument, to be effective, needs illustration. The position that remains to be met is that of the argument being capable of illustration. Now then please cite an illustration that will be acceptable to both parties.

29. You may perhaps cite the final deluge as an illustration of non-duality, because at that time there is no knowledge of duality, just as there is none during the condition of sound sleep. Against such an argument we may raise a

counter-question. What is there to prove that the condition of sleep is one of non-duality? That requires a further illustration.

30. You have said above that you have no experience of the condition of non-duality and therefore you cannot support the example of sleep, which you have cited above, by mentioning your own experience regarding the condition of sleep. If, under such a difficulty, you proceed to cite the experience of others in the matter, then you must indeed be wonderfully clever! Fancy a person, not admitting his own experience, having the boldness to speak of other peoples' experience under similar conditions!

31. You may perhaps say that you simply infer that a person is asleep from his being motionless. Even after this we will ask you to state your ground for this inference. In this way ultimately you will be forced to cite your own experience and this experience will be found to be one which does not stand in need of another proof.

32. You admit your own condition of sleep, although it is not witnessed by any of your senses; nor can you be convinced of it by the experience of other persons. This is a sufficient proof of the self-refulgent nature of this experience. Knowledge which rises by itself without any cause may be said to shine by its own light.

33. You may now say that, even taking for granted that the condition of sleep is non-dual and cognizable by itself, it remains to prove that that condition is blissful. If so be prepared to hear that absence of misery in that condition leads to the inevitable conclusion that what is experienced in that state is bliss.

34. You may perhaps ask what evidence is there to support the statement that there is absence of misery in sleep?

We say that there is the testimony of the S'rutis, corroborated by the experience of all people. During the condition of sound sleep, identification of the spirit with the material body is relaxed, and therefore one who is blind forgets his blindness ; one who is wounded forgets his wounds, and the diseased forgets his disease.

35. You may perhaps say that mere absence of misery is not happiness and you may instance in support of that statement such substances as clods of earth or stones, in which the feelings of both happiness and misery are absent. Our reply to this argument is that the illustration is not suitable.

36. The feelings of misery or happiness can only be conjectured by the expressions of the face indicating dejection or cheerfulness. In the case of substances like clods of earth, &c., no such indication is possible and there no conjecture can be ventured and therefore you cannot assert that the feeling of misery is absent there.

37. We may now turn to the distinction between knowledge of the feelings of others and that of the feelings of oneself. The feelings of others are known by inference. Such is not the case with the feelings of oneself. One's own feelings of happiness or misery need not be inferred. The existence as also the absence of happiness or misery are therefore known by experience only.

38. Such being the case absence of misery during the condition of sleep is known by experience. Thus misery, which cannot co-exist with happiness being absent, what remains is uninterrupted happiness.

39. If there were no happiness in sleep, why should people secure the means of inducing sleep, such as soft bedding, &c., with a great deal of trouble.

40. You may perhaps say that all this trouble for inducing sleep is taken simply with the view of securing a cessation of misery and not for positive happiness. This contention may be correct in the case of a person who is afflicted with a disease, but the fact that a healthy man also is anxious to secure sleep is sufficient to lead to the conclusion that there is positive happiness in that state.

41. Now the fact that the happiness experienced in sleep is the result of such means as a soft bed, &c., may induce you to contend that that happiness is material and not spiritual. We agree with you that the happiness derived from such means as a soft bed, &c., is material, but that precedes the happiness experienced in the condition of actual sleep.

42. The happiness, experienced during the condition of sleep cannot however be traced to any material causes. Antecedent to this condition one directs his mind towards that happiness and at this stage means such as a soft bed are of service. But when actually in it he becomes wholly absorbed in supreme happiness.

43. When one is fatigued by the thousand and one acts which he performs during the condition of wakefulness, he seeks rest. When free from distraction his mind becomes easy and he then enjoys the happiness resulting from lying on a soft bed, &c.

44. While in this condition he directs his intellect towards the spirit and the intellect receives the reflection of the spiritual bliss. Even in this condition one is not likely to experience absolute happiness, because even there some fatigue is caused by the consciousness of the three different factors, *viz.*, the person who enjoys happiness, the happiness that is enjoyed and the act of enjoyment.

45. To secure recreation from this fatigue the जीव is likely to run towards the spiritual element that is within

him, and identifying himself with that spirit may enjoy the bliss that peculiarly belongs to the spirit.

46. For the elucidation of the nature of this bliss the S'ruti cites five illustrations, *viz.*, those of (1) a bird, (2) a hawk, (3) a boy, (4) a great king, and (5) a highly qualified Brahmin.

47 & 48. The first illustration occurs in the छांदोग्य उपनिषद्. It is stated there that if a piece of thread is tied to the foot of a bird, the bird after wandering in all directions in search of prey, &c., and not finding a place of rest returns to the place where the other end of the thread is attached, whether it be the hand of a man or a post, &c. Similarly the mind embodied in the जीव wanders forth during the conditions of wakefulness and dream in order to secure the fruits of his meritorious and sinful acts, and after the force of former actions is spent lays itself to rest in ignorance of which it is born.

49. The second illustration occurs in the बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्. Therein it is stated that just as a hawk, after flying about a great deal repairs to his nest with the object of sleeping, that being his only desire, so the जीव after a day's labour anxiously goes to sleep, his only desire being the enjoyment of the spiritual bliss that is experienced there.

The next three illustrations occur in the बाळाकि ब्राह्मण.

50. A suckling child, having had its fill from the mother's breast, and lying smiling on a soft bed, evinces a temperament resulting from an experience of unalloyed happiness, the emotions of love and hatred not having arisen then.

51. A sovereign who has established his sway over the whole earth and is completely satiated by all sorts of enjoyments may be practically said to have attained the highest limit of human happiness and is thus an incarnation of bliss itself.

52. Similarly a highly qualified Brahmin, who has acquired a knowledge of ब्रह्म and has thus attained the climax of happiness resulting from knowledge, in which condition he feels the satisfaction of having done all that was to be done, remains satisfied.

The condition of a man in sound sleep resembles that indicated in the five illustrations given above.

53. Of all human beings the three above mentioned are the only happy ones, because in this world happiness is proved to be possible only in the case of (1) those who are incapable of thinking for themselves, *e.g.*, an infant, (2) those who are able to command all sorts of enjoyments, *e.g.*, a king, and (3) those who are completely satisfied on account of their having acquired a direct knowledge of the supreme spirit. All the rest are miserable and not happy.

54. The upshot of the argument may be indicated in terms of the ज्योतिर्ब्रह्मण, in which it is stated that a person in the condition of sound sleep is perfectly ignorant of what passes within as well as without himself, like one who is held in her embrace by a woman. Such a person, like the infant and others above mentioned, is solely absorbed in spiritual bliss.

55. The 'within' and 'without' referred to in the foregoing stanza may be interpreted thus with respect to different conditions. That which occurs in one's house may be described as occurring within, while that which passes in the streets, &c., may be described as occurring without. Similarly the condition of wakefulness may be described as outward, while the condition of dreaming, which is the result of the impressions contracted during the condition of wakefulness, may be described as inward with respect to the condition of sound sleep.

56. There is a श्रुति which says that one who is a father does not carry that impression with him while he is asleep. The drift of this and similar texts is to indicate that during sleep there remains the spirit divested of its cloak of जीवत्व because there is then perfect freedom from the idea of migration from one state or life to another.

57. It is this idea of being a father, &c., which is the source of all misery. When that idea vanishes, one gets over all misery.

58. There is a text in the अथर्ववेद which says that in the condition of sound sleep, when all operations cease, the जीव becomes perfectly enveloped in ignorance and there attains the spiritual condition of bliss.

59. This is corroborated by everybody's experience. One who has awakened from sound sleep remembers that he slept happily and that he was then perfectly ignorant of everything else. He thus has the recollection of the happiness and ignorance experienced during that condition.

60. Recollection is only possible in the case of matters that are once experienced. The fact of there being a recollection would therefore pre-suppose the existence of experience during the condition of sound sleep. No experience is, however, possible without the operation of the mind and other senses, and, it being admitted that this operation ceases during sleep, it follows that there can be no experience during sleep. To such an argument the reply is that the happiness experienced being spiritual it does not stand in need of the senses for producing a knowledge thereof. This spiritual happiness also makes the experience of ignorance during sleep possible.

61. Now you may perhaps say that even if the happiness experienced during sleep is admitted to be that which is experienced on its own account and without the assistance

of any other senses, it does not follow that this happiness is spiritual happiness, as stated in stanza (45) *ante*. To meet this argument we may say that it is stated in the बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, which comes under the S'rutis owned by the चाजसनेय sect, that bliss in the form of knowledge is ब्रह्म itself. It is thus clear that the happiness which is experienced by itself is ब्रह्म only and nothing else.

62. Now the rule is that experience and subsequent recollection are the functions of the same faculties, and since it is the जीव who recollects after sleep that he slept soundly and that he was ignorant of everything else, it must follow that the same जीव must have had also the experience of happiness and ignorance during sleep. But that is not so. The जीव as represented by the विज्ञानमय and मनोमय sheaths is wholly absorbed in ignorance and therefore it cannot be said to have the experience of happiness and ignorance during sleep. Sleep is but the condition in which these two distinguishing features are absorbed. There is a text which says विज्ञानविरतिः सुप्तिः i.e., cessation of विज्ञान is sleep. This sleep is treated as synonymous with अज्ञान or ignorance.

63. It may perhaps be asked how it is possible for the जीव in the विज्ञान stage to remember what occurred in the condition of sleep in which it did not exist. To this the reply is that the जीव did not cease to exist altogether during sleep. It did not exist in the stage of विज्ञान but entered on the next stage of आनन्द, and therefore even when it reverts to the stage of विज्ञान after awaking, it is quite possible for it to remember its experiences of the आनन्द stage. Just as clarified butter, having melted by contact with fire, may again become solid by contact with cold breeze, &c., so the mind, after finishing all its operations in the state of wakefulness, rests during sleep, but on waking up again enters upon active life in its

function of विज्ञान. When the mind enjoys complete rest the जीव is said to enter on the stage known as आनंदमय.

64. In the moment immediately preceding sound sleep the intellect directs itself towards the spirit that is within, desiring to be happy, and thus receives the reflection of the spiritual bliss. Now this intellect with the reflection of bliss becomes absorbed in the spirit. This condition of the intellect is known as आनंदमय कोश.

65. Now the जीव in this stage of आनंदमय कोश, which is the result of directing the intellect inside, enjoys spiritual bliss with the help of those conditions of the intellect, which, being associated with the जीव, result from ignorance.

66. It may be asked why in that condition the जीव does not identify itself with the idea that it enjoys happiness. The reply is that the workings of the intellect during the condition of ignorance are very minute and indistinct, while the workings of the intellect during the conditions of wakefulness and dreaming are more pronounced and vivid. Such is the view propounded by those proficient in the tenets of Vedanta.

67. In the मांडूक्य and तापनीय Upanishads and other Sr'uti texts this has been very distinctly stated. It is said there that the जीव in the आनंदमय stage is one that enjoys, and spiritual bliss is that which is enjoyed.

68. In the मांडूक्य उपनिषद् it is stated that the जीव, which before sleep was in the विज्ञानमय stage, enters upon the आनंदमय stage during sleep, and becoming identified with the spirit and full of intelligence, enjoys spiritual bliss with the help of the intellect holding a reflection of the spirit.

69. Now let us analyse the several factors of the stage आनंदमय indicated in the previous stanza. Let us first refer to the identification of the जीव, with the spirit. During the

condition of wakefulness the जीव identifies itself with the various forms and conditions with which it comes into contact and thus is known by several denominations from विज्ञानमय downwards. This जीव when it is in the condition of sound sleep, gets rid of its identity with physical and mental surroundings and remaining by itself becomes identified with the spirit of which it is the reflection, just as grains of rice when ground into flour lose their individuality in the quantity of flour.

70. The second factor is the intelligence of which the जीव becomes quite full during sleep. During the condition of wakefulness the intellect is taken up with the ideas of objects which came within its range and these ideas are known as प्रज्ञान. During the condition of sleep these ideas are deprived of their objects and therefore the intellect, being withdrawn from them, becomes collectively identified with the spirit, just as, in the countries lying in the north, drops of snow become solid by accumulation.

71. This accumulation of intelligence, which is known in the Vedanta philosophy as the साक्षी, *i.e.*, the witnesser, is interpreted by ordinary persons and Tarkikas to mean absence of misery. Their reason for this interpretation is that all ideas of misery and pain disappear in that stage.

72. The remaining factor of the text cited in stanza 68 is the means by which happiness is experienced during sleep. For the enjoyment of happiness during sleep the medium is the reflection of the spirit in ignorance.

Now the question naturally arises why does not the जीव continue incessantly in the enjoyment of spiritual bliss of which he is in possession during sleep? Why should he lose it by returning again to the condition of wakefulness? The reply is that he is forced to abandon that happiness and come out of it by the force of his actions.

73. In support of this assertion may be cited a text of the कैवल्यश्रुति in which it is stated that the जीव is awakened from sleep by the force of his actions in a former birth. Re-awakening is thus the result of कर्म.

74. The spiritual bliss experienced in sleep leaves its impress on the mind for some time after the जीव is awakened. This is clear from the fact that after awaking he tries to remain silent for some time, his mind being unoccupied by any object and experiencing a taste of happiness.

75. In this condition he is impelled by his former actions to occupy himself with worldly pursuits, and while engrossed in various miseries he gradually forgets the spiritual bliss once experienced.

76. All human beings show an appreciation of this spiritual bliss day after day at the commencement and expiration of sleep. They court sleep by devising such means as a soft bed, &c., and at its expiration they must need rest silently for some little time before leaving their beds. In these circumstances what sage man will dispute the existence of spiritual happiness in the condition of sleep?

77. It may naturally be argued that if spiritual happiness can be found in the state of quietness preceding and following sleep, all dull and slothful persons will have gained the desired goal and there will be no needs for study of the S'âstras nor for the advice of teachers and preceptors.

78. Surely such persons will have gained the goal if they knew that the happiness which they experienced was spiritual. But who can know the extremely unfathomable spirit without the assistance of the S'âstra and a preceptor.

79. You may perhaps retort by saying that you have known from what we ourselves have said that the happiness experienced during sleep is spiritual and may therefore ask

why you should not have gained the goal. In that case I will cite the illustration of a person who considered himself as wise as you do.

80. A certain king proclaimed that a reward of rupees one thousand would be given to one who knew the four Vedas. A man who knew nothing more than that the Vedas were four in number went to the king and saying that he knew that the Vedas were four claimed the reward promised.

81. Now you may perhaps say that the knowledge of this man was confined to the number and did not extend to the Vedas themselves. It so we will retort by saying that your knowledge of ब्रह्म is equally limited.

82. On this you may perhaps argue that the spirit constitutes an unvaried succession of uniform happiness and is beyond the pale of माया and its ramifications : therefore there can be nothing like partial or complete knowledge regarding it.

83. We will meet this argument by a counter-question—when you say that you know ब्रह्म to be possessed of the properties mentioned by you, does it signify that you know only so many words or that you know their meaning also ? In case your knowledge is only confined to words it follows that their meaning yet remains to be understood.

84. Even when the meaning is understood with the help of grammar there remains the realization of the sense conveyed by actual experience. The incomplete nature of your knowledge is thus clear and therefore it is necessary that you should serve apprenticeship with a teacher until you find that the object aimed at is accomplished.

85. Resuming the thread of the main discourse we may say that whenever happiness is experienced without the help of material objects you may be sure that it is the result of

the impressions produced by the experience of spiritual happiness. This happiness is known as वासनानंद.

86. Even when our material desires are satisfied by actual enjoyment, our mind naturally turns inside and then receives a reflection of the spiritual bliss that lies there. This happiness is known as विषयानंद.

87. Thus we have described three sorts of happiness : (1) ब्रह्मानंद, (2) वासनानंद and (3) विषयानंद. All happiness experienced in this world falls under one or other of these categories.

88. The first of these, ब्रह्मानंद, is capable of existing by itself and gives rise to the other two, *viz.*, विषयानंद and वासनानंद.

89. We have so far proved the existence of ब्रह्मानंद during the condition of sleep, by quoting texts from the S'rutis, and by resorting to processes of inference and by appealing to actual experience. Let us now proceed to prove its existence in other conditions.

90. During sleep the जीव is in what is known as आनंदमय sheath. At other times the same जीव is in its विज्ञानमय sheath, and while in this sheath it enters upon the conditions of wakefulness and dreaming according to the medium with which it comes into contact.

91. During wakefulness the medium is the eyes. In dreams the medium is the throat. While in the state of sound sleep the medium is the heart. When we say that the eyes are the medium during wakefulness we imply that in that condition the जीव identifies itself with all parts of the body from head to foot.

92. The kind of identification of the जीव with the material body is that found in a heated ball of iron in which the fire identifies itself with each particle of iron. While in this condition of identification the जीव always goes about with the certainty that he is a human being, &c.

93. The जीव is either (1) happy or (2) miserable or (3) indifferent. Happiness and misery are the results of his actions, while indifference is his natural state.

94. Of happiness and misery there are two sorts, *viz.*, those resulting from external causes and those produced by mental operations. The interval between happiness and misery is characterized by indifference.

95. While in such intervals, it is usual for a man to say that there are now no cares to trouble him and that he is at ease. He thus gives vent to that sense of happiness which is natural to him.

96. This sense of happiness does not represent the spiritual bliss (ब्रह्मानन्द) we have indicated before, because it is clouded by a sort of spiritual ignorance implied in the identification before mentioned. This sense of happiness is merely an impression resulting from spiritual happiness.

97. This may be illustrated by an example. Take a pot and fill it with cold water. If you touch the pot from outside, what you feel is the sensation of coldness and not the touch of water. That sensation of coldness is indeed the result of the water inside and therefore from that sensation you can infer the presence of water inside.

98. Similarly the sense of happiness above referred to is not identical with the spiritual delight of which it is the result. As in the case of water in the pot, the presence of spiritual bliss can be inferred from the sense of happiness above referred to. This power of inference is acquired by constant abstraction, which gradually makes one forget the assumed identification of self with the material body. Each moment of abstraction takes us nearer to the realization of spiritual bliss.

99. When this identification is gradually altogether forgotten it is reduced to the most subtle condition. This condition

is not one of sleep, because the internal sense does not here rest altogether as in sleep, and therefore the material body does not fall as in sleep.

100. The happiness which is felt in that condition, in which there is neither the experience of duality nor sleep, is ब्रह्मानन्द or spiritual bliss. So said God Krishna to Arjuna in the 6th chapter of the Bhagavad Gita, the stanzas bearing on the subject being as follows.

101. One should try to stop the workings of the mind by degrees with the help of the intellect fortified by patience. The mind should then be directed towards the spirit within and all thought should cease.

102. One who is desirous of attaining this goal should direct the mind, which is by nature fickle and unsteady, from the objects to which it is attracted, by arguing to oneself that those objects are transient and therefore not calculated to yield lasting pleasure. In this way the range of the mind being limited to the self it becomes completely subdued.

103. One, who has thus subdued his mind, gets rid of the element of रजोगुण, becomes the spirit, and is free from sin. To such a योगी comes bliss of the highest order.

104, 105, 106 and 107. That condition in which the mind ceases to work, having been subdued by practice of abstraction : in which one is pleased by seeing his own-self with the sight directed inwards : in which he experiences eternal happiness which can be grasped by the intellect only and no other sense, and being thus spiritually inclined is not dislodged from his position : in which he does not set a higher value on anything else than the attainment of the spirit : in which even the heaviest sorrow does not bring him down from his spiritual height : that is the condition known by the name of योग or akstraction, in which there is no contact with misery. Such

abstraction should be practised without allowing the mind to be overpowered by despondency.

108. A योगी who, on account of his righteous conduct, has his path free from obstacles which follow a sinful course of life and who always identifies himself with the spirit in the manner above indicated, enjoys eternal spiritual bliss without trouble.

109. The bird in the fable, whose eggs were carried away by the sea, determined upon emptying that vast storage of water with the help of a blade of grass which took away one drop at a time, did not allow its mind to be overpowered by despondency, which was likely to result by bestowing a thought on the impossibility of the undertaking. The subjection of the mind should be undertaken with a similar spirit.

110. This subject of spiritual bliss is also dealt with in other places. In the Yajurveda there is a branch called मैत्रायणी. Therein is related an episode in which it is mentioned that the sage शाकायन्य, while speaking to his pupil King बृहद्रथ, indicated the nature of spiritual bliss by first describing the state of abstraction known as समाधि.

111. His reasoning was as follows:—As fire which is not provided with fuel does not blaze forth but remains in the invisible possession of its original properties of light and heat ; so the mind, which is not provided with material to work upon, remains in its original condition: i.e., the mind, when abstracted from objects by constant practice, gets rid of the qualities of रजोगुण and तमोगुण, and is restored to its proper condition of सत्त्वगुण.

112. To a mind which is thus reduced to the state of quietness by practice of abstraction, which is ever inclined in the direction of the spirit, and is turned away from the objects of the senses, all wordly experiences resulting from actions will appear a delusion.

113. It may perhaps be said that it is absurd to hold that the world is known to be a delusion simply by the mind being reduced to a state of quietness, in as much as the mind does not form a constituent of the world. To this we may reply that although the world is not made of the mind the pleasurable and painful sensations experienced are the creation of the mind and therefore all worldly affairs together with the succession of births and deaths owe their existence to the mind. It is therefore of supreme importance to make an effort to purify it by constant practice and by inculcation of the ephemerical nature of all worldly objects and affairs, so that the elements of रजस् and तमस् may be eliminated. It is an axiom true for all times that every one is wholly absorbed in that to which his mind is directed.

114. With the mind purified in this manner, one is able to destroy the effect of all actions, whether good or evil. With this possession of a pure mind, he is able to identify himself with the spirit that is within him and enjoys eternal happiness.

115. Who will not be freed from the trammels of these worldly affairs, if he were to set his mind or thoughts regarding the spirit to the same extent as he does on worldly objects?

116. The mind is spoken of as either pure or impure. It is impure when it is associated with passions of different sorts. It is pure when free from such associations.

117. It is the mind that is the cause of the conditions of bondage and absolution experienced by human beings. The mind that is devoted to worldly pursuits serves to bring on bondage; while the mind that is dissociated from them serves to secure absolution.

118. When all the impurities of the mind are washed off by the practice of abstraction, and when it is directed towards

the spirit, the bliss that it experiences is such as cannot be described by speech but is realized by the internal sense.

119. It is true that this abstraction is rarely secured by men continuously for a long time. Nevertheless even a short duration of it is sufficient to afford a definite idea of what spiritual happiness is.

120. It may perhaps be said that several persons resort to the process of reading, hearing, contemplation, &c., but do not seem to realize what spiritual happiness is. That may be so; but those who take things on faith, as also those who have formed an unflinching resolution to know it, will certainly realize that spiritual bliss, and having once realized it will on other occasions also believe in it.

121. Such a person will disregard the impressions of happiness which may present themselves before him when he derives neither pleasure nor pain from worldly objects and will diligently realize spiritual bliss.

122. This may be illustrated by the example of an adulteress, who, being attached to a particular person, will even while engaged in the duties of her household, will all along experience within herself the taste of the happiness resulting from the society of her paramour.

123. Similarly a wise man, who has once known the pure ultimate essence, feels a sense of relief from the troubles of this world and will within himself experience the results of that knowledge, though outwardly following worldly pursuits.

124. In the foregoing stanza we have used the terms 'wise man'. It will be advisable to state what this wisdom consists of.

The business of the several senses is to attract a person to their several objects. To withstand the force of all these senses and to continue the contemplation of the spirit, with

the desire of experiencing the delight which it yields, is the sort of wisdom indicated in the foregoing stanza.

125. In stanza (123) we have also spoken of relief from worldly troubles. Just as a person bearing a heavy head-load puts it down and feels a sense of ease, so one feels a similar sense of ease who has abandoned all absorption in worldly pursuits.

126. One who has acquired the greatest possible ease in this manner will be absorbed solely in the enjoyment of spiritual happiness both while he is indifferent to worldly pursuits and while he is experiencing the joys and miseries of the world.

127. Such a person looks upon all worldly objects, which prove to be obstacles in the way of his being unceasingly occupied with spiritual bliss, in the same light as a woman who is preparing to go to the funeral pyre looks upon the operation of wearing her ornaments which is likely to delay the execution of her desire.

128. Thus the intellect by turns occupies itself with worldly objects which do not interfere with its spiritual inclination and with the spiritual bliss, like the sight of a crow.

129. A crow has only one apparatus of vision for both eyes. This can be turned in one direction only at a time. Similarly the intellect of one who has known the truth is directed by turns to one or other of the sorts of happiness above referred to.

130. A philosopher, while thus experiencing by turns worldly and spiritual pleasures, may have a knowledge of things worldly and things spiritual described in the Upanishads, just like a person who knows two languages.

131. While in this condition he is not troubled to the same extent as before by the approach of misery, since he is

now possessed of two-fold experiences, like the man whose lower half is immersed in the waters of a river and the upper half is exposed to the sun and thus experiences both cold and heat.

132. In this manner a philosopher experiences spiritual bliss even during the condition of wakefulness. Similar experience also awaits him during dreams, which form a counter-part of the impressions contracted during wakefulness.

133. During dreams, he like an ignorant person also experiences worldly happiness and misery, because during wakefulness he has contracted impressions of worldly affairs.

134. Thus have we described in this first chapter of the last section of this work, which is devoted to the description of spiritual bliss, the experiences of a Yogi which illustrate the nature of spiritual happiness.

CHAPTER XII.

BLISS RESULTING FROM ANALYSIS OF SELF.

1. In the last chapter we have spoken of three kinds of happiness (1) ब्रह्मानन्द, *i. e.*, pure spiritual delight which is experienced during the condition of sound sleep ; (2) वासनानन्द, *i. e.*, delight which is the result of the impressions left by pure spiritual delight and (3) निजानन्द, *i. e.*, delight which is experienced when the mind free from the pleasure or pain derived from worldly objects. This last sort of happiness can only be experienced by a philosopher who is able to control his mind. But what is to become of one who is not so able ?

2. Let him go through the endless succession of births and deaths according to his merits and sins. Why should we have any regard for him ?

3. This sort of reply may be met by saying that all preceptors are always actuated by compassion towards the ignorant and are always ready to confer favours on them, and therefore it is necessary that they should have every regard for them. If so we accept the reasoning. Let us then know if this person that you speak of is one who is impelled with a desire for knowledge or one who does not care for it.

4. To one who does not care for knowledge we will prescribe the practice of either उपासना, *i. e.*, worships or कर्म, *i. e.*, actions calculated to secure certain results. As for those who are desirous of acquiring knowledge, such as have quick intellect may be advised to secure identification with ब्रह्म by practising योग, *i. e.*, abstraction of the mind ; while those with a dull intellect may be instructed to secure their object through the instrumentality of आत्मानंद, *i. e.*, satisfaction resulting from analysis of one's own self.

5. Instructions regarding this आत्मानंद were preached by sage Yājñavalkya to his dear wife Maitreyi. The sage said that a husband is not dear to his wife on account of his own self.

6. Everything in this world, whether it be the husband or wife, son or wealth, cattle, Brahmins or Kshatriyas, the different worlds, gods, the Vedas or the rest of the creation, becomes dear to a person on account of his own self and not on account of any property residing in any of them.

7. A wife is fond of her husband when she is desirous of his company. When however the husband is overpowered by hunger, or is engaged in some religious observances or is suffering from a disease, she does not like him, because in those conditions he is unable to satisfy her.

8. It is thus clear that the fondness or affection entertained by a wife towards her husband is not for the husband but on account of her own self. Similarly a husband loves his wife not for her sake but for his own.

9. So also in the case of mutual attachment or fondness the motive is the satisfaction of the desire of oneself.

10. A father kisses his child even while it is crying on account of the pricking of his moustache and beard. In this case the kissing is not done for the child's satisfaction but for that of one's self.

11. Coming to articles of wealth such as gold, silver, jewels, &c., all the care that one takes of them and all the satisfaction that is felt by their possession are due to his own self. It cannot even be suggested that it is due to the things themselves, because they being insentient matter are in capable of having desires, &c.

12. An ox is even against his wish made to bear a burden. In this case the satisfaction is purely on the side of the trader. How can it be on that of the ox?

13. A person, being a Brahmin, feels flattered by the respect and reverence which he commands by reason of his belonging to that high caste and not account of any consideration for the caste, which, having no feeling, is incapable of experiencing any gratification.

14. Similarly the gratification resulting from enjoying a kingdom belongs to the person who feels that he is a Kshatriya and is therefore born to rule, and is not felt by the caste itself. The same may be said of the other castes, *viz.*, Vaishya and S'udra.

15. The desire that one may attain to the worlds known as स्वर्गलोक and ब्रह्मलोक is entertained not for any good that is likely to be done to those worlds, but for the enjoyment of the pleasures which they are calculated to yield.

16. So also the Gods ईश and विष्णु are worshipped in order that the worshipper's sins may be expiated. The worship does no good to the gods who are sinless. It is offered for the worshipper's own good.

17. The Vedas are studied in order that one may become a ब्राह्मण in the proper acceptation of the term and not be looked upon as a ब्राह्मण. This distinction has no concern with the Vedas but is observed among human beings.

18. The five elements are also wished for on account of their uses: earth on account of the support it affords for living; water on account of its necessity for satisfying thirst; fire on account of its assistance in cooking food; wind on account of its property of drying up moisture; and space on account of the ample scope it affords for the existence of created objects. The elements have no purpose of their own to serve.

19. The same may be said of the relation of master and servant, king and his subjects, &c. The master desires to have a servant for his own purposes and not for those of the servant. So also the king and others.

20. The object of citing so many illustrations in order to make clear one and the same conclusion is to indicate the existence of self love in all the several dealings of which life is made up and thus to impress its nature more firmly on the intellect.

21 & 22. It may be asked under which of the four kinds, viz., राग, श्रद्धा, भक्ति, and इच्छा, does the self-love described above fall? If it is taken as synonymous with राग, i.e., fondness, then it will only extend to one's wife, children, &c., if the second, viz., श्रद्धा, then it will apply only to faith which impels a man to perform sacrifices, &c., if the third, viz., भक्ति, then it will be co-extensive with the devotion which one has for his gods and preceptor; if the last, viz., इच्छा, then it will mean a desire for things which are not in one's possession. In none of these cases does the particular kind of self love become generally common. Such being the case we reply that the self love referred to by us is that condition of the mind which is the result of the predominance of the first of the three qualities,

viz., सख, and which takes cognizance only of pleasurable sensations.

It may perhaps be said that the condition so indicated is nothing else than इच्छा or desire. But that is not so. It differs from इच्छा in so far as it exists irrespective of the possession or loss of the object of desire.

23 and 24. The means of securing happiness, such as food and drink become agreeable on that account. One's own self is also agreeable and therefore it may be argued that self comes in the category of food and drink. If you say so your position will be untenable by reason of the fact that food and drink are the means of securing happiness to one's self and therefore there is no similarity between the two which may serve to bring them in the same category. If you say that there is similarity because the self is satisfied by means of one's self, then you land yourself into the predicament of making one and the same thing the subject and the object.

25. It may perhaps be argued that a love of sensual pleasures is also seen to exist and therefore the love of self may be looked upon as belonging to the same class. But there is a marked difference of degree which clearly distinguishes the two. For sensual pleasures the love is only of the positive degree while in the case of self that love is of the superlative degree. Moreover the love for sensual pleasures is not unremitting. Sometime or other it is likely to be diverted to other objects. That is not the case with self love.

26. The love of worldly pleasures leaves one object and takes to another. In the case of self this process of leaving and taking to is not possible. How then can love for self be said to exist and cease to exist?

27. You may perhaps say that a thing which does not admit of being thrown off or taken deserves disregard like

grass and similar worthless stuff. But self cannot be an object of disregard, because it is identical with him to whom such feeling of disregard must be attributed.

28. You may again say that it is sometimes observed that persons who are overpowered by disease or anger court death, and that this proves that self is found fit to be got rid of on account of a feeling of disgust.

29. This however is not correct. When overpowered by disease or anger, what one wishes to get rid of is the material body and not the self. The body which is desired to be got rid of is not self. He who desires to get rid of that body is the self. The feeling of disgust you refer to is not for one who is desirous of getting rid of the body but for the body itself. This being so, our conclusion regarding self love remains unaffected.

30. The same conclusion may also be demonstrated by analogy. The mere fact that every thing or person that is agreeable to oneself is so on account of its or his contributing to the happiness of self, is enough to prove that love for self is superior to all other considerations. This may be illustrated by an example. Suppose a person has a son and that son has a friend. Then that person's regard for his son's friend, being purely due to that friend's relations with his son, is clearly subordinate to the regard he has for his own son.

31. So far we have shown that self is supreme by citing the authority of the S'rutis and by the help of analogy. Let us now see if this conclusion is corroborated by the testimony of experience. It will be admitted by all that no member of the animate creation ever wishes that he should cease to exist. On the contrary he desires that he should continue to exist for ever. This is enough to demonstrate the supreme nature of the love one feels for his ownself.

32. Thus have we proved the supreme nature of self love in three different ways. Nevertheless there are some who maintain that our regard for our own selves is due to our having sons, wives, &c., *i.e.*, that we exist for them.

33. In support of this position they say that the S'rutis evidently consider that a son is superior to oneself, in as much as there are texts like आत्मा वै पुत्रनामासि, which mean that one's own self is but his own son. This is also clear from the ऐतरेय उपनिषद्.

34. Therein it is stated that the son who is but another self is set up by the father as his representative for the performance of meritorious deeds. When he is thus established, the other self, *viz.*, that of the father, having done his own part, dies.

35. The importance of a son is also clear from the fact that there are texts which say that a person, although possessed of his own self, if without a son, will not be able to attain to higher worlds. The wise say that a son who is instructed by his father in terms of certain specified मंत्रs secures for his father a higher world.

36. It is also said in the S'rutis that the comforts of this world are to be secured by means of a son. Wealth and other worldly possessions become enjoyable only if there is a son, and by no other means.

Now, the मंत्रs above referred to are to be imparted to a son by a father when he is on his death-bed. In these मंत्रs the father says that the son is himself ब्रह्म or the spirit, यज्ञ or the sacrifice and लोक or the higher world.

37. Texts like those above referred to indicate the superior importance of sons, wives, &c. Ordinary people also agree to the superior importance of sons.

38. It is observed that men endeavour to secure a competence that may serve to maintain their sons, wives, &c., after

their death. From this it follows that the importance of sons, &c., is greater than that of one's own self.

39. Admitting the facts as above set forth, it does not follow as a matter of course that one's self is subordinate to one's sons, wife, &c. This self is of three kinds, *viz.*, गौण, मिथ्या and मुख्य.

40. When we say that a certain individual is a lion, the identification of the two is merely गौण, *i.e.*, having reference to certain attributes, in as much as the difference between the two is clearly perceived. The identification with self of sons, &c., is of this nature.

41. The five different कोश, *i.e.*, sheaths, are really distinct from the spirit who is the साक्षी, *i.e.*, the witnesser of their conditions, but as the distinction is not apparent on the surface the two are identified. This identification comes under the second class, *viz.*, मिथ्या. A wooden post that is mistaken from a distance for a thief affords another illustration of this sort of identification.

42. Now the spirit who is described as साक्षी in the foregoing stanza, is himself the मुख्यआत्मा. In his case a distinction does neither appear nor exist. The spirit is without a प्रतियोगी or counterpart and in its absence no distinction is possible. The spirit is the मुख्यआत्मा by reason of his being all pervading.

43. This being the case, in ordinary dealings importance may be given to such as may deserve it relatively. Thus in particular cases the first rank will be enjoyed by the relatively important factor and the remaining ones will occupy a subordinate position.

44. Suppose a person is on the point of death. For securing the protection of his house, property, &c., he finds the गौणआत्मा, *viz.*, his sons, wife, &c., useful. His मुख्यआत्मा will not

serve that purpose as he is not susceptible of performing different functions. His मिथ्यात्मा also will not do, because that is about to be no more. In these circumstances the गौणात्मा assumes importance.

45. When it is said that a person studying is fire, you do not take that remark to refer to fire, although fire does exist, because the quality of studying, which is connoted of the person does not apply to fire. The remark is correctly understood to refer to a student because of its applicability.

46. When one says that he has become lean and that therefore he would try to become fat, the remark evidently refers to the मिथ्यात्मा, *i. e.*, the delusive self, *viz.*, the material body. If cannot refer to the गौणात्मा, *i. e.*, sons, &c., because in order to secure flesh one does not entrust his son with the task of eating food which is likely to bring on flesh.

47. When one says that he will attain to heaven by practising penance, the remark applies to the विज्ञानमय self, the chief function of which is action. It does not apply to the material body because that is completely subordinated in the action contemplated. This will be clear from the fact that in observing the several kinds of penances prescribed in the S'âstras he altogether disregards the requirements of the material body in the matter of food, clothing, &c.

48. When one says that he will secure absolution, that must refer to the मुख्य्यात्मा or the spiritual self. In the process of securing absolution one acquires a knowledge of the spirit with the help of the S'âstras and a preceptor, and then he is perfectly devoid of a desire to act with the view of attaining a particular end.

49. It will thus be seen that the three kinds of self, *viz.*, गौण, मिथ्या and मुख्य assume importance in different spheres. For example may be cited in different kinds of sacrifices prescribed by the S'âstras for the different castes. For the

Brahmins the बृहस्पतिसव is prescribed: for the Kshatriyas the राजसूय and for the Vaishyas the वैश्यस्तोम. These particular sacrifices are to be performed by the particular castes only and may not be performed by others.

50. The attachment is supreme in the case of that self which is of the greatest importance in the particular circumstances. The attachment is then of the common sort in the case of remaining selves. In the case of everything else there is no attachment.

51. In the last sentence of the foregoing stanza we have referred to things for which one has no attachment. These things come under two heads, *viz.*, (1) those which may be disregarded, *e. g.*, grass growing on a road, &c., and (2) those which may be hated or feared and thus avoided, *e. g.*, tigers, snakes, &c.

52. There is thus a fourfold division of things: (a) Things for which one has supreme attachment, *viz.*, the important self; (b) Things for which one has ordinary attachment, *viz.*, the subordinate self; (c) Things to be disregarded; (d) Things to be feared or hated.

It cannot be said that these things as a rule belong to a particular class. They change their classes according to the different conditions.

53. This may be illustrated by an example. A tiger may be feared or hated when he is in front of you. When he has turned his back upon you he may be disregarded. But if by being tamed and fouldled he amuses you or becomes useful in securing livelihood for you by being taken from door to door he becomes dear to you and comes in the second class.

54. It may be said that if one and the same object assumes different characters under different conditions this speaks want of system. But it is not so. There is a criterion

which determines the classification of objects under the heads above indicated. The criterion is whether a thing is agreeable, disagreeable or neither. That which is agreeable is प्रिय, *i.e.*; dear; that which is disagreeable is द्वेष्य, *i.e.*, fit to be hated; and that which is neither is उपेक्ष्य, *i. e.*, fit to be disregarded.

55. Thus one's self is the dearest of all objects. Those that play a subordinate part are dear to a limited extent. The rest come under the category of those to be hated or feared and those to be disregarded or taken no notice of. Thus all things classify themselves under these four classes. This is the view advocated by Yājñavalkya, as will be seen from मैत्रेयी ब्राह्मण.

56. There are others श्रुति texts which corroborate this view. In the पुरुषविच ब्राह्मण it is stated that one's own innermost self is dearer than sons, wealth and other things.

57. A careful consideration based on an analysis of the texts in the S'rutis leads one to the conclusion that the साक्षी or the spirit who witnesses everything is the मुख्यआत्मा or the principal self, and none else. This careful consideration consists of an analysis of the five sheaths which envelop the जीव and the ascertainment of what there is inside.

58. Now this spirit which is capable of shining by its own light and is intelligence itself, witnesses the commencement and conclusion of the conditions of wakefulness, dreaming and sound sleep.

59. All other things, commencing with the प्राण or vital airs and ending with riches, approach the spirit in importance according to their comparative merits. The attachment that is felt for these things corresponds to their comparative importance.

60. These degrees of attachment may be illustrated as follows :—One's son is dearer to him than his riches. One's

own body is dearer than his son. The organs of sense are dearer than the body. The vital airs are dearer than the organs of sense. The self is dearer than the vital airs and the dearest of all.

61. Having this in view the S'ruti has indicated the difference of opinion between a learned and an ignorant man in the form of a discussion. The upshot of that discussion is that one's self is the dearest of all.

62. The nature of that discussion is as follows:—

The man knowing the truth maintained that the spirit who witnesses is dearer than everything else which is witnessed. The ignorant man asserted that sons, &c., were the dearest of all and that the function of the spirit or साक्षी was only to enjoy the happiness thus derived.

63. The person who maintains that something else than the spirit is dear to oneself may be either a pupil or an opponent. The answer that is given may serve them both in different ways. It may serve as instruction to the pupil and be looked upon as a curse by the opponent.

64. The answer that the philosopher gives is that everything else than the spirit is sure to make one cry, *i.e.*, is sure to produce misery or pain. From this answer a pupil gathers that what according to him is dear possesses defects.

65. The want of a son is a constant source of uneasiness to a married couple. As soon as the woman conceives there is the fear of abortion. If the foetus is developed up to the usual period there is the pain attendant on child-birth.

66. During infancy there is the trouble caused by evil stars and diseases. When the child grows up, there is the fear of his turning out a block-head. In case he is found possessed of intellectual calibre there is the anxiety of his acquiring learning after the performance of the ceremony of investiture

with the sacred thread. Supposing he turns out a learned man there is the anxiety that he should not remain unmarried.

67. Supposing he gets married there is the anxiety of his contracting vices like adultery, &c. There is also the anxiety of his being reduced to beggary by the increase in the number of mouths he has to feed. Supposing he amasses wealth there is still the fear of his being snatched away by death. Thus there is no end to the misery of parents.

68. What is said above regarding a son may *mutatis mutandis* be applied to other persons and objects. Having thus examined the situation one should discard all attachment for sons, &c., and should determine the advisability of directing it towards one's own self, *i.e.*, the spirit within himself. He then constantly realizes the presence of that spirit.

69. The opponent who persists in maintaining his position either through obstinacy or personal spite is visited with the curse that he will go to hell and will also pass through a succession of births of a lower order and there experience misery.

70. It may naturally be asked what is there in a philosopher that invests his words with the power of having this sort of effect. The answer is that one who has acquired a direct knowledge of ब्रह्म becomes identified with the supreme spirit and thus becomes all powerful. His words therefore are bound to have the intended effect in the case of his pupil and opponent.

71. To one who realizes the presence of the spirit who is the साक्षी, *i.e.*, the witnesser of all things, and who is the dearest of all, the self same spirit will be dearer than everything else and will never vanish.

72. The quality of being dear in the highest degree implies a condition of extreme happiness or blissfulness.

That the increase of happiness corresponds to the increase of attachment is stated in the S'ruti texts of तैत्तिरीय and बृहदारण्यक Upanishads, the illustration given being the progressive stages of power commencing with the sovereignty of the world and ending with the position of हिरण्यगर्भ, in which happiness is commensurate with the degree of attachment entertained.

73. It may be objected that if blissfulness were one of the natural qualities of self in the same way as intelligence, it would be experienced in all conditions of the intellect in the same way as intelligence.

74. This objection however is not valid, as will be seen from the illustration of a lamp, which is by nature both luminous and hot and still diffuses in the house its light only and not its heat. The presence of the quality of intelligence in all conditions corresponds to the diffusion of light, while the limitation of the quality of blissfulness corresponds to the non-transmission of heat.

75. Again if it is argued that, intelligence and blissfulness being one and the same, the latter quality will be present in all conditions in which the former exists, the reply will be that such is not the rule. This may be illustrated by an example: suppose an object possesses four properties, viz., smell, form, taste and touch; each of these will be separately grasped by a peculiar distinct sense and by no other. Similarly intelligence and blissfulness are two different functions.

76. Such a reply may perhaps not be considered satisfactory on the ground that the parallel is not correct, in as much as there is no difference between the attributes of intelligence and blissfulness, while the properties of smell, form, taste and touch are distinct from each other. If so, we will ask you to say if this want of difference between the attributes of intelligence and blissfulness is understood by

you with reference to the साक्षी (the all-witnessing spirit) or with reference to something else.

77. If the former, *i.e.*, if you say that there is no difference so far as the साक्षी is concerned, then as respects the illustration also the several properties are not different with respect to the fruit or flower to which they relate. In the latter case the properties appear different to the different senses and in the former the qualities appear different according to the different mental conditions.

78. In the mental condition in which the quality of सत्त्व predominates, the qualities of intelligence and blissfulness are observed to exist together, on account of the lucid nature of that condition. While the mental condition in which रज predominates the quality of blissfulness is obscured by the unclean nature of that condition.

79. As an illustration we may take the tamarind fruit. This by nature has a very acid taste. But if it is mixed with salt its acidity becomes greatly minimized. Similarly the nature of blissfulness does reside in the self but it is obscured by the predominance of रजस् in the mind.

80. You may perhaps now ask that even if the quality of blissfulness is known to reside in the spirit by reason of its being dearest of all objects, what good will result without the help of योग.

81. Our reply is that whatever can be accomplished by योग can be achieved by the process of discrimination indicated in the foregoing stanzas. In the preceding chapter योग is described as the means of acquiring direct knowledge, but does that imply that the same cannot be acquired by the process of discrimination ?

82. That the goal attained by the योगी's (those who practise concentration and other methods for controlling the mind) and the विवेकी's (those who resort to the process of analysis

and discrimination) is the same is vouched for by the authority of the Bhagvad Gita, in which it is stated that the place which is reached by the सांख्य is also approached by the योगी.

83. To some योग is difficult to practise. To others analysis and discrimination appear difficult. Having this in view God Shri Krishna has indicated two paths for the attainment of the same object.

84. The knowledge, which is the result of both, being the same in both cases, what in your opinion is there to recommend योग? Absence of mental emotions like fondness, hatred, &c., is also the same in the case of both the योगी and विवेकी.

85. For one who has come to know that the spirit is dearer than all the rest, it is not possible to entertain any attachment or fondness for worldly objects. That being the case, hatred or disgust is also not possible.

86. It may perhaps be urged that some sort of ill feeling is inevitable in dealing with things which are capable of doing harm to oneself, as for instance poisonous snakes, scorpions, &c. If so, the suggestion applies equally in the case of both the योगी and the विवेकी. If you say that one who is capable of such ill feeling does not for the time being come under the category of योगी, then we say the same of a विवेकी.

87. So far as worldly dealings are concerned both the योगी and विवेकी, while engaged in them, act as if they recognize the existence of a duality. If you say that a योगी while in the condition of समाधि has no consciousness of duality, then the same may be said of a विवेकी who has realized the oneness of the all-pervading supreme spirit.

88. This predicament of a विवेकी will be dwelt upon in the next chapter, which will specially deal with that subject. Everything will thus be extremely satisfactory.

89. If you say that one who is always absorbed in the delight consequent on association with the self which represents the supreme spirit, and has no consciousness of the existence of anything else is practically a योगी, then there is no difference between us and I wish you all joy of your conclusion.

90. In this second chapter of the section known as ब्रह्मानंद or spiritual bliss, we have, for the behoof of those who are not capable, dealt with the bliss derived from the knowledge of self.

CHAPTER XIII.

BLISS RESULTING FROM NON-PRECEPTION OF DUALITY.

1. In the first chapter of this section, *i.e.*, in Chapter XI, bliss or आनंद is stated to fall under one or other of the three heads, *viz.*, ब्रह्मानंद, विद्यानंद and विषयानंद. In that chapter योगानंद is dwelt upon, which comes under the first head. The second chapter however deals with आत्मानंद and therein mention is made of मिथ्यात्मा, गौणात्मा, &c. From this it would seem that this आत्मानंद is connected with things which admit of a dual conception, that being so it would seem to follow that आत्मानंद could not come under the first head. To meet this contention, the following argument may be advanced.

2. From all that is said in the तैत्तिरीय श्रुति regarding the generation of the whole world commencing with आकाश, and ending with the material body, from आत्मा, it will be seen that the whole world has no existence apart from आनंद. From this it follows that आत्मानंद is identical with the non-dual spirit.

3. It may perhaps be argued that the text of the श्रुति referred to in the foregoing stanzas has reference to आत्मा and

not to आनंद. If so we will refer to another text in which it is stated that the whole creation proceeds from आनंद, is sustained by आनंद and is finally absorbed in आनंद. As a rule the effect is not separable from the cause, and, judging by the same reasoning, how should the world be distinct from आनंद ?

4. You may perhaps say that in the case of an earthen pot the potter is himself a cause of it but he is not identical with the pot. This is true, but the potter is merely an instrumental cause. Our argument has reference to the material cause, which in the case of the pot is earth, which is not separable from the pot. Similarly आनंद is the material cause of the creation and not the instrumental cause.

5. It may perhaps be asked why a potter should not also be the material cause of an earthen pot. The reply is that he does not satisfy the definition of a material cause. An earthen pot during its conditions of existence and destruction never rests in the potter, while it does rest in earth. For the same reason आनंद is the material cause of the creation, as stated in the S'ruti.

6. A material cause may be of three sorts:—(1) विवर्ति, *i.e.*, capable of appearing different from what it is; (2) परिणामि, *i.e.*, capable of conversion into a different condition; and (3) आरंभक, *i. e.*, capable of assuming a different form. Of these the last two cannot apply in the case of what is incapable of having parts.

7. Those belonging to the वैशेषिक school of philosophy and others hold that, from a cause which is in itself quite different from the effect, an effect is produced which is different from the cause. This tenet is called आरंभवाद. They cite the instance of a piece of cloth produced by weaving a number of threads. In this case they hold that threads and cloth are different from each other as regards form and other properties.

8. When a substance is transformed into a condition different from the original, the change is called परिणाम. As instances may be cited curdled milk, pot made of clay, and an ornament made of gold.

9. The presentation of an appearance different from the real, unaccompanied by any change in the actual condition, comes under the category of विवर्त, *e. g.*, a piece of rope appearing like a snake.

It may perhaps be said that the illustration here cited being of a substance which has parts, the material cause known as विवर्ति might not apply in the case of that which is not divisible and therefore the statement made at the end of stanza (6) will not hold good. If so we will cite the illustration of the sky, which though not capable of division is still understood to possess the appearance of an inverted pot having a bottom and a blue colour.

10. Thus the appearance of the world on the substratum of आनंद, which is not capable of division into parts, is known as विवर्त. It may be asked what is it that causes this illusion. The reply is that it is the force of माया. As an illustration may be cited the power of creating an illusion which is exhibited by a magician.

11. The position taken in the last stanza would appear to imply the existence of the force of माया independent of आनंदात्मा and thus lead to the admission of duality. This objection may be met by saying that the force of माया may be taken as delusive from the fact of its being incapable of being satisfactorily explained. Any particular force is ordinarily never seen to exist apart from the possessor of that force, as is seen from a number of cases, *e. g.*, fire. On the other hand there is reason to suppose that in certain instances the force does exist separately. It is seen that by incantations, &c., the effect of poisonous and other evil affections is neutralized.

This would lead to the inference that force is capable of being dealt with independently of the thing to which it belongs. Otherwise it would be impossible to say what is neutralized.

12. It may be asked how it is possible to understand the neutralization of a force which cannot be grasped by the senses. The reply is that such neutralization can be inferred from the result. When a certain thing possesses a certain force, the fact that the force has ceased to operate will show that neutralization has been effected. As an illustration it may be stated that if fire, of which the property is to create burning sensation, ceases to burn, it may be inferred that its force has been neutralized by incantations, &c.

13. So much with regard to forces seen to exist in the creation. Now let us turn to the force of **माया**. Regarding the latter there are texts in the **श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्**, the purport of which is as follows:—The sages, while investigating the origin of the universe by means of abstract contemplation, concluded that the self luminous spirit possessed a force known as **माया**, which was deeply obscured by the several worldly objects created by that force. That supreme force is known by the several names of **क्रिया** (action) **ज्ञान** (knowledge) and **बल** (power.)

14. Such is the text of the S'ruti. The Smritis also contain allusion to the existence of the force of **माया**. Vashishtha has said :—**ब्रह्म** (the supreme spirit) is all powerful, superior to everything, eternal, all replete, and alone by itself without a second.

15. When that supreme spirit sometimes presents a different appearance on account of the force inherent in it, then is the time for the discernment of that force. Oh Rama, the force of that supreme spirit is observed in all animate creation in the form of life.

16. In the wind it is seen in the form of that property by which movement is caused. Among stones it is represented by hardness; in water by the property of moisture; and in fire by the property of burning.

17. In the sky that force is represented by vacancy, and in destructible objects by destructibility. Just as a large serpent is in its first stage comprised in an eggshell, so the whole universe is comprised in the spirit.

18. A tree in full growth is covered with fruit, leaves, creepers, flowers, branches and roots, and yet all these are comprised in the seed. In the same manner this universe is comprised in ब्रह्म or the spirit.

19. Just as corn of different kinds rises from the ground at different times and places, so these forces arise from this spirit.

20. This spirit, Oh Rama, is all-pervading and always illumines everything without any limitation. When the spirit assumes for the while the function of thinking then that force is called मनः.

21. The order of creation is as follows:—First the mind; then the ideas of being bound and absolved, and then the appearance of what are known as the worlds. Thus it is clear that the whole is but the result of imagination. If so, the question may naturally be asked how this imaginary creation comes to be looked upon in the light of the real. The reply, Oh lucky Rama, is that this occurs by the analogy of stories told to children.

22-25. One of such good stories may be cited for illustration, which was told by a nurse for the amusement of a child:—There were three princes. Two of them were never born and the third was not even conceived. They led a religious life in a city which had no existence. Once

upon a time they issued forth from their city with hearts free from impure feelings. While going they witnessed in the sky some trees laden with fruit. The three princes now reside there in a city that is to be, diverting themselves with the pleasures of hunting.

26. Oh Rama! this story so told by the nurse was taken to be true by the child that was incapable of judging for itself.

27. Similarly the dealings of this world are looked upon as real by persons whose minds are forsaken by thought.

28. It was by such episodes that sage Vasishtha explained the ramifications of the force of **माया**. It is here proposed to explain the nature of the same force.

29. This force of **माया** is separate from the results produced by it, *viz.*, the universe, as also from **ब्रह्म** on which its illusion rests, and without which the illusion would not have been possible. Taking the case of fire as an illustration, it will be noted that the boils produced by burning and the burning coal are both visible, but such is not the burning power which caused the boils. The existence of the force or power in these cases is a matter of inference.

30. Taking the case of an earthen pot, it may be noted that the pot with its big and round form, as well as the earth, possessing the five properties of sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, of which the pot is made, are both visible. But the capability of earth to be made into a pot can not be indicated by any of the properties which are seen to exist in the pot as well as earth.

31. Such being the case, the question naturally follows what is the nature or characteristic of that capability by which the creation of an earthen pot became possible? The reply is that it is something which cannot be conceived and

therefore does not end itself to description. This is the only way of indicating it.

32 That capability lay concealed in earth even before the pot was made. It was brought into play by the efforts of the pot-maker, including the use of his wheel and other instruments.

33. The effect produced by this combination being distinct from the cause, the question may naturally be asked why should not the distinction between the cause and the effect be not clearly perceived. The reply is that it is due to want of deliberation. People who do not trouble themselves with the operations of thought and analysis are in the habit of giving the designation of 'pot' to the whole conglomeration of earth, with all its attributes, (which is the material cause) and the particular form with its characteristics of greatness and roundness.

34. That which existed before the operations of the potter were performed could never be called a 'pot.' That appellation became appropriate only after a portion of earth became invested with a particular form.

35. Now this thing which is called a 'pot' does not exist apart from the earth, in as much as if earth is taken away from the pot there will be nothing left. It can neither be said to be the same as earth, in as much as it was never seen when earth was in its natural form of a clod.

36. Thus it is something indescribable, in the same way as the capability which made the form of a pot possible. It is also the result of that capability. Now both the form and the capability which made that form possible belong to the category of things which cannot be accounted for, but the reason why they receive different names is traceable to the difference in circumstances. The same thing receives the

names of 'capability' and 'pot' according as it is beyond observation and subject to observation.

37. Powers which are known as magical are also not observed at a certain stage, but they become apparent when by means of incantations, &c., castles in the air and other delusinos are exhibited.

38. The unreal nature of forms which are produced by माया and the real nature of that which is the substratum of that form are indicated in the छान्दोग्यउपनिषद्.

39. The drift of what is said there is that all names given by speech to different kinds of pots are but indications of apparent changes and therefore unreal, and that only the earth of which the pots are made is real, being possessed of the properties of touch, &c.

40. There are thus three factors to be considered. Firstly the capability of producing a form, which is in an unobservable state; secondly the form which is the result of that capability; and thirdly the material cause, viz., earth, of which the pot is made. But of these three, the first two only exist by turns at different times, while the third exists at all times and in all conditions.

41. A pot is thus without substance, merely presents an appearance, is seen to exist, and is subject to the operations of production and destruction. When it is produced or made it is given a particular name by people.

42. Even when the apparent form vanishes, the name remains in the mouths of people. The form being capable of indication by name, the two may be said to be identical.

43. Thus the form of a pot, being without substance, being destructible, and being identical with the name given to it as the result of the process of speech, is not in the least real like earth of which the pot is made.

44. Thus so far as a pot is concerned, what is real is earth of which it is made. Why? Because it exists when the form is apparent, as well as before and after, in an unaltered condition; it is possessed of substance and is indestructible.

45. If that which is indicated by the terms 'व्यक्त' (manifest) 'घट' (pot) and विकार (transformation or change) is unreal, why should not all idea regarding it vanish when it is known that the only real thing in it is earth?

46. To such a question the reply is that the idea is as good as vanished when your notion of its reality has been dispelled. In this instance the result of true knowledge does not go further. It is confined to the removal of the notion of reality, but will not amount to the total removal of the idea regarding form, &c. When one perceives the existence of silver where there is merely a pearl shell, or when one perceives the existence of a serpent where there is only a rope, a knowledge that there really exist merely a shell and a rope totally removes the illusion of silver and serpent. In the present case, however, the result of true knowledge extends to the removal of the notion of reality regarding that which is called a pot, the idea of the pot remaining nevertheless. The two instances of shell and rope illustrate what is called निरुपाधिकभ्रम, while the case of earthen pot illustrates what is called सोपाधिक भ्रम.

47. This may be made clear by an illustration. Suppose a person standing on the bank of a reservoir of water and having his form reflected head downwards in the water. Now this reflection though clearly observable has no real existence. Nowhere will you be able to see anybody paying the same regard to the reflection as to the person standing on the bank.

48. It may perhaps be asked whether mere knowledge of the unreality of illusious like form, &c., is the end and aim of

all enquiry. The reply is that according to the doctrine of अद्वैतवादीस (i.e. those who maintain the absence of duality) such knowledge is sufficient to lead to the goal. According to them the object of experiencing supreme spiritual felicity is attained merely by determining the unreal nature of everything besides that.

It may now be said that the unreal nature of the form of a pot, &c., will only be acquiesced in when it is known that घट is merely a विवर्त of earth, i.e., a mere illusion; that however has not yet been proved. This position may be met by saying that the case of an earthen pot is clearly one of the विवर्त kind, in as much as the earth of which the pot is made does not disappear in the pot.

49. If this were a case of परिणाम then the original substance would not be seen in the transformed condition, just as when milk is turned into curd the original milk cannot be had. In the cases of pots made of earth or ornaments made of gold the original earth and gold are not lost.

50. You may perhaps say that a pot when broken is reduced to pieces and no earth is apparent. That is however not the case. If the broken pieces are pounded you will have earth in its original form. In the case of an ornament the preservation of the original material is perfectly clear.

51. In stanza (8) three instances have been given to illustrate परिणाम, viz., (1) milk and curds, (2) earth and pots and (3) gold and ornaments. It may therefore perhaps be urged that if the last two of these could be made to serve as instances of विवर्त, there is no reason why the first also should not be made to do that service. To such an argument the reply is that the difference in the attendant conditions in the three cases accounts for the difference in the service done by them. In the case of milk turned into curds it is never

possible to revert to the original condition of milk and therefore this must purely be an instance of परिणाम, and cannot serve as विवर्त. This however need not affect the aptness of the remaining two cases to serve as instances of both परिणाम and विवर्त.

52. It may perhaps be urged that the cases which are made to serve as instances of परिणाम and विवर्त might also be taken as instances of आरंभ. But that is not possible. Because according to the supporters of आरंभवाद the properties of the effect must be distinct from the properties of the cause ; if therefore the two instances in question were made to fall in the category of आरंभ, it would follow that a pot should have properties different from those of earth, which is however not the case.

53. In the छांदोग्य उपनिषद् the son of Aruna (उद्दालक) cited three instances of विवर्त, viz., earth, gold, and iron, and thence determined that whatever is a product, a result or an effect is untrue. This conclusion should therefore be seriously impressed upon the mind.

54. It is also stated there that sage उद्दालक concluded that the effect is known from the cause. Thus from the knowledge of the real follows the knowledge of the unreal. The question then arises whether such a conclusion is correct.

55. Taking the instance of an earthen pot, what is commonly called the effect is earth itself invested with a form. There is thus in the pot a mixture of the real and the unreal, and it is only the real part which is known from the real cause.

56. It may then be asked why should not the unreal part, viz., the form, &c., be also known in the same way as the real. The reply is that the unreal part need not be known as no useful purpose is served thereby. The knowledge of reality

is the goal of all human effort, and not the knowledge of what is unreal.

57. Such being the case, you may be inclined to say that the conclusion, *viz.*, that from the knowledge of the cause the knowledge of the effect follows, will in the case of the instance in point practically amount to stating that when earth is known earth is known, which evidently is devoid of novelty.

58. It is quite true that the conclusion is devoid of novelty to those who are capable of looking at it in the light above indicated, *i. e.*, those who can know that what is real in the effect is the same as in the cause. But who can prevent the ignorant from feeling surprised at it ?

59. The advocates of आरंभ and परिणाम as well as others who judge of things by common sense, are all surprised when they hear it asserted that when the one cause is known its several effects are known as a matter of course.

60. The drift of the text of the छांदोग्य उपनिषद् referred to above is to inculcate non-duality by showing that by the knowledge of one all are known. It is not the object to impart a knowledge of the several effects resulting from one cause.

61. Just as by knowing a lump of clay, one necessarily acquires a knowledge of everything that is made of it ; so by having a knowledge of the non-dual Brahma one may have an idea of the whole world.

62 It may perhaps be said that a knowledge of ब्रह्म as well as of the world is not possible without some idea of their composition and properties. To meet this difficulty it may be here stated that the first is known by the attributes of सत् (existence) चित् (knowledge) and सुख (felicity) while the second is known by the attributes of नाम (name) and रूप (form).

It may be asked what is the authority for attributing the above properties to Brahma. The reply is that the second part of the तापनीयोपनिषद् of the अथर्व वेद Brahma is described by these attributes.

63. Similarly in the छांदोग्य उपनिषद् Uddálaka, the son of Aruna, has described Brahma as having the attribute of existence. In the ऐतरेयोपनिषद्, which forms part of the ऋग्वेद, Brahma is described as knowledge or intelligence. It is also stated in the छान्दोग्य उपनिषद् that Sanatkumár has explained to his pupil Nārada that Brahma, which is all-pervading, is essentially bliss itself. This kind of testimony may if necessary be multiplied.

64. In the same manner texts may be cited in support of the position that the world possesses the attributes of name and form. The first text may be that in which it is said that ईश्वर having contemplated all the created forms gave them names. A second one may be that in which it is said that ईश्वर having created the world and having penetrated it in the capacity of जीव gave it name and form.

65. Another text is found in the बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद् which says that before the creation the world was in the 'unmanifest' condition. After creation it became manifest in two ways, viz., by name and form. That inexplicable force which is inhereant in Brahma and which is otherwise known as माया is here indicated by the term अव्याकृत.

66. The force of माया, which resides in Brahma, which is itself unsusceptible of change, constitutes the प्रकृति or the material cause of the universe. He who wields this force is known as महेश्वर.

67. The first manifestation proceeding from that ब्रह्म is आकाश. It possesses the three distinctive properties of ब्रह्म, viz., (1) existence (अस्ति), (2) appearance (भाति), and (3) agreeableness (प्रिय). Its peculiar attribute is 'space.'

This latter has no real existence, but the same is not the case with the former three.

68. The reason why the latter attribute has no real existence is that it did not exist before आकाश became manifest nor will it exist after it ceases to be manifest. That which does not exist either in the beginning or in the end cannot have any real existence in the intermediate stage.

69. God Krishna has said to Arjuna in the Bhagvadgita that all created objects are manifest neither in the commencement nor in the end but only in the intermediate stage.

70. The three properties of सत्, चित् and आनंद are ever present in आकाश just as earth is ever present in all objects made of it. The property of 'space' has been shown to have no real existence. How then, it may be asked, is it possible to realize the above three attributes irrespective of the idea of space? The reply is that they are realizable in respect of one's own self.

71. Disregarding the property of space, what is there left of आकाश? You may perhaps say that what is left is nothing. We have no objection to accept this conclusion, in so far as it indicates that something does remain over and above the attribute of space but that you describe it as nothing.

72. This leads to the conclusion that what remains has an existence. It also possesses the property of blissfulness in as much as it is neutral. It may perhaps be asked how can bliss result without some experience of an agreeable sensation? The reply is that real spiritual happiness is characterized by the absence of agreeable as well as disagreeable sensations.

73. Agreeable sensations produce joy and disagreeable ones produce pain. Absence of both is the characteristic of spiritual happiness. There exists nothing like misery in the spiritual condition.

74. Spiritual happiness is always uniform and steady. Joy and pain however are unsteady and momentary, because that is the nature of the mind of which they are the functions. They thus fall under the same category as the mind.

75. In this manner the presence of spiritual happiness (आनंद) is clearly traceable in आकाश. The first two attributes of ब्रह्म, viz., सत्ता, i.e., existence and भान, i.e., appearance, have already been acknowledged. Similarly these attributes may be traced in the case of the rest of the creation, commencing with वायु (wind) and ending with the material bodies which are formed of the elements.

76. The peculiar properties of wind are motion and touch ; of fire, burning and light ; of water, liquidity ; and of earth, hardness.

77. The remaining objects in the creation such as plants, food, bodies, &c., have a peculiar form. Their special features may be determined by a proper exercise of the mind.

78. Although the creation may bear different forms and may be known by different names, the properties of ब्रह्म, viz., सत्, चित् and आनंद, are without doubt uniformly present in all.

79. Both name and form are unreal. It is they that undergo the vicissitudes of birth and death. The manifestation of them on the substratum of ब्रह्म or the spirit is like the appearance of bubbles, eddies &c., on the sea.

80. When ब्रह्म or spirit, in its perfect state and as indicated by the attributes of सत्, चित् and आनंद, is definitely known, one of his own accord gradually despises both names and forms.

81. It may also be stated that if one cultivates the habit of disregarding names and forms, that proves of great assistance to him in realizing the spirit. Similarly as the spirit is realized in course of time, one loses all regard for names and forms.

82. When the knowledge of ब्रह्म becomes confirmed by the constant practice of realizing it, he enjoys the blessing of absolution even in this life in spite of the material body which has to run its course.

83. It may be asked what constitutes the practice spoken of above. The wise understand the practice of realizing ब्रह्म to consist of constant meditation thereof; incessant conversation regarding it; comparing of notes and communication of advice; in short, total exclusion of all other subjects from the range of thought.

84. It is true that previous impressions received long time back will prove a serious obstacle in the way of realizing ब्रह्म. But this obstacle may be totally removed by long and constant practice steadily and diligently pursued.

85. It may look *prima facie* absurd that ब्रह्म, which is without a second, should give rise to the illusion of creation consisting of innumerable objects. But this is quite possible in the case of ब्रह्म, when combined with माया, just as earth possesses the capacity of producing pots of different sizes. Or a better illustration may be cited, *viz.*, that of the condition of dreaming which is experienced during sleep.

86. Just as sleep brings on strange dreams to living beings, so माया acting in conjunction with ब्रह्म, produces the creation, the existence and the end of the world.

87. It often happens that while dreaming one fancies that he has ascended into the sky, or that his head has been cut off, or that one whole year has passed off within the space of a moment, or that he sees his sons, &c., that have died.

88. In that condition there appears to exist no regard for propriety or impropriety. Whatever is seen in whatever condition is all right so far as that condition is concerned.

89. When sleep possesses such capability of producing strange illusions, what wonder is there that the force of माया should possess possibilities beyond the range of thought.

90. Sleep produces dreams of various sorts, while the person dreaming is lying on his bed. Similarly माया produces manifestations on the substratum of ब्रह्म which is itself unsusceptible of any change.

91. The manifestations produced are ether, wind, fire, water, earth, different worlds, living beings, stones, &c. The whole creation being the result of the combination of the five elements, it may be asked why some objects are animate and others inanimate. The reply is that in the case of animate objects the essence of ब्रह्म is reflected in their intellect and therefore they exhibit a state of animation, while the rest are inanimate.

92. In the case of animate as well as inanimate objects the substratum of ब्रह्म, or the spirit, with its attributes of सत्, चित् and आनन्द, is uniformly the same. It is only the names and forms that are different.

93. These names and forms become manifested on the substratum of ब्रह्म, just as a picture is drawn on canvass. If these names and forms are disregarded, the idea of the spirit with the attributes of सत्, चित् and आनन्द becomes all absorbing.

94. Just as a person standing on the bank of a pool of water observes his reflection in the water having its head downwards but nevertheless disregards it altogether and is only mindful of his body standing on the bank.

95. Or, just as people never pay any regard to the castles that they build in the air by thousands; so should all names and forms be treated with feelings of unreality and disregard.

96. The structures of fancy change every moment. What has once passed away does not appear again. The dealings of this world should also be looked upon in the same light.

97. Childhood cannot be experienced during youth, nor youth in old age. A father once dead does not appear again, nor does a day that has once passed.

98. In what way do the dealings of this transitory world differ from the process of building castles in the air? For the time being they present the appearance of reality, but one should abandon all idea of their being real.

99. Worldly dealings being looked upon in their true aspect, one's mind becomes perfectly free to follow the meditation of the supreme spirit.

In that case, it may be asked what would be the nature of the dealings of such a person. The reply is that his behaviour in the world would be like that of a stage actor, who identifies himself with his part subject to certain limitations.

100. It may perhaps be argued that to admit that a philosopher is capable of worldly dealings is tantamount to the admission that he is susceptible of being affected by pain or joy. This however is not so. A large piece of stone in the bed of a river remains stable, notwithstanding that the water flows over it. So does the कूटस्थ, ब्रह्म, or the unchangeable spirit, retain its true character, in spite of the susceptible nature of names and forms.

101. It may perhaps be asked how the illusion of the world is possible in the case of the spirit which does not partake of any of its attributes. The explanation may be given by an illustration. A mirror having no hole or cavity presents the reflection of space along with a number of things. Similarly the spirit, which is full of the essence of reality and light is capable of manifesting the universe comprising the different worlds.

102. It may again be asked how the manifestation of the universe becomes possible while the spirit is invisible. The

reply may be given by means of the same illustration. Just as it is not possible to see what is reflected in the mirror without seeing the mirror itself, so it is not possible to have any idea of names and forms without some idea of the essential spirit which forms the substratum.

103. It is true that names and forms readily present themselves and thus divert the mind from the substratum of the spirit which makes their appearance possible. But endeavour should be made to keep the mind steadily on the spirit and not to allow it to go in the direction of names and forms.

104. In this way it is determined that ब्रह्म which is really and is distinguished by the attributes of सत्, चित् and आनन्द gives rise to manifestations of the nature of the universe. The realization of this idea results in what is called the felicity of non-duality. May this long prove a source of rest to people.

105. Thus has been finished the third chapter of the section of this work known as ब्रह्मानन्द, or spiritual bliss. By meditating on the unreal nature of the universe one is bound to experience the happiness of non-duality.

CHAPTER XIV.

BLISS RESULTING FROM KNOWLEDGE.

1. Commencing with the eleventh chapter there are in all five chapters of this section of the work, which is styled ब्रह्मानन्द or spiritual bliss. In the eleventh chapter 'Felicity derived from abstraction' has been described; in the twelfth 'Bliss resulting from analysis of self' has been dealt with; the thirteenth treats of the 'Bliss resulting from non-perception of duality'; and now we proceed to describe the bliss resulting from knowledge to a person who has realized spiritual happiness by these several means.

2. The bliss resulting from knowledge is, like the bliss resulting from the enjoyment of external objects, merely a function of the intellect. This bliss is experienced in four ways.

3. It may either be in the shape of (1) Absence of misery, or (2) Attainment of one's desires, or (3) Satisfaction of having accomplished all that was to be done, or (4) Satisfaction of having acquired all that was to be acquired.

4. Misery may be of two sorts. It may relate either to the affairs of this world or to those of the next. The means of getting over the first are described in a text in the बृहदारण्यक.

5. The purport of that text is as follows :—If a person were to realize that he is but the spirit, what necessity will there be for him to identify himself with the material body and to feel all the misery which results from hankering after particular objects of desire ?

6. The question then naturally arises how should it have become possible for the spirit to suffer pain or misery ? The spirit under different circumstances receives the appellations of जीवात्मा and परमात्मा. When it identifies itself with the three bodies known as स्थूल, सूक्ष्म and कारण, it becomes जीव and becomes susceptible to the affections of pleasure and pain.

7. परमात्मा is distinguished by the attributes of सत्, चित् and आनन्द. But when it becomes identified with names and forms, i. e., with the world of which it is the substratum, then it comes into the category of objects contributing to pain or pleasure. When the spirit is carefully separated from the three bodies as well as from the world, it is free from susceptibility to pain and pleasure, as also from liability to be classed as things contributing to pain or pleasure.

8. The necessity to participate in the sufferings of the body arises from the desire to obtain for the जीव the objects

of its wishes. All the sufferings are incidental to the three bodies and do not belong to the spirit.

9. The sufferings of the material body (स्थूलदेह) are the consequence of diseases resulting from uneven distribution of bodily humours. The sufferings of the subtle body (सूक्ष्मदेह) are the consequence of emotions like wish, anger, &c. In the third body (कारण) the sufferings result from अज्ञान, or ignorance, which is the cause of the sufferings in the first two bodies.

10. When the supreme spirit is clearly distinguished by the process indicated in the last chapter, viz., that of enjoying the felicity resulting from non-perception of duality, one arrives at the stage at which all the objects of enjoyment are perceived to be unreal. What there is left for such a person to desire ?

11. Similarly, when the true nature of individual self is understood by the method described in the second chapter of this section, which deals with 'Bliss resulting' from analysis of self, it becomes clear that in this body there is no one that is susceptible of suffering. Whence then can there be any pain ?

12. So much is for the sufferings of this world. What then is the misery relating to the next world ? Anxiety regarding meritorious and sinful actions performed in this world constitutes that misery. It has however been stated in the first chapter of this section that such anxiety does not trouble one who has acquired true spiritual knowledge.

13. It may perhaps be said that such a person may be free from anxiety regarding the results of the deeds all ready done and falling under the class of प्रारब्ध, but that it is inevitable that he should concern himself about future actions. To this it may be replied that one who has acquired knowledge is not thenceforward affected by the actions that he

does, in the same manner as the petals of a lotus flower do not contract any moisture from the water which surrounds it.

14. It may again be asked what becomes of actions coming under the category of *संचित*. The reply is that immediately after acquisition of knowledge all such actions are annihilated in the same manner as the thin blade of grass is totally burnt by fire in a moment.

15. This is also confirmed by what is stated in stanza 37 of Chapter IV of the Bhagavad Gita. There it is said that the fire of knowledge reduces to ashes all former actions in the same manner as well ignited fire reduces the fuel to ashes.

16. Similarly as regards future actions it is stated as follows in stanza 17 of Chapter XVIII of the Bhagavad Gita : —He who is free from all feeling of identification with anything else than the spirit and whose intellect is thus unsusceptible of impressions, does not contract any sin by killing others nor does he incur any liability.

17. There are S'ruti texts also which corroborate this position. For instance one may be cited from *कौषीतकी*, which purports to say that any sin of the nature of murder of parents, theft, killing an embryo, &c., does not serve to mar the acquisition of *मुक्ति* (final absolution) once achieved. Not only this, but the lustre of the face of such a person does not vanish on account of such a sin.

18. In stanzas (2) & (3) above it is stated that bliss resulting from knowledge is experienced in four ways. Of these the first has until now been described. We will now proceed to the second, *viz.*, attainment of one's desires. It is said in the S'rutis that a person who has acquired knowledge attains all his desires in the same way as he experiences freedom from misery. A text in the *ऐतरेय* S'ruti says that such a person having attained all his desires rises to the condition of the eternal spirit.

19. A text in the छान्दोग्य, S'ruti says that such a person, whether he eats, plays, and enjoys himself either in the company of women or friends, or with the assistance of conveyances, &c., never has any recollection of the body in which his spirit is clothed. The vital airs keep him up so long as it is necessary for his former actions to run out their course.

20. A text in the तैत्तिरीय S'ruti says that such a person attains all his desires at once and not like others who have to work for them and then to undergo a succession of births and deaths for their attainment. (It has already been stated that all संचित actions of such a person are totally destroyed and hence there is no possibility of succession of births and deaths in his case). All enjoyments attend on such a person simultaneously without regard to any sequence.

21 & 22. Texts in the तैत्तिरीय and बृहदारण्यक Upanishads may be summarized as follows :—One who has known ब्रह्म enjoys all the felicity experienced by a king who is young, gifted with personal beauty, learned, healthy, endowed with a firm mind, possessing an army, ruling over the whole earth full of wealth, who is in full enjoyment of all human pleasures and is thus perfectly contented.

23. As worldly objects are not equally accessible to one who has acquired a knowledge of ब्रह्म as to a king, it may perhaps be urged that there can be no comparison between the satisfaction experienced by both. It must however be remembered that the comparison is based on the feelings of indifference towards objects of pleasure entertained by both. They both are devoid of any desire for the enjoyment of worldly pleasures and hence their satisfaction is similar. In the case of one (the king) this condition is due to satiety resulting from full enjoyment, while in the case of the other it is due to the faculty of discrimination which is developed in him.

24. The philosopher, being acquainted with Vedic texts, discerns the defects of all objects of worldly enjoyment in the light of what is propounded in the S'ruti and S'astra. These defects have been recited by king Brihadratha in verses embodied in the portion known as मैत्रायणीय शाखा.

25. Those defects have reference partly to the body, partly to the mind and partly to the objects themselves. Such being the case a true philosopher has no desire for worldly objects which are looked upon by him as some kind of milk preparation which is vomited by a dog.

26. & 27. Thus although the satisfaction is equal in both cases, the position of a true philosopher is superior, in so far as the king has already had some trouble in securing those objects which have contributed to his pleasure, and he is also greatly apprehensive that what he has secured will vanish in the near or distant future. The philosopher has experienced neither that trouble nor has he any similar apprehension, and hence his satisfaction is decidedly greater. Again the king who has the command of earthly enjoyments is still animated with the hope of securing the happiness enjoyed by Gandharvas, but the philosopher is troubled with no such hope.

28. There are two classes of Gandharvas : (1) मर्त्यगन्धर्व, and (2) देवगन्धर्व. One who, being a mortal human being in a particular age, rises to the status of Gandharvas, as a reward of specially meritorious actions, is called a मर्त्यगन्धर्व.

29. One who attains the position of Gandharvas at the beginning of a particular age, on account of meritorious actions performed in the preceding age, is styled a देवगन्धर्व.

30. Of those who have departed this life and have entered the class of manes (पितरः) those that are known by the names of अग्निष्वात्त, &c., are classed as चिरलोकपितर. Those that rise to the status of Gods (देव) at the commencement of a particular age are known by the name of आजानदेवता.

31. Those who during a particular age attain a high position by the performance of meritorious actions like an अश्वमेध sacrifice, and thus become fit to be worshipped by आजानदेवता deities, receive the appellation of कर्मदेवता.

32. यम, the God of death and अग्नि, fire, are some of the principal deities. इन्द्र and बृहस्पति are too well known to need mention. प्रजापति is the same as विराट्, *i.e.*, the embodiment of the individual items of the creation. God Brahma is known by the name of सूत्रात्मा, *i.e.*, who works the whole machine of the creation.

33. Now, commencing with a sovereign king of the earth and ending with God Brahma, all are inspired with a desire to attain to the next superior state of happiness. Spiritual happiness is superior to the happiness experienced by all these. Such happiness cannot be described by words nor can it be realized by the mind.

34. A person who has acquired a knowledge of ब्रह्म, or the supreme spirit, is necessarily quite indifferent to all the pleasures which are sought by worldly and celestial beings in the several stages indicated above. He thus has practically had full enjoyment of them.

35. This is the condition in which one may be said to have attained all his desires. It may further be said that in as much as such a person feels ever happy by reason of his identifying himself thoroughly with the spirit and thus becoming a witness of the intellect which identifies itself with happiness, he also derives happiness by witnessing the sentiments of pleasure which pass through the minds of others.

36. It may perhaps be said that in this manner even an ignorant person can be said to have all the pleasures indicated above. To him ignorance is certainly bliss, but he cannot have that satisfaction for want of knowledge that he is the spirit and is thus the witness of all the pleasures enjoyed by

others. There is a text in the तैत्तिरीय S'ruti, which says that he who has acquired a knowledge of the spirit that lies hid in the envelopment of the body really derives all enjoyment.

37. The all-pervading nature of the spirit is also alluded to in the Sāma Veda. It is said there that the food that one eats is the spirit itself and he who eats is also the spirit.

38. Thus have we dealt with two of the four ways in which bliss resulting from knowledge may be experienced (*vide* stanza 3) *viz.* (1) absence of misery and (2) attainment of one's desires. Now let us turn to the remaining two, *viz.*, (3) satisfaction of having done all that was to be done and (4) satisfaction of having acquired all that was to be acquired.

39. Both of them have been fully described by us in Chapter VII. The stanzas occurring there may be repeated here in order to impress them properly on the intellect.

40. Formerly he had much to accomplish in three distinct directions. For the purposes of this world he had to follow a particular avocation and earn wealth, &c. For the purposes of the next world he had to perform sacrifices and do certain penances. For attaining absolution he had to resort to the processes of श्रवण, मनन and निदिध्यास. Now all wordly desires are no more and the supreme bliss of realizing the identity of self with intelligence or the spirit is ever present. Nothing therefore remains to be done.

41. He thus always feels satisfaction by constantly keeping in view his former state and the present want of having anything to accomplish.

42. Let those who are ignorant and therefore miserable indulge in wordly pursuits with the desire of having sons, acquiring wealth, &c. I am full of supreme joy. With what object will I care for wordly pursuits ?

43. Those who are desirous of attaining to the other worlds may perform the necessary ceremonies and penances. I pervade all the worlds. How and wherefore shall I undergo all that trouble?

44. Let those who are entitled to it follow the pursuit of explaining the meaning of the S'āstras and teaching the Vedas. I am not so entitled because all my actions have ceased.

45. It may perhaps be pointed out to me that my actions cannot be said to have ceased in as much as I indulge in operations like sleep, begging, bathing, answering calls of nature, &c. To this my reply is that I neither desire these operations nor perform them. If others think that I perform them, they are quite welcome to such a notion. How do their notions affect me?

46. For illustration may be taken a cluster of red berries known as गुंजा. On account of their colour some person may look upon them as fire. But this fact is not enough to impart to that cluster of berries the power of burning things that come in contact with it. Similarly, I do not really partake of the attributes of a wordly man, simply because other people assign them to me.

47. Let those who have not grasped the real situation take the trouble of having the explanation of the S'āstras. Why should I who have known the truth, do likewise? Let those who doubt their power of retaining the conclusions which they have formed after hearing the S'āstras, resort to the process of contemplating them over and over again. I am free from doubt and therefore I do not do likewise.

48. He who is likely to fall again into the delusion of considering that the material body is identical with the spirit may resort to the process of निदिध्यास, *i. e.*, repeated meditation. I am not subject to such a delusion. What then is the necessity for meditation in my case?

49. It is true that I act like other human beings and it may be asked how should I do so without being subject to the delusion above referred to? The reply is that this is the result of impressions which have been contracted from a series of previous existences, without there being any such delusion.

50. When the force of प्रारब्धकर्म is spent all further action will cease. So long as that force remains unspent, the dealings will not cease even though there may be constant meditation.

51. He who thinks that these wordly dealings are a great obstruction in his way may resort to meditation in order to minimize the obstruction. For myself I look upon these dealings as perfectly harmless. Why then should I resort to meditation?

52. Since I am not susceptible of विक्षेप, i. e., disturbance of the equilibrium of the mind, there is no necessity of समाधि, i. e., concentration of the mind. विक्षेप and समाधि are functions of the mind which by nature is susceptible of change. So far as I am concerned, this mind has been completely obliterated and therefore I am not affected by its functions.

53. It may be urged that I should resort to समाधि with the view of experiencing its results. I reply by saying that in my present state I am continuously experiencing the satisfaction which results from समाधि. In fact that very satisfaction constitutes my existence. There is no room therefore for any satisfaction resulting from समाधि. With me the conviction is firm that all that was to be done has been done and all that was to be accomplished has been accomplished.

54. Let my dealings be according to my प्रारब्ध. It matters very little to me if they look like those of ordinary persons or like those dictated by the Śāstras or something

quite different from either. So far as I am concerned I have no connection with those dealings.

55. Or, though I have accomplished everything, I may act according to the methods laid down in the S'āstras just with the object of guiding other people to the right course. What harm will that do to me ?

56. Let my body be engaged in actions like worship of Gods, bathing, answering calls of nature, begging alms, &c. Let my speech be employed in repeating the प्रणवमंत्र, *i. e.*, ओंकार and in reading the best portion of the Vedas, *viz.*, उपनिषद्.

57. Let my intellect contemplate God Vishnu, or let it be absorbed in the delight resulting from realizing the ब्रह्म. Myself am the witness of all these processes. I neither perform them nor cause them to be performed.

58. Being satisfied that he has done all that was to be done and also feeling satisfaction at having obtained all that was to be aimed at, such a person incessantly indulges in that sense of satisfaction in the manner described in the following stanzas.

59. Blessed am I that possess a direct knowledge of the eternal spirit that is within me ! Blessed am I that clearly realize the bliss that results from such knowledge !

60. Blessed am I that do not feel the miseries which are attendant upon worldly pursuits ! Blessed am I whose illusion has been thoroughly dispelled !

61. Blessed am I who have now nothing left to do ! Blessed am I who have now attained all my desires !

62. Blessed indeed am I ! What is there in this world to compare to my sense of satisfaction ? Twice, thrice, four times blessed am I !

63. Truly this is a sure result of my meritorious deeds ! Blessed is myself who originally achieved the deeds of which this is the result !

64. Blessed is that science of philosophy by studying which I have attained to this state ! Blessed is the preceptor from whom I received instruction which led to this satisfaction ! Oh the knowledge and the bliss resulting therefrom !

65. Thus have we finished the fourth Chapter in this section. The subject thereof is ' Bliss resulting from acquisition of knowledge.' It is desirable that one should pursue the acquisition of knowledge until that bliss is attained.

CHAPTER XV.

BLISS ATTENDANT ON THE ENJOYMENT OF WORLDLY OBJECTS.

1. Some people may question the advisability of treating of such a subject in a work the sole object of which is to deal with matters connected with मोक्ष, or absolution. The author therefore justifies his conduct by remarking at the very threshold that the bliss which it is proposed to describe here partakes of the nature of spiritual bliss and forms as it were an entrance into the field of spiritual bliss. That this bliss partakes of the nature of spiritual bliss is vouched for by a text in the S'ruti-

2. The purport of that text is as follows :—One who has experienced a direct knowledge of the spirit enjoys the highest bliss, the principal recommendations of which are continuity and uniformity. The bliss that is enjoyed by other beings is merely a fraction thereof.

3. To illustrate the thesis that worldly bliss partakes of the nature of spiritual bliss it is first proposed to delineate the emotions of the mind. These are of three kinds according to the गुण, or quality, which predominates, viz., (1) सात्त्विक, (those which are the result of सत्त्वगुण) (2) राजस, (Those which are the result of रजोगुण) & (3) तामस (those which are the result of तमोगुण). The first may be described as quiet, the second

as terrible and the third as confused. Asceticism, forbearance, generousness, &c., fall under the first category.

4. Desire, affection, attachment, avarice, &c., fall under the second class. Infatuation, fear, &c., fall under the third.

5. The intelligence of the spirit is reflected in all these emotions. Those of the first class excel in so far as the blissful nature of the spirit is also reflected therein.

6. In confirmation of this may be cited a text from S'ruti which says that the supreme spirit was seen to bear different forms according to its several reflections. The great सूत्रकार, (i. e., composer of aphorisms of Vedanta) has also said in one of his aphorisms as follows :—"The illustration of the sun's reflection is therefore applicable."

7. Another text from S'ruti may be cited to illustrate the position that what is really without a second may assume various forms by reflection. It runs as follows:—"The supreme spirit, though one, is, like the reflection of the moon in water, seen in different forms according to the several media through which it is seen" !

8. Just as the reflection of the moon is not clear in turbid water but is clear in a lucid stream ; so the reflection of the spirit varies according to the nature of the emotions.

9. The emotions of the second and third class being of a turbid nature, they are incapable of receiving a reflection of the blissful nature of the spirit. The little clearness there is in them enables them to receive a reflection of the property of intelligence.

10. This may be illustrated by another example. Fire possesses two properties, viz., (1) heat and (2) light. Even clear water when boiled partakes of the heat of fire but does not take in the power of giving out light. Similarly these emotions of the second and third class present a reflection of intelligence only but not of bliss.

11. In the case of burning wood however it will be seen that it partakes of both heat and light. Similarly emotions of the first class present a reflection of both blissfulness and intelligence which characterize the spirit.

12. The cause of this difference lies in the nature of the things concerned and the above observations are made in the light of experience.

13. During emotions of the second and third classes the experience of happiness or blissfulness is totally absent. Even during emotions of the first class excess of bliss of the exquisite kind is only experienced on certain rare occasions.

14. When one is impelled with a desire to possess houses, fields, &c., his mind may be said to be taken up by emotions of the second sort and therefore there is no possibility of his deriving happiness in that bargain.

15. The first cause of pain is the uncertainty of success. Failure serves to augment that pain. If one's plans are obstructed there is cause for irritation. If others act in a manner unfavourable to the execution of one's projects, animosity is engendered.

16. If one finds it impossible to counteract obstruction or other peoples' unfavourable attitude, dejection takes possession of his heart. This dejection comes under emotions of the third class. In all these cases there is thus occasion for very great misery. Even the chance of happiness is quite out of the question.

17. When one attains his desires he becomes delighted. This emotion being of the first class it affords very great pleasure. When one actually enjoys what he once desired his pleasure is still greater. There is some little pleasure even when one finds that his desires are about to be attained.

18. In asceticism there is a perfect absence of desires and therefore the pleasure is highest. The nature of this pleasure

has been indicated in the last chapter. The same is the case with the virtues of forbearance and generousness, because irritation and avarice are respectively absent in those cases.

19. Whatever pleasure or happiness is derived is due to the reflection of the spirit and therefore partakes of its nature. Such reflection receives no impediment when the emotions are diverted from external objects and directed inwards.

20. The three characteristics of the supreme spirit 'ब्रह्म' are (1) सत्ता, or reality, (2) चित्ति or intelligence & (3) सुख or blissfulness. In the case of earth, stones, &c., only the first is observed and not the other two.

21. In the case of emotions of the second and third class the first two of the above three characteristics are observed, while in those of the first class all the three are observable. Thus have we dealt with the spirit in its association with non-spiritual elements.

22. ब्रह्म in its pure unmixed state is understood either by means of abstraction or direct knowledge. Of these two the first has been dealt with in the eleventh chapter, and the second in the following two chapters.

23 & 24. The characteristics of माया are also three but they are quite the contrary of those in the case of the spirit. They are (1) असत्ता or absence of reality, (2) जाड्य or absence of intelligence or sense, (3) दुःख or pain. The first is observable in such expressions as 'horns of human beings', &c., the second is seen in inanimate objects such as wood, stone, &c.; the third in the case of emotions proceeding from the working of the two qualities of रजस् and तमस्. Such are the ramifications of माया. We have spoken above of associated or mixed ब्रह्म and unassociated or pure ब्रह्म. The spirit is called associated or mixed by reason of its becoming identified with the emotions resulting from the working of the three qualities.

25. Such being the case, he who may desire to contemplate the spirit should altogether leave out of consideration all unreal objects and think of the rest in their proper significance.

26. In inanimate objects such as stone, &c., names and forms should be disregarded and thought should be directed solely to what is real in them, *viz.*, ब्रह्म. In the case of emotions of the second and third classes all misery should be left out of account and the two characteristics of ब्रह्म, *viz.*, reality and knowledge should be contemplated.

27. In emotions of the first sort one should direct his attention to all the three characteristics of ब्रह्म, which are observed to exist in them. The degrees of excellence which mark the contemplation in these three cases range in the inverse order, *i. e.*, the last is the best ; the one before that is next to it and the first is the lowest.

28. We have proposed to treat of what forms the subject of this chapter with the sole object of stating that the contemplation of ब्रह्म in a mixed or associated condition is most advisable in the case of persons of dull intellect who are unable to dissociate themselves from their worldly dealings and are thus incapable of contemplating ब्रह्म in its pure state.

29. The three sorts of contemplation indicated above have reference to particular conditions of the mind resulting from contact with external objects. There is, however, a certain condition of the mind which is quite independent of external objects. This may be termed a neutral state or indifference. In this state the hold or grasp of the mind is loose and there is the experience of a certain pleasure resulting from impressions already contracted. The contemplation of ब्रह्म while the mind is in this condition is excellent. Thus have we dealt with contemplation of four sorts.

30. It is not quite correct to denote this last sort by the term contemplation. It is even more than that. With the assistance of योग, *i. e.*, abstraction and ज्ञान, *i. e.*, knowledge it is really as effective as the study of spiritual science. When the mind becomes concentrated by contemplation, the practices of spiritual science begin to take firm root.

31. As one advances in these practices, the three characteristics of ब्रह्म, *viz.*, सत्, चित् and आनन्द, begin to be realized continuously and uniformly and also merge into one another in the absence of the objects and emotions in which they were previously observed separately.

32. The emotions in which the characteristics of ब्रह्म are separately observable are those of the three classes indicated before and the objects are stone, wood, &c. Abstraction and constant thought serve to induce a condition of mind in which one rises superior to these media.

33. Thereafter one realizes the supreme spirit in an unassociated and self-refulgent condition, standing alone by itself without a second. In that condition the three factors that used to be present before in all mental operations do not exist. It is therefore called by a name which signifies unbounded joy.

34. Thus have we finished the fifth chapter in this section of the work in which we proposed to deal with ब्रह्मानन्द, or spiritual satisfaction. The subject treated of in this chapter is as it were a stepping stone for entrance into the regions of spiritual bliss.

35. May this serve to secure the constant propitiation of Gods Hari and Hara. May those Gods protect all who seek their protection with pure minds.

Thus ends the fifth chapter of the third section of this work which has reached its conclusion.

May this be considered as dedicated to God Krishna!

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

पञ्चदशी ।

॥ तत्त्वविवेकप्रकरणम् ॥ १ ॥

नमः श्रीशङ्करानन्दगुरुपादाम्बुजन्मने ॥ सविलासमहामोहग्रो-
हग्रासैककर्मणे ॥ १ ॥ तत्पादाम्बुरुहद्वन्द्वसेवानिर्मलचेतसाम् ॥
सुखबोधाय तत्त्वस्य विवेकोऽयं विधीयते ॥ २ ॥ शब्दस्पर्शादयो
वेद्या वैचित्र्याज्जागरे पृथक् ॥ ततो विभक्ता तत्संविदैकरूप्यान् भिद्यते
॥ ३ ॥ तथा स्वप्नेऽत्र वेद्यं तु न स्थिरं जागरे स्थिरम् ॥ तद्भेदोऽतस्त-
योः संविदैकरूपा न भिद्यते ॥ ४ ॥ सुप्तोत्थितस्य सौप्ततमोबोधो
भवेत्स्मृतिः ॥ सा चाऽवबुद्धविषयाऽवबुद्धं तत्तदा तमः ॥ ५ ॥
स बोधो विषयाद्भिन्नो न बोधात्स्वप्नबोधवत् ॥ एवं स्थानत्रये-
ऽप्येका संवित्तद्बहिनान्तरे ॥ ६ ॥ मासाब्दयुगकल्पेषु गताऽगम्ये-
ष्वनेकधा ॥ नोदेति नास्तमेत्येका संविदेवा स्वयंप्रभा ॥ ७ ॥
इयमात्मा परानन्दः परप्रेमास्पदं यतः ॥ मा न भूवं हि भूया-
समिति प्रेमाऽऽत्मनीक्ष्यते ॥ ८ ॥ तत्प्रेमात्मार्थमन्यत्र नैवमन्यार्थ-
मात्मनि ॥ अतस्तत्परमं तेन परमानन्दताऽऽत्मनः ॥ ९ ॥ इत्थं सच्चि-
त्परानन्द आत्मा युक्त्या तथाविधम् ॥ परं ब्रह्म तयोश्चैक्यं श्रुत्य-
न्तेषूपदिश्यते ॥ १० ॥ अभाने न परं प्रेम भाने न विषये स्पृहा ॥
अतो भानेऽप्यभाताऽसौ परमानन्दताऽऽत्मनः ॥ ११ ॥ अध्येतृवर्ग-
मध्यस्थपुत्राध्ययनशब्दवत् ॥ भानेऽप्यभानं भानस्य प्रतिबन्धेन
युज्यते ॥ १२ ॥ प्रतिबन्धोऽस्तिभातीतिव्यवहारार्हवस्तुनि ॥ तन्नि-
रस्य विरुद्धस्य तस्योत्पादनमुच्यते ॥ १३ ॥ तस्य हेतुः समानाभिहारः
पुत्रध्वनिश्रुतौ ॥ इहाऽनादिरविद्यैव व्यामोहैकानिबन्धनम् ॥ १४ ॥

चिदानन्दमयब्रह्मप्रतिबिम्बसमन्विता ॥ तमोरजःसत्त्वगुणाप्रकृति-
 द्विविधा च सा ॥ १५ ॥ सत्त्वशुद्धयविशुद्धिभ्यां मायाऽविद्ये च ते
 मते ॥ मायाबिम्बोवशीकृत्य तां स्यात्सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः ॥ १६ ॥ अवि-
 द्यावशगस्त्वन्यस्तद्वैचित्र्यादनेकधा ॥ सा कारणशरीरं स्यात् प्राज्ञ-
 स्तत्राऽभिमानवान् ॥ १७ ॥ तमःप्रधानप्रकृतेस्तद्भोगायेश्वराज्ञया ॥
 वियत्पवनतेजोम्बुभुवो भूतानि जज्ञिरे ॥ १८ ॥ सत्त्वांशैः पञ्च-
 भिस्तेषां क्रमाद्धीन्द्रियपञ्चकम् ॥ श्रोत्रत्वगक्षिरसनघ्राणाख्यमुप-
 जायते ॥ १९ ॥ तैरन्तःकरणं सर्वैर्दृष्टिभेदेन तद्विधा ॥ मनो
 विमर्शरूपं स्याद्बुद्धिः स्यान्निश्चयात्मिका ॥ २० ॥ रजोऽंशैः पञ्च-
 भिस्तेषां क्रमात्कर्मेन्द्रियाणि तु ॥ वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाभिधानानि
 जज्ञिरे ॥ २१ ॥ तैः सर्वैः सहितैः प्राणो वृत्तिभेदात्स पञ्चधा ॥ प्राणोऽ-
 पानः समानश्चोदानव्यानौ च ते पुनः ॥ २२ ॥ बुद्धिकर्मेन्द्रियप्राणपञ्च-
 कैर्भनसा धिया ॥ शरीरं सप्तदशभिः सूक्ष्मं तल्लिङ्गमुच्यते ॥ २३ ॥
 प्राज्ञस्तत्राभिमानेन तैजसत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥ हिरण्यगर्भतामीशस्तयोर्व्य-
 ष्टिसमष्टिता ॥ २४ ॥ समष्टिरीशः सर्वेषां स्वात्मतादात्म्यवेदनात् ॥
 तदभावात्ततोऽन्ये तु कथ्यन्ते व्यष्टिसंज्ञया ॥ २५ ॥ तद्भोगाय
 पुनर्भोग्यभोगायतनजन्मने ॥ पञ्चीकरोति भगवान् प्रत्येकं वियदा-
 दिकम् ॥ २६ ॥ द्विधा विधाय चैकैकं चतुर्धा प्रथमं पुनः ॥ स्वस्वे-
 तर्द्वितीयांशैर्योजनात्पञ्च पञ्च ते ॥ २७ ॥ तैरण्डस्तत्र भुवनं
 भोग्यभोगाश्रयोद्भवः ॥ हिरण्यगर्भः स्थूलेऽस्मिन् देहे वैश्वानरो भवेत्
 ॥ २८ ॥ तेजसा विश्वतां याता देवतिर्यङ्नरादयः ॥ ते परागदर्शिनः
 प्रत्यक्तत्त्वबोधविवर्जिताः ॥ २९ ॥ कुर्वते कर्म भोगाय कर्म कर्तुं
 च भुञ्जते ॥ नद्यां कीटा इवावर्तादावर्तान्तरमाशु ते ॥ व्रजन्तो जन्मनो
 जन्म लभन्ते नैव निर्वृतिम् ॥ ३० ॥ सत्कर्मपरिपाकात्ते करुणा-
 निधिनोद्धृताः ॥ प्राप्य तीरतरुच्छायां विश्राम्यन्ति यथासुखम् ॥ ३१ ॥

उपदेशमवाप्यैवमाचार्यात्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ॥ पञ्चकोशविवेकेन लभ्यन्ते
निर्वृतिं पराम् ॥ ३२ ॥ अन्नं प्राणो मनो बुद्धिरानन्दश्चेति पञ्च
ते ॥ कोशास्तैरावृतः स्वात्मा विस्मृत्या संसृतिं व्रजेत् ॥ ३३ ॥
स्यात्पञ्चीकृतभूतोत्थो देहः स्थूलोऽन्नसंज्ञकः ॥ लिङ्गे तु राजसैः
प्राणैः प्राणः कर्मेन्द्रियैः सह ॥ ३४ ॥ सात्त्विकैर्धीन्द्रियैः साकं विम-
र्शात्मा मनोमयः ॥ तैरेव साकं विज्ञानमयो धीर्निश्चयात्मिका ॥ ३५ ॥
कारणे सत्त्वमानन्दमयो मोदादिवृत्तिभिः ॥ तत्तत्कोशैस्तु तादात्म्या-
दात्मा तत्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥ ३६ ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पञ्चको-
शविवेकतः ॥ स्वात्मानं तत उद्धृत्य परं ब्रह्म प्रपद्यते ॥ ३७ ॥ अभाने
स्थूलदेहस्य स्वप्ने यद्भानमात्मनः ॥ सोऽन्वयो व्यतिरेकस्तद्भानेऽन्या-
नवभासनम् ॥ ३८ ॥ लिङ्गभाने सुषुप्तौ स्यादात्मनो भानमन्वयः ॥
व्यतिरेकस्तु तद्भाने लिङ्गस्याभानमुच्यते ॥ ३९ ॥ तद्विवेकाद्वि-
विक्षाः स्युः कोशाः प्राणमनोधियः ॥ ते हि तत्र गुणावस्थाभेद-
मात्रात्पृथक्कृताः ॥ ४० ॥ सुषुप्त्यभाने भानं तु समाधावात्मनो-
ऽन्वयः ॥ व्यतिरेकस्त्वात्मभाने सुषुप्त्यनवभासनम् ॥ ४१ ॥
यथा मुञ्जादिषीकैवमात्मा युक्त्या समुद्धृतः ॥ शरीरत्रितयाद्धैरैः परं
ब्रह्मैव जायते ॥ ४२ ॥ परापरात्मनोरेवं युक्त्या संभावितैकता ॥
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यैः सा भागत्यागेन लक्ष्यते ॥ ४३ ॥ जगतो
यदुपादानं मायामादाय तामसीम् ॥ निमित्तं शुद्धसत्त्वां तामुच्यते
ब्रह्म तद्विरा ॥ ४४ ॥ यदा मलिनसत्त्वां तां कामकर्मादिदूषिताम् ॥
आदत्ते तत्परं ब्रह्म त्वंपदेन तदोच्यते ॥ ४५ ॥ त्रितयीमपि तां
मुक्त्वा परस्परविरोधिनीम् ॥ अखण्डं सच्चिदानन्दं महावाक्येन
लक्ष्यते ॥ ४६ ॥ सोऽयमित्यादिवाक्येषु विरोधात्तदिदंतयोः ॥
त्यागेन भागयोरेक आश्रयो लक्ष्यते यथा ॥ ४७ ॥ मायाविद्ये
विद्यायैवमुपाधी परजीवयोः ॥ अखण्डं सच्चिदानन्दं परं ब्रह्मैव

लक्ष्यते ॥ ४८ ॥ सविकल्पस्य लक्ष्यत्वे लक्ष्यस्य स्यादवस्तुता ॥
 निर्विकल्पस्य लक्ष्यत्वं न दृष्टं न च संभवि ॥ ४९ ॥ विकल्पो
 निर्विकल्पस्य सविकल्पस्य वा भवेत् ॥ आद्ये व्याहृतिरन्यत्रानवस्था-
 त्माश्रयादयः ॥ ५० ॥ इदं गुणक्रियाजातीद्रव्यसंबन्धवस्तुषु ॥
 समं तेन स्वरूपस्य सर्वमेतदितीष्यताम् ॥ ५१ ॥ विकल्पतदभा-
 वाभ्यामसंसृष्टात्मवस्तुनि ॥ विकल्पितत्वलक्ष्यत्वसंबन्धाद्यास्तु
 कल्पिताः ॥ ५२ ॥ इत्थं वाक्यैस्तदर्थानुसंधानं श्रवणं भवेत् ॥
 युक्त्या संभावितत्त्वानुसंधानं मननं तु तत् ॥ ५३ ॥ ताभ्यां
 निर्विचिकित्सेऽर्थे चेतसः स्थापितस्य यत् ॥ एकतानत्वमेतद्धि
 निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ॥ ५४ ॥ ध्यातृध्याने परित्यज्य क्रमाद्ध्ये-
 यैकगोचरम् ॥ निवातदीपवच्चित्तं समाधिरभिधीयते ॥ ५५ ॥
 वृत्तयस्तु तदानीमज्ञाता अप्यात्मगोचराः ॥ स्मरणादनुमीयन्ते
 व्युत्थितस्य समुत्थितात् ॥ ५६ ॥ वृत्तीनामनुवृत्तिस्तु प्रयत्नात्प्र-
 थमादपि ॥ अदृष्टासकृद्भ्याससंस्कारसचिवाद्भवेत् ॥ ५७ ॥ यथा
 दीपो निवातस्थ इत्यादिभिरनेकधा ॥ भगवानिषमेवार्थमर्जुनाय
 न्यरूपयत् ॥ ५८ ॥ अनादाविह संसारे संचिताः कर्मकोटयः ॥
 अनेन विलयं यान्ति शुद्धो धर्मो विवर्धते ॥ ५९ ॥ धर्ममेघामिमं
 प्राहुः समाधिं योगवित्तमाः ॥ वर्षत्येष यतो धर्मामृतधाराः सह-
 स्रशः ॥ ६० ॥ अमुना वासनाजाले निःशेषं प्रविलापिते ॥ समू-
 लोन्मूलिते पुण्यपापाख्ये कर्मसंचये ॥ ६१ ॥ वाक्यमप्रतिबद्धं
 सत्प्राक्परोक्षावभासिते ॥ करामलकवद्बोधमपरोक्षं प्रसूयते ॥ ६२ ॥
 परोक्षं ब्रह्मविज्ञानं शाब्दं देशिकपूर्वकम् ॥ बुद्धिपूर्वकृतं पापं कृत्स्नं
 दहति वह्निवत् ॥ ६३ ॥ अपरोक्षात्मविज्ञानं शाब्दं देशिकपूर्व-
 कम् ॥ संसारकारणाज्ञानतमसश्चण्डभास्करः ॥ ६४ ॥ इत्थं तत्त्वविवेकं
 विधाय विधिवन्मनः समाधाय ॥ विगलितसंसृतिबन्धः प्राप्नोति
 परं पदनरो न चिरात् ॥ ६५ ॥ इति पञ्चदश्यां तत्त्वविवेकप्रकरणम् ।

॥ महाभूतविवेकप्रकरणम् ॥ २ ॥

सदद्वैतं श्रुतं यत्तत्पञ्चभूतविवेकतः ॥ बोद्धुं शक्यं ततो भूतपञ्चकं
 प्रविचिच्यते ॥ १ ॥ शब्दस्पर्शौ रूपरसौ गन्धो भूतगुणा इमे ॥
 एकद्वित्रिचतुः पञ्च गुणा व्योमादिषु क्रमात् ॥ २ ॥ प्रतिध्वनिर्वि-
 यच्छब्दो वायौ बीसीति शब्दनम् ॥ अनुष्णाशीतसंस्पर्शौ बह्वौ
 भुगुभुगुध्वनिः ॥ ३ ॥ उष्णः स्पर्शः प्रभारूपं जले बुलुबुलुध्वनिः ॥
 शीतः स्पर्शः शुक्लरूपं रसो माधुर्यमीरितम् ॥ ४ ॥ भूमौ कडकडा-
 शब्दः काठिन्यं स्पर्श इष्यते ॥ नीलादिकं चित्ररूपं मधुराम्लादिको
 रसः ॥ ५ ॥ सुरभीतरगन्धौ द्वौ गुणाः सम्यग्विवेचिताः ॥ श्रोत्रं
 त्वक्चक्षुषी जिह्वा घ्राणं चेन्द्रियपञ्चकम् ॥ ६ ॥ कर्णादिगोलकस्थं
 तच्छब्दादिग्राहकं क्रमात् ॥ सौक्ष्म्यात्कार्यानुमेयं तत्प्रायो धावेद्व-
 हिर्मुखम् ॥ ७ ॥ कदाचित्पिहिते कर्णे श्रूयते शब्द आन्तरः ॥ प्राण-
 वायौ जाठराग्नौ जलपानेऽन्नभक्षणे ॥ ८ ॥ व्यज्यन्ते ह्यान्तराः
 स्पर्शा मीलने चान्तरं तमः ॥ उद्गारे रसगन्धौ चेत्यक्षाणामान्तर-
 ग्रहः ॥ ९ ॥ पञ्चोत्तयादानगमनविसर्गानन्दकाः क्रियाः ॥ कृषि-
 चाणिज्यसेवाद्याः पञ्चस्वन्तर्भवन्तिहि ॥ १० ॥ वाक्पाणिपाद-
 पायूपस्थैरक्षैस्तत्क्रियाजनिः ॥ मुखादिगोलकेष्वास्ते तत्कर्मेन्द्रिय-
 पञ्चकम् ॥ ११ ॥ मनो दशेन्द्रियाध्यक्षं हृत्पद्मगोलके स्थितम् ॥
 तच्चान्तःकरणं बाह्येष्वस्वातन्त्र्याद्विनेन्द्रियैः ॥ १२ ॥ अक्षेष्वर्यापि-
 तेष्वेतद्गुणदोषविचारकम् ॥ सत्त्वं रजस्तमश्चास्य गुणा विक्रियते हि तैः
 ॥ १३ ॥ वैराग्यं क्षान्तिरौदार्यमित्याद्याः सत्त्वसंभवाः ॥ कामक्रोधौ
 लोभयत्नावित्याद्या रजसोत्थिताः ॥ १४ ॥ आलस्यभ्रान्तितन्द्राद्या
 विकारास्तमसोत्थिताः ॥ सात्त्विकैः पुण्यनिष्पत्तिः पापोत्पत्तिश्च रा-
 जसैः ॥ १५ ॥ तामसैर्नोभयं किं तु वृथायुःक्षपणं भवेत् ॥ अत्राह

प्रत्ययी कर्तेत्येवं लोकव्यवस्थितिः ॥ १६ ॥ स्पष्टशब्दादियुक्तेषु भौतिक-
 त्वमतिरुमुत्तम ॥ अशादावपि तच्छालमुक्तिभ्यामवधार्यताम् ॥ १७ ॥
 एकादशेन्द्रियैर्युक्तया शास्त्रेणाप्यवगम्यते ॥ यावत्किंचिद्भवेदेतदिदं-
 शब्दोदितं जगत् ॥ १८ ॥ इदं सर्वं पुरा सृष्टेरेकमेवाद्वितीयकम् ॥
 सदेवासीन्नामरूपे नास्तामित्यारुणैर्वचः ॥ १९ ॥ वृक्षस्य स्वगतो
 भेदः पत्रपुष्पफलादिभिः ॥ वृक्षान्तरात्सजातीयो विजातीयः
 शिलादितः ॥ २० ॥ तथा सद्रस्तुनो भेदत्रयं प्राप्तं निवार्यते ॥
 ऐक्यावधारणद्वैतप्रतिषेधैस्त्रिभिः क्रमात् ॥ २१ ॥ सतो नावयवाः
 शङ्क्यास्तदंशस्यानिरूपणात् ॥ नामरूपे न तस्यांशौ तयोरद्याप्य-
 नुद्भवात् ॥ २२ ॥ नामरूपोद्भवस्यैव सृष्टित्वात्सृष्टितः पुरा ॥ न
 तयोरुद्भवस्तस्मान्निरंशं सद्यथा विद्यत् ॥ २३ ॥ सदन्तरं सजातीयं न
 वैलक्षण्यवर्जनात् ॥ नामरूपोपाधिभेदं विना नैव सतो भिदा ॥ २४ ॥
 विजातीयमसत्तत्तु न खल्वस्तीति गम्यते ॥ नास्यातः प्रतियोगित्वं
 विजातीयाद्भिदा कुतः ॥ २५ ॥ एकमेवाद्वितीयं सत्सिद्धमत्र तु
 केचन ॥ विह्वला असदेवेदं पुरासीदित्यवर्णयन् ॥ २६ ॥ मग्न-
 स्याब्धौ यथाऽक्षाणि विह्वलानि तथास्य धीः ॥ अखण्डैकरसं श्रुत्वा
 निःप्रचारा बिभेत्यतः ॥ २७ ॥ गौडाचार्या निर्विकल्पे समाधाव-
 न्ययोगिनाम् ॥ साकारब्रह्मनिष्ठानामत्यन्तं भयमूचिरे ॥ २८ ॥
 अस्पर्शयोगो नामैष दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः ॥ योगिनो बिभ्यति
 ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः ॥ २९ ॥ भगवत्पूज्यपादाश्च शुष्कतर्कपटू-
 नमून् ॥ आहुर्माध्यमिकान् भ्रान्तानचिन्त्येऽस्मिन्सदात्मनि ॥ ३० ॥
 अनादृत्य श्रुतिं मौख्यादिमे बौद्धास्तमस्विनः ॥ आपेदिरे निरात्म-
 त्वमनुमानैकचक्षुषः ॥ ३१ ॥ शून्यमासीदिति ब्रूषे सद्योगं वा
 सदात्मताम् ॥ शून्यस्य न तु तद्युक्तमुभयं व्याहतत्वतः ॥ ३२ ॥
 न युक्तस्तमसा सूर्यो नापि चासौ तमोमयः ॥ सच्छून्ययोर्विरो-

धित्वाच्छून्यमासीत्कथं वद ॥ ३३ ॥ वियदादेर्नामरूपे मायया
सुविकल्पिते ॥ शून्यस्य नामरूपे च तथा चेज्जीव्यतां चिरम् ॥ ३४ ॥
सतोऽपि नामरूपे द्वे कल्पिते चेत्तदा वद ॥ कुत्रेति निरधिष्ठानो न
भ्रमः कचिदीक्ष्यते ॥ ३५ ॥ सदासीदिति शब्दार्थभेदे वैगुण्यमापतेत् ॥
अभेदे पुनरुक्तिः स्यान्मैवं लोके तथेक्षणात् ॥ ३६ ॥ कर्तव्यं कुरुते
वाक्यं ब्रूते धार्यस्य धारणम् ॥ इत्यादिवासनाविष्टं प्रत्यासीत्सदिती-
रणम् ॥ ३७ ॥ कालाभावे पुरेत्युक्तिः कालवासनया युतम् ॥ शिष्यं
प्रत्येव तेनात्र द्वितीयं न हि शङ्क्यते ॥ ३८ ॥ चोद्यं वा परिहारो
वा क्रियतां द्वैतभाषया ॥ अद्वैतभाषया चोद्यं नास्ति नापि तदु-
त्तरम् ॥ ३९ ॥ तदा स्तिमितगम्भीरं न तेजो न तमस्ततम् ॥ अना-
ख्यमनभिव्यक्तं सत्किंचिदवशिष्यते ॥ ४० ॥ ननु भूम्यादिकं माभूत्प-
रमाष्वन्तनाशतः ॥ कथं ते वियतोऽसत्त्वं बुद्धिमारोहतीतिचेत् ॥ ४१ ॥
अत्यन्तं निर्जगज्ज्योम यथा ते बुद्धिमाश्रितम् ॥ तथैव सन्निराकाशं
कुतो नाश्रयते मतिम् ॥ ४२ ॥ निर्जगज्ज्योम दृष्टं चेत्प्रकाशतमसी विना ॥
क दृष्टं किं च ते पक्षे न प्रत्यक्षं वियत्खलु ॥ ४३ ॥ सद्ब्रह्म शुद्धं
त्वस्माभिर्निश्चितैरनुभूयते ॥ तूष्णीं स्थितौ न शून्यत्वं शून्यबुद्धेश्च
वर्जनात् ॥ ४४ ॥ सद्बुद्धिरपि चेन्नास्ति मास्त्वस्य स्वप्रभत्वतः ॥
निर्मनस्कत्वसाक्षित्वात्सन्मात्रं सुगमं नृणाम् ॥ ४५ ॥ मनो
जृम्भणराहित्ये यथा साक्षी निराकुलः ॥ मायाजृम्भणतः पूर्वं
सत्तथैव निराकुलम् ॥ ४६ ॥ निस्तत्त्वा कार्यगम्याऽस्य शक्तिर्मा-
याग्रिशक्तिवत् ॥ न हि शक्तिः कचित्कैश्चिद्बुध्यते कार्यतः पुरा ॥ ४७ ॥
न सद्ब्रह्म सतः शक्तिर्न हि ब्रह्मः स्वशक्तिता ॥ सद्विलक्षणतायां तु
शक्तेः किं तत्त्वमुच्यताम् ॥ ४८ ॥ शून्यत्वमिति चेच्छून्यं माया-
कार्यमितीरितम् ॥ न शून्यं नापि सद्यादृक्तादृक्तत्त्वमिहेष्यताम् ॥ ४९ ॥
नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीं किं त्वभूत्तमः ॥ सद्योगात्तमसः सत्त्वं

न स्वतस्तन्निषेधनात् ॥ ५० ॥ अत एव द्वितीयत्वं शून्यवन्न हि
 गण्यते ॥ न लोके चैत्रतच्छक्त्योर्जीवितं लिख्यते पृथक् ॥ ५१ ॥
 शक्त्याधिक्ये जीवितं चेद्वर्धते तत्र वृद्धिकृत् ॥ न शक्तिः किं तु
 तत्कार्यं युद्धकृष्यादिकं तथा ॥ ५२ ॥ सर्वथा शक्तिमात्रस्य न
 पृथग्गणना कचित् ॥ शक्तिकार्यं तु नैवास्ति द्वितीयं शङ्क्यते
 कथम् ॥ ५३ ॥ न कृत्स्नब्रह्मवृत्तिः सा शक्तिः किंत्वेकदेशभाक् ॥
 घटशक्तिर्यथा भूमौ स्निग्धमृद्येव वर्तते ॥ ५४ ॥ पादोऽस्य सर्वा
 भूतानि त्रिपादस्ति स्वयंप्रभः ॥ इत्येकदेशवृत्तित्वं मायाया वदति
 श्रुतिः ॥ ५५ ॥ विष्टभ्याहमिदं कृत्स्नमेकांशेन स्थितो जगत् ॥
 इति कृष्णोऽर्जुनायाह जगत्स्त्वेकदेशताम् ॥ ५६ ॥ स भूमिं
 विश्वतो वृत्त्वा ह्यत्यतिष्ठदशाङ्गुलम् ॥ विकारावर्ति चात्रास्ति श्रुति-
 सूत्रकृतोर्वचः ॥ ५७ ॥ निरंशेऽप्यंशमारोप्य कृत्स्नेऽंशे वेति
 पृच्छतः ॥ तद्भाषयोत्तरं ब्रूते श्रुतिः श्रोतृहितैषिणी ॥ ५८ ॥
 सत्तत्त्वमाश्रिता शक्तिः कल्पयेत्सति विक्रियाः ॥ वर्णा भित्तिगता
 भित्तौ चित्रं नानाविधं तथा ॥ ५९ ॥ आद्यो विकार आकाशः
 सोऽवकाशस्वरूपवान् ॥ आकाशोऽस्तीति सत्तत्त्वमाकाशेऽप्यनु-
 गच्छति ॥ ६० ॥ एकस्वभावं सत्तत्त्वमाकाशो द्विस्वभावकः ॥
 नावकाशः सति व्योम्नि स चैपोऽपि द्वयं स्थितम् ॥ ६१ ॥ यद्वा
 प्रतिध्वनिर्व्योम्नो गुणो नासौ सतीक्ष्यते ॥ व्योम्नि द्वौ सद्द्वनी तेन
 सदेकं द्विगुणं वियत् ॥ ६२ ॥ या शक्तिः कल्पयेद्भ्योम सा सद्भ्यो-
 म्नोरभिन्नताम् ॥ आपाद्य धर्मधर्मित्वं व्यत्ययेनावकल्पयेत् ॥ ६३ ॥
 सतो व्योमत्वमापन्नं व्योम्नः सत्तां तु लौकिकाः ॥ तार्किकाश्चाव-
 गच्छन्ति मायाया उचितं हि तत् ॥ ६४ ॥ यद्यथा वर्तते तस्य
 तथात्वं भाति मानतः ॥ अन्यथात्वं भ्रमेणेति न्यायोऽयं सार्वलौ-
 किकः ॥ ६५ ॥ एवं श्रुतिविचारात्पाग्यथा यद्वस्तु भासते ॥

विचारेण विपर्येति ततस्तच्चिन्त्यतां वियत् ॥ ६६ ॥ भिन्ने
वियत्सती शब्दभेदाद्बुद्धेश्च भेदतः ॥ वाय्वादिष्वनुवृत्तं सन्नतु
व्योमेति भेदधीः ॥ ६७ ॥ सद्ब्रह्मस्त्वधिकवृत्तित्वाद्धर्मि व्योम्नस्तु
धर्मता ॥ धिया सतः पृथक्कारे ब्रूहि व्योम किमात्मकम् ॥ ६८ ॥
अवकाशात्मकं तच्चेदसत्तदिति चिन्त्यताम् ॥ भिन्नं सतोऽसच्च नैति
वक्षि चेद्वाहतिस्तव ॥ ६९ ॥ भातीतिचेद्भातु नाम भूषणं मायि-
कस्य तत् ॥ यदसद्भासमानं तन्मिथ्या स्वप्नगजादिवत् ॥ ७० ॥
जातिव्यक्ती देहिदेहौ गुणद्रव्ये यथा पृथक् ॥ वियत्सतोस्तथैवास्तु
पार्थक्यं कोऽत्र विस्मयः ॥ ७१ ॥ बुद्धोऽपि भेदो नो चित्ते निरूढिं
याति चेत्तदा ॥ अनैकाग्र्यात्संशयाद्वा रूढ्यभावोऽस्य ते वद ॥ ७२ ॥
अप्रमत्तो भव ध्यानादाद्येऽन्यस्मिन्विवेचनम् ॥ कुरु प्रमाणयुक्तिभ्यां
ततो रूढतमो भवेत् ॥ ७३ ॥ ध्यानान्मानाद्युक्तितोऽपि रूढे भेदे
वियत्सतोः ॥ न कदाचिद्वियत्सत्यं सद्ब्रह्मस्तुच्छिद्रवन्न च ॥ ७४ ॥
ब्रह्मस्य भाति सदा व्योम निस्तत्त्वोल्लेखपूर्वकम् ॥ सद्ब्रह्मस्त्वपि विभात्यस्य
निश्छिद्रत्वपुरःसरम् ॥ ७५ ॥ वासनायां प्रवृद्धायां वियत्सत्य-
त्ववादिनम् ॥ सन्मात्राबोधयुक्तं च दृष्ट्वा विस्मयते बुधः ॥ ७६ ॥
एवमाकाशमिथ्यात्वे सत्सत्यत्वे च वासिते ॥ न्यायेनानेन वाय्वादेः
सद्ब्रह्मस्तु प्रविविच्यताम् ॥ ७७ ॥ सद्ब्रह्मस्तुन्येकदेशस्था माया तत्रैकदे-
शगम् ॥ वियत्तत्राप्येकदेशगतो वायुः प्रकल्पितः ॥ ७८ ॥ शोष-
स्पर्शौ गतिर्वेगो वायुधर्मा इमे मताः ॥ त्रयः स्वभावाः सन्मायाव्योम्नां
ये तेपि वायुगाः ॥ ७९ ॥ वायुरस्तीति सद्भावाः सतो वायौ पृथ-
क्कृते ॥ निस्तत्त्वरूपता मायास्वभावो व्योमगो ध्वनिः ॥ ८० ॥
सतोऽनुवृत्तिः सर्वत्र व्योम्नो नेति पुरेरितम् ॥ व्योमानुवृत्तिरधुना कथं
न व्याहृतं वचः ॥ ८१ ॥ छिद्रानुवृत्तिर्नेतीति पूर्वोक्तिरधुना त्वियम् ॥
शब्दानुवृत्तिरेवोक्ता वचसो व्याहृतिः कुतः ॥ ८२ ॥ ननु सद्ब्रह्म-

पार्थक्यादसत्त्वं चेत्तदा कथम् ॥ अव्यक्तमायावैषम्यादमायामयतापि
 नो ॥ ८३ ॥ निस्तत्त्वरूपतैवात्र मायात्वस्य प्रयोजिका ॥ सा शक्ति-
 कार्ययोस्तुल्या व्यक्ताव्यक्तत्वभेदिनोः ॥ ८४ ॥ सदसत्त्वविवेकस्य
 प्रस्तुतत्वात्स चिन्त्यताम् ॥ असतोऽवान्तरो भेद आस्तां तच्चिन्तयात्र
 किम् ॥ ८५ ॥ सद्ब्रह्म शिष्टोऽंशो वायुर्मिथ्या यथा वियत् ॥
 वासयित्वा चिरं वायोर्मिथ्यात्वं मरुतं त्यजेत् ॥ ८६ ॥ चिन्तये-
 द्ब्रह्मिण्येवं मरुतो न्यूनवर्तिनम् ॥ ब्रह्माण्डावरणेष्वेषा न्यूनाधिकवि-
 चारणा ॥ ८७ ॥ वायोर्दशांशतो न्यूनो वह्निर्वायौ प्रकल्पितः ॥
 पुराणोक्तं तारतम्यं दशांशैर्भूतपञ्चके ॥ ८८ ॥ वह्निरूष्णः प्रका-
 शात्मा पूर्वाणुगतिरत्र च ॥ अस्ति वह्निः स निस्तत्त्वः शब्दवान् स्पर्श-
 वानपि ॥ ८९ ॥ सन्मायाव्योमवाय्वंशैर्युक्तस्याग्नेर्निजो गुणः ॥ रूपं
 तत्र सतः सर्वमन्यद्बुद्ध्या विविच्यताम् ॥ ९० ॥ सतो विवेचिते
 बह्नौ मिथ्यात्वे सति वासिते ॥ आपो दशांशतो न्यूनाः कल्पिता
 इति चिन्तयेत् ॥ ९१ ॥ सन्त्यापोऽमूः शून्यतत्त्वाः सशब्दस्पर्श-
 संयुताः ॥ रूपवत्योन्यधर्मानुवृत्त्या स्वीयो रसो गुणः ॥ ९२ ॥
 सतो विवेचितास्वप्सु तन्मिथ्यात्वे च वासिते ॥ भूमिर्दशांशतो न्यूना
 कल्पिताप्स्विति चिन्तयेत् ॥ ९३ ॥ अस्ति भूस्तत्त्वशून्यास्यां शब्द-
 स्पर्शौ सरूपकौ ॥ रसश्च परतो गंधो नैजः सत्ता विविच्यताम्
 ॥ ९४ ॥ पृथक्कृतायां सत्तायां भूमिर्मिथ्याऽवशिष्यते ॥ भूमेर्द-
 शांशतो न्यूनं ब्रह्माण्डं भूमिमध्यगम् ॥ ९५ ॥ ब्रह्माण्डमध्ये तिष्ठन्ति
 भुवनानि चतुर्दश ॥ भुवनेषु वसन्तेषु प्राणिदेहा यथायथम् ॥ ९६ ॥
 ब्रह्माण्डलोकदेहेषु सद्ब्रह्मस्तुनि पृथक्कृते ॥ असन्तोऽण्डादयो भान्तु तद्भा-
 नेऽपीह का क्षतिः ॥ ९७ ॥ भूतभौतिकमायानामसत्त्वेऽत्यन्तवासिते ॥
 सद्ब्रह्मद्वैतमित्येषा धीर्विपर्येति न कश्चित् ॥ ९८ ॥ सदद्वैतात्पृथग्भूते
 द्वैते भूम्यादिरूपिणि ॥ तत्तदर्थक्रिया लोके यथा दृष्टा तथैव सा ॥

॥ ९९ ॥ साङ्ख्यकाणादबौद्धार्थैर्जगद्भेदो यथायथा ॥ उत्प्रेक्ष्य-
 तेऽनेकयुक्त्या भवत्वेष तथातथा ॥ १०० ॥ अवज्ञातं सदद्वैतं
 निःशङ्कैरन्यवादिभिः ॥ एवं का क्षतिरस्माकं तद्वैतमवजानताम्
 ॥ १०१ ॥ द्वैतावज्ञा सुस्थिता चेदद्वैते धीः स्थिरा भवेत् ॥ स्थैर्ये
 तस्याः पुमानेष जीवन्मुक्त इतीर्यते ॥ १०२ ॥ एषा ब्राह्मी स्थितिः
 पार्थ नैनां प्राप्य विमुह्यति ॥ स्थित्वाऽस्यामन्तकालेऽपि ब्रह्म निर्वा-
 णमृच्छति ॥ १०३ ॥ सदद्वैतेऽनृतद्वैते यदन्योन्यैक्यवीक्षणम् ॥
 तस्यान्तकालस्तद्भेदबुद्धिरेव न चेतारः ॥ १०४ ॥ यद्वाऽन्तकालः
 प्राणस्य वियोगोऽस्तु प्रसिद्धितः ॥ तस्मिन् कालेऽपि न भ्रान्तैर्गतायाः
 पुनरागमः ॥ १०५ ॥ नीरोग उपविष्टो वा रुग्णो वा विलुठन् भुवि ॥
 मूर्छितो वा त्यजत्वेष प्राणान् भ्रान्तिर्न सर्वथा ॥ १०६ ॥ दिनेदिने
 स्वप्नसुप्त्योरधीते विस्मृतेऽप्ययम् ॥ परेद्युर्नानधीतः स्यात्तद्वद्विद्या न
 नश्यति ॥ १०७ ॥ प्रमाणोत्पादिता विद्या प्रमाणं प्रबलं विना ॥ न
 नश्यति न वेदान्तात्प्रबलं मानमीक्ष्यते ॥ १०८ ॥ तस्माद्वेदान्तसं-
 सिद्धं सदद्वैतं न बाध्यते ॥ अन्तकालेऽप्यतो भूतविवेकान्निवृत्तिः
 स्थिता ॥ १०९ ॥

इति पञ्चदश्यां महाभूतविवेकः समाप्तः ॥ २ ॥

॥ अथ पञ्चकोशविवेकप्रकरणम् ॥ ३ ॥

गुहाहितं ब्रह्म यत्तत् पञ्चकोशविवेकतः ॥ बोद्धुं शक्यं ततः
 कोशपञ्चकं प्रविविच्यते ॥ १ ॥ देहादभ्यन्तरः प्राणः प्राणादभ्यन्तरं
 मनः ॥ ततः कर्ता ततो भोक्ता गुहा सेयं परंपरा ॥ २ ॥ पितृभु-
 क्तान्नजाद्वीर्याज्जातोऽन्नेनैव वर्धते ॥ देहः सोऽन्नमयोनात्मा प्राक्
 चोर्ध्वं तदभावतः ॥ ३ ॥ पूर्वजन्मन्यसन्नेतज्जन्म संपादयेत्कथम् ॥
 भाविजन्मन्यसन्कर्म न भुञ्जीतेह संचितम् ॥ ४ ॥ पूर्णो देहे बलं
 यच्छन्नक्षाणां यः प्रवर्तकः ॥ वायुः प्राणमयो नासावात्मा चैतन्य-
 वर्जनात् ॥ ५ ॥ अहंतां ममतां देहे गेहादौ च करोति यः ॥
 कामाद्यवस्थया भ्रान्तो नासावात्मा मनो मयः ॥ ६ ॥ लीना सुप्तौ
 वपुर्बोधे व्याप्नुयादानखाग्रगा ॥ चिच्छायोपेतधीर्नात्मा विज्ञानमय-
 शब्दभाक् ॥ ७ ॥ कर्तृत्वकरणत्वाभ्यां विक्रियेतान्तरिन्द्रियम् ॥
 विज्ञानमनसी अन्तर्बहिश्चैते परस्परम् ॥ ८ ॥ काचिदन्तर्मुखा वृत्ति-
 रानन्दप्रतिबिम्बभाक् ॥ पुण्यभोगे भोगशान्तौ निद्रारूपेण लीयते
 ॥ ९ ॥ कादाचित्कत्वतोऽनात्मा स्यादानन्दमयोऽप्ययम् ॥ बिम्ब-
 भूतो य आनन्द आत्माऽसौ सर्वदास्थितः ॥ १० ॥ ननु देहमुप-
 क्रम्य निद्रानन्दान्तवस्तुषु ॥ मा भूदात्मत्वमन्यस्तु न कश्चिदनुभू-
 यते ॥ ११ ॥ बाढं निद्रादयः सर्वेऽनुभूयन्ते न चेतः ॥ तथाप्ये-
 तेऽनुभूयन्ते येन तं को निवारयेत् ॥ १२ ॥ स्वयमेवानुभूतित्वा-
 द्विद्यते नानुभाव्यता ॥ ज्ञातृज्ञानान्तराभावादज्ञेयो न त्वसत्तया
 ॥ १३ ॥ माधुर्यादिस्वभावानामन्यत्र स्वगुणार्पिणाम् ॥ स्वस्मिंस्त-
 दर्पणापेक्षा नो न चास्त्यन्यदर्पकम् ॥ १४ ॥ अर्पकान्तरराहि-
 त्येऽप्यस्त्येषां तत्स्वभावता ॥ मा भूत्तथानुभाव्यत्वं बोधात्मा तु न
 हीयते ॥ १५ ॥ स्वयंज्योतिर्भवत्येष पुरोऽस्माज्ज्ञासतेऽखिलात् ॥

तमेव भान्तमन्वेति तद्भासा भास्यते जगत् ॥ १६ ॥ येनेदं जानते
 सर्वं तत्केनान्येन जानताम् ॥ विज्ञातारं केन विद्याच्छक्तं वेद्ये तु
 साधनम् ॥ १७ ॥ स वेत्ति वेद्यं तत्सर्वं नान्यस्तस्यास्ति वेदिता ॥
 विदिताविदिताभ्यां तत्पृथग्बोधस्वरूपकम् ॥ १८ ॥ बोधेऽप्यनुभवो
 यस्य न कथंचन जायते ॥ तं कथं बोधयेच्छास्त्रं लोष्टं नरसमाकृ-
 तिम् ॥ १९ ॥ जिह्वा मेऽस्ति न वेत्युक्तिर्लज्जायै केवलं यथा ॥
 न बुध्यते मया बोधो बोद्धव्य इति तादृशी ॥ २० ॥ यस्मिन्य-
 स्मिन्नस्ति लोके बोधस्तत्तदुपेक्षणे ॥ यद्बोधमात्रं तद्ब्रह्मेत्येवं धीर्ब्र-
 ह्मनिश्चयः ॥ २१ ॥ पञ्चकोशपरित्यागे साक्षिबोधावशेषतः ॥
 स्वस्वरूपं स एव स्याच्छून्यत्वं तस्य दुर्घटम् ॥ २२ ॥ अस्ति
 तावत्स्वयं नाम विवादाविषयत्वतः ॥ स्वस्मिन्नपि विवादश्चेत्प्रति-
 वाद्यत्र को भवेत् ॥ २३ ॥ स्वासत्त्वं तु न कस्मैचिद्रोचते विभ्रमं
 विना ॥ अत एव श्रुतिर्बाधं ब्रूते चासत्त्ववादिनः ॥ २४ ॥ असद्ब्रह्मेति
 चेद्वेद स्वयमेव भवेदसत् ॥ अतोऽस्य माभूद्वेद्यत्वं स्वसत्त्वं त्वभ्युपे-
 यताम् ॥ २५ ॥ कीदृक् तर्हीति चेत्पृच्छेदीदृक्ता नास्ति तत्र हि ॥
 यदनीदृगतादृक् च तत्स्वरूपं विनिश्चिनु ॥ २६ ॥ अक्षाणां विष-
 यस्त्वीदृक् परोक्षस्तादृगुच्यते ॥ विषयी नाक्षविषयः स्वत्यान्नास्य
 परोक्षता ॥ २७ ॥ अवेद्योऽप्यपरोक्षोऽतः स्वप्रकाशो भवत्ययम् ॥
 सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं चेत्यस्तीह ब्रह्मलक्षणम् ॥ २८ ॥ सत्यत्वं बाध-
 राहित्यं जगद्बाधैकसाक्षिणः ॥ बाधः किंसाक्षिको ब्रूहि न त्वसाक्षिक
 इष्यते ॥ २९ ॥ अपनीतेषु मूर्तेषु ह्यमूर्तं शिष्यते वियत् ॥ शक्येषु
 बाधितेष्वन्ते शिष्यते यत्तदेव तत् ॥ ३० ॥ सर्वबाधेन किञ्चिद्यन्न
 किञ्चित्तदेव तत् ॥ भाषा एवात्र भिद्यन्ते निर्बाधं तावदस्ति हि
 ॥ ३१ ॥ अत एव श्रुतिर्बाध्यं बाधित्वा शेषयत्यदः ॥ स एष नेति
 नेत्यात्मेत्यतद्व्यावृत्तिरूपतः ॥ ३२ ॥ इदं रूपं तु यद्यावत्तत्त्यक्तं

शक्यतेऽखिलम् ॥ अशक्यो ह्यनिदंरूपः स आत्मा बाधवर्जितः ॥ ३३ ॥
 सिद्धं ब्रह्मणि सत्यत्वं ज्ञानत्वं तु पुरेरितम् ॥ स्वयमेवानुभूतित्वा-
 दित्यादिवचनैः स्फुटम् ॥ ३४ ॥ न व्यापित्वाद्देशतोऽन्तो नित्य-
 त्वान्नापि कालतः ॥ न वस्तुतोऽपि सार्वान्त्र्यादानन्त्यं ब्रह्मणि
 त्रिधा ॥ ३५ ॥ देशकालान्यवस्तूनां कल्पितत्वाच्च मायया ॥ न
 देशादिकृतोऽन्तोस्ति ब्रह्मानन्त्यं स्फुटं ततः ॥ ३६ ॥ सत्यं ज्ञान-
 मनन्तं यद्ब्रह्म तद्वस्तु तस्य तत् ॥ ईश्वरत्वं च जीवत्वमुपाधिद्वयक-
 ल्पितम् ॥ ३७ ॥ शक्तिरस्त्यैश्वरी काचित्सर्ववस्तुनियामिका ॥
 आनन्दमयमारभ्य गूढा सर्वेषु वस्तुषु ॥ ३८ ॥ वस्तुधर्मा नियम्येरन्
 शक्त्या नैव यदा तदा ॥ अन्योन्यधर्मसाङ्ख्याद्विप्लवेत जगत्खलु
 ॥ ३९ ॥ चिच्छायावेशतः शक्तिश्चेतनेव विभाति सा ॥ तच्छक्त्यु-
 पाधिसंयोगाद्ब्रह्मैवेश्वरतां व्रजेत् ॥ ४० ॥ कोशोपाधिविवक्षायां याति
 ब्रह्मैव जीवताम् ॥ पिता पितामहश्चैकः पुत्रपौत्रौ यथा प्रति ॥ ४१ ॥
 पुत्रादेशविवक्षायां न पिता न पितामहः ॥ तद्वन्नेशो नापि जीवः
 शक्तिकोशाविवक्षणे ॥ ४२ ॥ य एवं ब्रह्म वेदैष ब्रह्मैव भवति
 स्वयम् ॥ ब्रह्मणो नास्ति जन्मातः पुनरेष न जायते ॥ ४३ ॥

इति पञ्चदश्यां पञ्चकोशविवेकः ॥ ३ ॥

॥ अथ द्वैतविवेकप्रकरणम् ॥ ४ ॥

ईश्वरेणापि जीवेन सृष्टं द्वैतं विविच्यते ॥ विवेके सति जीवेन हेयो बन्धः स्फुटीभवेत् ॥ १ ॥ मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ॥ स मायी सृजतीत्याहुः श्वेताश्वतरशाखिनः ॥ २ ॥ आत्मा वा इदमग्रेऽभूत्स ईक्षत सृजा इति ॥ संकल्पेनासृजलोकान्स एतानिति बहुचाः ॥ ३ ॥ खंवाय्वग्निजलोर्व्योषध्यन्नदेहाः क्रमादमी ॥ संभूता ब्रह्मणस्तस्मादेतस्मादात्मनोऽखिलाः ॥ ४ ॥ बहु स्यामहमेवातः प्रजायेयेति कामतः ॥ तपस्तप्त्वाऽसृजत्सर्वं जगदित्याह तित्तिरिः ॥ ५ ॥ इदमग्रे सदेवासीद्बहुत्वाय तदैक्षत ॥ तेजोऽबन्नाण्डजादीनि ससर्जेति च सामगाः ॥ ६ ॥ विस्फुलिङ्गा यथा वह्नेर्जायन्तेऽक्षरतस्तथा ॥ विविधाश्चिज्जडा भावा इत्यार्थवर्णिका श्रुतिः ॥ ७ ॥ जगदव्याकृतं पूर्वमासीद्व्याक्रियताधुना ॥ दृश्याभ्यां नामरूपाभ्यां विराडादिषु ते स्फुटे ॥ ८ ॥ विराष्मनुर्नरा गावः खराश्वाजावयस्तथा ॥ पिपीलिकावधिद्वन्द्वमिति वाजसनेयिनः ॥ ९ ॥ कृत्वा रूपान्तरं जैवं देहे प्राविशदीश्वरः ॥ इति ताः श्रुतयः प्राहुर्जीवत्वं प्राणधारणात् ॥ १० ॥ चैतन्यं यदधिष्ठानं लिङ्गदेहश्च यः पुनः ॥ चिच्छाया लिङ्गदेहस्था तत्सङ्गो जीव उच्यते ॥ ११ ॥ माहेश्वरी तु माया या तस्या निर्माणशक्तिवत् ॥ विद्यते मोहशक्तिश्च तं जीवं मोहयत्यसौ ॥ १२ ॥ मोहादनीशतां प्राप्य मग्नो वपुषि शोचति ॥ ईशसृष्टमिदं द्वैतं सर्वमुक्तं समासतः ॥ १३ ॥ सप्तान्नब्राह्मणे द्वैतं जीवसृष्टं प्रपञ्चितम् ॥ अन्नानि सप्तज्ञानेन कर्मणाऽजनयात्पिता ॥ १४ ॥ मर्त्यान्नमेकं देवान्ने द्वे पश्वन्नं चतुर्थकम् ॥ अन्यत्रितयमात्मार्यमन्नानां विनियोजनम् ॥ १५ ॥ व्रीह्यादिकं दर्शपूर्णमासौ क्षीरं तथा मनः ॥ वाक् प्राणश्चेति सप्तत्वमन्नानामव-

गम्यताम् ॥ १६ ॥ ईशेन यद्यप्येतानि निर्मितानि स्वरूपतः ॥
 तथापि ज्ञानकर्मभ्यां जीवोऽकार्षीत्तदन्नताम् ॥ १७ ॥ ईशकार्यं
 जीवभोग्यं जगद्भाभ्यां समन्वितम् ॥ पितृजन्या भर्तृभोग्या यथा
 योषितथेष्यताम् ॥ १८ ॥ मायावृत्त्यात्मको हीशसंकल्पः साधनं
 जनौ ॥ मनोवृत्त्यात्मको जीवसंकल्पो भोगसाधनम् ॥ १९ ॥
 ईशनिर्मितमण्यादौ वस्तुन्येकविधे स्थिते ॥ भोक्तृधीवृत्तिनानात्वा-
 त्तद्भोगो बहुधेष्यते ॥ २० ॥ हृष्यत्येको मणिं लब्ध्वा क्रुध्यत्यन्यो
 ह्यलाभतः ॥ पश्यत्येव विरक्तोऽत्र न हृष्यति न कुप्यति ॥ २१ ॥
 प्रियोऽप्रिय उपेक्ष्यश्चेत्याकारामणिगास्त्रयः ॥ सृष्टा जीवैरीशसृष्टं रूपं
 साधारणं त्रिषु ॥ २२ ॥ भार्या स्तुषा ननान्दा च याता मातेत्यने-
 कधा ॥ प्रतियोगिधिया योषिद्भिद्यते न स्वरूपतः ॥ २३ ॥ ननु
 ज्ञानानि भिद्यन्तामाकारस्तु न भिद्यते ॥ योषिद्वपुष्यतिशयो न
 दृष्टो जीवनिर्मितः ॥ २४ ॥ मैवं मांसमयी योषित्काचिदन्या मनो-
 मयी ॥ मांसमय्या अभेदेऽपि भिद्यते हि मनोमयी ॥ २५ ॥ भ्रान्तिस्वप्न-
 मनोराज्यस्मृतिष्वस्तु मनोमयम् ॥ जाग्रन्मानेन मेयस्य न मनोमय-
 तेति चेत् ॥ २६ ॥ बाढं माने तु मेयेन योगात्स्याद्विषयाकृतिः ॥
 भाष्यवार्त्तिककाराभ्यामयमर्थ उदीरितः ॥ २७ ॥ मूषासिक्तं यथा
 ताम्रं तन्निभं जायते तथा ॥ रूपादीन् व्याप्नुवच्चित्तं तन्निभं दृश्यते
 ध्रुवम् ॥ २८ ॥ व्यञ्जको वा यथाऽऽलोको व्यङ्ग्यस्याकारताभि-
 यात् ॥ सर्वार्थव्यञ्जकत्वाद्धीरर्थाकारा प्रदृश्यते ॥ २९ ॥ मातुर्मा-
 नाभिनिष्पत्तिर्निष्पन्नं मेयमेति तत् ॥ मेयाभिसङ्गतं तच्च मेयाभत्वं
 प्रपद्यते ॥ ३० ॥ सत्येवं विषयौ द्वौ स्तो घटौ मृन्मयधीमयौ ॥
 मृन्मयो मानमेयः स्यात्साक्षिभास्यस्तु धीमयः ॥ ३१ ॥ अन्वयव्य-
 तिरेकाभ्यां धीमयो जीवबन्धकृत् ॥ सत्यस्मिन् सुखदुःखे स्तस्त-
 स्मिन्नसति न द्वयम् ॥ ३२ ॥ असत्यापि च बाह्यार्थे स्वप्नादौ बध्यते

नरः ॥ समाधिसुप्तिमूर्च्छासु सत्यप्यस्मिन्न बध्यते ॥ ३३ ॥ दूरदेशं
गते पुत्रे जीवत्येवात्र तत्पिता ॥ विप्रलम्भकवाक्येन मृतं मत्वा
प्ररोदिति ॥ ३४ ॥ मृतेऽपि तस्मिन्वार्तायामश्रुतायां न रोदिति ॥
अतः सर्वस्य जीवस्य बन्धकृन्मानसं जगत् ॥ ३५ ॥ विज्ञानवादो
बाह्यार्थवैयर्थ्यात्स्यादिहेति चेत् ॥ न ह्यकारमाधातुं बाह्यस्यापेक्षि-
तत्वतः ॥ ३६ ॥ वैयर्थ्यमस्तु वा बाह्यं न वारयितुमीश्वरे ॥
प्रयोजनमपेक्षन्ते न मानानीति हि स्थितिः ॥ ३७ ॥ बन्धश्चेन्मान-
सद्वैतं तन्निरोधेन शाम्यति ॥ अभ्यसेद्योगमेवातो ब्रह्मज्ञानेन किं
वद ॥ ३८ ॥ तात्कालिकद्वैतशान्तावप्यागामिजनिक्षयः ॥ ब्रह्मज्ञानं
विना न स्यादिति वेदान्तडिण्डिमः ॥ ३९ ॥ अनिवृत्तेऽपीशसृष्टे
द्वैते तस्य मृषात्मताम् ॥ बुद्ध्वा ब्राह्मद्वयं बोद्धुं शक्यं वस्त्वैक्यवा-
दिनः ॥ ४० ॥ प्रलये तन्निवृत्तौ तु गुरुशास्त्राद्यभावतः ॥ विरो-
धिद्वैताभावेऽपि न शक्यं बोद्धुमद्वयम् ॥ ४१ ॥ अबाधकं साधकं च
द्वैतमीश्वरनिर्मितम् ॥ अपनेतुमशक्यं चेत्यास्तां तद्विष्यते कुतः ॥ ४२ ॥
जीवद्वैतं तु शास्त्रीयमशास्त्रीयमिति द्विधा ॥ उपाददीत शास्त्रीयमा
तत्त्वस्यावबोधनात् ॥ ४३ ॥ आत्मब्रह्मविचारारूपं शास्त्रीयं मानसं
जगत् ॥ बुद्धे तत्त्वे तच्च हेयमिति श्रुत्यनुशासनम् ॥ ४४ ॥
शास्त्राण्यधीत्य मेधावी अभ्यस्य च पुनःपुनः ॥ परमं ब्रह्म विज्ञाय
उल्कावत्तान्यथोत्सृजेत् ॥ ४५ ॥ ग्रन्थमभ्यस्य मेधावी ज्ञानविज्ञान-
तत्परः ॥ पलालमिव धान्यार्थी त्यजेद् ग्रन्थमशेषतः ॥ ४६ ॥
तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः ॥ नानुध्यायान्बहूञ्छब्दा-
न्वाचो विग्लापनं हि तत् ॥ ४७ ॥ तमेवैकं विजानीथ ह्यन्या वाचो
विमुञ्चथ ॥ यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसी प्राज्ञ इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः स्फुटाः ॥ ४८ ॥
अशास्त्रीयमपि द्वैतं तीव्रं मन्दमिति द्विधा ॥ कामक्रोधादिकं तीव्रं
मनोराज्यं तथेतरत् ॥ ४९ ॥ उभयं तत्त्वबोधात् प्राङ्निवार्यं बोध-

सिद्धये ॥ शमः समाहितत्वं च साधनेषु श्रुतं यतः ॥ ५० ॥
 बोधादूर्ध्वं च तद्धेयं जीवन्मुक्तिप्रसिद्धये ॥ कामादिक्लेशबन्धेन युक्तस्य
 न हि मुक्तता ॥ ५१ ॥ जीवन्मुक्तिरियं मा भूजन्माभावे त्वहं-
 कृती ॥ तर्हि जन्मापि तेऽस्त्वेव स्वर्गमात्रात्कृती भवान् ॥ ५२ ॥
 क्षयातिशयदोषेण स्वर्गो हेयो यदा तदा ॥ स्वयं दोषतमात्माऽयं
 कामादिः किं न हीयते ॥ ५३ ॥ तत्त्वं बुद्ध्वाऽपि कामादीन्निःशेषं न
 जहासि चेत् ॥ यथेष्टाचरणं ते स्यात्कर्मशास्त्रातिलङ्घिनः ॥ ५४ ॥
 बुद्धाद्वैतस्वतत्त्वस्य यथेष्टाचरणं यदि ॥ शुनां तत्सदृशां चैव को
 भेदोऽशुचिभक्षणे ॥ ५५ ॥ बोधात्पुरा मनोदोषमात्रात्क्लिश्नास्यथा-
 धुना ॥ अशेषलोकनिन्दा चेत्यहो ते बोधवैभवम् ॥ ५६ ॥ विद्व-
 राहादितुल्यत्वं मा काङ्क्षीस्तत्त्वविद्भवान् ॥ सर्वधीदोषसंत्यागा-
 ल्लोकैः पूज्यश्च देववत् ॥ ५७ ॥ काम्यादिदोषदृष्ट्याद्याः कामा-
 दित्यागहेतवः ॥ प्रसिद्धो मोक्षशास्त्रेषु तानन्विष्य सुखी भव ॥ ५८ ॥
 त्यज्यतामेष कामादिर्मनोराज्ये तु का क्षतिः ॥ अशेषपोषबीजत्वा-
 त्क्षतिर्भगवतेरिता ॥ ५९ ॥ ध्यायतो विषयान्पुंसः सङ्गस्तेषूपजा-
 यते ॥ सङ्गात्संजायते कामः कामात्क्रोधोऽभिजायते ॥ ६० ॥
 शक्यं जेतुं मनोराज्यं निर्विकल्पसमाधितः ॥ सुसंपादः क्रमात्सोऽपि
 सविकल्पसमाधिना ॥ ६१ ॥ बुद्धतत्त्वेन धीदोषशून्येनैकान्तवा-
 सिना ॥ दीर्घं प्रणवमुच्चार्य मनोराज्यं विजीयते ॥ ६२ ॥ जिते
 तस्मिन्वृत्तिशून्यं मनस्तिष्ठति मूकवत् ॥ एतत्पदं वसिष्ठेन रामाय
 बहुधेरितम् ॥ ६३ ॥ दृश्यं नास्तीति बोधेन मनसोदृश्यमार्जनम् ॥
 संपन्नं चेत्तदुत्पन्ना परा निर्वाणनिर्वृतिः ॥ ६४ ॥ विचारितमलं शास्त्रं
 चिरमुद्गाहितं मिथः ॥ संत्यक्तवासनान्मौनादृते नास्त्युत्तमं पदम्
 ॥ ६५ ॥ विक्षिप्यते कदाचिद्धीः कर्मणा भोगदायिना ॥ पुनः
 समाहिता सा स्यात्तदैवाभ्यासपाटवात् ॥ ६६ ॥ विक्षेपो यस्य

नास्त्यस्य ब्रह्मविच्चं न मन्यते ॥ ब्रह्मैवायमिति प्राहुर्मुनयः पारद-
र्शिनः ॥ ६७ ॥ दर्शनादर्शने हित्वा स्वयं केवलरूपतः ॥ यस्तिष्ठति
स तु ब्रह्मन् ब्रह्म न ब्रह्मविस्त्वयम् ॥ ६८ ॥ जीवन्मुक्तेः
परा काष्ठा जीवद्वैतविवर्जनात् ॥ लभ्यतेऽसावतोऽत्रेदमीशद्वैताद्विवे-
चितम् ॥ ६९ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीभारतीतीर्थविद्यारण्यमुनि-
वर्यकृतद्वैतविवेकः समाप्तः ॥ ४ ॥

॥ अथ महावाक्यविवेकप्रकरणम् ॥ ५ ॥

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

येनेक्षते शृणोतीदं जिघ्रति व्याकरोति च ॥ स्वाद्वस्वादू विजा-
नाति तत्प्रज्ञानमुदीरितम् ॥ १ ॥ चतुर्मुखेन्द्रदेवेषु मनुष्याश्वगवा-
दिषु ॥ चैतन्यमेकं ब्रह्मातः प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म मन्यपि ॥ २ ॥ परिपूर्णः
परात्मास्मिन्देहे विद्याधिकारिणि ॥ बुद्धेः साक्षितया स्थित्वा स्फुर-
ब्रह्मितीर्यते ॥ ३ ॥ स्वतः पूर्णः परात्माऽत्र ब्रह्मशब्देन वर्णितः ॥
अस्मीत्यैक्यपरामर्शस्तेन ब्रह्म भवाम्यहम् ॥ ४ ॥ एकमेवाद्वितीयं
सन्नामरूपविवर्जितम् ॥ सृष्टेः पुराऽधुनाप्यस्य तादृक्त्वं तदितीर्यते
॥ ५ ॥ श्रोतुर्देहेन्द्रियातीतं वस्त्वत्र त्वंपदेरितम् ॥ एकता ग्राह्य-
तेऽसीति तदैक्यमनुभूयताम् ॥ ६ ॥ स्वप्रकाशापरोक्षत्वमयमित्यु-
क्तितो मतम् ॥ अहंकारादिदेहान्तात्प्रत्यगात्मेति गीयते ॥ ७ ॥
दृश्यमानस्य सर्वस्य जगतस्तत्त्वमीर्यते ॥ ब्रह्मशब्देन तद्ब्रह्म स्वप्र-
काशात्मरूपकम् ॥ ८ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्य श्रीभारतीतीर्थविद्यारण्यमुनि-

वर्यकृतमहावाक्यविवेकः समाप्तः ॥

॥ अथ चित्रदीपप्रकरणम् ॥ ६ ॥

यथा चित्रपटे दृष्टमवस्थानां चतुष्टयम् ॥ परमात्मानि विज्ञेयं
तथाऽवस्थाचतुष्टयम् ॥ १ ॥ यथा धौतो घटितश्च लाञ्छितो रञ्जितः
पटः ॥ चिदन्तर्यामी सूत्रात्मा विराट् चात्मा तथैर्यते ॥ २ ॥ स्वतः
शुभ्रोऽत्र धौतः स्याद्घटितोऽन्नविलेपनात् ॥ मण्ड्याकारैर्लाञ्छितः
स्याद्रञ्जितो वर्णपूरणात् ॥ ३ ॥ स्वतश्चिदन्तर्यामी तु मायावी
सूक्ष्मसृष्टितः ॥ सूत्रात्मा स्थूलसृष्ट्यैव विराडित्युच्यते परः ॥ ४ ॥
ब्रह्माद्याः स्तम्बपर्यन्ताः प्राणिनोऽत्र जडा अपि ॥ उत्तमाधमभावेन
वर्तन्ते पटचित्रवत् ॥ ५ ॥ चित्रार्पितमनुष्याणां वस्त्राभासाः पृथक्
पृथक् ॥ चित्राधारेण वस्त्रेण सदृशा इव कल्पिताः ॥ ६ ॥ पृथक्
पृथक् चिदाभासाश्चैतन्याध्यस्तदेहिनाम् ॥ कल्प्यन्ते जीवनामानो
बहुधा संसरन्त्यमी ॥ ७ ॥ वस्त्राभासस्थितान् वर्णान् यद्वदाधार-
वस्त्रगान् ॥ वदन्त्यज्ञास्तथा जीवसंसारं चिद्वतं विदुः ॥ ८ ॥
चित्रस्थपर्वतादीनां वस्त्राभासो न लिख्यते ॥ सृष्टिस्थमृत्तिकादीनां
चिदाभासस्तथा नहि ॥ ९ ॥ संसारः परमार्थोऽयं संलग्नः स्वात्म-
वस्तुनि ॥ इति भ्रान्तिरविद्या स्याद्विद्यैषा निवर्तते ॥ १० ॥
आत्माभासस्य जीवस्य संसारो नात्मवस्तुनः ॥ इति बोधो भवेद्विद्या
लभ्यतेऽसौ विचारणात् ॥ ११ ॥ सदा विचारयेत्तस्माज्जगज्जी-
वपरात्मनः ॥ जीवभावजगद्भाववाधे स्वात्मैव शिष्यते ॥ १२ ॥
नाप्रतीतिस्तयोर्बाधः किंतु मिथ्यात्वनिश्चयः ॥ नोचेत्सुषुप्तिमूर्च्छादौ
मुच्येतायन्नतो जनः ॥ १३ ॥ परमात्मावशेषोऽपि तत्सत्यत्ववि-
निश्चयः ॥ न जगद्विस्मृतिर्नोच्चेज्जीवन्मुक्तिर्न संभवेत् ॥ १४ ॥
परोक्षा चापरोक्षेति विद्या द्वेधा विचारजा ॥ तत्रापरोक्षविद्याप्तो
विचारोऽयं समाप्यते ॥ १५ ॥ अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद परोक्षज्ञानमेव

तत् ॥ अहं ब्रह्मेति चेद्रेद साक्षात्कारः स उच्यते ॥ १६ ॥
 तत्साक्षात्कारसिद्धयर्थमात्मतत्त्वं विविच्यते ॥ येनायं सर्वसंसारान्
 सद्य एव विमुच्यते ॥ १७ ॥ कूटस्थो ब्रह्म जीवेशावित्येवं चिच्चतु-
 र्विधा ॥ घटाकाशमहाकाशौ जलाकाशाभ्रखे यथा ॥ १८ ॥ घटाव-
 च्छिन्नखे नीरं यत्तत्र प्रतिबिम्बितः ॥ साभ्रनक्षत्र आकाशो जला-
 काश उदीर्यते ॥ १९ ॥ महाकाशस्य मध्ये यन्मेघमण्डलमीक्ष्यते ॥
 प्रतिबिम्बतया तत्र मेघाकाशो जले स्थितः ॥ २० ॥ मेघांशरूप-
 मुदकं तुषाराकारसंस्थितम् ॥ तत्र स्वप्रतिबिम्बोऽयं नीरत्वादनुमी-
 यते ॥ २१ ॥ अधिष्ठानतया देहद्रयावच्छिन्नचेतनः ॥ कूटवन्निर्विकारेण
 स्थितः कूटस्थ उच्यते ॥ २२ ॥ कूटस्थे कल्पिता बुद्धिस्तत्र चित्प्र-
 तिबिम्बकः ॥ प्राणानां धारणाज्जीवः संसारेण स युज्यते ॥ २३ ॥
 जलव्योम्ना घटाकाशो यथा सर्वस्तिरोहितः ॥ तथा जीवेन कूटस्थः
 सोऽन्योन्याध्यास उच्यते ॥ २४ ॥ अयं जीवो न कूटस्थं विविनक्ति
 कदाचन ॥ अनादिरविवेकोऽयं मूलाविद्येति गम्यताम् ॥ २५ ॥
 विक्षेपावृत्तिरूपाभ्यां द्विधाऽविद्या व्यवस्थिता ॥ न भाति नास्ति
 कूटस्थ इत्यापादनमावृत्तिः ॥ २६ ॥ अज्ञानी विदुषा पृष्ठः कूटस्थं
 न प्रबुध्यते ॥ न भाति नास्ति कूटस्थ इति बुद्ध्वा वदत्यपि ॥ २७ ॥
 स्वप्रकाशे कुतोऽविद्या तां विना कथमावृत्तिः ॥ इत्यादितर्कजालानि
 स्वानुभूतिर्प्रसृत्यसौ ॥ २८ ॥ स्वानुभूतावविश्वासे तर्कस्याप्यनव-
 स्थितेः ॥ कथं वा तार्किकमन्यस्तत्त्वनिश्चयमाप्नुयात् ॥ २९ ॥
 बुद्धचारोहाय तर्कश्चेदपेक्षेत तथा सति ॥ स्वानुभूत्यनुसारेण
 तर्क्यतां मा कुतर्क्यताम् ॥ ३० ॥ स्वानुभूतिरविद्यायामावृतौ
 च प्रदर्शिता ॥ अतः कूटस्थचैतन्यमविरोधीति तर्क्यताम्
 ॥ ३१ ॥ तच्चेद्विरोधि केनेयमावृत्तिर्ह्यनुभूयताम् ॥ विवेकस्तु
 विरोध्यस्यास्तत्त्वज्ञानिनि दृश्यताम् ॥ ३२ ॥ अविद्यावृतकूटस्थे

देहद्वययुता चितिः ॥ शुक्तौ रूप्यवदध्यस्ता विक्षेपाध्यास एव
हि ॥ ३३ ॥ इदमंशश्च सत्यत्वं शुक्तिगं रूप्य ईक्ष्यते ॥ स्वयंत्वं
वस्तुता चैवं विक्षेपे वीक्ष्यतेऽन्यगम् ॥ ३४ ॥ नीलपृष्ठत्रिकोणत्वं
यथा शुक्तौ तिरोहितम् ॥ असङ्गानन्दताद्येवं कूटस्थेऽपि तिरोहितम्
॥ ३५ ॥ आरोपितस्य दृष्टान्ते रूप्यं नाम यथा तथा ॥ कूटस्थाध्य-
स्तविक्षेपनामाहमिति निश्चयः ॥ ३६ ॥ इदमंशः स्वतः पश्यन् रूप्यमि-
त्यभिमन्यते ॥ तथा स्वं च स्वतः पश्यन्नहमित्यभिमन्यते ॥ ३७ ॥
इदंत्वरूप्यते भिन्ने स्वत्वाहंते तथेष्यताम् ॥ सामान्यं च विशेषश्च
ह्युभयत्रापि गम्यते ॥ ३८ ॥ देवदत्तः स्वयं गच्छेत्त्वं वीक्षस्व स्वयं
तथा ॥ अहं स्वयं न शक्नोमीत्येवं लोके प्रयुज्यते ॥ ३९ ॥ इदं
रूप्यमिदं वस्त्रमिति यद्रदिदं तथा ॥ असौ त्वमहमित्येषु स्वयमि-
त्यभिमन्यते ॥ ४० ॥ अहंत्वाद्भिद्यतां स्वत्वं कूटस्थे तेन किं तव ॥
स्वयंशब्दार्थ एवैष कूटस्थ इति मे भवेत् ॥ ४१ ॥ अन्यत्ववारकं
स्वत्वमिति चेदन्यवारणम् ॥ कूटस्थस्यात्मतां वक्तुरिष्टमेव हि
तद्भवेत् ॥ ४२ ॥ स्वयमात्मेति पर्यायौ तेन लोके तयोः सह ॥
प्रयोगो नास्त्यतः स्वत्वमात्मत्वं चान्यवारकम् ॥ ४३ ॥ घटः स्वयं
न जानातीत्येवं स्वत्वं घटादिषु ॥ अचेतनेषु दृष्टं चेत् दृश्यतामात्म-
सत्त्वतः ॥ ४४ ॥ चेतनाचेतनभिदा कूटस्थात्मकृता न हि ॥ किं तु
बुद्धिकृता भासकृतैवेत्यवगम्यताम् ॥ ४५ ॥ यथा चेतन आभासः
कूटस्थे भ्रान्तिकल्पितः ॥ अचेतनो घटादिश्च तथा तत्रैव कल्पितः
॥ ४६ ॥ तत्तेदंते अपि स्वत्वमिव त्वमहमादिषु ॥ सर्वत्रानुगते तेन
तयोरप्यात्मतेति चेत् ॥ ४७ ॥ ते आत्मत्वेऽप्यनुगते तत्तेदंते तत-
स्तयोः ॥ आत्मत्वं नैव संभाव्यं सम्यक्त्वादेर्यथा तथा ॥ ४८ ॥
तत्तेदंते स्वतान्यत्वे त्वंताहंते परस्परम् ॥ प्रतिद्वन्द्वितया लोके प्रसिद्धे
नास्ति संशयः ॥ ४९ ॥ अन्यतायाः प्रतिद्वन्द्वी स्वयं कूटस्थ

इष्यताम् ॥ त्वत्तायाः प्रतियोग्येषोऽहमित्यात्मनि कल्पितः ॥ ५० ॥
 अहंतास्वत्वयोर्भेदे रूप्यतेदंतयोरिव ॥ स्पष्टेऽपि मोहमापन्ना एकत्वं
 प्रतिपेदिरे ॥ ५१ ॥ तादात्म्याध्यास एवात्र पूर्वोक्ताविद्यया कृतः ॥
 अविद्यायां निवृत्तायां तत्कार्यं विनिवर्तते ॥ ५२ ॥ अविद्यावृत्ति-
 तादात्म्ये विद्ययैव विनश्यतः ॥ विक्षेपस्य स्वरूपं तु प्रारब्धक्षय-
 मीक्षते ॥ ५३ ॥ उपादाने विनष्टेऽपि क्षणं कार्यं प्रतीक्षते ॥ इत्या-
 हुस्तार्किकास्तद्वदस्माकं किं न संभवेत् ॥ ५४ ॥ तन्तूनां दिनसं-
 ख्यानां तैस्तादृक् क्षण ईरितः ॥ भ्रमस्यासंख्यकल्पस्य योग्यः क्षण
 इहेष्यताम् ॥ ५५ ॥ विना क्षोदक्षमं मानं तैर्वृथा परिकल्प्यते ॥
 श्रुतियुक्त्यनुभूतिभ्यो वदतां किं नु दुःशकम् ॥ ५६ ॥ आस्तां
 दुस्तार्किकैः साकं विवादः प्रकृतं ब्रुवे ॥ स्वाहमोः सिद्धमेकत्वं
 कूटस्थपरिणामिनोः ॥ ५७ ॥ भ्राम्यन्ते पण्डितमन्याः सर्वे लौकिकतै-
 र्थिकाः ॥ अनादृत्य श्रुतिं मौख्यात्केवलां युक्तिमाश्रिताः ॥ ५८ ॥
 पूर्वापरपरामर्शविकलास्तत्र केचन ॥ वाक्याभासान् स्वस्वपक्षे योज-
 यन्त्यप्यलज्जया ॥ ५९ ॥ कूटस्थादिशरीरान्तसङ्घातस्यात्मतां जगुः ॥
 लोकायताः पामराश्च प्रत्यक्षाभासमाश्रिताः ॥ ६० ॥ श्रौतीकर्तुं
 स्वपक्षं ते कोशमन्नमयं तथा ॥ विरोचनस्य सिद्धान्तं प्रमाणं प्रतिज-
 ङ्गिरे ॥ ६१ ॥ जीवात्मनिर्गमे देहमरणस्यात्र दर्शनात् ॥ देहातिरिक्त
 एवात्मेत्याहुर्लोकायताः परे ॥ ६२ ॥ प्रत्यक्षत्वेनाभिमताहंधीर्दे-
 हातिरेकिणम् ॥ गमयेदिन्द्रियात्मानं वच्चीत्यादिप्रयोगतः ॥ ६३ ॥
 वागादीनामिन्द्रियाणां कलहः श्रुतिषु श्रुतः ॥ तेन चैतन्यमेतेषामा-
 त्मत्वं तत एव हि ॥ ६४ ॥ हैरण्यगर्भाः प्राणात्मवादिनस्त्वेवमू-
 चिरे ॥ चक्षुराद्यक्षलोपेऽपि प्राणसत्त्वे तु जीवति ॥ ६५ ॥
 प्राणो जागर्ति सुप्तेऽपि प्राणश्रैष्ठ्यादिकं श्रुतम् ॥ कोशः प्राणमयः
 सम्यग्विस्तरेण प्रपञ्चितः ॥ ६६ ॥ मन आत्मेति मन्यन्त उपासनपरा

जनाः ॥ प्राणस्याभोक्तृता स्पष्टा भोक्तृत्वं मनसस्ततः ॥ ६७ ॥
मन एव मनुष्याणां कारणं बन्धमोक्षयोः ॥ श्रुतो मनोमयः कोशस्ते-
नात्मेतीरितं मनः ॥ ६८ ॥ विज्ञानमात्मेति पर आहुः क्षणिकवादिनः ॥
यतो विज्ञानमूलत्वं मनसो गम्यते स्फुटम् ॥ ६९ ॥ अहंवृत्तिरिदं-
वृत्तिरित्यन्तःकरणं द्विधा ॥ विज्ञानं स्यादहंवृत्तिरिदंवृत्तिर्मनो भवेत्
॥ ७० ॥ अहंप्रत्ययबीजत्वमिदंवृत्तेरिति स्फुटम् ॥ अविदित्वा
स्वमात्मानं बाह्यं वेत्ति न तु कचित् ॥ ७१ ॥ क्षणेक्षणे जन्मना-
शावहंवृत्तेर्मितौ यतः ॥ विज्ञानं क्षणिकं तेन स्वप्रकाशं स्वतो मितेः
॥ ७२ ॥ विज्ञानमयकोशोऽयं जीव इत्यागमा जगुः ॥ सर्वसंसार
एतस्य जन्मनाशसुखादिकः ॥ ७३ ॥ विज्ञानं क्षणिकं नात्मा
विद्युद्भ्रननिषेवत् ॥ अन्यस्यानुपलब्धत्वाच्छून्यं माध्यमिका जगुः
॥ ७४ ॥ असदेवेदमित्यादाविदमेव श्रुतं ततः ॥ ज्ञानज्ञेयात्मकं सर्वं
जगद्भ्रान्तिप्रकल्पितम् ॥ ७५ ॥ निरधिष्ठानविभ्रान्तेरभावादात्म-
नोऽस्तित्ता ॥ शून्यस्यापि ससाक्षित्वादन्यथा नोक्तिरस्य ते ॥ ७६ ॥
अन्यो विज्ञानमयत आनन्दमय आन्तरः ॥ अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्य
इति वैदिकदर्शनम् ॥ ७७ ॥ अणुर्महान्मध्यमो वेत्येवं तत्रापि
वादिनः ॥ बहुधा विवदन्ते हि श्रुतियुक्तिसमाश्रयात् ॥ ७८ ॥
अणुं वदन्त्यान्तरालाः सूक्ष्मनाडीप्रचारतः ॥ रोम्णः सहस्रभागेन
तुल्यासु प्रचरत्ययम् ॥ ७९ ॥ अणोरणीयानेषोऽणुः सूक्ष्मात्सूक्ष्म-
तरं त्विति ॥ अणुत्वमाहुः श्रुतयः शतशोऽथ सहस्रशः ॥ ८० ॥
वालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च ॥ भागो जीवः स विज्ञेय
इति चाहापरा श्रुतिः ॥ ८१ ॥ दिगम्बरा मध्यमत्वमाहुरापादम-
स्तकम् ॥ चैतन्यव्याप्तिसंदष्टेरानखाग्रश्रुतेरपि ॥ ८२ ॥ सूक्ष्मनाडी-
प्रचारस्तु सूक्ष्मैरवयवैर्भवेत् ॥ स्थूलदेहस्य हस्ताभ्यां कञ्चुकप्रतिमो-
कवत् ॥ ८३ ॥ न्यूनाधिकशरीरेषु प्रवेशोऽपि गमागमैः ॥ आत्मा-

शानां भवेत्तेन मध्यमत्वं विनिश्चितम् ॥ ८४ ॥ सांशस्य घटवन्नाशो
 भवत्येव तथा सति ॥ कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमयोः को वारको भवेत्
 ॥ ८५ ॥ तस्मादात्मा महानेव नैवाणुर्नापि मध्यमः ॥ आकाशव-
 त्सर्वगतो निरंशः श्रुतिसंमतः ॥ ८६ ॥ इत्युक्त्वा तद्विशेषे तु
 बहुधा कलहं ययुः ॥ अचिद्रूपोऽथ चिद्रूपश्चिदचिद्रूप इत्यपि ॥ ८७ ॥
 प्राभाकरास्तार्किकाश्च प्राहुरस्याचिदात्मताम् ॥ आकाशवद्द्रव्य-
 मात्मा शब्दवत्तद्गुणश्चित्तिः ॥ ८८ ॥ इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्च धर्माधर्मौ
 सुखासुखे ॥ तत्संस्काराश्च तस्यैते गुणाश्चित्तिवदीरिताः ॥ ८९ ॥
 आत्मनो मनसा योगे स्वादृष्टवशतो गुणाः ॥ जायन्तेऽथ प्रलीयन्ते
 सुषुप्ते दृष्टसंक्षयात् ॥ ९० ॥ चित्तिमत्त्वाच्चेतनोऽयमिच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्न-
 वान् ॥ स्याद्धर्माधर्मयोः कर्ता भोक्ता दुःखादिमत्त्वतः ॥ ९१ ॥
 यथाऽत्र कर्मवशतः कादाचित्कं सुखादिकम् ॥ तथा लोकान्तरे देहे
 कर्मणेच्छादि जन्यते ॥ ९२ ॥ एवं च सर्वगस्यापि संभवेतां
 गमागमौ ॥ कर्मकाण्डः समग्रोऽत्र प्रमाणमिति तेऽवदन् ॥ ९३ ॥
 आनन्दमयकोशो यः सुषुप्तौ परिशिष्यते ॥ अस्पष्टचित्स आत्मैषां
 पूर्वकोशोऽस्य ते गुणाः ॥ ९४ ॥ गूढं चैतन्यमुत्प्रेक्ष्य जडबोध-
 स्वरूपताम् ॥ आत्मनो ब्रुवते भाट्टाश्चिदुत्प्रेक्षोत्थितस्मृतैः ॥ ९५ ॥
 जडो भूत्वा तदाऽस्वाप्समिति जाड्यस्मृतिस्तदा ॥ विना जाड्यानुभूतिं
 न कथंचिदुपपद्यते ॥ ९६ ॥ द्रष्टृदृष्टेरलोपश्च श्रुतः सुप्तौ ततस्त्वयम् ॥
 अप्रकाशप्रकाशाभ्यामात्मा खद्योतवद्भुतः ॥ ९७ ॥ निरंशस्योभया-
 त्मत्वं न कथंचिद् घटिष्यते ॥ तेन चिद्रूप एवात्मेत्याहुः साङ्ख्य-
 विवेकिनः ॥ ९८ ॥ जाड्यांशः प्रकृते रूपं विकारि त्रिगुणं च
 तत् ॥ चितो भोगापवर्गार्थं प्रकृतिः सा प्रवर्तते ॥ ९९ ॥ अस-
 ज्ञायाश्चितेर्बन्धमोक्षौ भेदाग्रहान्मतौ ॥ बन्धमुक्तिव्यवस्थार्थं पूर्वेषा-
 मिव चिद्भिदा ॥ १०० ॥ महतः परमव्यक्तमिति प्रकृतिरुच्यते ॥

श्रुतावसङ्गता तद्वदसङ्गो हीत्यतः स्फुटा ॥ १ ॥ चित्संनिधौ प्रवृ-
त्तायाः प्रकृतेर्हि नियामकम् ॥ ईश्वरं ब्रुवते योगाः स जीवेभ्यः
परः श्रुतः ॥ २ ॥ प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेश इति हि श्रुतिः ॥ आर-
ण्यकेऽसंभ्रमेण ह्यन्तर्याम्युपपादितः ॥ ३ ॥ अत्रापि कलहायन्ते
वादिनः स्वस्वयुक्तिभिः ॥ वाक्यान्यपि यथाप्रज्ञं दाढ्यायोदाहरन्ति
हि ॥ ४ ॥ क्लेशकर्मविपाकैस्तदाशयैरप्यसंयुतः ॥ पुंविशेषो भवेदीशो
जीवत्सोऽप्यसङ्गचित् ॥ ५ ॥ तथाऽपि पुंविशेषत्वाद्व्युत्पत्तेश्च निय-
न्तृता ॥ अव्यवस्थौ बन्धमोक्षावापतेतामिहान्यथा ॥ ६ ॥ भीषा-
स्मादित्येवमादावसङ्गस्य परात्मनः ॥ श्रुतं तद्युक्तमप्यस्य क्लेशकर्मा-
द्यसङ्गमात् ॥ ७ ॥ जीवानामप्यसङ्गत्वात् क्लेशादिर्न ह्यथाऽपि च ॥
विवेकाग्रहतः क्लेशकर्मादि प्रागुदीरितम् ॥ ८ ॥ नित्यज्ञानप्रयत्ने-
च्छागुणानीशस्य मन्वते ॥ असङ्गस्य नियन्तृत्वमयुक्तमिति तार्किकाः
॥ ९ ॥ पुंविशेषत्वमप्यस्य गुणैरेव न चान्यथा ॥ सत्यकामः
सत्यसंकल्प इत्यादि श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥ ११० ॥ नित्यज्ञानादिमत्त्वेऽस्य
सृष्टिरेव सदा भवेत् ॥ हिरण्यगर्भ ईशोऽतो लिङ्गदेहेन संयुतः ॥ ११ ॥
उद्गीथब्राह्मणे तस्य माहात्म्यमतिविस्तृतम् ॥ लिङ्गसत्त्वेऽपि जीवत्वं
नास्य कर्माद्यभावतः ॥ १२ ॥ स्थूलदेहं विना लिङ्गदेहो न कापि
दृश्यते ॥ वैराजो देह ईशोऽतः सर्वतोमस्तकादिमान् ॥ १३ ॥
सहस्रशीर्षेत्येवं च विश्वतश्चक्षुरित्यपि ॥ श्रुतमित्याहुरनिशं विश्वरू-
पस्य चिंतकाः ॥ १४ ॥ सर्वतः पाणिपादत्वे कृम्यादेरपि चेशता ॥
ततश्चतुर्मुखो देव एवेशो नेतरः पुमान् ॥ १५ ॥ पुत्रार्थं तमुपा-
सीना एवमाहुः प्रजापतिः ॥ प्रजा असृजतेत्यादिश्रुतिं चोदाहर-
न्त्यमी ॥ १६ ॥ विष्णोर्नाभेः समुद्भूतो वेधाः कमलजस्ततः ॥
विष्णुरेवेश इत्याहुर्लोके भागवता जनाः ॥ १७ ॥ शिवस्य पादा-
वन्वेष्टुं शाङ्गर्चशक्तस्ततः शिवः ॥ ईशो न विष्णुरित्याहुः शैवा

आगममानिनः ॥ १८ ॥ पुरत्रयं सादयितुं विघ्नेशं सोऽप्यपूजयत् ॥
 विनायकं प्राहुरीशं गाणपत्यमते रताः ॥ १९ ॥ एवमन्ये स्वस्व-
 पक्षाभिमानेनान्यथाऽन्यथा ॥ मन्त्रार्थवादकल्पादीनाश्रित्य प्रतिपे-
 दिरे ॥ १२० ॥ अन्तर्यामिणमारभ्य स्थावरान्तेशवादिनः ॥ सन्त्य-
 श्वत्थार्कवंशादेः कुलदैवतदर्शनात् ॥ २१ ॥ तत्त्वनिश्चयकामेन
 न्यायागमविचारिणाम् ॥ एकैव प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् साऽप्यत्र स्फुट-
 मुच्यते ॥ २२ ॥ मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ॥
 अस्यावयवभूतैस्तु व्याप्तं सर्वमिदं जगत् ॥ २३ ॥ इति श्रुत्यनुसा-
 रेण न्याय्यो निर्णय ईश्वरे ॥ तथा सत्यविरोधः स्यात्स्थावरान्ते-
 शवादिनाम् ॥ २४ ॥ माया चेयं तमोरूपा तापनीये तदीरणात् ॥
 अनुभूतिं तत्र मानं प्रतिजज्ञे श्रुतिः स्वयम् ॥ २५ ॥ जडं मोहात्मकं
 तच्चेत्यनुभावयति श्रुतिः ॥ आबालगोपं स्पष्टत्वादानन्त्यं तस्य
 साऽब्रवीत् ॥ २६ ॥ अचिदात्मघटादीनां यत्स्वरूपं जडं हि तत् ॥
 यत्र कुण्ठीभवेद्बुद्धिः स मोह इति लौकिकाः ॥ २७ ॥ इत्थं लौकि-
 कदृष्ट्यैतत्सर्वैरप्यनुभूयते ॥ युक्तिदृष्ट्या त्वनिर्वाच्यं नासदासीदिति
 श्रुतेः ॥ २८ ॥ नासदासीद्विभातत्वान्नो सदासीच्च बाधनात् ॥
 विद्यादृष्ट्या श्रुतं तुच्छं तस्य नित्यनिवृत्तितः ॥ २९ ॥ तुच्छाऽनि-
 र्वचनीया च वास्तवी चेत्यसौ त्रिधा ॥ ज्ञेया माया त्रिभिर्बोधैः
 श्रौतयौक्तिकलौकिकैः ॥ १३० ॥ अस्य सत्त्वमसत्त्वं च जगतो
 दर्शयत्यसौ ॥ प्रसारणाच्च संकोचाद्यथा चित्रपटस्तथा ॥ ३१ ॥
 अस्वतन्त्रा हि माया स्यादप्रतीतेर्विना चितिम् ॥ स्वतन्त्राऽपि तथैव
 स्यादसङ्गस्यान्यथाकृतेः ॥ ३२ ॥ कूटस्थासङ्गमात्मानं जगत्चेन
 करोति सा ॥ चिदाभासस्वरूपेण जीवेशावपि निर्ममे ॥ ३३ ॥
 कूटस्थमनुपद्रुत्य करोति जगदादिकम् ॥ दुर्घटैकविधायिन्यां मायायां
 का चमत्कृतिः ॥ ३४ ॥ द्रवत्वमुदके बह्वावौष्ण्यं काठिन्यमश्मनि ॥

मायाया दुर्घटत्वं च स्वतः सिध्यति नान्यतः ॥ ३५ ॥ न वेत्ति
लोको यावत्तां साक्षात्तावच्चमत्कृतिम् ॥ धत्ते मनसि पश्चात्तु मायैषे-
त्युपशाम्यति ॥ ३६ ॥ प्रसरन्ति हि चोद्यानि जगद्रस्तुत्ववादिषु ॥
न चोदनीयं मायायां तस्याश्रोद्यैकरूपतः ॥ ३७ ॥ चोद्येऽपि यदि
चोद्यं स्यात् त्वच्चोद्ये चोद्यते मया ॥ परिहार्यं ततश्चोद्यं न पुनः
प्रतिचोद्यताम् ॥ ३८ ॥ विस्मयैकशरीराया मायायाश्रोद्यरूपतः ॥
अन्वेष्ट्यः परिहारोऽस्या बुद्धिमद्भिः प्रयत्नतः ॥ ३९ ॥ मायात्वमेव
निश्चयमिति चेत्तर्हि निश्चिनु ॥ लोकप्रसिद्धमायाया लक्षणं यत्तदी-
क्ष्यताम् ॥ १४० ॥ न निरूपयितुं शक्या विस्पष्टं भासते च या ॥
सा मायेतीन्द्रजालादौ लोकाः संप्रतिपेदिरे ॥ ४१ ॥ स्पष्टं भाति
जगच्चेदमशक्यं तन्निरूपणम् ॥ मायामयं जगत्तस्मादीक्षस्वापक्षपाततः
॥ ४२ ॥ निरूपयितुमारब्धे निखिलैरपि पण्डितैः ॥ अज्ञानं
पुरतस्तेषां भाति कक्षासु कासुचित् ॥ ४३ ॥ देहेन्द्रियादयो भावा
वीर्येणोत्पादिताः कथम् ॥ कथं वा तत्र चैतन्यमित्युक्ते ते किमु-
त्तरम् ॥ ४४ ॥ वीर्यस्यैष स्वभावश्चेत्कथं तद्विदितं त्वया ॥ अन्व-
यव्यतिरेकौ यौ भग्नौ तौ बन्ध्यवीर्यतः ॥ ४५ ॥ न जानामि
किमप्येतदित्यन्ते शरणं तव ॥ अत एव महान्तोऽस्य प्रवदन्तीन्द्र-
जालताम् ॥ ४६ ॥ एतस्मात्किमिवेन्द्रजालमपरं यद्गर्भभासस्थितं
रेतश्चेतति हस्तमस्तकपदप्रोद्भूतनानाङ्कुरम् ॥ पर्यायेण शिशुत्वयौवनज-
रावेषैरनेकैर्वृतं पश्यत्यत्ति शृणोति जिघ्रति तथा गच्छत्यथागच्छति
॥ ४७ ॥ देहवद्द्रवधानादौ सुविचार्य विलोकयताम् ॥ क धाना कुत्र वा
वृक्षस्तस्मान्मायेति निश्चिनु ॥ ४८ ॥ निरुक्तावभिमानं ये दधते
तार्किकादयः ॥ हर्षमिश्रादिभिस्ते तु खण्डनादौ सुशिक्षिताः ॥ ४९ ॥
अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तेर्केषु योजयेत् ॥ अचिन्त्यरच-
नारूपं मनसाऽपि जगत्खलु ॥ १५० ॥ अचिन्त्यरचनाशक्तिबीजं

मायेति निश्चिनु ॥ मायाबीजं तदेवैकं सुषुप्तावनुभूयते ॥ ५१ ॥
 जाग्रत्स्वप्नजगत्तत्र लीनं बीज इव द्रुमः ॥ तस्मादशेषजगतो वास-
 नास्तत्र संस्थिताः ॥ ५२ ॥ या बुद्धिवासनास्तासु चैतन्यं प्रति-
 विम्बति ॥ मेघाकाशवदस्पृष्टचिदाभासोऽनुमीयताम् ॥ ५३ ॥
 साभासमेव तद्धीजं धीरूपेण प्ररोहति ॥ अतो बुद्धौ चिदाभासो
 विस्पष्टं प्रतिभासते ॥ ५४ ॥ मायाभासेन जीवेशौ करोतीति श्रुतौ
 श्रुतम् ॥ मेघाकाशजलाकाशाविव तौ सुव्यवस्थितौ ॥ ५५ ॥
 मेघवद्भर्तते माया मेघस्थिततुषारवत् ॥ धीवासनाश्चिदाभासस्तुषार-
 स्थखवत्स्थितः ॥ ५६ ॥ मायाधीनश्चिदाभासः श्रुतो मायी महेश्वरः ॥
 अन्तर्यामी च सर्वज्ञो जगद्योनिः स एव हि ॥ ५७ ॥ सौषुप्तमान-
 न्दमयं प्रक्रम्यैवं श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥ एष सर्वेश्वर इति सोऽयं वेदोक्त
 ईश्वरः ॥ ५८ ॥ सर्वज्ञत्वादिके तस्य नैव विप्रतिपद्यताम् ॥ श्रौता-
 र्थस्यावितर्क्यत्वान्मायायां सर्वसंभवात् ॥ ५९ ॥ अयं यत्सृजते
 विश्वं तदन्यथयितुं पुमान् ॥ न कोऽपि शक्तस्तेनायं सर्वेश्वर
 इतीरितः ॥ ६० ॥ अशेषप्राणिबुद्धीनां वासनास्तत्र संस्थिताः ॥
 ताभिः क्रोडीकृतं सर्वं तेन सर्वज्ञ ईरितः ॥ ६१ ॥ वासनानां
 परोक्षत्वात्सर्वज्ञत्वं न हीक्ष्यते ॥ सर्वबुद्धिषु तद्दृष्ट्वा वासनास्वनुमी-
 यताम् ॥ ६२ ॥ विज्ञानमयमुख्येषु कोशेष्वन्यत्र चैव हि ॥ अन्त-
 स्तिष्ठन् यमयति तेनान्तर्यामितां व्रजेत् ॥ ६३ ॥ बुद्धौ तिष्ठन्ना-
 न्तरोऽस्याधियानीक्ष्यश्च धीवपुः ॥ धियमन्तर्यमयतीत्येवं वेदेन
 घोषितम् ॥ ६४ ॥ तन्तुः पटे स्थितो यद्रुद्रुपादानतया तथा ॥
 सर्वोपादानरूपत्वात् सर्वत्रायमवस्थितः ॥ ६५ ॥ पटादप्यान्तर-
 स्तन्तुस्तन्तोरप्यंशुरान्तरः ॥ आन्तरत्वस्य विश्रान्तिर्यत्रासावनुमी-
 यताम् ॥ ६६ ॥ द्वित्रान्तरत्वकक्षाणां दर्शनेऽप्ययमान्तरः ॥
 न वीक्ष्यते ततो युक्तिश्रुतिभ्यामेव निर्णयः ॥ ६७ ॥ पटरूपेण

संस्थानात् पटस्तन्तोर्वपुर्यथा ॥ सर्वरूपेण संस्थानात्सर्वमस्य वपु-
स्तथा ॥ ६८ ॥ तन्तोः सङ्कोचविस्तारचलनादौ पटो यथा ॥
अवश्यमेव भवति न स्वातन्त्र्यं पटे मनाक् ॥ ६९ ॥ तथान्तर्याम्ययं
यत्र यथा वासनया यथा ॥ विक्रियेत तथाऽवश्यंभवत्येव न संशयः
॥ १७० ॥ ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ॥ भ्रामयन्सर्व-
भूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥ ७१ ॥ सर्वभूतानि विज्ञानमयास्ते
हृदये स्थिताः ॥ तदुपादानभूतेशस्तत्र विक्रियते खलु ॥ ७२ ॥
देहादि पञ्जरं यन्त्रं तदारोहोऽभिमानिता ॥ विहितप्रतिषिद्धेषु प्रवृ-
त्तिर्भ्रमणं भवेत् ॥ ७३ ॥ विज्ञानमयरूपेण तत्प्रवृत्तिस्वरूपतः ॥
स्वशक्त्येशो विक्रियते मायया भ्रामणं हि तत् ॥ ७४ ॥ अन्तर्य-
मयतीत्युक्त्याऽयमेवार्थः श्रुतौ श्रुतः ॥ पृथिव्यादिषु सर्वत्र न्यायोऽयं
योज्यतां धिया ॥ ७५ ॥ जानामि धर्मं न च मे प्रवृत्तिर्जानाम्यधर्मं
न च मे निवृत्तिः ॥ केनापि देवेन हृदि स्थितेन यथा नियुक्तोऽस्मि
तथा करोमि ॥ ७६ ॥ नार्थः पुरुषकारेणेत्येवं मा शङ्क्यतां यतः ॥
ईशः पुरुषकारस्य रूपेणापि विवर्तते ॥ ७७ ॥ ईदृग्बोधेनेश्वरस्य
प्रवृत्तिर्मेव वार्यताम् ॥ तथाऽपीशस्य बोधेन स्वात्मासङ्गत्वधीजनिः
॥ ७८ ॥ तावता मुक्तिरित्याहुः श्रुतयः स्मृतयस्तथा ॥ श्रुतिस्मृतौ
ममैवाज्ञे इत्यपीश्वरभाषितम् ॥ ७९ ॥ आज्ञया भीतिहेतुत्वं भीषा-
स्मादिति हि श्रुतम् ॥ सर्वेश्वरत्वमेतत्स्यादन्तर्यामित्वतः पृथक् ॥ १८० ॥
एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासन इति श्रुतिः ॥ अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ताऽयं
जनानामिति च श्रुतिः ॥ ८१ ॥ जगद्योनिर्भवेदेषप्रभवाप्ययकृ-
त्त्वतः ॥ आविर्भावतिरोभावावृत्तिप्रलयौ मतौ ॥ ८२ ॥ आविर्भा-
वयति स्वस्मिन् विलीनं सकलं जगत् ॥ प्राणिकर्मवशादेष पटो
यद्वत्प्रसारितः ॥ ८३ ॥ पुनस्तिरोभावयति स्वात्मन्येवाखिलं
जगत् ॥ प्राणिकर्मक्षयवशात्संकोचितपटो यथा ॥ ८४ ॥ रात्रिघस्रौ

सुप्तिबोधावुन्मीलननिमीलने ॥ तूष्णींभावमनोराज्ये इव सृष्टिलया-
 विमौ ॥ ८५ ॥ आविर्भावतिरोभावशक्तिमत्त्वेन हेतुना ॥ आर-
 म्भपरिणामादिचोद्यानां नात्र संभवः ॥ ८६ ॥ अचेतनानां हेतुः
 स्याज्जाड्यांशेनेश्वरस्तथा ॥ चिदाभासांशतस्त्वेष जीवानां कारणं
 भवेत् ॥ ८७ ॥ तमःप्रधानः क्षेत्राणां चित्प्रधानश्चिदात्मनाम् ॥
 परः कारणतामेति भावनाज्ञानकर्मभिः ॥ ८८ ॥ इति वार्तिककारेण
 जडचेतनहेतुता ॥ परमात्मन एवोक्ता नेश्वरस्येति चेच्छृणु ॥ ८९ ॥
 अन्योन्याध्यासमत्रापि जीवकूटस्थयोरिव ॥ ईश्वरब्रह्मणोः सिद्धं
 कृत्वा ब्रूते सुरेश्वरः ॥ १९० ॥ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं यद्ब्रह्म तस्मात्समु-
 त्थिताः ॥ खंवाय्वग्निजलोव्योषध्यन्नदेहा इति श्रुतिः ॥ ९१ ॥ आपातदृ-
 ष्टितस्तत्र ब्रह्मणो भाति हेतुता ॥ हेतोश्च सत्यता तस्मादन्योन्याध्यास
 इष्यते ॥ ९२ ॥ अन्योन्याध्यासरूपोऽसावन्नलिप्तपटो यथा ॥
 घटितेनैकतामेति तद्ब्रह्मान्त्यैकतां गतः ॥ ९३ ॥ मेघाकाशमहाकाशौ
 विविच्येते न पामरैः ॥ तद्ब्रह्मेशयोरैक्यं पश्यन्त्यापातदर्शिनः ॥ ९४ ॥
 उपक्रमादिभिरिलिङ्गैस्तात्पर्यस्य विचारणात् ॥ असङ्गं ब्रह्म मायावी
 सृजत्येष महेश्वरः ॥ ९५ ॥ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं चेत्युपक्रम्योपसंहृतम् ॥
 यतो वाचो निर्वर्तन्त इत्यसङ्गत्वनिर्णयः ॥ ९६ ॥ मायी सृजति
 विश्वं सन्निरुद्धस्तत्र मायया ॥ अन्य इत्यपरा ब्रूते श्रुतिस्तेनेश्वरः
 सृजेत् ॥ ९७ ॥ आनन्दमय ईशोऽयं बहु स्यामित्यवैक्षत ॥
 हिरण्यगर्भरूपोभूत्सुप्तिः स्वप्नो यथा भवेत् ॥ ९८ ॥ क्रमेण युगप-
 द्वैषा सृष्टिर्ज्ञेया यथाश्रुतिः ॥ द्विविधश्रुतिसद्भावात् द्विविधस्वप्नदर्श-
 नात् ॥ ९९ ॥ सूत्रात्मा सूक्ष्मदेहाख्यः सर्वजीवघनात्मकः ॥
 सर्वाहंमानधारित्वात् क्रियाज्ञानादिशक्तिमान् ॥ २०० ॥ प्रत्यूषे वा
 प्रदोषे वा मग्नो मन्दे तमस्ययम् ॥ लोको भाति यथा तद्ब्रह्मस्पष्टं
 जगदीक्ष्यते ॥ १ ॥ सर्वतो लाञ्छितो मग्न्या यथा स्याद्वद्वितः पटः ॥

सूक्ष्माकारैस्तथेशस्य वपुः सर्वत्र लाञ्छितम् ॥ २ ॥ सस्यं वा
 शाकजातं वा सर्वतोऽङ्कुरितं यथा ॥ कोमलं तद्वदेवैष पेलवो जगदङ्कुरः
 ॥ ३ ॥ आतपाभातलोको वा पटो वा वर्णपूरितः ॥ सस्यं वा
 फलितं यद्वत्तथा स्पष्टवपुर्विराट् ॥ ४ ॥ विश्वरूपाध्याय एष उक्तः
 सूक्तेऽपि पौरुषे ॥ धात्रादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तानेतस्यावयवान्विदुः ॥ ५ ॥
 ईशसूत्रविराड्वेधोविष्णुरुद्रेन्द्रवह्नयः ॥ विघ्नभैरवमैरालमरिका यक्ष-
 राक्षसाः ॥ ६ ॥ विप्रक्षत्रियविट्शूद्रा गवाश्वमृगपक्षिणः ॥ अश्व-
 त्यवट्चूताद्या यवव्रीहितृणादयः ॥ ७ ॥ जलपाषाणमृत्काष्ठवास्या-
 कुदालकादयः ॥ ईश्वराः सर्व एवैते पूजिताः फलदायिनः ॥ ८ ॥
 यथायथोपासते तं फलमीयुस्तथातथा ॥ फलोत्कर्षापकर्षौ तु पूज्य-
 पूजानुसारतः ॥ ९ ॥ मुक्तिस्तु ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य ज्ञानादेव न चान्यथा ॥
 स्वप्रबोधं विना नैव स्वस्वप्नो हीयते यथा ॥ २१० ॥ अद्वितीयब्रह्म-
 तत्त्वे स्वप्नोऽयमखिलं जगत् ॥ ईशजीवादिरूपेण चेतनाचेतनात्म-
 कम् ॥ ११ ॥ आनन्दमयविज्ञानमयावीश्वरजीवकौ ॥ मायया
 कल्पितावेतौ ताभ्यां सर्वं प्रकल्पितम् ॥ १२ ॥ ईक्षणादिप्रवेशान्ता
 सृष्टिरीशेन कल्पिता ॥ जाग्रदादिविमोक्षान्तः संसारो जीवकल्पितः
 ॥ १३ ॥ अद्वितीयं ब्रह्मतत्त्वमसङ्गं तन्न जानते ॥ जीवेशयोर्मायि-
 कयोर्वृथैव कलहं ययुः ॥ १४ ॥ ज्ञात्वा सदा तत्त्वनिष्ठा ननु
 मोदामहे वयम् ॥ अनुशोचाम एवान्यान्न भ्रान्तेर्विवदामहे ॥ १५ ॥
 तृणार्चकादियोगान्ता ईश्वरे भ्रान्तिमाश्रिताः ॥ लोकायतादिसा-
 ङ्ख्यान्ता जीवै विभ्रान्तिमाश्रिताः ॥ १६ ॥ अद्वितीयब्रह्मतत्त्वं न
 जानन्ति यदा तदा ॥ भ्रान्ता एवाखिलास्तेषां क मुक्तिः केह वा
 सुखम् ॥ १७ ॥ उत्तमाधमभावश्चेतेषां स्यादस्तु तेन किम् ॥
 स्वप्नस्थराज्यभिक्षाभ्यां न बुद्धः स्पृश्यते खलु ॥ १८ ॥ तस्मान्मु-
 मुक्षुभिर्नैव मतिर्जीवेशवादयोः ॥ कार्या किंतु ब्रह्मतत्त्वं विचार्य

बुध्यतां च तत् ॥ १९ ॥ पूर्वपक्षतया तौ चेत्तत्त्वनिश्चयहेतुताम् ॥
 प्रापतोऽस्तु निमज्जस्व तयोर्नैतावताऽवशः ॥ २० ॥ असंगचिद्वि-
 भुर्जीवः साङ्ख्योक्तस्तादृगीश्वरः ॥ योगोक्तस्तत्त्वमोरथौ शुद्धौ
 ताविति चेच्छृणु ॥ २१ ॥ न तत्त्वमोरुभावार्थावस्मत्सिद्धान्ततां
 गतौ ॥ अद्वैतबोधनायैव सा कक्षा काचिदिष्यते ॥ २२ ॥ अना-
 दिमायया भ्रान्ता जीवेशौ सुविलक्षणौ ॥ मन्यन्ते तद्व्युदासाय
 केवलं शोधनं तयोः ॥ २३ ॥ अत एवात्र दृष्टान्तो योग्यः प्राक्
 सम्यगीरितः ॥ घटाकाशमहाकाशजलाकाशाभ्रखात्मकः ॥ २४ ॥
 जलाभ्रोपाध्यधीने ते जलाकाशाभ्रखे तयोः ॥ आधारौ तु घटाका-
 शमहाकाशौ सुनिर्मलौ ॥ २५ ॥ एवमानन्दविज्ञानमयौ मायाधियो-
 र्वशौ ॥ तदधिष्ठानकूटस्थब्रह्मणी तु सुनिर्मले ॥ २६ ॥ एतत्क्षो-
 पयोगेन साङ्ख्ययोगौ मतौ यदि ॥ देहोऽन्नमयकक्षत्वादात्मत्वे-
 नाभ्युपेयताम् ॥ २७ ॥ आत्मभेदो जगत्सत्यमीशोऽन्य इति
 चेन्नयम् ॥ त्यज्यते तैस्तदा साङ्ख्ययोगवेदान्तसंमतिः ॥ २८ ॥
 जीवोऽसंगत्वमात्रेण कृतार्थ इति चेत्तदा ॥ स्रक्चन्दनादिनित्यत्व-
 मात्रेणापि कृतार्थता ॥ २९ ॥ यथा स्रगादिनित्यत्वं दुःसंपाद्यं
 तथाऽऽत्मनः ॥ असंगत्वं न संभाव्यं जीवतोर्जगदीशयोः ॥ ३० ॥
 अवश्यं प्रकृतिः संगं पुरेवापादयेत्तथा ॥ नियच्छत्येतमीशोऽपि
 कोऽस्य मोक्षस्तथा सति ॥ ३१ ॥ अविवेककृतः संगो नियमश्चेति
 चेत्तदा ॥ बलादापतितो मायावादः साङ्ख्यस्य दुर्मतेः ॥ ३२ ॥
 बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थार्थमात्मनानात्वमिष्यताम् ॥ इति चेन्नयतो माया
 व्यवस्थापयितुं क्षमा ॥ ३३ ॥ दुर्घटं घटयामीति विरुद्धं किं न
 पश्यसि ॥ वास्तवौ बन्धमोक्षौ तु श्रुतिर्न सहतेतराम् ॥ ३४ ॥
 न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ॥ न मुमुक्षुर्न वै
 मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ ३५ ॥ मायाख्यायाः कामधेनोर्वत्सौ

जीवश्वरावृभौ ॥ यथेच्छं पिबतां द्वैतं तत्त्वं त्वद्वैतमेव हि ॥ ३६ ॥
 कूटस्थब्रह्मणोर्भेदो नाममात्रादृते न हि ॥ घटाकाशमहाकाशौ वियु-
 ज्येते न हि क्वचित् ॥ ३७ ॥ यदद्वैतं श्रुतं सृष्टेः प्राक्तदेवाद्य चोपरि ॥
 मुक्तावपि वृथा माया भ्रामयत्यखिलाञ्जनान् ॥ ३८ ॥ ये वदन्ती-
 त्यमेतेऽपि भ्राम्यन्तेऽविद्ययाऽत्र किम् ॥ न यथा पूर्वमेतेषामत्र
 भ्रान्तेरदर्शनात् ॥ ३९ ॥ ऐहिकामुष्मिकः सर्वः संसारो वास्तव-
 स्ततः ॥ न भाति नास्ति चाद्वैतमित्यज्ञानिविनिश्चयः ॥ २४० ॥
 ज्ञानिनो विपरीतोऽस्मान्निश्चयः सम्यगीक्ष्यते ॥ स्वस्वनिश्चयतो
 बद्धोमुक्तोऽहं चेति मन्यते ॥ ४१ ॥ नाद्वैतमपरोक्षं चेन्न चिद्रूपेण
 भासनात् ॥ अशेषेण न भातं चेद्वैतं किं भासतेऽखिलम् ॥ ४२ ॥
 दिङ्मात्रेण विभानं तु द्वयोरपि समं खलु ॥ द्वैतसिद्धिवदद्वैतसिद्धिस्ते
 तावता न किम् ॥ ४३ ॥ द्वैतेन हीनमद्वैतं द्वैतज्ञाने कथं त्विदम् ॥
 चिद्भानं त्वविरोध्यस्य द्वैतस्यातोऽसमे उभे ॥ ४४ ॥ एवं तर्हि
 शृणु द्वैतमसन्मायामयत्वतः ॥ तेन वास्तवमद्वैतं परिशेषाद्विभासते
 ॥ ४५ ॥ अचिन्त्यरचनारूपं मायैव सकलं जगत् ॥ इति निश्चित्य
 वस्तुत्वमद्वैते परिशेष्यताम् ॥ ४६ ॥ पुनद्वैतस्य वस्तुत्वं भाति
 चेत्त्वं तथा पुनः ॥ परिशीलय को वाऽत्र प्रयासस्तेन ते वद ॥ ४७ ॥
 कियन्तं कालमिति चेत् खेदोऽयं द्वैत इष्यताम् ॥ अद्वैते तु न
 युक्तोऽयं सर्वानर्थनिवारणात् ॥ ४८ ॥ क्षुत्पिपासादयो दृष्टा यथापूर्वं
 मयीति चेत् ॥ मच्छब्दवाच्येऽहंकारे दृश्यतां नेति को वदेत् ॥ ४९ ॥
 चिद्रूपेऽपि प्रसज्येरंस्तादात्म्याध्यासतो यदि ॥ माऽध्यासं कुरु किंतु
 त्वं विवेकं कुरु सर्वदा ॥ २५० ॥ झटित्यध्यास आयाति दृढवा-
 सनयेति चेत् ॥ आवर्तयेद्विवेकं च दृढं वासयितुं सदा ॥ ५१ ॥
 विवेके द्वैतमिध्यात्वं युक्त्यैवेति न भण्यताम् ॥ अचिन्त्यरचना
 त्वस्यानुभूतिर्हि स्वसाक्षिकी ॥ ५२ ॥ चिदप्यचिन्त्यरचना यदि

तर्हस्तु नो वयम् ॥ चितिं सुचिन्त्यरचनां ब्रूमो नित्यत्वकारणात्
 ॥ ५३ ॥ प्रागभावो नानुभूतश्चितेर्नित्या ततश्चितिः ॥ द्वैतस्य
 प्रागभावस्तु चैतन्येनानुभूयते ॥ ५४ ॥ प्रागभावयुतं द्वैतं रच्यते हि
 घटादिवत् ॥ तथापि रचनाऽचिन्त्या मिथ्या तेनेन्द्रजालवत् ॥ ५५ ॥
 चित्प्रत्यक्षा ततोऽन्यस्य मिथ्यात्वं चानुभूयते ॥ नाद्वैतमपरोक्षं
 चेत्येतन्न व्याहृतं कथम् ॥ ५६ ॥ इत्थं ज्ञात्वाऽप्यसन्तुष्टाः केचित्कृत
 इतीर्यताम् ॥ चार्वाकादेः प्रबुद्धस्याप्यात्मा देहः कुतो वद ॥ ५७ ॥
 सम्यग्विचारो नास्त्यस्य धीदोषादिति चेत्तथा ॥ असंतुष्टास्तु
 शास्त्रार्थं न त्वैक्षन्त विशेषतः ॥ ५८ ॥ यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा
 येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ॥ इति श्रौतं फलं दृष्टं नेति चेद्दृष्टमेव तत् ॥ ५९ ॥
 यदा सर्वे प्रभिद्यन्ते हृदयग्रन्थयस्त्विति ॥ कामा ग्रन्थिस्वरूपेण
 व्याख्याता वाक्यशेषतः ॥ २६० ॥ अहंकारचिदात्मानावेकीकृत्या-
 विवेकतः ॥ इदं मे स्यादिदं मे स्यादितीच्छाः कामशब्दिताः ॥ ६१ ॥
 अप्रवेश्य चिदात्मानं पृथक् पश्यन्नहंकृतिम् ॥ इच्छंस्तु कोटिवस्तूनि
 न बाधो ग्रन्थिभेदतः ॥ ६२ ॥ ग्रन्थिभेदेऽपि संभाव्या इच्छाः
 प्रारब्धदोषतः ॥ बुद्ध्वाऽपि पापबाहुल्यादसंतोषो यथा तव ॥ ६३ ॥
 अहंकारगतेच्छाद्यैर्देहव्याध्यादिभिस्तथा ॥ वृक्षादिजन्मनाशैर्वा चिद्रू-
 पात्मनि किं भवेत् ॥ ६४ ॥ ग्रन्थिभेदात्पुराऽप्येवमिति चेत्तन्न
 विस्मर ॥ अयमेव ग्रन्थिभेदस्तव तेन कृती भवान् ॥ ६५ ॥ नैवं
 जानन्ति मूढाश्चेत्सोऽयं ग्रन्थिर्न चापरः ॥ ग्रन्थितद्भेदमात्रेण वैषम्यं
 मूढबुद्धयोः ॥ ६६ ॥ प्रवृत्तौ वा निवृत्तौ वा देहेन्द्रियमनोधियाम् ॥
 न किंचिदपि वैषम्यमस्त्यज्ञानिविबुद्धयोः ॥ ६७ ॥ त्रात्यश्रोत्रि-
 ययोर्वेदपाठापाठकृता भिदा ॥ नाहारादावस्ति भेदः सोऽयं न्यायोऽत्र
 योज्यताम् ॥ ६८ ॥ न द्वेष्टि संप्रवृत्तानि न निवृत्तानि काङ्क्षति ॥
 उदासीनवदासीन इति ग्रन्थिभिदोच्यते ॥ ६९ ॥ औदासीन्यं विधेयं

चेद्वच्छब्दव्यर्थता तदा ॥ न शक्ता अस्य देहाद्या इति चेद्रोग एव
सः ॥ २७० ॥ तत्त्वबोधं क्षयं व्याधिं मन्यन्ते ये महाधियः ॥
तेषां प्रज्ञाऽतिविशदा किं तेषां दुःशकं वद ॥ ७१ ॥ भारतादेरप्रवृत्तिः
पुराणोक्तेति चेत्तदा ॥ जक्षन् क्रीडन् रतिं विन्दन्नित्यश्रौषीर्न किं
श्रुतिम् ॥ ७२ ॥ न ह्याहारादि संत्यज्य भरताद्याः स्थिताः क्वचित् ॥
काष्ठपाषाणवत्किं तु संगभीता उदासते ॥ ७३ ॥ संगी हि बाध्यते
लोके निःसंगः सुखमश्रुते ॥ तेन संगः परित्याज्यः सर्वदा सुख-
मिच्छता ॥ ७४ ॥ अज्ञात्वा शास्त्रहृदयं मूढो वक्तयन्यथान्यथा ॥
मूर्खाणां निर्णयस्त्वास्तामस्मत्सिद्धान्त उच्यते ॥ ७५ ॥ वैराग्य-
बोधोपरमाः सहायास्ते परस्परम् ॥ प्रायेण सह वर्तन्ते विद्युज्यन्ते
क्वचित् क्वचित् ॥ ७६ ॥ हेतुस्वरूपकार्याणि भिन्नान्येषामसंकरः ॥
यथावदवगन्तव्यः शास्त्रार्थं प्रविचिच्यता ॥ ७७ ॥ दोषदृष्टिर्जिहासा च
पुनर्भोगेष्वदीनता ॥ असाधारणहेत्वाद्या वैराग्यस्य त्रयोऽप्यमी
॥ ७८ ॥ श्रवणादित्रयं तद्वत्तत्त्वमिध्याविवेचनम् ॥ पुनर्ग्रन्थेरनुदयो
बोधस्यैते त्रयो मताः ॥ ७९ ॥ यमादिर्धीनिरोधश्च व्यवहारस्य
संक्षयः ॥ स्युर्हेत्वाद्या उपरतेरित्यसंकर ईरितः ॥ २८० ॥ तत्त्वबोधः
प्रधानं स्यात् साक्षान्मोक्षप्रदत्वतः ॥ बोधोपकारिणावेतौ वैराग्योपर-
मावुभौ ॥ ८१ ॥ त्रयोऽप्यत्यन्तपक्वाश्चेन्महतस्तपसः फलम् ॥ दुरितेन
क्वचित्किंचित्कदाचित्प्रतिबध्यते ॥ ८२ ॥ वैराग्योपरती पूर्णे बोधस्तु
प्रतिबध्यते ॥ यस्य तस्य न मोक्षोऽस्ति पुण्यलोकस्तपोबलात् ॥ ८३ ॥
पूर्णे बोधे तदन्यौ द्वौ प्रतिबद्धौ यदा तदा ॥ मोक्षो विनिश्चितः
किंतु दृष्टदुःखं न नश्यति ॥ ८४ ॥ ब्रह्मलोकतृणीकारो वैराग्य-
स्यावधिर्मतः ॥ देहात्मवत्परात्मत्वदाढ्ये बोधः समाप्यते ॥ ८५ ॥
सुप्तिवद्विस्मृतिः सीमा भवेदुपरमस्य हि ॥ दिशाऽनया विनिश्चयं
तारतम्यमवान्तरम् ॥ ८६ ॥ आरब्धकर्मनानात्वाद्बुद्धानामन्य-

थाऽन्यथा ॥ वर्तनं तेन शास्त्रार्थे भ्रमितव्यं न पण्डितैः ॥ ८७ ॥
 स्वस्वकर्मानुसारेण वर्तन्तां ते यथा तथा ॥ अविशिष्टः सर्वबोधः
 समा मुक्तिरिति स्थितिः ॥ ८८ ॥ जगच्चित्रं स्वचैतन्ये पटे चित्र-
 मिवार्पितम् ॥ मायया तदुपेक्ष्यैव चैतन्यं परिशेष्यताम् ॥ ८९ ॥
 चित्रदीपमिमं नित्यं येऽनुसंदधते बुधाः ॥ पश्यन्तोऽपि जगच्चित्रं ते
 मुह्यन्ति न पूर्ववत् ॥ ९० ॥

इति विद्यारण्य० श्रीपञ्चदश्यां चित्रदीपः समाप्तः ॥

॥ अथ तृप्तिदीपप्रकरणम् ॥ ७ ॥

आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः ॥ किमिच्छन् कस्य
 कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ॥ १ ॥ अस्याः श्रुतेरभिप्रायः सम्यगत्र
 विचार्यते ॥ जीवन्मुक्तस्य या तृप्तिः सा तेन विशदायते ॥ २ ॥
 मायाभासेन जीवेशौ करोतीति श्रुतत्वतः ॥ कल्पितावेव जीवेशौ
 ताभ्यां सर्वं प्रकल्पितम् ॥ ३ ॥ ईक्षणादिप्रवेशान्ता सृष्टिरीशेन
 कल्पिता ॥ जाग्रदादिविमोक्षान्तः संसारो जीवकल्पितः ॥ ४ ॥
 भ्रमाधिष्ठानभूतात्मा कूटस्थसंगचिद्वपुः ॥ अन्योन्याध्यासतोऽसं-
 गधीस्थजीवोऽत्र पूरुषः ॥ ५ ॥ साधिष्ठानो विमोक्षादौ जीवोऽधि-
 क्रियते न तु ॥ केवलो निरधिष्ठानविभ्रान्तेः काप्यसिद्धितः ॥ ६ ॥
 अधिष्ठानांशसंयुक्तं भ्रमांशमवलम्बते ॥ यदा तदाऽहं संसारीत्येवं
 जीवोऽभिमन्यते ॥ ७ ॥ भ्रमांशस्य तिरस्कारादधिष्ठानप्रधानता ॥
 यदा तदा चिदात्माऽहमसंगोऽस्मीतिबुध्यते ॥ ८ ॥ नासंगेऽहंकृ-
 तिर्युक्ता कथमस्मीति चेच्छृणु ॥ एको मुख्यो द्वावमुख्यावित्यर्थ-
 स्त्रिविधोऽहमः ॥ ९ ॥ अन्योन्याध्यासरूपेण कूटस्थाभासयोर्वपुः ॥
 एकीभूय भवेन्मुख्यस्तत्र मूढैः प्रयुज्यते ॥ १० ॥ पृथगाभासकूट-
 स्थावमुख्यौ तत्र तत्त्ववित् ॥ पर्यायेण प्रयुक्तेऽहंशब्दं लोके च
 वैदिके ॥ ११ ॥ लौकिकव्यवहारेऽहं गच्छामीत्यादिके बुधः ॥
 विविच्यैव चिदाभासं कूटस्थात्तं विवक्षति ॥ १२ ॥ असंगोऽहं
 चिदात्माऽहमिति शास्त्रीयदृष्टितः ॥ अहंशब्दं प्रयुक्तेऽयं कूटस्थे केवले
 बुधः ॥ १३ ॥ ज्ञानिताज्ञानिते त्वात्माभासस्यैव न चात्मनः ॥
 तथा च कथमाभासः कूटस्थोऽस्मीति बुध्यताम् ॥ १४ ॥ नायं
 दोषश्चिदाभासः कूटस्थैकस्वभाववान् ॥ आभासत्वस्य मिथ्यात्वा-
 त्कूटस्थत्वावशेषणात् ॥ १५ ॥ कूटस्थोऽस्मीति बोधोऽपि मिथ्या

चेन्नेति को वदेत् ॥ न हि सत्यतयाऽभीष्टं रज्जुसर्पविसर्पणम् ॥ १६ ॥
 तादृशेनापि बोधेन संसारो हि निवर्तते ॥ यक्षानुरूपो हि बलिरि-
 त्याहुलौकिका जनाः ॥ १७ ॥ तस्मादाभासपुरुषः सकूटस्थो
 विविच्य तम् ॥ कूटस्थोऽस्मीति विज्ञातुमर्हतीत्यभ्यधाच्छ्रुतिः ॥ १८ ॥
 असंदिग्धाविपर्यस्तबोधो देहात्मनीक्ष्यते ॥ तद्वदन्नेति निर्णेतुमयमि-
 त्यभिधीयते ॥ १९ ॥ देहात्मज्ञानवज्ज्ञानं देहात्मज्ञानबाधकम् ॥
 आत्मन्येव भवेद्यस्य स नेच्छन्नपि मुच्यते ॥ २० ॥ अयमित्यपरो-
 क्षत्वमुच्यते चेत्तदुच्यताम् ॥ स्वयंप्रकाशचैतन्यमपरोक्षं सदा यतः
 ॥ २१ ॥ परोक्षमपरोक्षं च ज्ञानमज्ञानमित्यदः ॥ नित्यापरोक्षरूपेऽपि
 द्वयं स्यादशमे यथा ॥ २२ ॥ नवसंख्याहृतज्ञानो दशमो विश्रमा-
 त्तदा ॥ न वेत्ति दशमोऽस्मीति वीक्षमाणोऽपि तान्नवै ॥ २३ ॥
 न भाति नास्ति दशम इति स्वं दशमं तदा ॥ मत्वा वक्ति तदज्ञा-
 नकृतमावरणं विदुः ॥ २४ ॥ नद्यां ममार दशम इति शोचन्प्ररो-
 दिति ॥ अज्ञानकृतविक्षेपं रोदनादिं विदुर्बुधाः ॥ २५ ॥ न मृतो
 दशमोऽस्तीति श्रुत्वाऽऽप्तवचनं तदा ॥ परोक्षत्वेन दशमं वेत्ति
 स्वर्गादिलोकवत् ॥ २६ ॥ त्वमेव दशमोऽसीति गणयित्वा प्रदर्शितः ॥
 अपरोक्षतया ज्ञात्वा हृष्यत्येव न रोदिति ॥ २७ ॥ अज्ञानावृत्ति-
 विक्षेपद्विविधज्ञानतृप्तयः ॥ शोकापगम इत्येते योजनीयाश्चिदात्मनि
 ॥ २८ ॥ संसारासक्तचित्तः संश्रिदाभासः कदाचन ॥ स्वयंप्रका-
 शकूटस्थं स्वतत्त्वं नैव वेत्त्ययम् ॥ २९ ॥ न भाति नास्ति कूटस्थ
 इति वक्ति प्रसंगतः ॥ कर्ता भोक्ताऽहमस्मीति विक्षेपं प्रतिपद्यते
 ॥ ३० ॥ अस्ति कूटस्थ इत्यादौ परोक्षं वेत्ति वार्तया ॥ पश्चात्कू-
 टस्थ एवास्मीत्येवं वेत्ति विचारतः ॥ ३१ ॥ कर्ता भोक्तेत्येवमादि
 शोकजातं प्रमुञ्चति ॥ कृतं कृत्यं प्रापणीयं प्राप्तमित्येव तुष्यति
 ॥ ३२ ॥ अज्ञानमावृत्तिस्तद्विविक्षेपश्च परोक्षधीः ॥ अपरोक्षमतिः

शोकमोक्षस्तृप्तिर्निरंकुशा ॥ ३३ ॥ समावस्था इमाः सन्ति चिदा-
भासस्य तास्विमौ ॥ बन्धमोक्षौ स्थितौ तत्र तिस्रो बन्धकृताः
स्मृताः ॥ ३४ ॥ न जानामीत्युदासीनव्यवहारस्य कारणम् ॥
विचारप्रागभावेन युक्तमज्ञानमीरितम् ॥ ३५ ॥ अमार्गेण विचार्यार्थ
नास्ति नो भाति चेत्यसौ ॥ विपरीतव्यवहृतिरावृतेः कार्यमिष्यते
॥ ३६ ॥ देहद्वयचिदाभासरूपो विक्षेप ईरितः ॥ कर्तृत्वाद्यखिलः
शोकः संसाराख्योऽस्य बन्धकः ॥ ३७ ॥ अज्ञानमावृतिश्चैते विक्षेपात्
प्राक् प्रसिध्यतः ॥ यद्यप्यथाप्यवस्थे ते विक्षेपस्यैव नात्मनः ॥ ३८ ॥
विक्षेपोत्पत्तितः पूर्वमपि विक्षेपसंस्कृतिः ॥ अस्त्येव तदवस्थात्वम-
विरुद्धं ततस्तयोः ॥ ३९ ॥ ब्रह्मण्यारोपितत्वेन ब्रह्मावस्थे इमे
इति ॥ न शङ्कनीयं सर्वासां ब्रह्मण्येवाधिरोपणात् ॥ ४० ॥
संसार्यहं विबुद्धोऽहं निःशोकस्तुष्ट इत्यपि ॥ जीवगा उत्तरावस्था
भान्ति न ब्रह्मगा यदि ॥ ४१ ॥ तर्ह्यज्ञोऽहं ब्रह्मसत्त्वभाने मदृष्टितो
न हि ॥ इति पूर्वे अवस्थे च भासेते जीवगे खलु ॥ ४२ ॥
अज्ञानस्याश्रयो ब्रह्मेत्यधिष्ठानतया जगुः ॥ जीवावस्थात्वमज्ञाना-
भिमानीत्वादवादिषम् ॥ ४३ ॥ ज्ञानद्वयेन नष्टेऽस्मिन्नज्ञाने तत्कृ-
तावृतिः ॥ न भाति नास्ति चेत्येषा द्विविधाऽपि विनश्यति ॥ ४४ ॥
परोक्षज्ञानतो नश्येदसत्त्वावृतिहेतुता ॥ अपरोक्षज्ञाननाश्या ह्यभा-
नावृतिहेतुता ॥ ४५ ॥ अभानावरणे नष्टे जीवत्वारोपसंक्षयात् ॥
कर्तृत्वाद्यखिलः शोकः संसाराख्यो निवर्तते ॥ ४६ ॥ निवृत्ते
सर्वसंसारे नित्यमुक्तत्वभासनात् ॥ निरङ्कुशा भवेत्तृप्तिः पुनः शोक-
समुद्भवात् ॥ ४७ ॥ अपरोक्षज्ञानशोकनिवृत्त्याख्ये उभे इमे ॥
अवस्थे जीवगे ब्रूत आत्मानं चेदिति श्रुतिः ॥ ४८ ॥ अयमित्य-
परोक्षत्वमुक्तं तद्विविधं भवेत् ॥ विषयस्वप्रकाशत्वात् धियाऽप्येवं
तदीक्षणात् ॥ ४९ ॥ परोक्षज्ञानकालेऽपि विषयस्वप्रकाशता ॥ समा

ब्रह्म स्वप्रकाशमस्तीत्येवं विबोधनात् ॥ ५० ॥ अहं ब्रह्मेत्यनुल्लिख्य
 ब्रह्मास्तीत्येवमुल्लिखेत् ॥ परोक्षज्ञानमेतन्न भ्रान्तं बाधानिरूपणात्
 ॥ ५१ ॥ ब्रह्म नास्तीति मानं चेत् स्याद्वाध्येत तदा ध्रुवम् ॥
 न चैवं प्रबलं मानं पश्यामोऽतो न बाध्यते ॥ ५२ ॥ व्यक्त्यनुल्ले-
 खमात्रेण भ्रमत्वे स्वर्गधीरपि ॥ भ्रान्तिः स्याद्व्यक्त्यनुल्लेखात्सामा-
 न्योल्लेखदर्शनात् ॥ ५३ ॥ अपरोक्षत्वयोग्यस्य न परोक्षमतिभ्रमः ॥
 परोक्षमित्यनुल्लेखादर्थोत्पारोक्ष्यसंभवात् ॥ ५४ ॥ अंशागृहीतेभ्रा-
 न्तिश्चेद् घटज्ञानं भ्रमो भवेत् ॥ निरंशस्यापि सांशत्वं व्यावर्त्यांश-
 विभेदतः ॥ ५५ ॥ असत्त्वांशो निवर्तेत परोक्षज्ञानतस्तथा ॥
 अभानांशनिवृत्तिः स्यादपरोक्षधिया कृता ॥ ५६ ॥ दशमोऽस्तीति
 विभ्रान्तं परोक्षज्ञानमीक्ष्यते ॥ ब्रह्मास्तीत्यपि तद्वत्स्यादज्ञानावरणं
 समम् ॥ ५७ ॥ आत्मा ब्रह्मेति वाक्यार्थे निःशेषेण विचारिते ॥
 व्यक्तिरुल्लिख्यते यद्वदशमस्त्वमसीत्यतः ॥ ५८ ॥ दशमः क इति
 प्रश्ने त्वमेवेति निराकृते ॥ गणयित्वा स्वेन सह स्वमेव दशमं
 स्मरेत् ॥ ५९ ॥ दशमोऽस्मीति वाक्योत्था न धीरस्य विहन्यते ॥
 आदिमध्यावसानेषु न नवस्वस्य संशयः ॥ ६० ॥ सदेवेत्यादि-
 वाक्येन ब्रह्मसत्त्वं परोक्षतः ॥ गृहीत्वा तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्याद्व्यक्तिं
 समुल्लिखेत् ॥ ६१ ॥ आदिमध्यावसानेषु स्वस्य ब्रह्मत्वधीरियम् ॥
 नैव व्यभिचरेत्तस्मादापरोक्ष्यं प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥ ६२ ॥ जन्मादिकारण-
 त्वाख्यलक्षणेन भृगुः पुरा ॥ पारोक्ष्येण गृहीत्वाऽथ विचाराव्यक्ति-
 मैक्षत ॥ ६३ ॥ यद्यपि त्वमसीत्यत्र वाक्यं नोचे भृगोः पिता ॥
 तथाप्यन्नं प्राणमिति विचार्य स्थलमुक्तवान् ॥ ६४ ॥ अन्नप्राणा-
 दिकोशेषु सुविचार्य पुनः पुनः ॥ आनन्दव्यक्तिमीक्षित्वा ब्रह्मल-
 क्ष्माप्ययूयुजत् ॥ ६५ ॥ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं चेत्येवंब्रह्मस्वलक्षणम् ॥
 उक्त्वा गुहाहितत्वेन कोशेष्वेतत्प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ६६ ॥ पारोक्ष्येण

विबुध्येन्द्रो य आत्मेत्यादिलक्षणात् ॥ अपरोक्षीकर्तुमिच्छंश्चतुर्वारं
 गुरुं ययौ ॥ ६७ ॥ आत्मा वा इदमित्यादौ परोक्षं ब्रह्म लक्षितम् ॥
 अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म दर्शितम् ॥ ६८ ॥ अवान्तरेण
 वाक्येन परोक्षा ब्रह्मधीर्भवेत् ॥ सर्वत्रैव महावाक्यविचारादपरोक्षधीः
 ॥ ६९ ॥ ब्रह्मापरोक्ष्यसिद्धयर्थं महावाक्यमितीरितम् ॥ वाक्यवृ-
 त्तावतो ब्रह्मापरोक्ष्ये विमर्तिर्नहि ॥ ७० ॥ आलम्बनतया भाति
 योऽस्मत्प्रत्ययशब्दयोः ॥ अन्तःकरणसंभिन्नबोधः स त्वंपदाभिधः
 ॥ ७१ ॥ मायोपाधिर्जगद्योनिः सर्वज्ञत्वादिलक्षणः ॥ पारोक्ष्यश-
 वलः सत्याद्यात्मकस्तत्पदाभिधः ॥ ७२ ॥ प्रत्यक्परोक्षतैकस्य
 सद्वितीयत्वपूर्णता ॥ विरुध्येते यतस्तस्माल्लक्षणा संप्रवर्तते ॥ ७३ ॥
 तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येषु लक्षणा भागलक्षणा ॥ सोऽयमित्यादिवाक्य-
 स्थपदयोरिव नापरा ॥ ७४ ॥ संसर्गो वा विशिष्टो वा वाक्यार्थो
 नात्र संमतः ॥ अखण्डैकरसत्वेन वाक्यार्थो विदुषां मतः ॥ ७५ ॥
 प्रत्यग्बोधो य आभाति सोऽद्वयानन्दलक्षणः ॥ अद्वयानन्दरूपश्च
 प्रत्यग्बोधैकलक्षणः ॥ ७६ ॥ इत्थमन्योन्यतादात्म्यप्रतिपत्तिर्यदा
 भवेत् ॥ अब्रह्मत्वं त्वमर्थस्य व्यावर्तेत तदैव हि ॥ ७७ ॥ तदर्थस्य
 च पारोक्ष्यं यद्येवं किं ततः शृणु ॥ पूर्णानन्दैकरूपेण प्रत्यग्बोधोऽव-
 तिष्ठते ॥ ७८ ॥ एवं सति महावाक्यात्परोक्षज्ञानमीर्यते ॥ यैस्तेषां
 शास्त्रसिद्धान्तविज्ञानं शोभतेतराम् ॥ ७९ ॥ आस्तां शास्त्रस्य
 सिद्धान्तो युक्त्या वाक्यात्परोक्षधीः ॥ स्वर्गादिवाक्यवन्नैवं दशमे
 व्यभिचारतः ॥ ८० ॥ स्वतोऽपरोक्षजीवस्य ब्रह्मत्वमभिवाञ्छतः ॥
 नश्येत्सिद्धापरोक्षत्वमिति युक्तिर्महत्यहो ॥ ८१ ॥ वृद्धिमिष्टवतो
 मूलमपि नष्टमितीदृशम् ॥ लौकिकं वचनं सार्थं संपन्नं त्वत्प्रसादतः
 ॥ ८२ ॥ अन्तःकरणसंभिन्नबोधो जीवोऽपरोक्षताम् ॥ अर्हत्युपा-
 धिसद्भावान्न तु ब्रह्मानुपाधितः ॥ ८३ ॥ नैवं ब्रह्मत्वबोधस्य

सोपाधिविषयत्वतः ॥ यावद्विदेहकैवल्यमुपाधेरनिवारणात् ॥ ८४ ॥
 अन्तःकरणसाहित्यराहित्याभ्यां विशिष्यते ॥ उपाधिर्जीवभावस्य
 ब्रह्मतायाश्च नान्यथा ॥ ८५ ॥ यथा विधिरूपाधिः स्यात्प्रतिषेधस्तथा
 न किम् ॥ सुवर्णलोहभेदेन शृङ्खलात्वं न भिद्यते ॥ ८६ ॥ अत-
 द्वावृत्तिरूपेण साक्षाद्विधिमुखेन च ॥ वेदान्तानां प्रवृत्तिः स्याद्वि-
 धेत्याचार्यभाषितम् ॥ ८७ ॥ अहमर्थपरित्यागादहं ब्रह्मेति धीः
 कुतः ॥ नैवमंशस्य हि त्यागो भागलक्षणयोदितः ॥ ८८ ॥
 अन्तःकरणसंत्यागादवशिष्टे चिदात्मनि ॥ अहंब्रह्मेति वाक्येन
 ब्रह्मत्वं साक्षिणीक्ष्यते ॥ ८९ ॥ स्वप्रकाशोऽपि साक्ष्येव धीवृत्त्या
 व्याप्यतेऽन्यवत् ॥ फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शास्त्रकृद्भिर्निवारितम्
 ॥ ९० ॥ बुद्धितत्स्थचिदाभासौ द्वावपि व्याप्नुतो घटम् ॥ तत्राज्ञानं
 धिया नश्येदाभासेन घटः स्फुरेत् ॥ ९१ ॥ ब्रह्मण्यज्ञाननाशाय
 वृत्तिव्याप्तिरपेक्षिता ॥ स्वयंस्फुरणरूपत्वान्नाभास उपयुज्यते ॥ ९२ ॥
 चक्षुर्दीपावपेक्ष्येते घटादर्दशने यथा ॥ न दीपदर्शने किंतु च क्षुरे-
 कमपेक्ष्यते ॥ ९३ ॥ स्थितोऽप्यसौ चिदाभासो ब्रह्मण्येकीभवेत्परम् ॥
 न तु ब्रह्मण्यतिशयं फलं कुर्याद्घटादिवत् ॥ ९४ ॥ अप्रमेयमनादिं
 चेत्यत्र श्रुत्येदमीरितम् ॥ मनसैवेदमाप्तव्यमिति धीव्याप्यता श्रुता
 ॥ ९५ ॥ आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति वाक्यतः ॥ ब्रह्मात्म-
 व्यक्तिमुल्लिख्य यो बोधः सोभिधीयते ॥ ९६ ॥ अस्तु बोधोऽपरो-
 क्षोत्र महावाक्यात्तथाऽप्यसौ ॥ न दृढः श्रवणादीनामाचार्यैः पुन-
 रीरणात् ॥ ९७ ॥ अहंब्रह्मेतिवाक्यार्थबोधो यावद्दृढीभवेत् ॥
 शमादिसहितस्तावदभ्यसेच्छ्रवणादिकम् ॥ ९८ ॥ बाढं सन्ति हृदा-
 र्ह्यस्य हेतवः श्रुत्यनेकता ॥ असंभाव्यत्वमर्थस्य विपरीता च
 भावना ॥ ९९ ॥ शाखाभेदात्कामभेदाच्छ्रुतं कर्मान्यथान्यथा ॥
 एवमत्रापि माशङ्क्रीत्यतः श्रवणमाचरेत् ॥ १०० ॥ वेदान्तानामशे-

षाणामादिमध्यावसानतः ॥ ब्रह्मात्मन्येव तात्पर्यमितिधीः श्रवणं
भवेत् ॥ १ ॥ समन्वयाध्याय एतत्सूक्तं धीस्वास्थ्यकारिभिः ॥
तर्कैः संभावनाऽर्थस्य द्वितीयाध्याय ईरिता ॥ २ ॥ बहुजन्मदृढा-
भ्यासाद्देहादिष्वात्मधीः क्षणात् ॥ पुनःपुनरुदेत्येवं जगत्सत्यत्वधी-
रपि ॥ ३ ॥ विपरीता भावनेयमैकाग्र्यात्सा निर्वर्तते ॥ तत्त्वोपदे-
शात्प्रागेव भवत्येतदुपासनात् ॥ ४ ॥ उपास्तयोऽत एवात्र ब्रह्म-
शास्त्रेऽपि चिन्तिताः ॥ प्रागनभ्यासिनः पश्चाद्ब्रह्माभ्यासेन तद्भवेत्
॥ ५ ॥ तच्चिन्तनं तत्कथनमन्योन्यं तत्प्रबोधनम् ॥ एतदेकपरत्वं
च ब्रह्माभ्यासं विदुर्बुधाः ॥ ६ ॥ तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत
ब्राह्मणः ॥ नानुध्यायाद्ब्रह्मच्छब्दान्वाचो विग्लापनं हि तत् ॥ ७ ॥
अनन्याश्चिन्तयन्तो मां ये जनाः पर्युपासते ॥ तेषां नित्याभियुक्तानां
योगक्षेमं वहाम्यहम् ॥ ८ ॥ इतिश्रुतिस्मृती नित्यमात्मन्येकाग्रतां
धियः ॥ विधत्ते विपरीताया भावनायाः क्षयाय हि ॥ ९ ॥
यद्यथा वर्तते तस्य तत्त्वं हित्वाऽन्यथात्वधीः ॥ विपरीता भावना
स्यात्पित्रादावरिधीर्यथा ॥ ११० ॥ आत्मा देहादिभिन्नोऽयं मिथ्या
चेदं जगत्तयोः ॥ देहाद्यात्मत्वसत्यत्वधीर्विपर्ययभावना ॥ ११ ॥
तत्त्वभावनया नश्येत्साऽतो देहातिरिक्ताताम् ॥ आत्मनो भावये-
त्तद्वन्मिथ्यात्वं जगतोऽनिशम् ॥ १२ ॥ किं मन्त्रजपवन्मूर्तिध्यान-
वद्वाऽऽत्मभेदधीः ॥ जगन्मिथ्यात्वधीश्चात्र व्यावर्त्या स्यादुतान्यथा
॥ १३ ॥ अन्यथेति विजानीहि दृष्टार्थत्वेन मुक्तिवत् ॥ बुभुक्षुर्ज-
पवद्भुङ्क्ते न कश्चिन्नियतः कश्चित् ॥ १४ ॥ अश्नाति वा न वाऽश्नाति
भुङ्क्ते वा स्वेच्छयाऽन्यथा ॥ येन केन प्रकारेण क्षुधामपनिनीषति
॥ १५ ॥ नियमेन जपं कुर्यादकृतौ प्रत्यवायतः ॥ अन्यथाकरणेऽनर्थः
स्वरवर्णविपर्ययात् ॥ १६ ॥ क्षुधेव दृष्टवाधाकृद्विपरीता च भावना ॥
जेया केनाप्युपायेन नास्त्यत्रानुष्ठितेः क्रमः ॥ १७ ॥ उपायः

पूर्वमेवोक्तस्तच्चिन्ताकथनादिकः ॥ एतदेकपरत्वेऽपि निर्वन्धो ध्यान-
 वन्न हि ॥ १८ ॥ मूर्तिप्रत्ययसांतत्यमन्यानन्तरितं धियः ॥ ध्यानं
 तत्रातिनिर्वन्धो मनसश्चञ्चलात्मनः ॥ १९ ॥ चञ्चलं हि मनः कृष्ण
 प्रमाथि बलवद्दृढम् ॥ तस्याहं निग्रहं मन्ये वायोरिव सुदुष्करम्
 ॥ १२० ॥ अप्यब्धिपानान्महतः सुमेरुन्मूलनादपि ॥ अपि बह्वच-
 शनात्साधो विषमश्चित्तनिग्रहः ॥ २१ ॥ कथनादौ न निर्वन्धः
 शृङ्खलावद्धदेहवत् ॥ किंत्वनन्तेतिहासाद्यैर्विनोदो नाव्यवद्वियः
 ॥ २२ ॥ चिदेवात्मा जगन्मिथ्येत्यत्र पर्यवसानतः ॥ निदिध्यासन-
 विक्षेपो नेतिहासादिभिर्भवेत् ॥ २३ ॥ कृषिवाणिज्यसेवादौ काव्य-
 तर्कादिकेषु च ॥ विक्षिप्यते प्रवृत्त्या धीस्तैस्तत्त्वस्मृत्यसंभवात्
 ॥ २४ ॥ अनुसंदधतैवात्र भोजनादौ प्रवर्तितुम् ॥ शक्यतेऽस्त्यन्त-
 विक्षेपाभावादाद्यु पुनः स्मृतेः ॥ २५ ॥ तत्त्वविस्मृतिमात्रान्नानर्थः
 किंतु विपर्ययात् ॥ विपर्येतुं न कालोऽस्ति श्रुतिरिति स्मरतः कचित्
 ॥ २६ ॥ तत्त्वस्मृतेरवसरो नास्त्यन्याभ्यासशालिनः ॥ प्रत्युता-
 भ्यासघातित्वाद्बलात्तत्त्वमुपेक्ष्यते ॥ २७ ॥ तमेवैकं विजानीथ ह्यन्या
 वाचो विमुञ्चथ ॥ इति श्रुतं तथाऽन्यत्र वाचो विग्लापनं त्विति
 ॥ २८ ॥ आहारादि त्यजन्नेव जीवेच्छास्त्रान्तरं त्यजन् ॥ किं न
 जीवसि येनैवं करोष्यत्र दुराग्रहम् ॥ २९ ॥ जनकादेः कथं राज्य-
 मिति चेद्दृढबोधतः ॥ तथा तवापि चेत्तर्कं पठ यद्वा कृषिं कुरु
 ॥ १३० ॥ मिथ्यात्ववासनादाढ्ये प्रारब्धक्षयकाङ्क्षया ॥ अक्लि-
 श्यन्तः प्रवर्तन्ते स्वस्वकर्मानुसारतः ॥ ३१ ॥ अतिप्रसंगो मा
 शङ्क्यः स्वकर्मवशवर्तिनाम् ॥ अस्तु वा केन शक्येत कर्म वारयितुं
 वद ॥ ३२ ॥ ज्ञानिनोज्ञानिनश्चात्र समे प्रारब्धकर्मणी ॥ न क्लेशो
 ज्ञानिनो धैर्यान्मूढः क्लिश्यत्यधैर्यतः ॥ ३३ ॥ मार्गे गन्त्रोर्द्वयोः
 श्रान्तौ स मायामप्यदूरताम् ॥ जानन् धैर्याद् द्रुतं गच्छेदन्यस्तिष्ठति

दीनधीः ॥ ३४ ॥ साक्षात्कृतात्मधीः सम्यगविपर्ययबाधितः ॥
किमिच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ॥ ३५ ॥ जगन्मिथ्या-
त्वधीभावादाक्षिप्तौ काम्यकामुकौ ॥ तयोरभावे संतापः शाम्योन्नि-
स्नेहदीपवत् ॥ ३६ ॥ गन्धर्वपत्तने किञ्चिन्मैन्द्रजालिकनिर्मितम् ॥
जानन् कामयते किंतु जिहासति हसन्निदम् ॥ ३७ ॥ आपातर-
मणीयेषु भोगेष्वेवं विचारवान् ॥ नाहुरज्यति किंत्वेतान् दोषदृष्ट्या
जिहासति ॥ ३८ ॥ अर्थानामर्जने क्लेशस्तथैव परिपालने ॥ नाशे
दुःखं व्यये दुःखं विमर्थान् क्लेशकारिणः ॥ ३९ ॥ मांसपाञ्चालि-
कायास्तु यन्जलोलेऽङ्गपङ्कजे ॥ स्नायवस्थिग्रन्थिशालिन्याः स्त्रियाः
किमिव शोभनम् ॥ ४० ॥ एवमादिषु शास्त्रेषु दोषाः सम्पक्
प्रपञ्चिताः ॥ विमृशन्ननिशं तानि कथं दुःखेषु मज्जति ॥ ४१ ॥
क्षुधया पीड्यमानोऽपि न विषं ह्यनुमिच्छति ॥ मिष्टान्नध्वस्ततृट्
जानन्नामूढस्तज्जिघत्सति ॥ ४२ ॥ प्रारब्धकर्मप्रावल्याद्भोगेष्विच्छा
भवेद्यदि ॥ क्रिश्यन्नेव तदाप्येष भुङ्क्ते विष्टिष्टहीतवत् ॥ ४३ ॥
भुञ्जाना वा अपि बुधाः श्रद्धायन्तः कुटुम्बिनः ॥ नाद्यापि कर्म
नश्चिन्नमिति क्रिश्यन्ति संततम् ॥ ४४ ॥ नायं क्लेशोऽत्र संसार-
तापः किंतु विरक्तता ॥ भ्रान्तिज्ञाननिदानो हि तापः सांसारिकः
स्मृतः ॥ ४५ ॥ विवेकेन परिक्रिश्यन्नल्पभोगेन तृप्यति ॥ अन्य-
थाऽनन्तभोगेऽपि चैव तृप्यति कर्हिचित् ॥ ४६ ॥ न जातु कामः
कामानामुपभोगेन शाम्यति ॥ हविषा कृष्णवर्त्मैव भूय एवाभिवर्धते
॥ ४७ ॥ परिज्ञायोपभुक्तो हि भोगो भवति तृप्ये ॥ विज्ञाय सेवि-
तश्चोरो मैत्रीमेति न चोरताम् ॥ ४८ ॥ मनसो निष्टहीतस्य लीला-
भोगोऽल्पकोऽपि यः ॥ तमेवालव्यविस्तारं क्रिष्टत्वाद्बहु मन्यते
॥ ४९ ॥ बद्धमुक्तो महीपालो ग्राममात्रेण तृप्यति ॥ परैर्न बद्धो
नाक्रान्तो न राष्ट्रं बहु मन्यते ॥ ५० ॥ विवेके जाग्रति सति

दोषदर्शनलक्षणे ॥ कथमारब्धकर्मापि भोगेच्छा जनयिष्यति ॥५१॥
 नैष दोषो यतोऽनेकविधं प्रारब्धमीक्ष्यते ॥ इच्छाऽनिच्छा परेच्छा
 च प्रारब्धं त्रिविधं स्मृतम् ॥ ५२ ॥ अपथ्यसेविनश्चोरा राजदाररता
 अपि ॥ जानन्त एव स्वानर्थमिच्छन्त्यारब्धकर्मतः ॥ ५३ ॥
 न चात्रैतद्वारयितुमीश्वरेणापि शक्यते ॥ यत ईश्वर एवाह गीताया-
 मर्जुनं प्रति ॥ ५४ ॥ सदृशं चेष्टते स्वस्याः प्रकृतेर्ज्ञानवानपि ॥
 प्रकृतिं यान्ति भूतानि निग्रहः किं करिष्यति ॥ ५५ ॥ अवश्यं-
 भाविभावनां प्रतीकारो भवेद्यदि ॥ तदा दुःखैर्न लिप्येरन्नलरामयु-
 धिष्ठिराः ॥ ५६ ॥ न चेश्वरत्वमीशस्य हीयते तावता यतः ॥
 अवश्यंभाविताऽप्येषामीश्वरेणैव निर्मिता ॥ ५७ ॥ प्रश्नोत्तराभ्या-
 मेवैतद्गम्यतेऽर्जुनकृष्णयोः ॥ अनिच्छापूर्वकं चास्ति प्रारब्धमिति
 तच्छृणु ॥ ५८ ॥ अथ केन प्रयुक्तोऽयं पापं चरति पूरुषः ॥
 अनिच्छन्नपि वाष्ण्येय बलादिव नियोजितः ॥ ५९ ॥ काम एष
 क्रोध एष रजोगुणसमुद्भवः ॥ महाशनो महापाप्मा विद्ध्येनमिह
 वैरिणम् ॥ १६० ॥ स्वभावजेन कौन्तेय निबद्धः स्वेन कर्मणा ॥
 कर्तुं नेच्छसि यन्मोहात् करिष्यस्यवशोऽपि तत् ॥ ६१ ॥ नानि-
 छन्तौ नचेच्छन्तः परदाक्षिण्यसंयुताः ॥ सुखदुःखे भजन्त्येतत्परे-
 च्छापूर्वकर्म हि ॥ ६२ ॥ कथं तर्हि किमिच्छन्नित्येवमिच्छा निषि-
 द्यते ॥ नेच्छानिषेधः किंत्विच्छावाधो भर्जितबीजवत् ॥ ६३ ॥
 भर्जितानि तु बीजानि सन्त्यकार्यकराणि च ॥ विद्वदिच्छा तथे-
 ष्टव्यासत्त्वबोधान्न कार्यकृत् ॥ ६४ ॥ दग्धबीजमरोहेऽपि भक्षणायो-
 पयुज्यते ॥ विद्वदिच्छाऽप्यल्पभोगं कुर्यान्न व्यसनं बहु ॥ ६५ ॥
 भोगेन चरितार्थत्वात्प्रारब्धं कर्म हीयते ॥ भोक्तव्यसत्यताभ्रान्त्या
 व्यसनं तत्र जायते ॥ ६६ ॥ मा विनश्यत्वयं भोगो वर्धतामुत्तरो-
 त्तरम् ॥ मा विघ्नाः प्रतिबध्नन्तु धन्योऽस्म्यस्मादिति भ्रमः ॥ ६७ ॥

यदभावि न तद्भावि भावि चेन्न तदन्यथा ॥ इति चिन्ताविषयोऽयं
 बोधो भ्रमनिवर्तकः ॥ ६८ ॥ समेऽपि भोगे व्यसनं भ्रान्तो गच्छेन्न
 बुद्धवान् ॥ अशक्यार्थस्य संकल्पाद्भ्रान्तस्य व्यसनं बहु ॥ ६९ ॥
 मायामयत्वं भोगस्य बुद्ध्वाऽऽस्थामुपसंहरन् ॥ भुञ्जानोऽपि न संकल्पं
 कुरुते व्यसनं कुतः ॥ ७० ॥ स्वप्नेन्द्रजालसदृशमचिन्त्यरचनात्म-
 कम् ॥ दृष्टनष्टं जगत्पश्यन् कथं तत्रानुरज्यति ॥ ७१ ॥ स्वस्वप्न-
 मापरोक्ष्येण दृष्ट्वा पश्यन् स्वजागरम् ॥ चिन्तयेदप्रमत्तः सन्नुभावनु-
 दिनं मुहुः ॥ ७२ ॥ चिरं तयोः सर्वसाम्यमनुसंधाय जागरे ॥
 सत्यत्वबुद्धिं संत्यज्य नानुरज्यति पूर्ववत् ॥ ७३ ॥ इन्द्रजालमिदं
 द्वैतमचिन्त्यरचनात्वतः ॥ इत्यविस्मरतो हानिः का वा प्रारब्धभो-
 गतः ॥ ७४ ॥ निर्बन्धस्तत्त्वविद्याया इन्द्रजालत्वसंस्मृतौ ॥ प्रार-
 ब्धस्याग्रहो भोगे जीवस्य सुखदुःखयोः ॥ ७५ ॥ विद्यारब्धे विरुध्येते
 न भिन्नविषयत्वतः ॥ जानद्भिरप्येन्द्रजालविनोदो दृश्यते खलु ॥ ७६ ॥
 जगत्सत्यत्वमापाद्य प्रारब्धं भोजयेद्यदि ॥ तदा विरोधि विद्याया
 भोगमात्रान्न सत्यता ॥ ७७ ॥ अनूनो जायते भोगः कल्पितैः
 स्वप्नवस्तुभिः ॥ जाग्रद्वस्तुभिरप्येवमसत्यैर्भोग इष्यताम् ॥ ७८ ॥
 यदि विद्याऽपहुवीत जगत्प्रारब्धघातिनी ॥ तदा स्यान्न तु माया-
 त्वबोधेन तदपहवः ॥ ७९ ॥ अनपहुत्य लोकास्तदिन्द्रजालमिदं
 त्विति ॥ जानन्त्येवानपहुत्य भोगं मायात्वधीस्तथा ॥ १८० ॥
 यत्र त्वस्य जगत्स्वात्मा पश्येत्कस्तत्र केन किम् ॥ किं जिघ्रेत्
 किं वदेद्वेति श्रुतौ तु बहु घोषितम् ॥ ८१ ॥ तेन द्वैतमपहुत्य
 विद्योदेति न चान्यथा ॥ तथा च विदुषो भोगः कथं स्यादिति
 चेच्छृणु ॥ ८२ ॥ सुषुप्तिविषया मुक्तिविषया वा श्रुतिस्त्विति ॥
 उक्तं स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरिति सूत्रे ह्यतिस्फुटम् ॥ ८३ ॥ अन्यथा
 याज्ञवल्क्यादेराचार्यत्वं न संभवेत् ॥ द्वैतदृष्टावविद्वत्ता द्वैतादृष्टौ न

वाग्वदेत् ॥ ८४ ॥ निर्विकल्पसमाधौ तु द्वैतादर्शनहेतुतः ॥ सैवा-
 परोक्षविद्येति चेत्सुषुप्तिस्तथा न किम् ॥ ८५ ॥ आत्मतत्त्वं न
 जानाति सुप्तौ यदि तदा त्वया ॥ आत्मधीरेव विद्येति वाच्यं न
 द्वैतविस्मृतिः ॥ ८६ ॥ उभयं मिलितं विद्या यदि तर्हि घटादयः ॥
 अर्धविद्याभाजिनः स्युः सकलद्वैतविस्मृतेः ॥ ८७ ॥ मशकध्वनि-
 मुख्यानां विक्षेपाणां बहुत्वतः ॥ तव विद्या तथा न स्याद्वटादीनां
 यथा दृढा ॥ ८८ ॥ आत्मधीरेव विद्येति यदि तर्हि सुखी भव ॥
 दुष्टचित्तं निरुन्ध्याच्चेन्निरुद्धं त्वं यथासुखम् ॥ ८९ ॥ तादिष्टमे-
 ष्टव्यमायामयत्वस्य समीक्षणात् ॥ इच्छन्नप्यज्ञवन्नेच्छेत्किमिच्छन्निति
 हि श्रुतम् ॥ १९० ॥ रागो लिङ्गमबोधस्य सन्तु रागादयो बुधे ॥
 इति शास्त्रद्वयं सार्थमेवं सत्यविरोधतः ॥ ९१ ॥ जगन्मिथ्यात्वव-
 त्स्वात्मासंगत्वस्य समीक्षणात् ॥ कस्य कामायेति वचो भोक्तृभाव-
 विवक्षया ॥ ९२ ॥ पतिजायादिकं सर्वं तत्तद्भोगाय नेच्छति ॥
 किंत्वात्मभोगार्थमिति श्रुताबुद्धोषितं बहु ॥ ९३ ॥ किं कूटस्थ-
 श्चिदाभासोऽथ वा किं बोभयात्मकः ॥ भोक्ता तत्र न कूटस्थोऽसं-
 गत्वाद्भोक्तृतां व्रजेत् ॥ ९४ ॥ सुखदुःखाभिमानाख्यो विकारो
 भोग उच्यते ॥ कूटस्थश्च विकारी चेत्येतन्न व्याहतं कथम् ॥ ९५ ॥
 विकारिबुद्ध्यधीनत्वादाभासे विकृतावपि ॥ निरधिष्ठानविभ्रान्तिः
 केवला न हि तिष्ठति ॥ ९६ ॥ उभयात्मक एवातो लोके भोक्ता
 निगद्यते ॥ तादृगात्मानमारभ्य कूटस्थः शेषितः श्रुतौ ॥ ९७ ॥
 आत्मा कतम इत्युक्ते याज्ञवल्क्यो विबोधयन् ॥ विज्ञानमयमारभ्या-
 संगं तं पर्यशेषयत् ॥ ९८ ॥ कोऽयमात्मेत्येवमादौ सर्वत्रात्मवि-
 चारतः ॥ उभयात्मकमारभ्य कूटस्थः शेष्यते श्रुतौ ॥ ९९ ॥
 कूटस्थसत्यतां स्वस्मिन्नध्यस्यात्माऽविवेकतः ॥ तात्त्विकीं भोक्तृतां
 मत्वा न कदाचिज्जिहासति ॥ १०० ॥ भोक्ता स्वस्यैव भोगाय

पतिजायादिमिच्छति ॥ एष लौकिकवृत्तान्तः श्रुत्या सम्यगनूदितः
 ॥ १ ॥ भोग्यानां भोक्तृशेषत्वान्मा भोग्येष्वनुरज्यताम् ॥ भोक्तृर्येव
 प्रधानेऽतोऽनुरागं तं विधित्सति ॥ २ ॥ या प्रीतिरविवेकानां
 विषयेष्वनपायिनी ॥ त्वामनुस्मरतः सा मे हृदयान्मापसर्पतु ॥ ३ ॥
 इतिन्यायेन सर्वस्माद्भोग्यजाताद्विरक्तधीः ॥ उपसंहृत्य तां प्रीतिं
 भोक्तृर्येनं बुभुत्सते ॥ ४ ॥ स्रक्चन्दनवधूवस्त्रसुवर्णादिषु पामरः ॥
 अप्रमत्तो यथा तद्वन्न प्रमाद्यति भोक्तुरि ॥ ५ ॥ काव्यनाटकतर्का-
 दिमभ्यस्यति निरन्तरम् ॥ विजिगीषुर्यथा तद्वन्मुमुक्षुः स्वं विचारयेत्
 ॥ ६ ॥ जपयागोपासनादि कुरुते श्रद्धया यथा ॥ स्वर्गादिवाञ्छया
 तद्वच्छ्रद्धयात्स्वे मुमुक्षया ॥ ७ ॥ चित्तैकाग्र्यं यथा योगी महायासेन
 साधयेत् ॥ अणिमादिप्रेप्सयैवं विविच्यात् स्वं मुमुक्षया ॥ ८ ॥
 कौशलानि विवर्धन्ते तेषामभ्यासपाटवात् ॥ यथा तद्वद्विवेकोऽस्या-
 प्यभ्यासाद्विशदायते ॥ ९ ॥ विविचिता भोक्तृतत्वं जाग्रदादिष्वसं-
 गता ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां साक्षिण्यध्यवसीयते ॥ २१० ॥ यत्र
 यदृश्यते द्रष्टा जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ॥ तत्रैव तन्नेतरत्रेत्यनुभूतिर्हि
 संमता ॥ ११ ॥ स यत्तत्रेक्षते किञ्चित्तेनानन्वागतो भवेत् ॥ दृष्ट्वैव
 पुण्यं पापं चेत्येवं श्रुतिषु डिण्डिमः ॥ १२ ॥ जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यादि-
 प्रपञ्चं यत्प्रकाशते ॥ तद्वद्भाहमिति ज्ञात्वा सर्वबन्धैः प्रमुच्यते
 ॥ १३ ॥ एक एवात्मा मन्तव्यो जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ॥ स्थानत्रय-
 व्यतीतस्य पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥ १४ ॥ त्रिषु धामसु यद्भोग्यं
 भोक्ता भोगश्च यद्भवेत् ॥ तेभ्यो विलक्षणः साक्षी चिन्मात्रोऽहं
 सदाशिवः ॥ १५ ॥ एवं विवेचिते तत्त्वे विज्ञानमयशब्दितः ॥
 चिदाभासो विकारी यो भोक्तृतत्वं तस्य शिष्यते ॥ १६ ॥ मायि-
 कोऽयं चिदाभासः श्रुतेरनुभवादपि ॥ इन्द्रजालं जगत्प्रोक्तं तद-
 न्तःपात्ययं यतः ॥ १७ ॥ विलयोऽप्यस्य सुप्त्यादौ साक्षिणा ह्यनु-

भूयते ॥ एतादृशं स्वस्वभावं विविनक्ति पुनःपुनः ॥ १८ ॥
 विविच्य नाशं निश्चित्य पुनर्भोगं न वाञ्छति ॥ मुमूर्षुः शायितो
 भूमौ विवाहं कोऽभिवाञ्छति ॥ १९ ॥ जिहेति व्यवहर्तुं च
 भोक्ताऽहमिति पूर्ववत् ॥ छिन्ननास इव हीतः क्लिश्यन्नारब्धमश्रुते
 ॥ २२० ॥ यदा स्वस्यापि भोक्तृत्वं मन्तुं जिहेत्ययं तदा ॥
 साक्षिण्यारोपयेदेतदिति कैव कथा वृथा ॥ २१ ॥ इत्यभिप्रेत्य
 भोक्तारमाक्षिपत्यविशङ्क्या ॥ कस्य कामायेति ततः शरीरानुज्वरो
 न हि ॥ २२ ॥ स्थूलं सूक्ष्मं कारणं च शरीरं त्रिविधं स्मृतम् ॥
 अवश्यं त्रिविधोऽस्त्येव तत्र तत्रोचितो ज्वरः ॥ २३ ॥ वातपि-
 त्तश्लेष्मजन्यव्याधयः कोटिशस्तनौ ॥ दुर्गन्धित्वकुरूपत्वदाहभङ्गा-
 दयस्तथा ॥ २४ ॥ कामक्रोधादयः शान्तिदान्त्याद्या लिङ्गदेहगाः ॥
 ज्वरा द्वयेऽपि बाधन्ते प्राह्याऽप्राह्या नरं क्रमात् ॥ २५ ॥ स्वं
 परं च न वेत्त्यात्मा विनष्ट इव कारणे ॥ आगामिदुःखबीजं चेत्ये-
 तदिन्द्रेण दर्शितम् ॥ २६ ॥ एते ज्वराः शरीरेषु त्रिषु स्वाभाविका
 मताः ॥ वियोगे तु ज्वरैस्तानि शरीराण्येव नासते ॥ २७ ॥
 तन्तोर्वियुज्येत पटो बालेभ्यः कम्बलो यथा ॥ मृदो घटस्तथा देहो
 ज्वरेभ्योऽपीति दृश्यताम् ॥ २८ ॥ चिदाभासे स्वतः कोऽपि ज्वरो
 नास्ति यतश्चितः ॥ प्रकाशैकस्वभावत्वमेव दृष्टं न चेतरत् ॥ २९ ॥
 चिदाभासेऽप्यसंभाव्या ज्वराः साक्षिणि का कथा ॥ एवमप्येकतां
 मेने चिदाभासो ह्यविद्यया ॥ २३० ॥ साक्षिसत्यत्वमध्यस्य स्वेनो-
 पेते वपुस्त्रये ॥ तत्सर्वं वास्तवं स्वस्य स्वरूपमिति मन्यते ॥ ३१ ॥
 एतस्मिन् भ्रान्तिकालेऽयं शरीरेषु ज्वरस्त्वथ ॥ स्वयमेव ज्वरामीति
 मन्यते हि कुटुम्बिवत् ॥ ३२ ॥ पुत्रदारेषु तप्यत्सु तपामीति वृथा
 यथा ॥ मन्यते पुरुषस्तद्रदाभासोऽप्यभिमन्यते ॥ ३३ ॥ विविच्य
 भ्रान्तिमुज्झित्वा स्वमप्यगणयन्सदा ॥ चिन्तयन्साक्षिणं कस्माच्छ-

रीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ॥ ३४ ॥ अयथावस्तुसर्पादिज्ञानं हेतुः पलायने ॥
 रज्जुज्ञानेऽहिधीध्वस्तौ कृतमप्यनुशोचति ॥ ३५ ॥ मिथ्याभियो-
 गदोषस्य प्रायश्चित्तप्रसिद्धये ॥ क्षमापयन्निवात्मानं साक्षिणं शरणं
 गतः ॥ ३६ ॥ आवृत्तपापनुत्यर्थं स्नानाद्यावत्यर्ते यथा ॥ आवर्त-
 यन्निव ध्यानं सदा साक्षिपरायणः ॥ ३७ ॥ उपस्थकुष्ठिनी वेश्या
 विलासेषु विलज्जते ॥ जानतोऽग्रे तथाऽऽभासः स्वप्रख्यातौ
 विलज्जते ॥ ३८ ॥ गृहीतो ब्राह्मणो म्लेच्छैः प्रायश्चित्तं चरन् पुनः ॥
 म्लेच्छैः संकीर्यते नैव तथाऽऽभासः शरीरकैः ॥ ३९ ॥ यौवराज्ये
 स्थितो राजपुत्रः साम्राज्यवाञ्छया ॥ राजानुकारी भवति तथा
 साक्ष्यनुकार्ययम् ॥ ४० ॥ यो ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवत्येव इति
 श्रुतिः ॥ श्रुत्वा तदेकचित्तः सन् ब्रह्म वेत्ति न चेतरेत् ॥ ४१ ॥
 देवत्वकामा ह्यस्यादौ प्रविशन्ति यथा तथा ॥ साक्षित्वेनावशेषाय
 स्वविनाशं स वाञ्छति ॥ ४२ ॥ यावत्स्वदेहदाहं स नरत्वं नैव
 मुञ्चति ॥ तावदारब्धदेहं स्यान्नाभासत्वविमोचनम् ॥ ४३ ॥
 रज्जुज्ञानेऽपि कम्पादिः शनैरेवोपशाम्यति ॥ पुनर्मन्दान्धकारे सा
 रज्जुः क्षिप्तोरगी भवेत् ॥ ४४ ॥ एवमारब्धभोगोऽपि शनैः शाम्यति
 नो हठात् ॥ भोगकाले कदाचित्तु मर्त्योऽहमिति भासते ॥ ४५ ॥
 नैतावताऽपराधेन तत्त्वज्ञानं विनश्यति ॥ जीवन्मुक्तिव्रतं नेदं किंतु
 वस्तुस्थितिः खलु ॥ ४६ ॥ दशमोऽपि शिरस्ताडं रुदन्बुद्धा न
 रोदिति ॥ शिरोव्रणस्तु मासेन शनैः शाम्यति नो तदा ॥ ४७ ॥
 दशमामृतिलाभेन जातो हर्षो व्रणव्यथाम् ॥ तिरोधत्ते मुक्तिलाभस्तथा
 प्रारब्धदुःखिताम् ॥ ४८ ॥ व्रताभावाद्यदाऽध्यासस्तदा भूयो
 विविच्यताम् ॥ रससेवी दिने भुङ्क्ते भूयोभूयो यथा तथा ॥ ४९ ॥
 शमयत्यौषधेनायं दशमः स्वं व्रणं यथा ॥ भोगेन शमयित्वैतत्प्रारब्धं
 मुच्यते तथा ॥ ५० ॥ किमिच्छन्निति वाक्योक्तः शोकमोक्ष

उदीरितः ॥ आभासस्य ह्यवस्थैषा षष्ठी तृप्तिस्तु सप्तमी ॥ ५१ ॥
 साङ्कुशा विषयैस्तृप्तिरियं तृप्तिर्निरङ्कुशा ॥ कृतं कृत्यं प्रापणीयं
 प्राप्तमित्येव तृप्यति ॥ ५२ ॥ ऐहिकामुष्मिकव्रातसिद्धयै मुक्तेश्च
 सिद्धये ॥ बहु कृत्यं पुराऽस्याभूत्तत्सर्वमधुना कृतम् ॥ ५३ ॥
 तदेतत्कृतकृत्यत्वं प्रतियोगिपुरःसरम् ॥ अनुसंदधदेवायमेवं तृप्यति
 नित्यशः ॥ ५४ ॥ दुःखिनोऽज्ञाः संसरन्तु कामं पुत्राद्यपेक्षया ॥
 परमानन्दपूर्णोऽहं संसरामि किमिच्छया ॥ ५५ ॥ अनुतिष्ठन्तु
 कर्माणि परलोकयियासवः ॥ सर्वलोकात्मकः कस्मादनुतिष्ठामि किं
 कथम् ॥ ५६ ॥ व्याचक्षतां ते शास्त्राणि वेदानध्यापयन्तु वा ॥
 येऽत्राधिकारिणो मे तु नाधिकारोऽक्रियत्वतः ॥ ५७ ॥ निद्राभिक्षे
 स्नानशौचे नेच्छामि न करोमि च ॥ द्रष्टारश्चेत्कल्पयन्ति किं मे
 स्यादन्यकल्पनात् ॥ ५८ ॥ गुञ्जापुञ्जादि दह्येत नान्यारोपितव-
 ह्निना ॥ नान्यारोपितसंसारधर्मानेवमहं भजे ॥ ५९ ॥ शृण्वन्त्वज्ञा-
 ततत्त्वास्ते जानन्कस्माच्छृणोम्यहम् ॥ मन्यन्तां संशयापन्ना न
 मन्येऽहमसंशयः ॥ ६० ॥ विपर्यस्तो निदिध्यासेत्किं ध्यानमवि-
 पर्ययात् ॥ देहात्मत्वविपर्यासं न कदाचिद्भजाम्यहम् ॥ ६१ ॥
 अहं मनुष्य इत्यादिव्यवहारो विनाऽप्यमुम् ॥ विपर्यासं चिराभ्य-
 स्तवासनातोऽवकल्पते ॥ ६२ ॥ प्रारब्धकर्मणि क्षीणे व्यवहारो
 निवर्तते ॥ कर्माक्षये त्वसौ नैव शाम्येद्दयानसहस्रतः ॥ ६३ ॥
 विरलत्वं व्यवहृतेरिष्टं चेद्दयानमस्तु ते ॥ अबाधिकां व्यवहृतिं
 पश्यन् ध्यायाम्यहं कुतः ॥ ६४ ॥ विक्षेपो नास्ति यस्मान्मे न
 समाधिस्ततो मम ॥ विक्षेपो वा समाधिर्वा मनसः स्याद्विकारिणः
 ॥ ६५ ॥ नित्यानुभवरूपस्य को मे वाऽनुभवः पृथक् ॥ कृतं कृत्यं
 प्रापणीयं प्राप्तमित्येव निश्चयः ॥ ६६ ॥ व्यवहारो लौकिको
 वा शास्त्रीयो वाऽन्यथाऽपि वा ॥ ममाकर्तुरलेपस्य यथाऽरब्धं

प्रवर्तताम् ॥ ६७ ॥ अथवा कृतकृत्योऽपि लोकानुग्रहकाम्यया ॥
 शास्त्रीयेणैव मार्गेण वर्तेऽहं का मम क्षतिः ॥ ६८ ॥ देवार्चनस्तान-
 शौचभिक्षादौ वर्ततां वपुः ॥ तारं जपतु वाक् तद्रूपठत्वाम्नाय-
 मस्तकम् ॥ ६९ ॥ विष्णुं ध्यायतु धीर्यद्वा ब्रह्मानन्दे विलीयताम् ॥
 साक्ष्यहं किञ्चिदप्यत्र न कुर्वे नापि कारये ॥ २७० ॥ एवं च
 कलहः कुत्र संभवेत्कर्मिणो मम ॥ विभिन्नविषयत्वेन पूर्वापरसमुद्र-
 वत् ॥ ७१ ॥ वपुर्वाग्धीषु निर्वन्धः कर्मिणो न तु साक्षिणि ॥
 ज्ञानिनः साक्ष्यलेपत्वे निर्वन्धो नेतरत्र हि ॥ ७२ ॥ एवं चान्यो-
 न्यवृत्तान्तानभिज्ञौ बधिराविव ॥ विवदेतां बुद्धिमन्तो हसन्त्येव
 विलोक्य तौ ॥ ७३ ॥ यं कर्मी न विजानाति साक्षिणं तस्य
 तत्त्ववित् ॥ ब्रह्मत्वं बुध्यतां तत्र कर्मिणः किं विहीयते ॥ ७४ ॥
 देहवाग्बुद्ध्यस्त्यक्ता ज्ञानिनाऽनृतबुद्धितः ॥ कर्मी प्रवर्तयत्वाभिज्ञा-
 निनो हीयतेऽत्र किम् ॥ ७५ ॥ प्रवृत्तिर्नोपयुक्ता चेन्नवृत्तिः कोपयु-
 ज्यते ॥ बोधहेतुर्निवृत्तिश्चेद्बुभुत्सायां तथेतरा ॥ ७६ ॥ बुद्धश्चेन्न
 बुभुत्सेत नाप्यसौ बुध्यते पुनः ॥ अबाधादनुवर्तेत बोधो न त्वन्य-
 साधनात् ॥ ७७ ॥ नाविद्या नापि तत्कार्यं बोधं बाधितुमर्हति ॥
 पुरैव तत्त्वबोधेन बाधिते ते उभे यतः ॥ ७८ ॥ बाधितं दृश्यता-
 मक्षैस्तेन बाधो न शक्यते ॥ जीवन्नाखुर्न मार्जारं हन्ति हन्यात्कथं
 मृतः ॥ ७९ ॥ अपि राशुपतास्त्रेण विद्धश्चेन्न ममार यः ॥ निष्फलेषु
 वितुन्नाज्ज्ञो नङ्गयतीत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥ २८० ॥ आदावविद्यया
 चित्रैः स्वकार्यैर्जृम्भमाणया ॥ युद्धा बोधोऽजयत्सोऽद्य सुदृढो
 बाध्यतां कथम् ॥ ८१ ॥ तिष्ठन्त्वज्ञानतत्कार्यशवा बोधेन मारिताः ॥
 न भीतिर्बोधसम्राजः कीर्तिः प्रत्युत तस्य तैः ॥ ८२ ॥ य एवम-
 तिशूरेण बोधेन न विद्युज्यते ॥ प्रवृत्त्या वा निवृत्त्या वा देहादि-
 गतयाऽस्य किम् ॥ ८३ ॥ प्रवृत्तावाग्रहो न्याय्यो बोधहीनस्य

सर्वथा ॥ स्वर्गाय वाऽपवर्गाय यतितव्यं यतो नृभिः ॥ ८४ ॥
 विद्वांश्चेत्तादृशां मध्ये तिष्ठेत्तदनुरोधतः ॥ कायेन मनसा वाचा करो-
 त्येवाखिलाः क्रियाः ॥ ८५ ॥ एष मध्ये बुभूत्सूनां यदा तिष्ठेत्तदा
 पुनः ॥ बोधायैषां क्रियाः सर्वा दूषयंस्त्यजतु स्वयम् ॥ ८६ ॥
 अविद्वदनुसारेण वृत्तिर्बुद्धस्य युज्यते ॥ स्तनंधयानुसारेण वर्तते
 तत्पिता यतः ॥ ८७ ॥ अधिक्षिप्तस्ताडितो वा बालेन स्वपिता
 तदा ॥ न क्लिश्नाति न कुप्येत बालं प्रत्युत लालयेत् ॥ ८८ ॥
 निन्दितः स्तूयमानो वा विद्वानज्ञैर्न निन्दति ॥ न स्ताति किंतु तेषां
 स्याद्यथा बोधस्तथाऽऽचरेत् ॥ ८९ ॥ येनायं नटनेनात्र बुध्यते
 कार्यमेव तत् ॥ अज्ञप्रबोधानैवान्यत्कार्यमस्त्यत्र तद्विदः ॥ २९० ॥
 कृतकृत्यतया तृप्तः प्राप्तप्राप्यतया पुनः ॥ तृप्यन्नैवं स्वमनसा मन्य-
 तेऽसौ निरंतरम् ॥ ९१ ॥ धन्योऽहं धन्योऽहं नित्यं स्वात्मानमञ्जसा
 वेत्ति ॥ धन्योऽहं धन्योऽहं ब्रह्मानन्दो विभाति मे स्पष्टम् ॥ ९२ ॥
 धन्योऽहं धन्योऽहं दुःखं सांसारिकं न वीक्षेऽद्य ॥ धन्योऽहं धन्योऽहं
 स्वस्याज्ञानं पलायितं कापि ॥ ९३ ॥ धन्योऽहं धन्योऽहं कर्तव्यं मे
 न विद्यते किंचित् ॥ धन्योऽहं धन्योऽहं प्राप्तव्यं सर्वमद्य संपन्नम्
 ॥ ९४ ॥ धन्योऽहं धन्योऽहं तृप्तेर्मे कोपमा भवेल्लोके ॥ धन्योऽहं
 धन्योऽहं धन्योऽहं पुनः पुनर्धन्यः ॥ ९५ ॥ अहो पुण्यमहोपुण्यं
 फलितं फलितं दृढम् ॥ अस्य पुण्यस्य संपत्तेरहो वयमहो वयम्
 ॥ ९६ ॥ अहो शास्त्रमहो शास्त्रमहो गुरुरहो गुरुः ॥ अहो ज्ञानमहो
 ज्ञानमहो सुखमहो सुखम् ॥ ९७ ॥ तृप्तिदीपमिमं नित्यं येऽनुसंदधते
 बुधाः ॥ ब्रह्मानन्दे निमज्जन्तस्ते तृप्यन्ति निरंतरम् ॥ २९८ ॥

इति श्रीविद्यारण्यकृतपञ्चदश्यां तृप्तिदीपप्रकरणम् ॥

॥ अथ कूटस्थदीपप्रकरणम् ॥ ८ ॥

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

खादित्यदीपिते कुड्ये दर्पणादित्यदीप्तिवत् ॥ कूटस्थभासितो देहो धीस्थजीवेन भास्यते ॥ १ ॥ अनेकदर्पणादित्यदीप्तीनां बहुसंधिषु ॥ इतरा व्यज्यते तासामभावेऽपि प्रकाशते ॥ २ ॥ चिदाभास-विशिष्टानां तथाऽनेकधियामसौ ॥ संधिं धियामभावं च भासयन् प्रविविच्यताम् ॥ ३ ॥ घटैकाकारधीस्था चिद् घटमेवावभासयेत् ॥ घटस्य ज्ञातता ब्रह्मचैतन्येनावभासते ॥ ४ ॥ अज्ञातत्वेन ज्ञातोऽयं घटो बुद्ध्युदयात्पुरा ॥ ब्रह्मणैवोपरिष्ठात्तु ज्ञातत्वेनेत्यसौ भिदा ॥ ५ ॥ चिदाभासान्तधीवृत्तिर्ज्ञानं लोहान्तकुन्तवत् ॥ जाड्यमज्ञानमेताभ्यां व्याप्तः कुम्भो द्विधोच्यते ॥ ६ ॥ अज्ञातो ब्रह्मणा भास्यो ज्ञातः कुम्भस्तथा न किम् ॥ ज्ञानत्वजननेनैव चिदाभासपरिहयः ॥ ७ ॥ आभासहीनया बुद्ध्या ज्ञातत्वं नैव जन्यते ॥ तादृग्बुद्धेर्विशेषः को मृदादेः स्याद्विकारिणः ॥ ८ ॥ ज्ञात इत्युच्यते कुम्भो मृदा लिप्तो न कुत्रचित् ॥ धीमात्रव्याप्तकुम्भस्य ज्ञातत्वं नेष्यते तथा ॥ ९ ॥ ज्ञातत्वं नाम कुम्भेऽतश्चिदाभासफलोदयः ॥ न फलं ब्रह्मचैतन्यं मानात्प्रागपि सत्त्वतः ॥ १० ॥ परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन संमता ॥ संवित्सैवेह मेयोऽर्थो वेदान्तोक्तिप्रमाणतः ॥ ११ ॥ इति वार्तिककारेण चित्सादृश्यं विवक्षितम् ॥ ब्रह्मचित्प्रलयोर्भेदः सहस्रयां विश्रुतो यतः ॥ १२ ॥ आभास उदितस्तस्माज्ज्ञातत्वं जनयेद्घटे ॥ तत्पुनर्ब्रह्मणाभास्यमज्ञातत्ववदेव हि ॥ १३ ॥ धीवृत्त्याभासकुम्भानां समूहो भास्यते चिदा ॥ कुम्भमात्रफलत्वात्स एक आभासतः स्फुरेत् ॥ १४ ॥ चैतन्यं द्विगुणं कुम्भे ज्ञातत्वेन स्फुरत्यतः ॥ अन्येऽनुव्यवसायाख्यमाहुरेतद्यथोदि-

तम् ॥ १५ ॥ घटोयमित्यसावुक्तिराभासस्य प्रसादतः ॥ विज्ञातो
 घट इत्युक्तिर्ब्रह्मानुग्रहतो भवेत् ॥ १६ ॥ आभासब्रह्मणी देहाद्व-
 हिर्यद्वद्विवेचिते ॥ तद्वदाभासकूटस्थौ विविच्येतां वपुष्यपि ॥ १७ ॥
 अहंवृत्तौ चिदाभासः कामक्रोधादिकासु च ॥ संव्याप्य वर्तते तप्ते
 लोहे वह्निर्यथा तथा ॥ १८ ॥ स्वमात्रं भासयेत्तप्तं लोहं नान्यत्क-
 दाचन ॥ एवमाभाससहिता वृत्तयः स्वस्वभासिकाः ॥ १९ ॥
 क्रमाद्विच्छिद्य विच्छिद्य जायन्ते वृत्तयोऽखिलाः ॥ सर्वा अपि
 विलीयन्ते सुप्तिमूर्च्छासमाधिषु ॥ २० ॥ संधयोऽखिलवृत्तीनामभा-
 वाश्चावभासिताः ॥ निर्विकारेण येनासौ कूटस्थ इति चोच्यते
 ॥ २१ ॥ घटे द्विगुणचैतन्यं यथा बाह्ये तथाऽन्तरे ॥ वृत्तिष्वपि
 ततस्तत्र वैशद्यं संधितोऽधिकम् ॥ २२ ॥ ज्ञातताज्ञातते न स्तो
 घटवद्वृत्तिषु कचित् ॥ स्वस्य स्वेनागृहीतत्वात्ताभिश्चाज्ञाननाशनात्
 ॥ २३ ॥ द्विगुणीकृतचैतन्ये जन्मनाशानुभूतितः ॥ अकूटस्थं तद-
 न्यत्तु कूटस्थमविकारतः ॥ २४ ॥ अन्तःकरणतद्वृत्तिसाक्षीत्यादाव-
 नेकथा ॥ कूटस्थ एव सर्वत्र पूर्वाचार्यैर्विनिश्चितः ॥ २५ ॥ आत्मा-
 भासाश्रयाश्चैवं मुखाभासाश्रया यथा ॥ गम्यन्ते शास्त्रयुक्तिभ्या-
 मित्याभासश्च वर्णितः ॥ २६ ॥ बुद्ध्यवच्छिन्नकूटस्थो लोकान्तरग-
 मागमौ ॥ कर्तुं शक्तो घटाकाश इवाभासेन किं वद ॥ २७ ॥
 शृण्वसंगः परिच्छेदमात्राज्जीवो भवेन्नहि ॥ अन्यथा घटकुड्याद्यै-
 रवच्छिन्नस्य जीवता ॥ २८ ॥ न कुड्यसदृशी बुद्धिः स्वच्छत्वा-
 दिति चेत्तथा ॥ अस्तु नाम परिच्छेदे किं स्वाच्छयेन भवेत्तव
 ॥ २९ ॥ प्रस्थेन दारुजन्येन कांस्यजन्येन वा न हि ॥ विक्रेतुस्त-
 ण्डुलादीनां परिमाणं विशिष्यते ॥ ३० ॥ परिमाणाविशेषोपि प्रति-
 बिम्बो विशिष्यते ॥ कांस्ये यदि तदा बुद्धावप्याभासो भवेद्वलात्
 ॥ ३१ ॥ ईषद्भासनमाभासः प्रतिबिम्बस्तथाविधः ॥ बिम्बलक्षण-

हीनः सन् बिम्बवद्भासते स हि ॥ ३२ ॥ ससंगत्वविकाराभ्यां
 बिम्बलक्षणहीनता ॥ स्फूर्तिरूपत्वमेतस्य बिम्बवद्भासनं विदुः ॥ ३३ ॥
 नहि धीभावभावित्वादाभासोऽस्ति धियः पृथक् ॥ यथा मृदल्पमे-
 बोक्तं धीरप्येवं स्वदेहतः ॥ ३४ ॥ देहे मृतेऽपि बुद्धिश्चेच्छास्त्रादस्ति
 तथासति ॥ बुद्धेरन्यश्चिदाभासः प्रवेशश्रुतिषु श्रुतः ॥ ३५ ॥
 धीयुक्तस्य प्रवेशश्चैतरेये धियः पृथक् ॥ आत्मा प्रवेशं संकल्प्य
 प्रविष्ट इति गीयते ॥ ३६ ॥ कथं न्विदं साक्षदेहं मृते स्यादिति-
 रणात् ॥ विदार्य मूर्धसीमानं प्रविष्टः संसरत्ययम् ॥ ३७ ॥ कथं
 प्रविष्टोऽसंगश्चेत्स्पृष्टिर्वाऽस्य कथं वद ॥ मायिकत्वं तयोस्तुल्यं विना-
 शश्च समस्तयोः ॥ ३८ ॥ समुत्थायैष भूतेभ्यस्तान्येवानुविनश्यति ॥
 विस्पष्टमिति मैत्रेय्यै याज्ञवल्क्य उवाच हि ॥ ३९ ॥ अविनाश्य-
 मात्मेति कूटस्थः प्रविवेचितः ॥ मात्रासंसर्ग इत्येवमसंगत्वस्य कीर्ति-
 नात् ॥ ४० ॥ जीवापेतं वाव किल शरीरं म्रियते न सः ॥
 इत्यत्र न विमोक्षोर्यः किंतु लोकान्तरे गतिः ॥ ४१ ॥ नाहं ब्रह्मेति
 बुध्येत स विनाशीति चेन्न तत् ॥ सामानाधिकरण्यस्य बाधायामपि
 संभवात् ॥ ४२ ॥ योऽयं स्थाणुः पुमानेष पुंश्या स्थाणुधीरिव ॥
 ब्रह्मास्मीति धिया शेषाप्यहंबुद्धिर्निवर्त्यते ॥ ४३ ॥ नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धा-
 वप्येवमाचार्यैः स्पष्टमीरितम् ॥ सामानाधिकरण्यस्य बाधार्थत्वमतोऽस्तु
 तत् ॥ ४४ ॥ सर्वं ब्रह्मेति जगता सामानाधिकरण्यवत् ॥ अहं
 ब्रह्मेति जीवेन सामानाधिकृतिर्भवेत् ॥ ४५ ॥ सामानाधिकरण्यस्य
 बाधार्थत्वं निराकृतम् ॥ प्रयत्नतो विवरणे कूटस्थस्य विवक्षया
 ॥ ४६ ॥ शोधितस्त्वंपदार्थो यः कूटस्थो ब्रह्मरूपताम् ॥ तस्य
 वक्तुं विवरणे तथोक्तमितरत्र च ॥ ४७ ॥ देहेन्द्रियादियुक्तस्य जीवा-
 भासभ्रमस्य या ॥ अधिष्ठानचितिः सैषा कूटस्थात्र विवक्षिता ॥ ४८ ॥
 जगद्भ्रमस्य सर्वस्य यदधिष्ठानमीरितम् ॥ त्रय्यन्तेषु तदत्र स्याद्ब्रह्म-

शब्दविवक्षितम् ॥ ४९ ॥ एतस्मिन्नेव चैतन्ये जगदारोप्यते यदा ॥
 तदा तदेकदेशस्य जीवाभासस्य का कथा ॥ ५० ॥ जगत्तदेकदेशा-
 ख्यसमारोप्यस्य भेदतः ॥ तत्त्वंपदार्थौ भिन्नौ स्तो वस्तुतस्त्वेकता
 चितः ॥ ५१ ॥ कर्तृत्वादीन्बुद्धिधर्मान् स्फूर्त्याख्यां चात्मरूपताम् ॥
 दधद्विभाति पुरत आभासोऽतो भ्रमो भवेत् ॥ ५२ ॥ का बुद्धिः
 कोऽयमाभासः को वात्माऽत्र जगत्कथम् ॥ इत्यनिर्णयतो मोहः
 सोऽयं संसार इष्यते ॥ ५३ ॥ बुद्ध्यादीनां स्वरूपं यो विविनक्ति
 स तत्त्ववित् ॥ स एव मुक्त इत्येवं वेदान्तेषु विनिश्चयः ॥ ५४ ॥
 एवं च सति बन्धः स्यात्कस्येत्यादिकुतर्कजाः ॥ विडम्बना दृढं
 खण्ड्याः खण्डनोक्तिप्रकारतः ॥ ५५ ॥ वृत्तेः साक्षितया वृत्तिप्राग-
 भावस्य च स्थितः ॥ बुभुत्सायां तथाऽज्ञोऽस्मीत्याभासाज्ञानवस्तुनः
 ॥ ५६ ॥ असत्यालम्बनत्वेन सत्यः सर्वजडस्य तु ॥ साधकत्वेन
 चिद्रूपः सदा प्रेमास्पदत्वतः ॥ ५७ ॥ आनन्दरूपः सर्वार्थसाधक-
 त्वेन हेतुना ॥ सर्वसंबन्धवत्त्वेन संपूर्णः शिवसंज्ञितः ॥ ५८ ॥
 इति शैवपुराणेषु कूटस्थः प्रविवेचितः ॥ जीवेशत्वादिरहितः केवलः
 स्वप्रभः शिवः ॥ ५९ ॥ मायाभासेन जीवेशौ करोतीति श्रुतत्वतः ॥
 मायिकावेव जीवेशौ स्वच्छौ तौ काचकुम्भवत् ॥ ६० ॥ अन्नजन्यं
 मनो देहात्स्वच्छं यद्वत्तथैव तौ ॥ मायिकावपि सर्वस्मादन्यस्मात्स्व-
 च्छतां गतौ ॥ ६१ ॥ चिद्रूपत्वं च संभाव्यं चित्त्वेनैव प्रकाशनात् ॥
 सर्वकल्पनशक्ता या मायाया दुष्करं नहि ॥ ६२ ॥ अस्मन्निद्राऽपि
 जीवेशौ चेतनौ स्वप्नौ सृजेत् ॥ महामाया सृजत्येतावित्याश्चर्यं
 किमत्र ते ॥ ६३ ॥ सर्वज्ञत्वादिकं चेशे कल्पयित्वा प्रदर्शयेत् ॥
 धर्मिणं कल्पयेद्याऽस्याः को भारो धर्मकल्पने ॥ ६४ ॥ कूटस्थेऽप्य-
 तिशङ्का स्यादिति चेन्माऽतिशङ्क्यताम् ॥ कूटस्थमायिकत्वे तु प्रमाणं
 नहि विद्यते ॥ ६५ ॥ वस्तुत्वं घोषयन्त्यस्य वेदान्ताः सकला अपि ॥

सपन्नरूपं वस्त्वन्यन्न सहन्तेऽत्र किञ्चन ॥ ६६ ॥ श्रुत्यर्थं विशदी-
 कुर्मो न तर्काद्विचि किञ्चन ॥ तेन तार्किकशङ्कानामत्र कोऽवसरो वद
 ॥ ६७ ॥ तस्मात्कुतर्कं संत्यज्य मुमुक्षुः श्रुतिमाश्रयेत् ॥ श्रुतौ तु
 माया जीवेशौ करोतीति प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ६८ ॥ ईक्षणादिप्रवेशान्ता
 सृष्टिरीशकृता भवेत् ॥ जाग्रदादिविमोक्षान्तः संसारो जीवकर्तृकः
 ॥ ६९ ॥ असंग एव कूटस्थः सर्वदा नास्य कश्चन ॥ भवत्यति-
 शयस्तेन मनस्येवं विचार्यताम् ॥ ७० ॥ न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न
 बद्धो न च साधकः ॥ न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ ७१ ॥
 अवाङ्मनसगम्यं तं श्रुतिर्बोधयितुं सदा ॥ जीवमीशं जगद्रूपि
 समाश्रित्य प्रबोधयेत् ॥ ७२ ॥ यया यया भवेत्पुंसां व्युत्पत्तिः
 प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥ सा सैव प्रक्रियेह स्यात् साध्वीत्याचार्यभाषितम्
 ॥ ७३ ॥ श्रुतितात्पर्यमखिलमबुद्धा भ्राम्यते जडः ॥ विवेकी त्वखिलं
 बुद्ध्वा तिष्ठत्यानन्दवारिधौ ॥ ७४ ॥ मायामेघो जगन्नीरं वर्षत्वेष
 यथा तथा ॥ चिदाकाशस्य नो हानिर्न वा लाभ इति स्थितिः ॥ ७५ ॥
 इमं कूटस्थदीपं योऽनुसंधत्ते निरन्तरम् ॥ स्वयं कूटस्थरूपेण दीप्य-
 तेऽसौ निरन्तरम् ॥ ७६ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यविद्यारण्यस्वामिविरचितपञ्चदश्यां

कूटस्थदीपः समाप्तः ॥

॥ अथ ध्यानदीपप्रकरणम् ॥ ९ ॥

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

संवादिभ्रमवद्ब्रह्मतत्त्वोपास्त्यापि मुच्यते ॥ उत्तरे तापनीयेऽतः
 श्रुतोपास्तिरनेकधा ॥ १ ॥ मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याऽभिधावतोः ॥
 मिथ्याज्ञानाविशेषेऽपि विशेषेर्धेक्रियां प्रति ॥ २ ॥ दीपोऽपवरक-
 स्यान्तर्वर्तते तत्प्रभा बहिः ॥ दृश्यते द्वार्यथान्यत्र तद्बृष्टा मणेः प्रभा
 ॥ ३ ॥ दूरे प्रभाद्वयं दृष्ट्वा मणिबुद्ध्याऽभिधावतोः ॥ प्रभायां
 मणिबुद्धिस्तु मिथ्याज्ञानं द्वयोरपि ॥ ४ ॥ न लभ्यते मणिर्दीपप्रभां
 प्रत्यभिधावता ॥ प्रभायां धावताऽवश्यं लभ्येतैव मणिर्मणेः ॥ ५ ॥
 दीपप्रभामणिभ्रान्तिर्विसंवादिभ्रमः स्मृतः ॥ मणिप्रभामणिभ्रान्तिः
 संवादिभ्रम उच्यते ॥ ६ ॥ बाष्पं धूमतया बुद्ध्वा तत्राङ्गारानुमा-
 नतः ॥ वह्निर्यदृच्छया लब्धः स संवादिभ्रमो मतः ॥ ७ ॥ गोदा-
 वर्युदकं गङ्गोदकं मत्वा विशुद्धये ॥ संप्रोक्ष्य शुद्धिमाप्नोति स संवा-
 दिभ्रमो मतः ॥ ८ ॥ ज्वरेणाप्तः सन्निपातं भ्रान्त्या नारायणं
 स्मरन् ॥ मृतः स्वर्गमवाप्नोति स संवादिभ्रमो मतः ॥ ९ ॥
 प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानस्य तथा शास्त्रस्य गोचरे ॥ उक्तन्यायेन संवादि-
 भ्रमाः सन्ति हि कोटिशः ॥ १० ॥ अन्यथा मृत्तिकादारुशिलाः
 स्युर्देवताः कथम् ॥ अग्नित्वादिधियोपास्याः कथं वा योषिदादयः
 ॥ ११ ॥ अयथावस्तुविज्ञानात्फलं लभ्यत ईप्सितम् ॥ काकताली-
 यतः सोऽयं संवादिभ्रम उच्यते ॥ १२ ॥ स्वयंभ्रमोऽपि संवादी
 यथा सम्यक्फलप्रदः ॥ ब्रह्मतत्त्वोपासनाऽपि तथा मुक्तिफलप्रदा
 ॥ १३ ॥ वेदान्तेभ्यो ब्रह्मतत्त्वमखण्डैकरसात्मकम् ॥ परोक्षमवग-
 म्यैतदहमस्मीत्युपासते ॥ १४ ॥ प्रत्यग्व्यक्तिमनुल्लिख्य शास्त्राद्वि-
 ष्ण्वादिमूर्तिवत् ॥ अस्ति ब्रह्मेति सामान्यज्ञानमत्र परोक्षधीः ॥ १५ ॥

चतुर्भुजाद्यवगतावपि मूर्तिमनुल्लिखन् ॥ अक्षैः परोक्षज्ञान्येव न तदा
विष्णुमीक्षते ॥ १६ ॥ परोक्षत्वापराधेन भवेन्नातत्त्ववेदनम् ॥
प्रमाणेनैव शास्त्रेण सत्त्वमूर्तेर्विभासनात् ॥ १७ ॥ सच्चिदानन्दरूपस्य
शास्त्राद्ज्ञानेऽप्यनुल्लिखन् ॥ प्रत्यञ्चं साक्षिणं तत्तु ब्रह्म साक्षान्न
वीक्षते ॥ १८ ॥ शास्त्रोक्तेनैव मार्गेण सच्चिदानन्दनिश्चयात् ॥ परो-
क्षमपि तज्ज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं न तु भ्रमः ॥ १९ ॥ ब्रह्म यद्यपि शास्त्रेषु
प्रत्यक्त्वेनैव वर्णितम् ॥ महावाक्यैस्तथाऽप्येतद्बोधमविचारिणः
॥ २० ॥ देहाद्यात्मत्वविभ्रान्तौ जाग्रत्यां न हठात्पुमान् ॥ ब्रह्मा-
त्मत्वेन विज्ञातुं क्षमते मन्दधीत्वतः ॥ २१ ॥ ब्रह्ममात्रं सुविज्ञेयं
श्रद्धालोः शास्त्रदर्शिनः ॥ अपरोक्षद्वैतबुद्धिः परोक्षाद्वैतबुद्ध्यनुत्
॥ २२ ॥ अपरोक्षशिलाबुद्धिर्न परोक्षेशतां नुदेत् ॥ प्रतिमादिषु
विष्णुत्वे को वा विप्रतिपद्यते ॥ २३ ॥ अश्रद्धालोरविश्वासो
नोदाहरणमर्हति ॥ श्रद्धालोरेव सर्वत्र वैदिकेष्वधिकारतः ॥ २४ ॥
सकृदाप्तोपदेशेन परोक्षज्ञानमुद्भवेत् ॥ विष्णुमूर्त्युपदेशो हि न मीमां-
सामपेक्षते ॥ २५ ॥ कर्मोपास्ती विचार्येते अनुष्ठेयाविनिर्णयात् ॥
बहुशाखाविप्रकीर्णं निर्णेतुं कः प्रभुर्नरः ॥ २६ ॥ निर्णीतोऽर्थः
कल्पसूत्रैर्ग्रथितस्तावताऽस्ति कः ॥ विचारमन्तरेणापि शक्तोऽनुष्ठातु-
मञ्जसा ॥ २७ ॥ उपास्तीनामनुष्ठानमार्षग्रन्थेषु वर्णितम् ॥ विचा-
राक्षममर्त्याश्च तच्छ्रुत्वोपासते गुरोः ॥ २८ ॥ वेदवाक्यानि निर्णेतु-
मिच्छन्मीमांसतां जनः ॥ आप्तोपदेशमात्रेण ह्यनुष्ठानं हि संभवेत्
॥ २९ ॥ ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कृतिस्त्वेवं विचारेण विना नृणाम् ॥ आप्तोप-
देशमात्रेण न संभवति कुत्रचित् ॥ ३० ॥ परोक्षज्ञानमश्रद्धा प्रति-
बध्नाति नेतरत् ॥ अविचारोऽपरोक्षस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकः ॥ ३१ ॥
विचार्याप्यापरोक्ष्येण ब्रह्मात्मानं न वेत्ति चेत् ॥ आपरोक्ष्यावसा-
नत्वाद्भूयो भूयो विचारयेत् ॥ ३२ ॥ विचारयन्नामरणं नैवात्मानं

लभेत चेत् ॥ जन्मान्तरे लभेतैव प्रतिबन्धक्षये सति ॥ ३३ ॥
 इह वाऽमुत्र वा विद्येत्येवं सूत्रकृतोदितम् ॥ शृण्वन्तोऽप्यत्र बहवो
 यन्न विद्युरिति श्रुतिः ॥ ३४ ॥ गर्भं एव शयानः सन् वामदेवोऽवबु-
 द्धवान् ॥ पूर्वाभ्यस्तविचारेण यद्वदध्ययनादिषु ॥ ३५ ॥ बहुवार-
 मधीतेऽपि तदा नायाति चेत्पुनः ॥ दिनान्तरेऽनधीत्यैव पूर्वाधीतं
 स्मरेत्पुमान् ॥ ३६ ॥ कालेन परिपच्यन्ते कृषिगर्भादयो यथा ॥
 तद्वदात्मविचारोऽपि शनैः कालेन पच्यते ॥ ३७ ॥ पुनःपुनर्वि-
 चारेऽपि त्रिविधप्रतिबन्धतः ॥ न वेत्ति तत्त्वमित्येतद्वार्तिके सम्यगी-
 रितम् ॥ ३८ ॥ कृतस्तज्ज्ञानमिति चेत्तद्धि बन्धपरिक्षयात् ॥ असा-
 वपि च भूतो वा भावी वा वर्ततेऽथ वा ॥ ३९ ॥ अधीतवेदवे-
 दार्थोऽप्यत एव न मुच्यते ॥ हिरण्यनिधिदृष्टान्तादिदमेव हि दर्शि-
 तम् ॥ ४० ॥ अतीतेनापि महिषीस्नेहेन प्रतिबन्धतः ॥ भिक्षुस्तत्त्वं
 न वेदेति गाथा लोके प्रगीयते ॥ ४१ ॥ अनुसृत्य गुरुः स्नेहं
 महिष्यां तत्त्वमुक्तवान् ॥ ततो यथावद्वेदैष प्रतिबन्धस्य संक्षयात्
 ॥ ४२ ॥ प्रतिबन्धो वर्तमानो विषयासक्तिलक्षणः ॥ प्रज्ञामान्द्यं
 कुतर्कश्च विपर्ययदुराग्रहः ॥ ४३ ॥ शमाद्यैः श्रवणाद्यैश्च तत्र तत्रो-
 चितैः क्षयम् ॥ नीतेऽस्मिन्प्रतिबन्धेऽतः स्वस्य ब्रह्मत्वमश्रुते ॥ ४४ ॥
 आगामिप्रतिबन्धश्च वामदेवे समीरितः ॥ एकेन जन्मना क्षीणो
 भरतस्य त्रिजन्मभिः ॥ ४५ ॥ योगभ्रष्टस्य गीतायामतीते बहुज-
 न्मनि ॥ प्रतिबन्धक्षयः प्रोक्तो न विचारोऽप्यनर्थकः ॥ ४६ ॥
 प्राप्य पुण्यकृतां लोकानात्मतत्त्वविचारतः ॥ शुचीनां श्रीमतां गेहे
 साभिलाषोऽभिजायते ॥ ४७ ॥ अथवा योगिनामेव कुले भवति
 धीमताम् ॥ निस्पृहो ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य विचारात्तद्धि दुर्लभम् ॥ ४८ ॥
 तत्र तं बुद्धिसंयोगं लभते पौर्वदेहिकम् ॥ यतते च ततो भूयस्तस्मा-
 देतद्धि दुर्लभम् ॥ ४९ ॥ पूर्वाभ्यासेन तेनैव हियते ह्यवशोऽपि सः ॥

अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परां गतिम् ॥ ५० ॥ ब्रह्मलोकाभिवा-
 ङ्ग्यां सम्यक् सत्यां निरुध्य ताम् ॥ विचारयेद्य आत्मानं न तु
 साक्षात्करोत्ययम् ॥ ५१ ॥ वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्था इति शास्त्रतः ॥
 ब्रह्मलोके सकल्पान्ते ब्रह्मणा सह मुच्यते ॥ ५२ ॥ केषांचित्स विचा-
 रोऽपि कर्मणा प्रतिबध्यते ॥ श्रवणायापि बहुभिर्यो न लभ्य इति श्रुतेः
 ॥ ५३ ॥ अत्यन्तबुद्धिमान्द्याद्वा सामग्र्या वाप्यसंभवात् ॥ यो विचारं
 न लभते ब्रह्मोपासीत सोऽनिशम् ॥ ५४ ॥ निर्गुणब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य न
 ह्युपास्तेरसंभवः ॥ सगुणब्रह्मणीवात्र प्रत्ययावृत्तिसंभवात् ॥ ५५ ॥
 अवाङ्मनसगम्यं तन्नोपास्यमिति चेत्तदा ॥ अवाङ्मनसगम्यस्य वेदनं
 न च संभवेत् ॥ ५६ ॥ वागाद्यगोचराकारमित्येवं यदि वेच्यसौ ॥
 वागाद्यगोचराकारमित्युपासीत नो कुतः ॥ ५७ ॥ सगुणत्वमुपा-
 स्यत्वाद्यदि वेद्यत्वतोऽपि तत् ॥ वेद्यं चेच्छ्रवणावृत्त्या लक्षितं समु-
 पास्यताम् ॥ ५८ ॥ ब्रह्म विद्धि तदेव त्वं न त्विदं यदुपासते ॥
 इति श्रुतेरुपास्यत्वं निषिद्धं ब्रह्मणो यदि ॥ ५९ ॥ विदितादन्यदेवेति
 श्रुतेर्वेद्यत्वमस्य न ॥ यथा श्रुत्यैव वेद्यं चेत्तथा श्रुत्याऽप्युपास्यताम्
 ॥ ६० ॥ अवास्तवी वेद्यता चेदुपास्यत्वं तथा न किम् ॥ वृत्ति-
 व्याप्तिर्वेद्यता चेदुपास्यत्वेऽपि तत्समम् ॥ ६१ ॥ का ते भक्तिरु-
 पगन्तौ चेत्कस्ते द्वेषस्तदीरय ॥ मानाभावो न वाच्योऽस्यां बहु
 श्रुतिषु दर्शनात् ॥ ६२ ॥ उत्तरस्मिंस्तापनीये शैब्यप्रश्नेऽथ काठके ॥
 माण्डूक्यादौ च सर्वत्र निर्गुणोपास्तिरीरिता ॥ ६३ ॥ अनुष्ठानप्र-
 कारोऽस्या पञ्चीकरण ईरितः ॥ ज्ञानसाधनमेतच्चेन्नेति केनात्र वारि-
 तम् ॥ ६४ ॥ नानुतिष्ठति कोऽप्येतदिति चेन्माऽनुतिष्ठतु ॥ पुरुष-
 स्यापराधेन किमुपास्तिः प्रदुष्यति ॥ ६५ ॥ इतोऽप्यतिशयं मत्वा
 मन्त्रान्वश्यादिकारिणः ॥ मूढा जपन्तु तेभ्योऽतिमूढाः कृषिमुपास-
 ताम् ॥ ६६ ॥ तिष्ठन्तु मूढाः प्रकृता निर्गुणोपास्तिरीर्यते ॥ विद्यै-

कयात्सर्वशाखास्थान् गुणानत्रोपसंहरेत् ॥ ६७ ॥ आनन्दादेर्विधेयस्य
 गुणसंघस्य संहतिः ॥ आनन्दादय इत्यस्मिन् सूत्रे व्यासेन वर्णिता
 ॥ ६८ ॥ अस्थूलादेर्निषेध्यस्य गुणसंघस्य संहतिः ॥ तथा व्यासेन
 सूत्रेऽस्मिन्नुक्ताऽक्षरधियां त्विति ॥ ६९ ॥ निर्गुणब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य विद्यायां
 गुणसंहतिः ॥ न युज्येतेत्युपालम्भो व्यासं प्रत्येव मां न तु ॥ ७० ॥
 हिरण्यश्मश्रुसूर्यादिमूर्तीनामनुदाहृतेः ॥ अविर्बुद्धं निर्गुणत्वमिति
 चेत्तुष्यतां त्वया ॥ ७१ ॥ गुणानां लक्षकत्वेन न तत्त्वेऽन्तःप्रवे-
 शनम् ॥ इति चेदस्त्वेवमेव ब्रह्मतत्त्वमुपास्यताम् ॥ ७२ ॥
 आनन्दादिभिरस्थूलादिभिश्चात्माऽत्र लक्षितः ॥ अखण्डैकरसः सोऽह-
 मस्मीत्येवमुपासते ॥ ७३ ॥ बोधोपास्त्योर्विशेषः क इति चेदुच्यते
 शृणु ॥ वस्तुतन्त्रो भवेद्बोधः कर्तृतन्त्रमुपासनम् ॥ ७४ ॥ विचा-
 राज्जायते बोधोऽनिच्छा यं न निवर्तयेत् ॥ स्वोत्पत्तिमात्रात्संसारे
 दहत्यखिलसत्यताम् ॥ ७५ ॥ तावता कृतकृत्यः सन्नित्यतृप्तिमुपा-
 गतः ॥ जीवन्मुक्तिमनुप्राप्य प्रारब्धक्षयमीक्षते ॥ ७६ ॥ आप्तोपदेशं
 विश्वस्य श्रद्दालुरविचारयन् ॥ चिन्तयेत् प्रत्ययैरन्यैरनन्तरितवृत्तिभिः
 ॥ ७७ ॥ यावच्चिन्त्यस्वरूपत्वाभिमानः स्वस्य जायते ॥ तावद्वि-
 चिन्त्य पश्चाच्च तथैवामृतिं धारयेत् ॥ ७८ ॥ ब्रह्मचारी भिक्षमाणो
 युतः संवर्गविद्यया ॥ संवर्गरूपतां चित्ते धारयित्वा ह्यभिक्षत ॥ ७९ ॥
 पुरुषस्येच्छया कर्तुमकर्तुं कर्तुमन्यथा ॥ शक्योपास्तिरतो नित्यं
 कुर्यात्प्रत्ययसन्ततिम् ॥ ८० ॥ वेदाध्यायी ह्यप्रमत्तोधीते स्वप्ने-
 धिवासतः ॥ जपिता तु जपत्येव तथा ध्याताऽपि वासयेत् ॥ ८१ ॥
 विरोधिप्रत्ययं त्यक्त्वा नैरन्तर्येण भावयन् ॥ लभते वासनावेशात्स्व-
 मादावपि भावनाम् ॥ ८२ ॥ भुञ्जानोऽपि निजारब्धमास्थातिश-
 यतोऽनिशम् ॥ ध्यातुं शक्तो न संदेहो विषयव्यसनी यथा ॥ ८३ ॥
 परव्यसनिनी नारी व्यग्राऽपि गृहकर्मणि ॥ तदेवास्वादयत्यन्तः

परसंगरसायनम् ॥ ८४ ॥ परसंगं स्वादयन्त्या अपि नो गृहकर्म
तत् ॥ कुण्ठीभवेदपि त्वेतदापातेनैव वर्तते ॥ ८५ ॥ गृहकृत्यव्यस-
निनी यथा सम्यक्करोति तत् ॥ परव्यसनिनी तद्वन्न करोत्येव
सर्वथा ॥ ८६ ॥ एवं ध्यानैकनिष्ठोऽपि लेशालौकिकमारभेत् ॥
तत्त्ववित्त्वविरोधित्वालौकिकं सम्यगाचरेत् ॥ ८७ ॥ मायामयः
प्रपञ्चोऽयमात्मा चैतन्यरूपधृक् ॥ इति बोधे विरोधः को लौकिकव्य-
वहारिणः ॥ ८८ ॥ अपेक्षते व्यवहृतिर्न प्रपञ्चस्य वस्तुताम् ॥
नाप्यात्मजाड्यं किंत्वेषा साधनान्येव काङ्क्षति ॥ ८९ ॥ मनोवा-
कायतद्वाह्यपदार्थाः साधनानि तान् ॥ तत्त्वविन्नोपमृद्वाति व्यव-
हारोऽस्य नो कुतः ॥ ९० ॥ उपमृद्वाति चित्तं चेद्दृयाताऽसौ न तु
तत्त्ववित् ॥ न बुद्धिर्मर्दयन् दृष्टो घटतत्त्वस्य वेदिता ॥ ९१ ॥
सकृत्प्रत्ययमात्रेण घटश्चेद्भासते सदा ॥ स्वप्रकाशोऽयमात्मा किं
घटवच्च न भासते ॥ ९२ ॥ स्वप्रकाशतया किं ते तद्बुद्धिस्तत्त्ववे-
दनम् ॥ बुद्धिश्च क्षणनाशेति चोद्यं तुल्यं घटादिषु ॥ ९३ ॥
घटादौ निश्चिते बुद्धिर्नश्यत्येव यदा घटः ॥ इष्टो नेतुं तदा शक्य
इति चेत्सममात्मनि ॥ ९४ ॥ निश्चित्य सकृदात्मानं यदापेक्षा
तदैव तम् ॥ वक्तुं मन्तुं तथा ध्यातुं शक्नोत्येव हि तत्त्ववित् ॥ ९५ ॥
उपासक इव ध्यायँल्लौकिकं विस्मरेद्यदि ॥ विस्मरत्वेव सा ध्याना-
द्विस्मृतिर्न तु वेदनात् ॥ ९६ ॥ ध्यानं त्वैच्छिकमेतस्य वेदनान्मु-
क्तिसिद्धितः ॥ ज्ञानादेव तु कैवल्यमिति शास्त्रेषु डिण्डिमः ॥ ९७ ॥
तत्त्वविद्यदि न ध्यायेत्प्रवर्तते तदा बहिः ॥ प्रवर्ततां सुखेनायं को
बाधोऽस्य प्रवर्तने ॥ ९८ ॥ अतिप्रसंग इति चेत् प्रसंगं तावदीरय ॥
प्रसंगो विधिशास्त्रं चेन्न तत्तत्त्वविदं प्रति ॥ ९९ ॥ वर्णाश्रमवयो-
वस्थाभिमानो यस्य विद्यते ॥ तस्यैव च निषेधाश्च विधयः सकला
अपि ॥ १०० ॥ वर्णाश्रमादयो देहे मायया परिकल्पिताः ॥

नात्मनो बोधरूपस्येत्येवं तस्य विनिश्चयः ॥ १ ॥ समाधिमथ
 कर्माणि मा करोतु करोतु वा ॥ हृदयेनास्तसर्वाःस्थो मुक्त एवो-
 त्तमाशयः ॥ २ ॥ नैष्कर्म्येण न तस्यार्थस्तस्यार्थोऽस्ति न कर्मभिः ॥
 न समाधानजप्याभ्यां यस्य निर्वासनं मनः ॥ ३ ॥ आत्मासंगस्त-
 तोन्यत्स्यादिन्द्रजालं हि मायिकम् ॥ इत्यचञ्चलनिर्णीते कुतो मनसि
 वासना ॥ ४ ॥ एवं नास्ति प्रसंगोऽपि कुतोऽस्यातिप्रसंजनम् ॥
 प्रसंगो यस्य तस्यैव शङ्क्येतातिप्रसंजनम् ॥ ५ ॥ विध्यभावान्न
 बालस्य दृश्यतेऽतिप्रसंजनम् ॥ स्यात्कुतोऽतिप्रसंगोऽस्य विध्यभावे
 समेसति ॥ ६ ॥ न किञ्चिदेति बालश्चेत्सर्वं वेच्येव तत्त्ववित् ॥
 अल्पज्ञस्यैव विधयः सर्वे स्युर्नान्ययोर्द्वयोः ॥ ७ ॥ शापानुग्रहसामर्थ्यं
 यस्यासौ तत्त्वविद्यदि ॥ तन्न शापादिसामर्थ्यं फलं स्यात्तपसो यतः
 ॥ ८ ॥ व्यासादेरपि सामर्थ्यं दृश्यते तपसो बलात् ॥ शापादिका-
 रणादन्यत्तपो ज्ञानस्य कारणम् ॥ ९ ॥ द्वयं यस्यास्ति तस्यैव
 सामर्थ्यज्ञानयोजनिः ॥ एकैकं तु ततः कुर्वन्नेकैकं लभते फलम्
 ॥ ११० ॥ सामर्थ्यहीनो निन्द्यश्चेद्यतिभिर्विधिर्वर्जितः ॥ निन्द्यन्ते
 यतयोऽप्यन्यैरनिशं भोगलम्पटैः ॥ ११ ॥ भिक्षावस्त्रादि रक्षेयुर्यद्येते
 भोगतुष्टये ॥ अहो यतित्वमेतेषां वैराग्यभरमन्थरम् ॥ १२ ॥
 वर्णाश्रमपरान्मूढा निन्दन्तिवत्युच्यते यदि ॥ देहात्ममतयो बुद्धं
 निन्दन्त्वाश्रममानिनः ॥ १३ ॥ तदित्थं तत्त्वविज्ञाने साधनानुपम-
 र्दनात् ॥ ज्ञानिनाऽऽचरितुं शक्यं सम्यग्ग्राज्यादि लौकिकम् ॥ १४ ॥
 मिथ्यात्वबुद्ध्या तत्रेच्छा नास्ति चेत्तर्हिमाऽस्तु तत् ॥ ध्यायन्वाऽथ
 व्यवहरन्त्यथाऽरब्धं वसत्वयम् ॥ १५ ॥ उपासकस्तु सततं ध्यायन्नेव
 वसेद्यतः ॥ ध्यानेनैव कृतं तस्य ब्रह्मत्वं विष्णुतादिवत् ॥ १६ ॥
 ध्यानोपादानकं यत्तद्ध्यानाभावे विलीयते ॥ वास्तवी ब्रह्मता नैव
 ज्ञानाभावे विलीयते ॥ १७ ॥ ततोऽभिज्ञापकं ज्ञानं न नित्यं

जनयत्यदः ॥ ज्ञापकाभावमात्रेण न हि सत्यं विलीयते ॥ १८ ॥
 अस्त्येवोपासकस्यापि वास्तवी ब्रह्मतेति चेत् ॥ पामराणां तिरश्चां
 च वास्तवी ब्रह्मता न किम् ॥ १९ ॥ अज्ञानादपुमर्थत्वमुभयत्रापि
 तत्समम् ॥ उपवासाद्यथा भिक्षा वरं ध्यानं तथान्यतः ॥ १२० ॥
 पामराणां व्यवहृतेर्वरं कर्माद्यनुष्ठितिः ॥ ततोऽपि सगुणोपास्तिर्निर्गु-
 णोपासना ततः ॥ २१ ॥ यावद्विज्ञानसामीप्यं तावच्छ्रैष्ठ्यं विवर्द्धते ॥
 ब्रह्मज्ञानाय ते साक्षान्निर्गुणोपासनं शनैः ॥ २२ ॥ यथा संवादि-
 विभ्रान्तिः फलकाले प्रमायते ॥ विद्यायते तथोपास्तिर्मुक्तिकालेति-
 पाकतः ॥ २३ ॥ संवादिभ्रमतः पुंसः प्रवृत्तस्यान्यमानतः ॥ प्रमेति
 चेत्तथोपास्तिर्मन्तरे कारणायताम् ॥ २४ ॥ मूर्तिध्यानस्य मन्त्रादेरपि
 कारणता यदि ॥ अस्तु नाम तथाप्यत्र प्रत्यासत्तिर्विशिष्यते ॥ २५ ॥
 निर्गुणोपासनं पक्वं समाधिः स्याच्छनैस्ततः ॥ यः समाधिनिरो-
 धाख्यः सोऽनायासेन लभ्यते ॥ २६ ॥ निरोधलाभे पुंसोऽन्तरसंगं
 वस्तु शिष्यते ॥ पुनः पुनर्वासितेऽस्मिन्वाक्याज्जायेत तत्त्वधीः
 ॥ २७ ॥ निर्विकारासंगनित्यस्वप्रकाशैकपूर्णता ॥ बुद्धौ झटिति
 शास्त्रोक्ता आरोहन्त्यविवादतः ॥ २८ ॥ योगाभ्यासस्त्वेतदर्थोऽमृत-
 विन्द्वादिषु श्रुतः ॥ एवं च दृष्टद्वारापि हेतुत्वादन्यतो वरम् ॥ २९ ॥
 उपेक्ष्य तत्तीर्थयात्राजपादीनेव कुर्वताम् ॥ पिण्डं समुत्सृज्य करं
 लेढीति न्याय आपतेत् ॥ ३० ॥ उपासकानामप्येवं विचारत्यागतो
 यदि ॥ बाढं तस्माद्विचारस्यासंभवे योग ईरितः ॥ ३१ ॥ बहु-
 व्याकुलचित्तानां विचारात्तत्त्वधीर्नहि ॥ योगो मुख्यस्ततस्तेषां
 धीदर्पस्तेन नश्यति ॥ ३२ ॥ अव्याकुलधियां मोहमात्रेणाच्छादि-
 तात्मनाम् ॥ सांख्यनामा विचारः स्यान्मुख्यो झटिति सिद्धिदः
 ॥ ३३ ॥ यत्सांख्यैः प्राप्यते स्थानं तद्योगैरपि गम्यते ॥ एकं
 सांख्यं च योगं च यः पश्यति स पश्यति ॥ ३४ ॥ तत्कारणं

सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यमिति हि श्रुतिः ॥ यस्तु श्रुतेर्विरुद्धः स आभासः
 सांख्ययोगयोः ॥ ३५ ॥ उपासनं नापि पक्वमिह यस्य परत्र सः ॥
 मरणे ब्रह्मलोके वा तत्त्वं विज्ञाय मुच्यते ॥ ३६ ॥ यं यं वाऽपि
 स्मरन् भावं त्यजत्यन्ते कलेवरम् ॥ तंतमेवैति यच्चित्तस्तेन यातीति
 शास्त्रतः ॥ ३७ ॥ अन्त्यप्रत्ययतो नूनं भावि जन्म तथा सति ॥
 निर्गुणप्रत्ययोऽपि स्यात्सगुणोपासने यथा ॥ ३८ ॥ नित्यनिर्गुणरूपं
 तन्नाममात्रेण गीयताम् ॥ अर्थतो मोक्ष एवैष संवादिभ्रमवन्मतः
 ॥ ३९ ॥ तत्सामर्थ्याज्जायते धीर्मूलाविद्यानिवर्तिका ॥ अविमुक्तो-
 पासनेन तारकब्रह्मबुद्धिवत् ॥ १४० ॥ सोऽकामो निष्काम इति
 ह्यशरीरो निरिन्द्रियः ॥ अभयं हीति मुक्तत्वं तापनीये फलं श्रुतम्
 ॥ ४१ ॥ उपासनस्य सामर्थ्याद्विद्योत्पत्तिर्भवेत्ततः ॥ नान्यः पन्था
 इति ह्येतच्छास्त्रं नैव विरुध्यते ॥ ४२ ॥ निष्कामोपासनान्मुक्ति-
 स्तापनीये समीरिता ॥ ब्रह्मलोकः सकामस्य शैब्यप्रश्ने समीरितः
 ॥ ४३ ॥ य उपास्ते त्रिमात्रेण ब्रह्मलोके स नीयते ॥ स एतस्मा-
 ज्जीवघनात्परं पुरुषमीक्षते ॥ ४४ ॥ अप्रतीकाधिकरणे तत्क्रतुन्याय
 ईरितः ॥ ब्रह्मलोकफलं तस्मात्सकामस्येति वर्णितम् ॥ ४५ ॥
 निर्गुणोपास्तिसामर्थ्यात्तत्र तत्त्वमवेक्षते ॥ पुनरार्चिते त नायं कल्पान्ते
 च विमुच्यते ॥ ४६ ॥ प्रणवोपास्तयः प्रायो निर्गुणा एव वेदगाः ॥
 क्वचित्सगुणताप्युक्ता प्रणवोपासनस्य हि ॥ ४७ ॥ परापरब्रह्मरूप
 ओंकार उपवर्णितः ॥ पिप्पलादेन मुनिना सत्यकामाय पृच्छते
 ॥ ४८ ॥ एतदालम्बनं ज्ञात्वा यो यदिच्छति तस्य तत् ॥ इति
 प्रोक्तं यमेनापि पृच्छते नचिकेतसे ॥ ४९ ॥ इह वा मरणे वाऽस्य
 ब्रह्मलोकेऽथ वा भवेत् ॥ ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कृतिः सम्यगुपासीनस्य
 निर्गुणम् ॥ १५० ॥ अर्थोऽयमात्मगतायामपि स्पष्टमुदीरितः ॥
 विचाराक्षम आत्मानमुपासीतेति संततम् ॥ ५१ ॥ साक्षात्कर्तु-

मशक्तोऽपि चिन्तयेन्मामशङ्कितः ॥ कालेनानुभवारूढो भवेयं
फलितो ध्रुवम् ॥ ५२ ॥ यथाऽगाधनिधेर्लब्धौ नोपायः खननं
विना ॥ मल्लाभेऽपि तथा स्वात्मचिन्तां मुक्त्वा न चापरः ॥ ५३ ॥
देहोपलम्पाकृत्य बुद्धिकुदालकात्पुनः ॥ खात्वा मनोभुवं भूयो
गृहीयान्मां निधिं पुमान् ॥ ५४ ॥ अनुभूतेरभावेऽपि ब्रह्मास्मी-
त्येव चिन्त्यताम् ॥ अप्यसत्प्राप्यते ध्यानान्नित्याप्तं ब्रह्म किं पुनः
॥ ५५ ॥ अनात्मबुद्धिशैथिल्यं फलं ध्यानाद्दिनेदिने ॥ पश्यन्नपि
न चेद्ध्यायेत्कोऽपरोऽस्मात्पर्शुवद् ॥ ५६ ॥ देहाभिमानं विध्वंस्य
ध्यानादात्मानमद्वयम् ॥ पश्यन्मर्त्योऽमृतो भूत्वा ह्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते
॥ ५७ ॥ ध्यानदीपमिमं सम्यक्परामृशति यो नरः ॥ मुक्तसंशय
एवायं ध्यायति ब्रह्म संततम् ॥ १५८ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यविद्यारण्यप्रणीतपञ्चदश्यां

ध्यानदीपप्रकरणम् ॥ ९ ॥

॥ अथ नाटकदीपप्रकरणम् ॥ १० ॥

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

परमात्माऽद्वयानन्दपूर्णः पूर्वं स्वमायया ॥ स्वयमेव जगद्भूत्वा
 प्राविशज्जीवरूपतः ॥ १ ॥ विष्ण्वाद्युत्तमदेहेषु प्रविष्टो देवता
 भवेत् ॥ मर्त्याद्यधमदेहेषु स्थितो भजति मर्त्यताम् ॥ २ ॥
 अनेकजन्मभजनात् स्वविचारं चिकीर्षति ॥ विचारेण विनष्टायां
 मायायां शिष्यते स्वयम् ॥ ३ ॥ अद्वयानन्दरूपस्य सद्वयत्वं च
 दुःखिता ॥ बन्धः प्रोक्तः स्वरूपेण स्थितिर्मुक्तिरितीयते ॥ ४ ॥
 अविचारकृतो बन्धो विचारेण निवर्तते ॥ तस्माज्जीवपरमात्मानौ
 सर्वदैव विचारयेत् ॥ ५ ॥ अहमित्यभिमन्ता यः कर्ताऽसौ तस्य
 साधनम् ॥ मनस्तस्य क्रिये अन्तर्बहिर्वृत्ती क्रमोत्थिते ॥ ६ ॥
 अन्तर्मुखाऽहमित्येषा वृत्तिः कर्तारमुल्लिखेत् ॥ बहिर्मुखेदमित्येषा
 बाह्यं वस्तिवदमुल्लिखेत् ॥ ७ ॥ इदमो ये विशेषाः स्युर्गन्धरूपरसा-
 दयः ॥ असांकर्येण तान् भिन्नाद् घ्राणादीन्द्रियपञ्चकम् ॥ ८ ॥
 कर्तारं च क्रियां तद्वद्वावृत्तविषयानपि ॥ स्फोरयेदेकयत्नेन योऽसौ
 साक्ष्यत्र चिद्वपुः ॥ ९ ॥ ईक्षे शृणोमि जिघ्रामि खादयामि स्पृशा-
 म्यहम् ॥ इति भासयते सर्वं नृत्यशालास्थदीपवत् ॥ १० ॥
 नृत्यशालास्थितो दीपः प्रभुं सभ्यांश्च नर्तकीम् ॥ दीपयेदविशेषेण
 तदभावेऽपि दीप्यते ॥ ११ ॥ अहंकारं धियं साक्षी विषयानपि
 भासयेत् ॥ अहंकाराद्यभावेऽपि स्वयं भात्येव पूर्ववत् ॥ १२ ॥
 निरन्तरं भासमाने कूटस्थे ज्ञप्तिरूपतः ॥ तद्भासा भास्यमानेयं
 बुद्धिर्नृत्यत्यनेकधा ॥ १३ ॥ अहंकारः प्रभुः सभ्या विषया नर्तकी
 मतिः ॥ तालादिधारीण्यक्षाणि दीपः साक्ष्यवभासकः ॥ १४ ॥
 स्वस्थानसंस्थितो दीपः सर्वतो भासयेद्यथा ॥ स्थिरस्थायी तथा

साक्षी बहिरन्तः प्रकाशयेत् ॥ १५ ॥ बहिरन्तर्विभागोऽयं देहापेक्षो
न साक्षिणि ॥ विषया बाह्यदेशस्था देहस्यान्तरहंकृतिः ॥ १६ ॥
अन्तस्था धीः सहैवाक्षैर्बहिर्याति पुनःपुनः ॥ भास्यबुद्धिस्थचाञ्चल्यं
साक्षिण्यारोप्यते वृथा ॥ १७ ॥ गृहान्तरगतः स्वल्पो गवाक्षादा-
तपोऽचलः ॥ तत्र हस्ते नर्त्यमाने नृत्यतीवातपो यथा ॥ १८ ॥
निजस्थानस्थितः साक्षी बहिरन्तर्गमागमौ ॥ अकुर्वन् बुद्धिचाञ्च-
ल्यात् करोतीव तथा तथा ॥ १९ ॥ न बाह्यो नान्तरः साक्षी
बुद्धेर्देशौ हि तावुभौ ॥ बुद्ध्याद्यशेषसंशान्तौ यत्र भात्यस्ति तत्र
सः ॥ २० ॥ देशः कोऽपि न भासेत यदि तर्ह्यस्त्वदेशभाक् ॥
सर्वदेशप्रकृत्यैव सर्वगतत्वं न तु स्वतः ॥ २१ ॥ अन्तर्बहिर्वा सर्वं
वा यं देशं परिकल्पयेत् ॥ बुद्धिस्तदेशगः साक्षी तथा वस्तुषु
योजयेत् ॥ २२ ॥ यद्यद्रूपादि कल्प्येत बुद्ध्या तत्तत्प्रकाशयन् ॥
तस्य तस्य भवेत्साक्षी स्वतो वाग्बुद्ध्यगोचरः ॥ २३ ॥ कथं
तादृज्या ग्राह्य इति चेन्मैव गृह्यताम् ॥ सर्वग्रहोपसंशान्तौ स्वयमे-
वावशिष्यते ॥ २४ ॥ न तत्र मानापेक्षाऽस्ति स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपतः ॥
तादृग्व्युत्पत्त्यपेक्षा चेच्छ्रुतिं पठ गुरोर्मुखात् ॥ २५ ॥ यदि सर्व-
ग्रहत्यागोऽशक्यस्तर्हि धियं व्रज ॥ शरणं तदधीनोन्तर्बहिर्वैषोऽनु-
भूयताम् ॥ २६ ॥

इति पञ्चदश्यां नाटकदीपः समाप्तः ।

॥ ब्रह्मानन्दे योगानन्दप्रकरणम् ॥ ११ ॥

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

ब्रह्मानन्दं प्रवक्ष्यामि ज्ञाते तस्मिन्नशेषतः ॥ ऐहिकामुष्मिकानर्थ-
 व्रातं हित्वा सुखायते ॥ १ ॥ ब्रह्मवित्परमाप्नोति शोकं तरति
 चात्मवित् ॥ रसो ब्रह्मरसं लब्ध्वाऽऽनन्दीभवति नान्यथा ॥ २ ॥
 प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते स्वस्मिन् यदा स्यादथ सोऽभयः ॥ कुरुतेऽस्मिन्नन्तरं
 चेदथ तस्य भयं भवेत् ॥ ३ ॥ वायुः सूर्यो वह्निरिन्द्रो मृत्युर्जन्मा-
 न्तरेन्तरम् ॥ कृत्वा धर्मं विजानन्तोऽप्यस्माद्धीत्या चरन्ति हि ॥ ४ ॥
 आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् विभेति कुतश्चन ॥ एतमेव तपेनैषा चिन्ता
 कर्माग्निसंभृता ॥ ५ ॥ एवं विद्वान्कर्मणी द्वे हित्वाऽऽत्मानं स्मरे-
 त्सदा ॥ कृते च कर्मणी स्वात्मरूपेणैवैष पश्यति ॥ ६ ॥ भिद्यते
 हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ॥ क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे
 परावरे ॥ ७ ॥ तमेव विद्वानत्येति मृत्युं पन्था न चेतारः ॥ ज्ञात्वा
 देवं पाशहानिः क्षीणैः क्लेशैर्न जन्मभाक् ॥ ८ ॥ देवं मत्वा हर्षशोकौ
 जहात्यत्रैव धैर्यवान् ॥ नैनं कृताकृते पुण्यपापे तापयतः क्वचित्
 ॥ ९ ॥ इत्यादि श्रुतयो बह्व्यः पुराणैः स्मृतिभिः सह ॥ ब्रह्मज्ञा-
 नेऽनर्थहानिमानन्दं चाप्यघोषयन् ॥ १० ॥ आनन्दस्त्रिविधो ब्रह्मा-
 नन्दो विद्यासुखं तथा ॥ विषयानन्द इत्यादौ ब्रह्मानन्दो विविच्यते
 ॥ ११ ॥ भृगुः पुत्रः पितुः श्रुत्वा वरुणाद्ब्रह्मलक्षणम् ॥ अन्नप्रा-
 णमनोबुद्धीस्त्यक्त्वाऽऽनन्दं विजज्ञिवान् ॥ १२ ॥ आनन्दादेव
 भूतानि जायन्ते तेन जीवनम् ॥ तेषां लयश्च तत्रातो ब्रह्मानन्दो न
 संशयः ॥ १३ ॥ भूतोत्पत्तेः पुरा भूमा त्रिपुटीद्वैतवर्जनात् ॥
 ज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयरूपा त्रिपुटी प्रलये हि नो ॥ १४ ॥ विज्ञानमय उत्पन्नो
 ज्ञाता ज्ञानं मनोमयः ॥ ज्ञेयाः शब्दादयो नैतत्रयमुत्पत्तितः

पुरा ॥ १५ ॥ त्रयाभावे तु निद्वैतः पूर्ण एवानुभूयते ॥ समाधिसु-
 त्तिमूर्च्छासु पूर्णः सृष्टेः पुरा तथा ॥ १६ ॥ यो भूमा स सुखं
 नाल्पे सुखं त्रेधा विभेदिनि ॥ सनत्कुमारः प्राहैवं नारदायातिशो-
 किने ॥ १७ ॥ सपुराणान् पञ्च वेदान् शास्त्राणि विविधानि च ॥
 ज्ञात्वाऽप्यनात्मविच्चेन नारदोऽतिशुशोच ह ॥ १८ ॥ वेदाभ्यासा-
 त्पुरा तापत्रयमात्रेण शोकिता ॥ पश्चाच्चभ्यासविस्मारभङ्गगर्वैश्च
 शोकिता ॥ १९ ॥ सोहं विद्वन्प्रशोचामि शोकपारं नयात्र माम् ॥
 इत्युक्तः सुखमेवास्य पारमित्यभ्यधादृषिः ॥ २० ॥ सुखं वैषयिकं
 शोकसहस्रेणावृतत्वतः ॥ दुःखमेवेति मत्वाऽऽह नाल्पेऽस्ति सुख-
 मित्यसौ ॥ २१ ॥ ननु द्वैते सुखं मा भूदद्वैतेऽप्यस्ति नो सुखम् ॥
 अस्ति चेदुपलभ्येत तथा च त्रिपुटी भवेत् ॥ २२ ॥ मास्त्वद्वैते
 सुखं किं तु सुखमद्वैतमेव हि ॥ किं मानमिति चेन्नास्ति मानाकांक्षा
 स्वयंप्रभे ॥ २३ ॥ स्वप्रभत्वे भवद्वाक्यं मानं यस्माद्भवानिदम् ॥
 अद्वैतमभ्युपेत्यास्मिन्सुखं नास्तीति भाषते ॥ २४ ॥ नाभ्युपैम्यह-
 मद्वैतं त्वद्वचोनूद्य दूषणम् ॥ वच्मीति चेत्तदा ब्रूहि किमासीद्वैततः
 पुरा ॥ २५ ॥ किमद्वैतमुत द्वैतमन्यो वा कोटिरन्तिमः ॥ अप्रसिद्धो
 न द्वितीयोऽनुत्पत्तेः शिष्यतेऽग्रिमः ॥ २६ ॥ अद्वैतसिद्धिर्युक्त्यैव
 नानुभूत्येति चेद्वद ॥ निर्दृष्टान्ता सदृष्टान्ता वा कोट्यन्तरमत्र नो
 ॥ २७ ॥ नानुभूतिर्न दृष्टान्त इतियुक्तिस्तु शोभते ॥ सदृष्टान्तत्वपक्षे
 तु दृष्टान्तं वद मे मतम् ॥ २८ ॥ अद्वैतः प्रलयो द्वैतानुपलम्भेन
 सुप्तिवत् ॥ इति चेत्सुप्तिरद्वैतेत्यत्र दृष्टान्तमीरय ॥ २९ ॥ दृष्टान्तः
 परसुप्तिश्चेदहो ते कौशलं महत् ॥ यः स्वसुप्तिं न वेत्यस्य परसुप्तौ तु
 का कथा ॥ ३० ॥ निश्चेष्टत्वात्परः सुप्तो यथाऽहमिति चेत्तदा ॥
 उदाहर्तुः सुषुप्तेस्ते स्वप्रभत्वं बलाद्भवेत् ॥ ३१ ॥ नेन्द्रियाणि न
 दृष्टान्तस्तथाऽप्यङ्गीकरोषि ताम् ॥ इदमेव स्वप्रभत्वं यद्ज्ञानं

साधनैर्विना ॥ ३२ ॥ स्तामद्वैतस्वप्नभत्वे वद सुप्तौ सुखं कथम् ॥
 शृणु दुःखं तदा नास्ति ततस्ते शिष्यते सुखम् ॥ ३३ ॥ अन्धः
 सन्नप्यनन्धः स्याद्विद्धोऽविद्धोऽथ रोग्यपि ॥ अरोगीति श्रुतिः प्राह
 तच्च सर्वे जना विदुः ॥ ३४ ॥ न दुःखाभावमात्रेण सुखं लोष्ट-
 शिलादिषु ॥ द्वाभावावस्य दृष्टत्वादिति चेद्विषमं वचः ॥ ३५ ॥
 सुखदैर्न्यविकासाभ्यां परदुःखसुखोहनम् ॥ दैन्याद्यभावतो लोष्टे
 दुःखाद्यूहो न संभवेत् ॥ ३६ ॥ स्वकीये सुखदुःखे तु नोहनीये
 ततस्तयोः ॥ भावो वेद्योऽनुभूत्यैव तदभावोपि नान्यतः ॥ ३७ ॥
 तथा सति स्वसुप्तौ च दुःखाभावोऽनुभूतितः ॥ विरोधिदुःखराहित्या-
 त्सुखं निर्विघ्नमिष्यताम् ॥ ३८ ॥ महत्तरप्रयासेन मृदुशय्यादिसा-
 धनम् ॥ कुतः संपाद्यते सुप्तौ सुखं चेत्तत्र नो भवेत् ॥ ३९ ॥
 दुःखनाशार्थमेवैतदिति चेद्रोगिणस्तथा ॥ भवत्वरोगिणस्त्वेतत्सुखा-
 यैवेति निश्चिनु ॥ ४० ॥ तर्हि साधनजन्यत्वात्सुखं वैषयिकं भवेत् ॥
 भवत्वेवात्र निद्रायाः पूर्वं शय्यासनादिजम् ॥ ४१ ॥ निद्रायां तु
 सुखं यत्तज्जन्यते केन हेतुना ॥ सुखाभिमुखधीरादौ पश्चान्मज्जेत्परे
 सुखे ॥ ४२ ॥ जाग्रद्व्यावृत्तिभिः श्रान्तो विश्रम्याथ विरोधिनि ॥
 अपनीते स्वस्थचित्तोऽनुभवेद्विषये सुखम् ॥ ४३ ॥ आत्माभिमुख-
 धीवृत्तौ स्वानन्दः प्रतिबिम्बति ॥ अनुभूयैनमात्रापि त्रिपुल्या
 श्रान्तिमाप्नुयात् ॥ ४४ ॥ तच्छ्रमस्यापनुत्त्यर्थं जीवो धावेत्परात्मनि ॥
 तेनैक्यं प्राप्य तत्रत्यो ब्रह्मानन्दः स्वयं भवेत् ॥ ४५ ॥ दृष्टान्ताः
 शकुनिः श्येनः कुमारश्च महानृपः ॥ महाब्राह्मण इत्येते सुप्त्यानन्दे
 श्रुतीरिताः ॥ ४६ ॥ शकुनिः सूत्रबद्धः सन् दिक्षु व्यापृत्य
 विश्रमम् ॥ अलब्ध्वा बन्धनस्थानं हस्तस्तम्भाद्युपाश्रयेत् ॥ ४७ ॥
 जीवोपाधिमनस्तद्वद्धर्मधर्मफलाप्तये ॥ स्वप्ने जाग्रति च भ्रान्त्वा
 क्षीणे कर्मणि लीयते ॥ ४८ ॥ श्येनो वेगेन नीडैकलम्पटः शयितुं

व्रजेत् ॥ जीवः सुप्त्यै तथा धावेद्ब्रह्मानन्दैकलम्पटः ॥ ४९ ॥
 अतिबालः स्तनं पीत्वा मृदुशय्यागतो हसन् ॥ रागद्वेषाद्यनुत्पत्ते-
 रानन्दैकस्वभावभाक् ॥ ५० ॥ महाराजः सार्वभौमः संतुष्टः
 सर्वभोगतः ॥ मानुषानन्दसीमानं प्राप्यानन्दैकमूर्तिभाक् ॥ ५१ ॥
 महाविप्रो ब्रह्मवेदी कृतकृत्यत्वलक्षणाम् ॥ विद्यानन्दस्य परमां
 काष्ठां प्राप्यावतिष्ठते ॥ ५२ ॥ मुग्धबुद्धातिबुद्धानां लोके सिद्धा
 सुखात्मता ॥ उदाहृतानामन्ये तु दुःखिनो न सुखात्मकाः ॥ ५३ ॥
 कुमारादिवदेवायं ब्रह्मानन्दैकतत्परः ॥ स्त्रीपरिष्वक्तवद्वेद न बाह्यं
 नापि चान्तरम् ॥ ५४ ॥ बाह्यं रथ्यादिकं वृत्तं गृहकृत्यं यथान्तरम् ॥
 तथा जागरणं बाह्यं नाडीस्थः स्वप्न आन्तरः ॥ ५५ ॥ पितापि
 सुप्तावपितेत्यादौ जीवत्ववारणात् ॥ सुप्तौ ब्रह्मैव नो जीवः संसारि-
 त्वासमीक्षणात् ॥ ५६ ॥ पितृत्वाद्यभिमानो यः सुखदुःखाकरः स
 हि ॥ तस्मिन्नपगते तीर्णः सर्वाञ्छोकान्भवत्ययम् ॥ ५७ ॥ सुषुप्ति-
 काले सकले विलीने तमसाऽऽवृतः ॥ सुखरूपमुपैतीति ब्रूते ह्यार्थवर्णी
 श्रुतिः ॥ ५८ ॥ सुखमस्वाप्समत्राहं न वै किञ्चिद्वेदिषम् ॥ इति
 सुप्ते सुखाज्ञाने परामृशति चोत्थितः ॥ ५९ ॥ परामर्शोऽनुभूतेस्ती-
 त्यासीदनुभवस्तदा ॥ चिदात्मत्वात्स्वतो भाति सुखमज्ञानधीस्ततः
 ॥ ६० ॥ ब्रह्म विज्ञानमानन्दमिति वाजसनेयिनः ॥ पठन्त्यतः
 स्वप्रकाशं सुखं ब्रह्मैव नेतरत् ॥ ६१ ॥ यदज्ञानं तत्र लीनौ तौ
 विज्ञानमनोमयौ ॥ तयोर्हि विलयावस्था निद्राऽज्ञानं च सैव हि
 ॥ ६२ ॥ विलीनघृतवत्पश्चात्स्याद्विज्ञानमयो घनः ॥ विलीनावस्थ
 आनन्दमयशब्देन कथ्यते ॥ ६३ ॥ सुप्तिपूर्वक्षणे बुद्धिवृत्तिर्या
 सुखबिम्बिता ॥ सैव तद्विम्बसहिता लीनानन्दमयस्ततः ॥ ६४ ॥
 अन्तर्मुखो य आनन्दमयो ब्रह्मसुखं तदा ॥ भुङ्क्ते चिद्विम्बयुक्ताभि-
 रज्ञानोत्पन्नवृत्तिभिः ॥ ६५ ॥ अज्ञानवृत्तयः सूक्ष्मा विस्पष्टा

बुद्धिवृत्तयः ॥ इति वेदान्तसिद्धान्तपारगाः प्रवदन्ति हि ॥ ६६ ॥
 माण्डूक्यतापनीयादिश्रुतिष्वेतदतिस्फुटम् ॥ आनन्दमयभोक्तृत्वं
 ब्रह्मानन्दे च भोग्यता ॥ ६७ ॥ एकीभूतः सुषुप्तस्थः प्रज्ञानघनतां
 गतः ॥ आनन्दमय आनन्दभुक् चेतोमयवृत्तिभिः ॥ ६८ ॥
 विज्ञानमयमुख्यैर्यो रूपैर्युक्तः पुराधुना ॥ स लयेनैकतां प्राप्तो
 बहुतन्दुलपिष्टवत् ॥ ६९ ॥ प्रज्ञानानि पुरा बुद्धिवृत्तयोऽथ घनोऽभ-
 वत् ॥ घनत्वं हिमबिन्दूनामुदग्देशे यथा तथा ॥ ७० ॥ तद्धनत्वं
 साक्षिभावं दुःखाभावं प्रचक्षते ॥ लौकिकास्तार्किका यावदुःखवृ-
 त्तिविलोपनात् ॥ ७१ ॥ अज्ञानबिम्बिता चित्स्यान्मुखमानन्दभो-
 जने ॥ भुक्तं ब्रह्मसुखं त्यक्त्वा बहिर्यात्यथ कर्मणा ॥ ७२ ॥ कर्म
 जन्मान्तरेभूद्यत्तद्योगाद्बुध्यते पुनः ॥ इति कैवल्यशाखायां कर्मजो
 बोध ईरितः ॥ ७३ ॥ कंचित्कालं प्रबुद्धस्य ब्रह्मानन्दस्य वासना ॥
 अनुगच्छेद्यतस्तूष्णीमास्ते निर्विषयः सुखी ॥ ७४ ॥ कर्मभिः
 प्रेरितः पश्चान्नानादुःखानि भावयन् ॥ शनैर्विस्मरति ब्रह्मानन्दमेषो-
 ऽखिलो जनः ॥ ७५ ॥ प्रागूर्ध्वमपि निद्रायाः पक्षपातो दिनेदिने ॥
 ब्रह्मानन्दे नृणां तेन प्राज्ञोस्मिन्निवदेत कः ॥ ७६ ॥ ननु तूष्णीं
 स्थितौ ब्रह्मानन्दश्चेद्भाति लौकिकाः ॥ अलसाश्चरितार्थाः स्युः शास्त्रेण
 गुरुणात्र किम् ॥ ७७ ॥ बाढं ब्रह्मेति विद्युश्चेत्कृतार्थास्तावतैव ते ॥
 गुरुशास्त्रे विनाऽत्यन्तं गम्भीरं ब्रह्म वेत्ति कः ॥ ७८ ॥ जानाम्यहं
 त्वदुक्त्याद्य कुतो मे न कृतार्थता ॥ शृण्वन्न त्वादृशो वृत्तं प्राज्ञ-
 मन्यस्य कस्यचित् ॥ ७९ ॥ चतुर्वेदविदे देयमिति शृण्वन्नवोचत ॥
 वेदाश्चत्वार इत्येवं वेद्मि मे दीयतां धनम् ॥ ८० ॥ संख्यामेवैष
 जानाति न तु वेदानशेषतः ॥ यदि तर्हि त्वमप्येवं नाशेषं ब्रह्म
 वेत्सि हि ॥ ८१ ॥ अखण्डैकरसानन्दे मायातत्कार्यवर्जिते ॥
 अशेषत्वसशेषत्ववार्तावसर एव कः ॥ ८२ ॥ शब्दानेव पठस्याहो

तेषामर्थं च पश्यसि ॥ शब्दपाठेऽर्थबोधस्ते संपाद्यत्वेन शिष्यते ॥ ८३ ॥ अर्थे व्याकरणाद्बुद्धे साक्षात्कारोवशिष्यते ॥ स्यात्कृतार्थत्वधीर्यावत्तावद्गुरुमुपास्व भोः ॥ ८४ ॥ आस्तामेतद्यत्रयत्र सुखं स्याद्विषयैर्विना ॥ तत्र सर्वत्र विद्ध्येतां ब्रह्मानन्दस्य वासनाम् ॥ ८५ ॥ विषयेष्वपि लब्धेषु तदिच्छोपरमे सति ॥ अन्तर्मुखमनोवृत्तावानन्दः प्रतिबिम्बति ॥ ८६ ॥ ब्रह्मानन्दो वासना च प्रतिबिम्ब इति त्रयम् ॥ अन्तरेण जगत्यस्मिन्नानन्दो नास्ति कश्चन ॥ ८७ ॥ तथा च विषयानन्दो वासनानन्द इत्यम् ॥ आनन्दौ जनयन्नास्ते ब्रह्मानन्दः स्वयंप्रभः ॥ ८८ ॥ श्रुतियुक्तयनुभूतिभ्यः स्वप्रकाशचिदात्मके ॥ ब्रह्मानन्दे सुप्तिकाले सिद्धे सत्यन्यदा शृणु ॥ ८९ ॥ य आनन्दमयः सुप्तौ स विज्ञानमयात्मताम् ॥ गत्वा स्वप्नं प्रबोधं वा प्राप्नोति स्थानभेदतः ॥ ९० ॥ नेत्रे जागरणं कण्ठे स्वप्नः सुप्तिर्हृदम्बुजे ॥ आपादमस्तकं देहं व्याप्य जागर्ति चेतनः ॥ ९१ ॥ देहतादात्म्यमापन्नस्तप्तायः पिण्डवत्ततः ॥ अहं मनुष्य इत्येवं निश्चित्यैवावतिष्ठते ॥ ९२ ॥ उदासीनः सुखी दुःखीत्यवस्थात्रयमेत्यसौ ॥ सुखदुःखे कर्मकार्ये त्वौदासीन्यं स्वभावतः ॥ ९३ ॥ बाह्यभोगान्मनोराज्यात्सुखदुःखे द्विधा मते ॥ सुखदुःखान्तरालेषु भवेत्तूष्णीमवस्थितिः ॥ ९४ ॥ न कापि चिन्ता मेस्त्यद्य सुखमास इति ब्रुवन् ॥ औदासीन्ये निजानन्दभानं वक्तव्यखिलो जनः ॥ ९५ ॥ अहमस्मीत्यहंकारसामान्याच्छादितत्वतः ॥ निजानन्दो न मुख्योयं किं त्वसौ तस्य वासना ॥ ९६ ॥ नीरपूरितभाण्डस्य बाह्ये शैत्यं न तज्जलम् ॥ किं तु नीरगुणस्तेन नीरसत्तानुमीयते ॥ ९७ ॥ यावद्यावदहंकारो विस्मृतोभ्यासयोगतः ॥ तावत्तावत्सूक्ष्मदृष्टेर्निजानन्दोनुमीयते ॥ ९८ ॥ सर्वात्मना विस्मृतः सन्सूक्ष्मतां परमां व्रजेत् ॥ अलीनत्वान्न निद्रैषा ततो देहोपि नो पतेत् ॥ ९९ ॥

न द्वैतं भासते नापि निद्रा तत्रास्ति यत्सुखम् ॥ स ब्रह्मानन्द
 इत्याह भगवानर्जुनं प्रति ॥ १०० ॥ शनैः शनैरुपरमेद्बुद्ध्या
 धृतिगृहीतया ॥ आत्मसंस्थं मनः कृत्वा न किञ्चिदपि चिन्तयेत्
 ॥ १ ॥ यतोयतो निश्चरति मनश्चञ्चलमस्थिरम् ॥ ततस्ततो निय-
 म्यैतदात्मन्येव वशं नयेत् ॥ २ ॥ प्रशान्तमनसं ह्येनं योगिनं सुख-
 मुत्तमम् ॥ उपैति शान्तरजसं ब्रह्मभूतमकल्मषम् ॥ ३ ॥ यत्रोपरमते
 चित्तं निरुद्धं योगसेवया ॥ यत्र चैवात्मनात्मानं पश्यन्नात्मनि तुष्यति
 ॥ ४ ॥ सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्तद्बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् ॥ वेत्ति यत्र न
 चैवायं स्थितश्चलति तत्त्वतः ॥ ५ ॥ यं लब्ध्वा चापरं लाभं मन्यते
 नाधिकं ततः ॥ यस्मिन् स्थितो न दुःखेन गुरुणापि विचाल्यते
 ॥ ६ ॥ तं विद्यादुःखसंयोगवियोगं योगसंज्ञितम् ॥ स निश्चयेन
 योक्तव्यो योगो निर्विण्णचेतसा ॥ ७ ॥ युञ्जन्नेवं सदात्मानं योगी
 विगतकल्मषः ॥ सुखेन ब्रह्मसंस्पर्शमत्यन्तं सुखमश्नुते ॥ ८ ॥
 उत्सेक उदधेर्यद्वत्कुशाग्रेणैकविन्दुना ॥ मनसो निग्रहस्तद्वद्भवेदप-
 रिखेदतः ॥ ९ ॥ बृहद्रथस्य राजर्षेः शाकायन्यो मुनिः सुखम् ॥
 प्राह मैत्राख्यशाखायां समाधुक्तिपुरःसरम् ॥ ११० ॥ यथा
 निरिन्धनो वह्निः स्वयोनावुपशाम्यति ॥ तथा वृत्तिक्षयाच्चित्तं
 स्वयोनावुपशाम्यति ॥ ११ ॥ स्वयोनावुपशान्तस्य मनसः सत्य-
 कामिनः ॥ इन्द्रियार्थविमूढस्यानृताः कर्मवशानुगाः ॥ १२ ॥
 चित्तमेव हि संसारस्तत्प्रयत्नेन शोधयेत् ॥ यच्चित्तस्तन्मयो मर्त्यो
 गुह्यमेतत्सनातनम् ॥ १३ ॥ चित्तस्य हि प्रसादेन हन्ति कर्म
 शुभाशुभम् ॥ प्रसन्नात्मात्मनि स्थित्वा सुखमक्षयमश्नुते ॥ १४ ॥
 समासक्तं यथा चित्तं जन्तोर्विषयगोचरे ॥ यद्येवं ब्रह्मणि स्यात्तत्को
 न मुच्येत बन्धनात् ॥ १५ ॥ मनो हि द्विविधं प्रोक्तं शुद्धं
 चाशुद्धमेव च ॥ अशुद्धं कामसंपर्काच्छुद्धं कामविवर्जितम् ॥ १६ ॥

मन एव मनुष्याणां कारणं बन्धमोक्षयोः ॥ बन्धाय विषयासक्तं
मुक्त्यै निर्विषयं स्मृतम् ॥ १७ ॥ समाधिनिर्धूतमलस्य चेतसो
निवेशितस्यात्मनि यत्सुखं भवेत् ॥ न शक्यते वर्णयितुं गिरा तदा
स्वयं तदन्तःकरणेन गृह्यते ॥ १८ ॥ यद्यप्यसौ चिरं कालं समा-
धिर्दुर्लभो नृणाम् ॥ तथापि क्षणिको ब्रह्मानन्दं निश्चाययत्यसौ
॥ १९ ॥ श्रद्धालुर्व्यसनी योऽत्र निश्चिनोत्येव सर्वथा ॥ निश्चिते
तु सकृत्तस्मिन् विश्वसित्यन्यदाप्ययम् ॥ २० ॥ तादृक् पुमानु-
दासीनकालेष्यानन्दवासनाम् ॥ उपेक्ष्य मुख्यमानन्दं भावयत्येव
तत्परः ॥ २१ ॥ परव्यसनिनी नारी व्यग्रापि गृहकर्मणि ॥ तदे-
वास्वादयत्यन्तः परसंगरसायनम् ॥ २२ ॥ एवं तत्त्वे परे शुद्धे
धीरो विश्रान्तिमागतः ॥ तदेवास्वादयत्यन्तर्बहिर्व्यवहरन्नपि ॥ २३ ॥
धीरत्वमक्षप्राबल्येष्यानन्दास्वादवाञ्छया ॥ तिरस्कृत्याखिलाक्षाणि
तच्चिन्तायां प्रवर्तनम् ॥ २४ ॥ भारवाही शिरोभारं मुक्त्वास्ते
विश्रमं गतः ॥ संसारव्यापृतित्यागे तादृक्बुद्धिस्तु विश्रमः ॥ २५ ॥
विश्रान्तिं परमां प्राप्तस्त्वौदासीन्ये यथा तथा ॥ सुखदुःखदशायां
च तदानन्दैकतत्परः ॥ २६ ॥ अग्निप्रवेशहेतौ धीः शृङ्गारे यादृशी
तथा ॥ धीरस्योदेति विषयेऽनुसंधानविरोधिनि ॥ २७ ॥ अविरो-
धिसुखे बुद्धिः स्वानन्दे च गमागमौ ॥ कुर्वन्त्यास्ते क्रमादेषा
काकाक्षिवदितस्ततः ॥ २८ ॥ एकैव दृष्टिः काकस्य वामदक्षिणे-
त्रयोः ॥ यात्यायात्येवमानन्दद्वये तत्त्वविदो मतिः ॥ २९ ॥
भुञ्जानो विषयानन्दं ब्रह्मानन्दं च तत्त्ववित् ॥ द्विभाषाभिज्ञवद्वि-
द्यादुभौ लौकिकवैदिकौ ॥ ३० ॥ दुःखप्राप्तौ न चोद्वेगो यथापूर्वं
यतो द्विटक् ॥ गङ्गामगार्द्धकायस्य पुंसः शीतोष्णधीर्यथा ॥ ३१ ॥
इत्थं जागरणे तत्त्वविदो ब्रह्मसुखं सदा ॥ भाति तद्वासनाजन्ये
स्वप्ने तद्भासते तथा ॥ ३२ ॥ अविद्यावासनाप्यस्तीत्यतस्तद्वा-

सनोत्थिते ॥ स्वप्ने मूर्खवदेवैष सुखं दुःखं च वीक्षते ॥ ३३ ॥
 ब्रह्मानन्दाभिधे ग्रन्थे ब्रह्मानन्दप्रकाशकम् ॥ योगिप्रत्यक्षमध्याये
 प्रथमेऽस्मिन्नुदीरितम् ॥ १३४ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्य श्रीभारतीतीर्थविद्यारण्य-
 मुनिवर्यविरचितपञ्चदश्यां ब्रह्मानन्दे योगानन्दो
 नाम प्रथमोऽध्यायः ॥ १ ॥

॥ इति ब्रह्मानन्दे योगानन्दः ॥ ११ ॥

॥ ब्रह्मानन्दे आत्मानन्दप्रकरणम् ॥ १२ ॥

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

नन्वेवं वासनानन्दाद्ब्रह्मानन्दादपीतरम् ॥ वेत्तु योगी निजानन्दं
मूढस्यात्रास्ति का गतिः ॥ १ ॥ धर्माधर्मवशादेष जायतां म्रियता-
मपि ॥ पुनःपुनर्देहलक्षैः किन्नो दाक्षिण्यतो वद ॥ २ ॥ अस्ति
वोनुजिघृक्षुत्वादाक्षिण्येन प्रयोजनम् ॥ तर्हि ब्रूहि स मूढः किं
जिज्ञासुर्वा पराङ्मुखः ॥ ३ ॥ उपास्ति कर्म वा ब्रूयाद्विमुखाय
यथोचितम् ॥ मन्दप्रज्ञं तु जिज्ञासुमात्मानन्देन बोधयेत् ॥ ४ ॥
बोधयामास मैत्रेयीं याज्ञवल्क्यो निजप्रियाम् ॥ न वा अरे पत्युरर्थे
पतिः प्रिय इतीरयन् ॥ ५ ॥ पतिर्जाया पुत्रवित्ते पशुब्राह्मणबाहुजाः ॥
लोका देवा वेदभूते सर्वे चात्मार्यतः प्रियम् ॥ ६ ॥ पत्याविच्छा
यदा पत्यास्तदा प्रीतिं करोति सा ॥ क्षुदनुष्ठानरोगार्थैस्तदा नेच्छति
तत्पतिः ॥ ७ ॥ न पत्युरर्थे सा प्रीतिः स्वार्थ एव करोति ताम् ॥
पतिश्चात्मन एवार्थे न जायार्थे कदाचन ॥ ८ ॥ अन्योन्यप्रेरणेप्येवं
स्वेच्छयैव प्रवर्तनम् ॥ ९ ॥ श्मश्रुकण्टकवेधेन बालो रुदति तत्पिता ॥
चुम्बत्येव न सा प्रीतिर्बालार्थे स्वार्थ एव सा ॥ १० ॥ निरिच्छमपि
रत्नादिवित्तं यत्नेन पालयन् ॥ प्रीतिं करोति स स्वार्थे विचार्यत्वं
न शङ्कितम् ॥ ११ ॥ अनिच्छति बलीवर्दे विवाहयिषते बलात् ॥
प्रीतिः सा वर्णिगर्थैव बलीवदर्थिता कुतः ॥ १२ ॥ ब्राह्मण्यं मेस्ति
पूज्योहमिति तुष्यति पूजया ॥ अचेतनाया जातेर्नो संतुष्टिः पुंस
एव सा ॥ १३ ॥ क्षत्रियोहं तेन राज्यं करोमीत्यत्र राजता ॥ न
जातेर्वैश्यजात्यादौ योजनायेदमीरितम् ॥ १४ ॥ स्वर्गलोकब्रह्मलोकौ
स्तां ममेत्यभिवाञ्छनम् ॥ लोकयोर्नोपकराय स्वभोगायैव केवलम्
॥ १५ ॥ ईशविष्णवादयो देवाः पूज्यन्ते पापनष्टये ॥ न तन्निष्पा-

पदेवार्थं तत्तु स्वार्थं प्रयुज्यते ॥ १६ ॥ ऋगादयो ह्यधीयन्ते दुर्ब्रा-
 ह्मणानवाप्तये ॥ न तत्प्रसक्तं वेदेषु मनुष्येषु प्रसज्यते ॥ १७ ॥
 भूम्यादिपञ्चभूतानि स्थानतृप्ताकशोषणैः ॥ हेतुभिश्चावकाशेन
 वाञ्छन्त्येषां न हेतवः ॥ १८ ॥ स्वामिभृत्यादिकं सर्वं स्वोपकाराय
 वाञ्छति ॥ तत्तत्कृतोपकारस्तु तस्य तस्य न विद्यते ॥ १९ ॥
 सर्वव्यवहृतिष्वेवमनुसंधातुमीदृशम् ॥ उदाहरणबाहुल्यं तेन स्वां
 वासयेन्मतिम् ॥ २० ॥ अथ केयं भवेत्प्रीतिः श्रूयते या निजा-
 त्मनि ॥ रागो बन्धादिविषये श्रद्धा यागादिकर्मणि ॥ भक्तिः
 स्यादुरुदेवादाविच्छा त्वप्राप्तवस्तुनि ॥ २१ ॥ तर्ह्यस्तु सात्त्विकी
 वृत्तिः सुखमात्रानुवर्तिनी ॥ प्राप्ते नष्टेऽपि सद्भावादिच्छातो व्यतिरिच्यते
 ॥ २२ ॥ सुखसाधनतोषाधेरन्नपानादयः प्रियाः ॥ २३ ॥ आत्मा-
 नुकूल्यादन्नादिसमश्चेदमुनात्र कः ॥ अनुकूलयितव्यः स्यान्नैकस्मि-
 न्कर्मकर्तृता ॥ २४ ॥ सुखे वैषयिके प्रीतिमात्रमात्मा त्वतिप्रियः ॥ सुखे
 व्यभिचरत्येषा नात्मनि व्यभिचारिणी ॥ २५ ॥ एकं त्यक्त्वाऽन्य-
 दादत्ते सुखं वैषयिकं सदा ॥ नात्मा त्याज्यो न चादेयस्तस्मिन्व्य-
 भिचरेत्कथम् ॥ २६ ॥ हानादानविहीनेस्मिन्नुपेक्षा चेत्तृणादिवत् ॥
 उपेक्षितुः स्वरूपत्वान्नोपेक्ष्यत्वं निजात्मनः ॥ २७ ॥ रोगक्रोधा-
 भिभूतानां मुमूर्षावीक्ष्यते क्वचित् ॥ ततो द्वेषाद्भवेत्याज्य आत्मेति
 यदि तन्न हि ॥ २८ ॥ त्यक्तुं योग्यस्य देहस्य नात्मता त्यक्तुरेव
 सा ॥ न त्यक्त्यस्ति स द्वेषस्त्याज्ये द्वेषे तु का क्षतिः ॥ २९ ॥
 आत्मार्थत्वेन सर्वस्य प्रीतिश्चात्मा ह्यतिप्रियः ॥ सिद्धो यथा पुत्र-
 मित्रात्पुत्रः प्रियतरस्तथा ॥ ३० ॥ मा न भूवमहं किं तु भूयासं
 सर्वदेत्यसौ ॥ आशीः सर्वस्य दृष्टेति प्रत्यक्षा प्रीतिरात्मनि ॥ ३१ ॥
 इत्यादिभिस्त्रिभिः प्रीतौ सिद्धायामेवमात्मनि ॥ पुत्रभार्यादिशे-
 षत्वमात्मनः कैश्चिदीरितम् ॥ ३२ ॥ एतद्विवक्षया पुत्रे मुख्यात्मत्वं

श्रुतीरितम् ॥ आत्मा वै पुत्रनामेति तच्चोपनिषदि स्फुटम् ॥ ३३ ॥
 सोस्यायमात्मा पुण्येभ्यः कर्मभ्यः प्रतिधीयते ॥ अथास्येतर आत्मायं
 कृतकृत्यः प्रमीयते ॥ ३४ ॥ सत्यप्यात्मनि लोकोस्ति नापुत्रस्यात
 एव हि ॥ अनुशिष्टं पुत्रमेव लोक्यमाहुर्मनीषिणः ॥ ३५ ॥ मनु-
 ष्यलोको जय्यः स्यात्पुत्रेणैवेतरेण नो ॥ मुमूर्षुर्मन्त्रयेत्पुत्रं त्वंब्रह्मे-
 त्यादिमन्त्रकैः ॥ ३६ ॥ इत्यादिश्रुतयः प्राहुः पुत्रभार्यादिशेषताम् ॥
 लौकिका अपि पुत्रस्य प्राधान्यमनुमन्वते ॥ ३७ ॥ स्वस्मिन्मृतेपि
 पुत्रादिर्जीवेद्वित्तादिना यथा ॥ तथैव यन्नं कुरुते मुख्याः पुत्रादय-
 स्ततः ॥ ३८ ॥ बाढमेतावता नात्मा शेषो भवति कस्यचित् ॥
 गौणमिथ्यामुख्यभेदेरात्मायं भवति त्रिधा ॥ ३९ ॥ देवदत्तस्तु
 सिंहोयमित्यैक्यं गौणमेतयोः ॥ भेदस्य भासमानत्वात्पुत्रादेरात्मता
 तथा ॥ ४० ॥ भेदोस्ति पञ्चकोशेषु साक्षिणो न तु भात्यसौ ॥
 मिथ्यात्मताऽतः कोशानां स्थाणोश्चैरात्मता यथा ॥ ४१ ॥ न
 भाति भेदो नाप्यस्ति साक्षिणोऽप्रतियोगिनः ॥ सर्वान्तरत्वात्तस्यैव
 मुख्यमात्मात्वमिष्यते ॥ ४२ ॥ सत्येवं व्यवहारेषु येषु यस्यात्म-
 तोचिता ॥ तेषु तस्यैव शेषित्वं सर्वस्यान्यस्य शेषता ॥ ४३ ॥
 मुमूर्षोर्गृह्यक्षादौ गौणात्मैवोपयुज्यते ॥ न मुख्यात्मा न मिथ्यात्मा
 पुत्रः शेषीभवत्यतः ॥ ४४ ॥ अध्येता वह्निरित्यत्र सन्नप्यग्निर्न
 गृह्यते ॥ अयोग्यत्वेन योग्यत्वाद्बदरेवापि गृह्यते ॥ ४५ ॥ कृशोयं
 पुष्टिमाप्स्यामीत्यादौ देहात्मतोचिता ॥ न पुत्रं विनियुक्तेन पुष्टिहे-
 त्वन्नभक्षणे ॥ ४६ ॥ तपसा स्वर्गमेष्यामीत्यादौ कर्त्रात्मतोचिता ॥
 अनपेक्ष्य वपुर्भोगं चरेत्कृच्छ्रादिकं ततः ॥ ४७ ॥ मोक्षयेहमित्यत्र
 युक्तं चिदात्मत्वं तदा पुमान् ॥ तद्वेत्ति गुरुशास्त्राभ्यां न तु किञ्चि-
 च्चिकीर्षति ॥ ४८ ॥ विप्रक्षत्रादयो यद्वद्बृहस्पतिसवादिषु ॥ व्यव-
 स्थितास्तथा गौणमिथ्यामुख्या यथोचितम् ॥ ४९ ॥ तत्रतत्रोचिते

प्रीतिरात्मन्येवातिशायिनी ॥ अनात्मनि तु तच्छेषे प्रीतिरन्यत्र
 नोभयम् ॥ ५० ॥ उपेक्ष्यं द्वेष्यमित्यन्यत् द्वेधामार्गतृणादिकम् ॥
 उपेक्ष्यं व्याघ्रसर्पादि द्वेष्यमेवं चतुर्विधम् ॥ ५१ ॥ आत्मा शेष
 उपेक्ष्यं च द्वेष्यं चेति चतुर्ष्वपि ॥ न व्यक्तिनियमः किंतु तत्तत्कार्य-
 र्यात्तथातथा ॥ ५२ ॥ स्याद्व्याघ्रः संमुखो द्वेष्यो ह्युपेक्ष्यस्तु परा-
 ड्मुखः ॥ लालनादनुकूलश्चेद्विनोदायेति शेषताम् ॥ ५३ ॥
 व्यक्तीनां नियमो माभूलक्षणात्तु व्यवस्थितिः ॥ आनुकूल्यं प्रातिकूल्यं
 द्वयाभावश्च लक्षणम् ॥ ५४ ॥ आत्मा प्रेयान् प्रियः शेषो द्वेषोपेक्षे
 तदन्ययोः ॥ इति व्यवस्थितो लोको याज्ञवल्क्यमतं च तत् ॥ ५५ ॥
 अन्यत्रापि श्रुतिः प्राह पुत्राद्वित्तात्तथान्यतः ॥ सर्वस्मादान्तरं तत्त्वं
 तदेतत्प्रेय इष्यताम् ॥ ५६ ॥ श्रोत्या विचारदृष्ट्यायं साक्ष्येवात्मा
 न चेतरेः ॥ कोशान्पञ्च विविच्यान्तर्वस्तुदृष्टिर्विचारणा ॥ ५७ ॥
 जागरस्वप्नसुषुप्तीनामागमापायभासनम् ॥ यतो भवत्यसावात्मा स्वप्न-
 काशचिदात्मकः ॥ ५८ ॥ शेषाः प्राणादिवित्तान्ता आसन्नास्तारत-
 म्यतः ॥ प्रीतिस्तथा तारतम्यात्तेषु सर्वेषु वीक्ष्यते ॥ ५९ ॥
 वित्तात्पुत्रः प्रियः पुत्रात्पिण्डः पिण्डात्तथेन्द्रियम् ॥ इन्द्रियाच्च प्रियः
 प्राणः प्राणादात्मा प्रियः परः ॥ ६० ॥ एवं स्थिते विवादोत्र
 प्रतिबुद्धविमूढयोः ॥ श्रुत्योदाहारि तत्रात्मा प्रेयानित्येव निर्णयः
 ॥ ६१ ॥ साक्ष्येव दृष्ट्यादन्यस्मात्प्रेयानित्याह तत्त्ववित् ॥ प्रेया-
 न्पुत्रादिरेवेमं भोक्तुं साक्षीति मूढधीः ॥ ६२ ॥ आत्मनोन्यं प्रियं ब्रूते
 शिष्यश्च प्रतिवाद्यापि ॥ तस्योत्तरं वचो बोधशापौ कुर्यात्तयोः
 क्रमात् ॥ ६३ ॥ प्रियं त्वां रोत्स्यतीत्येवमुत्तरं वक्ति तत्त्ववित् ॥
 स्वोक्तप्रियस्य दुष्टत्वं शिष्यो वेत्ति विवेकतः ॥ ६४ ॥ अलभ्य-
 मानस्तनयः पितरौ क्लेशोच्चिरम् ॥ लब्धोपि गर्भपातेन प्रसवेन च
 बाधते ॥ ६५ ॥ जातस्य ग्रहरोगादिः कुमारस्य च मूर्खता ॥

उपनीतेष्वविद्यत्वमनुद्वाहश्च पण्डिते ॥ ६६ ॥ यूनश्च परदारादि
 दारिद्र्यं च कुटुम्बिनः ॥ पित्रोर्दुःखस्य नास्त्यन्तो धनी चेन्मित्रयते
 तदा ॥ ६७ ॥ एवं विविच्य पुत्रादौ प्रीतिं त्यक्त्वा निजात्मानि ॥
 निश्चित्य परमां प्रीतिं वीक्षते तमहर्निशम् ॥ ६८ ॥ आग्रहाद्वृक्ष-
 विद्वेषादपि पक्षममुञ्चतः ॥ वादिनो नरकः प्रोक्तो दोषश्च बहुयोनिषु
 ॥ ६९ ॥ ब्रह्मविद्वृक्षरूपत्वादीश्वरस्तेन वर्णितम् ॥ यद्यत्तत्तत्तथैव
 स्यात्तच्छिष्यप्रतिवादिनोः ॥ ७० ॥ यस्तु साक्षिणमात्मानं सेवते
 प्रियमुत्तमम् ॥ तस्य प्रेयानसावात्मा न नश्यति कदाचन ॥ ७१ ॥
 परप्रेमास्पदत्वेन परमानन्दरूपता ॥ सुखवृद्धिः प्रीतिवृद्धौ सार्वभौ-
 मादिषु श्रुता ॥ ७२ ॥ चैतन्यवत्सुखं चास्य स्वभावश्चेच्छिदात्मनः ॥
 धीवृत्तिष्वनुवर्तेत सर्वास्वपि चित्तिर्यथा ॥ ७३ ॥ मैवमुष्णप्रकाशात्मा
 दीपस्तस्य प्रभा गृहे ॥ व्याप्नोति नोष्णता तद्रश्चित्तेरेवानुवर्तनम्
 ॥ ७४ ॥ गन्धरूपरसस्पर्शेष्वपि सत्सु यथा पृथक् ॥ एकाक्षेणैक
 एवार्थो गृह्यते नेतरस्तथा ॥ ७५ ॥ चिदानन्दौ नैव भिन्नौ गन्धा-
 द्यास्तु विलक्षणाः ॥ इति चेत्तदभेदोपि साक्षिण्यन्यत्र वा वद
 ॥ ७६ ॥ आद्ये गन्धादयोप्येवमभिन्नाः पुष्पवर्तिनः ॥ अक्षभेदेन
 तद्भेदे वृत्तिभेदात्तयोर्भिदा ॥ ७७ ॥ सत्त्ववृत्तौ चित्सुखैक्यं तद्वृत्ते-
 निर्मलत्वतः ॥ रजोवृत्तेस्तु मालिन्यात्सुखांशोत्र तिरस्कृतः ॥ ७८ ॥
 तिनित्तिणीफलमत्यम्लं लवणेन युतं यदा ॥ तदाम्लस्य तिरस्कारादी-
 षदम्लं यथा तथा ॥ ७९ ॥ ननु प्रियतमत्वेन परमानन्दतात्मनि ॥
 विवेक्तुं शक्यतामेवं विना योगेन किं भवेत् ॥ ८० ॥ यद्योगेन
 तदेवेति वदामो ज्ञानसिद्धये ॥ योगः प्रोक्तो विवेकेन ज्ञानं किं
 नोपजायते ॥ ८१ ॥ यत्साङ्ख्यैः प्राप्यते स्थानं तद्योगैरपि गम्यते ॥
 इति स्मृतं फलैकत्वं योगिनां च विवेकिनाम् ॥ ८२ ॥ असाध्यः
 कस्यचिद्योगः कस्यचिज्ज्ञाननिश्चयः ॥ इत्थं विचार्य मार्गौ द्वौ

जगाद् परमेश्वरः ॥ ८३ ॥ योगे कोतिशयस्तेऽत्र ज्ञानमुक्तं समं
 द्वयोः ॥ रागद्वेषाद्यभावश्च तुल्यो योगिविवेकिनोः ॥ ८४ ॥
 न प्रीतिर्विषयेष्वस्ति प्रेयानात्मेति जानतः ॥ कुतो रागः कुतो द्वेषः
 प्रातिकूल्यमपश्यतः ॥ ८५ ॥ देहादेः प्रतिकूलेषु द्वेषस्तुल्यो द्वयोरपि ॥
 द्वेषं कुर्वन्न योगी चेदविवेक्यपि तादृशः ॥ ८६ ॥ द्वैतस्य प्रतिभानं
 तु व्यवहारे द्वयोः समम् ॥ समाधौ नेति चेत्तद्वन्नाद्वैतत्वविवेकिनः
 ॥ ८७ ॥ विवक्ष्यते तदस्माभिरद्वैतानन्दनामके ॥ अध्याये हि
 तृतीयेतः सर्वमप्यतिमङ्गलम् ॥ ८८ ॥ सदा पश्यन्निजानन्दमपश्य-
 न्निखिलं जगत् ॥ अर्थाद्योगीति चेत्तर्हि संतुष्टो वर्द्धतां भवान्
 ॥ ८९ ॥ ब्रह्मानन्दाभिधे ग्रन्थे मन्दानुग्रहसिद्धये ॥ द्वितीयाध्याय
 एतस्मिन्नात्मानन्दो विवेचितः ॥ ९० ॥

इति श्रीब्रह्मानन्दे आत्मानन्दः ॥ १२ ॥

॥ ब्रह्मानन्दे अद्वैतानन्दप्रकरणम् ॥ १३ ॥

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

योगानन्दः पुरोक्तो यः स आत्मानन्द इष्यताम् ॥ कथं ब्रह्म-
त्वमेतस्य सद्द्वयस्येति चेच्छृणु ॥ १ ॥ आकाशादिस्वदेहान्तं तैत्तिरी-
यश्रुतीरितम् ॥ जगन्नस्त्यन्यदानन्दादद्वैतब्रह्मता ततः ॥ २ ॥
आनन्दादेव तज्जातं तिष्ठत्यानन्द एव तत् ॥ आनन्द एव लीनं
चेत्युक्तानन्दात्कथं पृथक् ॥ ३ ॥ कुलालाद्वट उत्पन्नो भिन्नश्चेति न
शङ्क्यताम् ॥ मृद्वदेष उपादानं निमित्तं न कुलालवत् ॥ ४ ॥
स्थितिर्लयश्च कुम्भस्य कुलाले स्तो न हि क्वचित् ॥ दृष्टौ तौ मृदि
तद्वत्स्यादुपादानं तयोः श्रुतेः ॥ ५ ॥ उपादानं त्रिधा भिन्नं विवर्ति
परिणामि च ॥ आरम्भकं च तत्रान्त्यौ न निरंशेऽवकाशिनौ ॥ ६ ॥
आरम्भवादिनोन्यस्मादन्यस्योत्पत्तिमूचिरे ॥ तन्तोः पटस्य निष्पत्ते-
र्भिन्नौ तन्तुपटौ खलु ॥ ७ ॥ अवस्थान्तरतापत्तिरेकस्य परिणा-
मिता ॥ स्यात्क्षीरं दधि मृत्कुम्भः सुवर्णं कुण्डलं यथा ॥ ८ ॥
अवस्थान्तरभानं तु विवर्तो रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥ निरंशेऽप्यस्त्यसौ व्योम्नि
तलमालिन्यकल्पनात् ॥ ९ ॥ ततो निरंश आनन्दे विवर्तो जग-
दिष्यताम् ॥ मायाशक्तिः कल्पिका स्यादैन्द्रजालिकशक्तिवत् ॥ १० ॥
शक्तिः शक्तात्पृथङ् नास्ति तद्वद्वृष्टेर्न चाभिदा ॥ प्रतिबन्धस्य दृष्ट-
त्वाच्छक्त्यभावे तु कस्य सः ॥ ११ ॥ शक्तेः कार्यानुमेयत्वादकार्ये
प्रतिबन्धनम् ॥ ज्वलतोऽग्नेरदाहे स्यान्मन्त्रादिप्रतिबन्धता ॥ १२ ॥
देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढां मुनयोऽविदन् ॥ परास्य शक्तिर्विविधा
क्रियाज्ञानबलात्मिका ॥ १३ ॥ इति वेदवचः प्राह वसिष्ठश्च
तथाऽब्रवीत् ॥ सर्वशक्ति परं ब्रह्म नित्यमापूर्णमद्वयम् ॥ १४ ॥
ययोल्लसति शक्त्यासौ प्रकाशमधिगच्छति ॥ चिच्छक्तिर्ब्रह्मणो राम

शरीरेषूपलभ्यते ॥ १५ ॥ स्पन्दशक्तिश्च वातेषु दार्ढ्यशक्तिस्तथो-
 पले ॥ द्रवशक्तिस्तथाम्भस्सु दाहशक्तिस्तथानले ॥ १६ ॥ शून्यश-
 क्तिस्तथाकाशे नाशशक्तिर्विनाशिनि ॥ यथाण्डेन्तर्महासर्पो जगदस्ति
 तथात्मनि ॥ १७ ॥ फलपत्रलतापुष्पशाखाविटपमूलवान् ॥ ननु
 बीजे यथा वृक्षस्तथेदं ब्रह्मणि स्थितम् ॥ १८ ॥ कचित्काश्चित्कदा-
 चिच्च तस्मादुद्यन्ति शक्तयः ॥ देशकालविचित्रत्वात्क्षमातलादिव
 शालयः ॥ १९ ॥ स आत्मा सर्वगो राम नित्योदितमहावपुः ॥
 यन्मनाञ्जननीं शक्तिं धत्ते तन्मन उच्यते ॥ २० ॥ आदौ मनस्त-
 दनुबन्धविमोक्षदृष्टी पश्चात्पपञ्चरचना भुवनाभिधाना ॥ इत्यादिका
 स्थितिरियं हि गता प्रतिष्ठामाख्यायिकासु भगबालजनोदितेव ॥ २१ ॥
 बालस्य हि विनोदाय धात्री वक्ति शुभां कथाम् ॥ कचित्सन्ति
 महाबाहो राजपुत्रास्त्रयः शुभाः ॥ २२ ॥ द्वौ न जातौ तथैकस्तु
 गर्भ एव न च स्थितः ॥ वसन्ति ते धर्मयुक्ता अत्यन्तासति पत्तने
 ॥ २३ ॥ स्वकीयाच्छून्यनगरान्निर्गत्य विमलाशयाः ॥ गच्छन्तो
 गगने वृक्षान् ददृशुः फलशालिनः ॥ २४ ॥ भविष्यन्नगरे तत्र
 राजपुत्रास्त्रयोपि ते ॥ सुखमद्य स्थिताः पुत्र मृगयाव्यवहारिणः
 ॥ २५ ॥ धात्र्येति कथिता राम बलकाख्यायिका शुभा ॥ निश्चयं
 स ययौ बालो निर्विचारणया धिया ॥ २६ ॥ इयं संसाररचना
 विचारोज्झितचेतसाम् ॥ बालकाख्यायिकेवेत्थमवस्थितिमुपागता
 ॥ २७ ॥ इत्यादिभिरुपाख्यानैर्मायाशक्तेश्च विस्तरम् ॥ वसिष्ठः
 कथयामास सैव शक्तिर्निरूप्यते ॥ २८ ॥ कार्यादाश्रयतश्चैषा भवे-
 च्छक्तिर्विलक्षणा ॥ स्फोटाद्भारौ दृश्यमानौ शक्तिस्तत्रानुमीयते
 ॥ २९ ॥ पृथुबुधोदराकारो घटः कार्योत्र मृत्तिका ॥ शब्दादिभिः
 पञ्चगुणैर्युक्ता शक्तिस्त्वतद्विधा ॥ ३० ॥ न पृथ्वादिर्न शब्दादिः
 शक्तावस्तु यथा तथा ॥ अत एव ह्यचिन्त्यैषा न निर्वचनमर्हति ॥ ३१ ॥

कार्योत्पत्तेः पुरा शक्तिर्निगूढा मृद्यवस्थिता ॥ कुलालादिस-
हायेन विकाराकारतां व्रजेत् ॥ ३२ ॥ पृथुत्वादिविकारान्तं
स्पर्शादिं चापि मृत्तिकाम् ॥ एकीकृत्य घटं प्राहुर्विचारविकला
जनाः ॥ ३३ ॥ कुलालव्यापृतेः पूर्वो यावानंशः स नो घटः ॥
पश्चात्तु पृथुबुद्धादिमत्वे युक्ता हि कुम्भता ॥ ३४ ॥ स घटो न
मृदो भिन्नो वियोगे सत्यनीक्षणात् ॥ नाप्यभिन्नः पुरा पिण्डदशा-
यामनवेक्षणात् ॥ ३५ ॥ अतोऽनिर्वचनीयोयं शक्तिवत्तेन शक्तिजः ॥
अव्यक्तत्वे शक्तिरुक्ता व्यक्तत्वे घटनामभूत् ॥ ३६ ॥ ऐन्द्रजालिक-
निष्ठापि माया न व्यज्यते पुरा ॥ पश्चाद्गन्धर्वसेनादिरूपेण व्यक्ति-
माप्नुयात् ॥ ३७ ॥ एवं मायामयत्वेन विकारस्यानृतात्मताम् ॥
विकाराधारमृद्वस्तुसत्यत्वं चाब्रवीच्छ्रुतिः ॥ ३८ ॥ वाङ्निष्पाद्यं
नाममात्रं विकारो नास्य सत्यता ॥ स्पर्शादिगुणयुक्ता तु सत्या
केवलमृत्तिका ॥ ३९ ॥ व्यक्ताव्यक्ते तदाधार इति त्रिष्वध्ययोर्द्वयोः ॥
पर्यायः कालभेदेन तृतीयस्त्वनुगच्छति ॥ ४० ॥ निस्तत्त्वं भासमानं
च व्यक्तमुत्पत्तिनाशभाक् ॥ तदुत्पत्तौ तस्य नाम वाचा निष्पाद्यते
नृभिः ॥ ४१ ॥ व्यक्ते नष्टेऽपि नामैतन्नृवक्त्रेष्वनुवर्तते ॥ तेन नाम्ना
निरूप्यत्वाच्चक्तं तद्रूपमुच्यते ॥ ४२ ॥ निस्तत्त्वत्वाद्दिनाशित्वाद्वा-
चारम्भणनामतः ॥ व्यक्तस्य न तु तद्रूपं सत्यं किञ्चिन्मृदादिवत्
॥ ४३ ॥ व्यक्तकाले ततः पूर्वमूर्ध्वमप्येकरूपभाक् ॥ सतत्त्वमविनाशं
च सत्यं मृद्वस्तु कथ्यते ॥ ४४ ॥ व्यक्तं घटो विकारश्चेत्येतैर्नाम-
भिरीरितः ॥ अर्थश्चेदनृतः कस्मान्न मृद्वोऽपि निवर्तते ॥ ४५ ॥
निवृत्त एव यस्मात्ते तत्सत्यत्वमतिर्गता ॥ ईदृङ्निवृत्तिरेवात्र बोधजा
न त्वभासनम् ॥ ४६ ॥ पुमानधोमुखो नीरे भातोऽप्यस्ति न
वस्तुतः ॥ तदस्थमर्त्यवत्तस्मिन्नैवास्था कस्यचित्कचित् ॥ ४७ ॥
ईदृग्वोऽपि पुमर्थत्वं मतमद्वैतवादिनाम् ॥ मृद्वपस्यापरित्यागाद्विवर्तत्वं

घटे स्थितम् ॥ ४८ ॥ परिणामे पूर्वरूपं त्यजेत्तक्षीररूपवत् ॥
 मृत्सुवर्णे निर्वर्तेते घटकुण्डलयोर्न हि ॥ ४९ ॥ घटे भग्ने न मृद्भावः
 कपालानामवेक्षणात् ॥ मैवं चूर्णेस्ति मृद्रूपं स्वर्णरूपं त्वतिस्फुटम्
 ॥ ५० ॥ क्षीरादौ परिणामोस्तु पुनस्तद्भाववर्जनात् ॥ एतावता
 मृदादीनां दृष्टान्तत्वं न हीयते ॥ ५१ ॥ आरम्भवादिनः कार्ये
 मृदो द्वैगुण्यमापतेत् ॥ रूपस्पर्शादयः प्रोक्ताः कार्यकारणयोः पृथक्
 ॥ ५२ ॥ मृत्सुवर्णमयश्चेति दृष्टान्तत्रयमारुणिः ॥ प्राहातो वासये-
 त्कार्यानृतत्वं सर्ववस्तुषु ॥ ५३ ॥ कारणज्ञानतः कार्यविज्ञानं चापि
 सोऽवदत् ॥ सत्यज्ञानेऽनृतज्ञानं कथमत्रोपपद्यते ॥ ५४ ॥ समृत्कस्य
 विकारस्य कार्यता लोकदृष्टितः ॥ वास्तवोत्र मृदंशोस्य बोधः
 कारणबोधतः ॥ ५५ ॥ अनृतांशो न बोद्धव्यस्तद्बोधानुपयोगतः ॥
 तत्त्वज्ञानं पुमर्थं स्यान्नानृतांशावबोधनम् ॥ ५६ ॥ तर्हि कारण-
 विज्ञानात्कार्यज्ञानमितीरिते ॥ मृद्बोधान्मृत्तिका बुद्धेत्युक्तं स्यात्कोत्र
 विस्मयः ॥ ५७ ॥ सत्यं कार्येषु वस्त्वंशः कारणात्मेति जानतः ॥
 विस्मयो मास्तिवहाज्ञस्य विस्मयः केन वार्यते ॥ ५८ ॥ आरम्भी
 परिणामी च लौकिकश्चैककारणे ॥ ज्ञाते सर्वमतिं श्रुत्वा प्राप्नुवन्त्येव
 विस्मयम् ॥ ५९ ॥ अद्वैतेभिमुखीकर्तुमेवात्रैकस्य बोधतः ॥ सर्व-
 बोधः श्रुतौ नैव नानात्वस्य विवक्षया ॥ ६० ॥ एकमृत्पिण्डवि-
 ज्ञानात्सर्वमृन्मयधीर्यथा ॥ तथैकब्रह्मबोधेन जगद्बुद्धिर्विभाव्यताम्
 ॥ ६१ ॥ सच्चित्सुखात्मकं ब्रह्म नामरूपात्मकं जगत् ॥ तापनीये
 श्रुतं ब्रह्म सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणम् ॥ ६२ ॥ सद्रूपमारुणिः प्राह प्रज्ञानं
 ब्रह्म बहुचः ॥ सनत्कुमार आनन्दमेवमन्यत्र गम्यताम् ॥ ६३ ॥
 विचिन्त्य सर्वरूपाणि कृत्वा नामानि तिष्ठति ॥ अहं व्याकरवाणीमे
 नामरूपे इति श्रुते ॥ ६४ ॥ अव्याकृतं पुरा सृष्टेरूर्ध्वं व्याक्रियते
 द्विधा ॥ अचिन्त्यशक्तिर्मयैषा ब्रह्मण्यव्याकृताभिधा ॥ ६५ ॥

अविक्रियब्रह्मनिष्ठा विकारं यात्यनेकधा ॥ मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्या-
 न्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ॥ ६६ ॥ आद्यो विकार आकाशः सोस्ति
 भात्यपि च प्रियः ॥ अवकाशस्तस्य रूपं तन्मिथ्या न तु तत्त्रयम्
 ॥ ६७ ॥ न व्यक्तेः पूर्वमस्त्येव न पश्चाच्चापि नाशतः ॥ आदावन्ते
 च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ॥ ६८ ॥ अव्यक्तादीनि भूतानि
 व्यक्तमध्यानि भारत ॥ अव्यक्तनिधनान्येवेत्याह कृष्णोऽर्जुनं प्रति
 ॥ ६९ ॥ मृद्वत्ते सच्चिदानन्दा अनुगच्छन्ति सर्वदा ॥ निराकाशे
 सदादीनामनुभूतिर्निजात्मनि ॥ ७० ॥ अवकाशे विस्मृतेऽथ तत्र
 किं भाति ते वद ॥ शून्यमेवेति चेदस्तु नाम तादृग्विभाति हि
 ॥ ७१ ॥ तादृक्त्वादेव तत्सत्त्वमौदासीन्येन तत्सुखम् ॥ आनुकू-
 ल्यप्रातिकूल्यहीनं यत्तन्निजं सुखम् ॥ ७२ ॥ आनुकूल्ये हर्षधीः
 स्यात्प्रातिकूल्ये तु दुःखधीः ॥ द्रयाभावे निजानन्दो निजदुःखं न
 तु क्वचित् ॥ ७३ ॥ निजानन्दे स्थिरे हर्षशोकयोर्व्यत्ययः क्षणात् ॥
 मनसः क्षणिकत्वेन तयोर्मानसतेष्यताम् ॥ ७४ ॥ आकाशेऽप्येवमा-
 नन्दः सत्ताभाने तु संमते ॥ वाय्वादिदेहपर्यन्तं वस्तुष्वेवं विभाव्य-
 ताम् ॥ ७५ ॥ गतिस्पर्शौ वायुरूपं वहेदाहप्रकाशने ॥ जलस्य द्रवता
 भूमेः काठिन्यं चेति निर्णयः ॥ ७६ ॥ असाधारण आकार
 औषध्यन्नवपुष्यपि ॥ एवं विभाव्यं मनसा तत्तद्रूपं यथोचितम्
 ॥ ७७ ॥ अनेकधा विभिन्नेषु नामरूपेषु चैकधा ॥ तिष्ठन्ति
 सच्चिदानन्दा विसंवादो न कस्यचित् ॥ ७८ ॥ निस्तत्त्वे नामरूपे
 द्वे जन्मनाशयुते च ते ॥ बुद्ध्या ब्रह्मणि वीक्षस्व समुद्रे बुद्बुदा-
 दिवत् ॥ ७९ ॥ सच्चिदानन्दरूपेऽस्मिन्पूर्णे ब्रह्मणि वीक्षिते ॥
 स्वयमेवावजानाति नामरूपे शनैःशनैः ॥ ८० ॥ यावद्यावदवज्ञा
 स्यात्तावत्तावत्तदीक्षणम् ॥ यावद्यावद्वीक्ष्यते तत्तावत्तावदुभे त्यजेत्
 ॥ ८१ ॥ तदभ्यासेन विद्यायां सुस्थितायामयं पुमान् ॥ जीवन्नेव

भवेन्मुक्तो वपुरस्तु यथा तथा ॥ ८२ ॥ तच्चिन्तनं तत्कथनमन्योन्यं
 तत्प्रबोधनम् ॥ एतदेकपरत्वं च ब्रह्माभ्यासं विदुर्बुधाः ॥ ८३ ॥
 वासनानेककालीना दीर्घकालं निरन्तरम् ॥ सादरं चाभ्यस्यमाने
 सर्वथैव निवर्तते ॥ ८४ ॥ मृच्छक्तिवद्ब्रह्मशक्तिरनेकाननृतान्सृजेत् ॥
 यद्वा जीवगता निद्रा स्वप्नश्चात्र निदर्शनम् ॥ ८५ ॥ निद्राशक्तिर्यथा
 जीवे दुर्घटस्वप्नकारिणी ॥ ब्रह्मण्येषा स्थिता माया सृष्टिस्थित्यन्त-
 कारिणी ॥ ८६ ॥ स्वप्ने वियद्गतिं पश्येत्स्वमूर्द्धच्छेदनं यथा ॥
 मुहूर्ते वत्सरौघं च मृतपुत्रादिकं पुनः ॥ ८७ ॥ इदं युक्तमिदं नेति
 व्यवस्था तत्र दुर्लभा ॥ यथायथेक्ष्यते यद्यत्तत्तद्युक्तं तथातथा ॥ ८८ ॥
 ईदृशो महिमा दृष्टो निद्राशक्तेर्यदा तदा ॥ मायाशक्तेरचिन्त्योयं
 महिमेति किमद्भुतम् ॥ ८९ ॥ शयाने पुरुषे निद्रा स्वप्नं बहुविधं
 सृजेत् ॥ ब्रह्मण्येवं निर्विकारे विकारान्कल्पयत्यसौ ॥ ९० ॥
 खानिलाग्निजलोर्व्यण्डलोकप्राणिशिलादिकाः ॥ विकाराः प्राणिधी-
 ष्वन्तश्चिच्छाया प्रतिबिम्बिता ॥ ९१ ॥ चेतनाचेतनेष्वेषु सच्चिदा-
 नन्दलक्षणम् ॥ समानं ब्रह्म भिद्येते नामरूपे पृथक्पृथक् ॥ ९२ ॥
 ब्रह्मण्येते नामरूपे पटे चित्रमिव स्थिते ॥ उपेक्ष्य नामरूपे द्वे
 सच्चिदानन्दधीर्भवेत् ॥ ९३ ॥ जलस्थेऽधोमुखे स्वस्य देहे दृष्टेऽप्यु-
 पेक्ष्य तम् ॥ तीरस्थ एव देहे स्वे तात्पर्यं स्याद्यथा तथा ॥ ९४ ॥
 सहस्रशो मनोराज्ये वर्तमाने सदैव तत् ॥ सर्वैरुपेक्ष्यते यद्द्रुपेक्षा
 नामरूपयोः ॥ ९५ ॥ क्षणेक्षणे मनोराज्यं भवत्येवान्यथाऽन्यथा ॥
 गतं गतं पुनर्नास्ति व्यवहारो बहिस्तथा ॥ ९६ ॥ न बाल्यं यौवने
 लभ्यं यौवनं स्थाविरे तथा ॥ मृतः पिता पुनर्नास्ति नायात्येव गतं
 दिनम् ॥ ९७ ॥ मनोराज्याद्विशेषः कः क्षणध्वंसिनि लौकिके ॥
 अतोऽस्मिन् भासमानेपि तत्सत्यत्वधियं त्यजेत् ॥ ९८ ॥ उपेक्षिते
 लौकिके धीर्निर्विघ्ना ब्रह्मचिन्तने ॥ नटवत्कृत्रिमास्थायां निर्वहत्येव

लौकिकम् ॥ ९९ ॥ प्रवहत्यपि नीरेऽथः स्थिरा प्रौढशिला यथा ॥
 नामरूपान्यथात्वेपि कूटस्थं ब्रह्म नान्यथा ॥ १०० ॥ निश्छिद्रे दर्पणे
 भाति वस्तुगर्भं बृहद्वियत् ॥ सच्चिद्वने तथा नाना जगद्गर्भमिदं वियत्
 ॥ १०१ ॥ अदृष्टा दर्पणं नैव तदन्तस्थेक्षणं तथा ॥ अमत्वा सच्चिदानन्दं
 नामरूपमतिः कुतः ॥ १०२ ॥ प्रथमं सच्चिदानन्दे भासमानेऽथ
 तावता ॥ बुद्धिं नियम्य नैवोर्ध्वं धारयेन्नामरूपयोः ॥ १०३ ॥
 एवं च निर्जगद्ब्रह्म सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणम् ॥ अद्वैतानन्द एतस्मिन्वि-
 श्राम्यन्तु जनाश्चिरम् ॥ १०४ ॥ ब्रह्मानन्दाभिधे ग्रन्थे तृतीयोऽध्याय
 ईरितः ॥ अद्वैतानन्द एव स्याज्जगन्मिथ्यात्वचिन्तया ॥ १०५ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीमद्विद्यारण्यमुनिविरचिते

ब्रह्मानन्दे अद्वैतानन्दो नाम तृतीयोऽध्यायः ॥ ३ ॥

॥ इति ब्रह्मानन्दे अद्वैतानन्दप्रकरणम् ॥ १३ ॥

॥ ब्रह्मानन्दे विद्यानन्दप्रकरणम् ॥ १४ ॥

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

योगेनात्मविवेकेन द्वैतमिथ्यात्वचिन्तया ॥ ब्रह्मानन्दं पश्यतोऽथ
विद्यानन्दो निरूप्यते ॥ १ ॥ विषयानन्दवद्विद्यानन्दो धीवृत्तिरू-
पकः ॥ दुःखाभावादिरूपेण प्रोक्त एव चतुर्विधः ॥ २ ॥ दुःखा-
भावश्च कामाप्तिः कृतकृत्योहमित्यसौ ॥ प्राप्तप्राप्योहमित्येव चातु-
र्विध्यमुदाहृतम् ॥ ३ ॥ ऐहिकं चामुष्मिकं चेत्येवं दुःखं द्विधेरितम् ॥
निवृत्तिमैहिकस्याह बृहदारण्यकं वचः ॥ ४ ॥ आत्मानं चेद्विजानी-
यादहमस्मीति पूरुषः ॥ किमिच्छन्कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत्
॥ ५ ॥ जीवात्मा परमात्मा चेत्यात्मा द्विविध ईरितः ॥ चित्तादा-
त्म्यान्निभिर्देहैर्जीवः सन् भोक्तृतां व्रजेत् ॥ ६ ॥ परात्मा सञ्चिता-
नन्दस्तादात्म्यं नामरूपयोः ॥ गत्वा भोग्यत्वमापन्नस्तद्विवेके तु
नोभयम् ॥ ७ ॥ भोग्यमिच्छन् भोक्तुरर्थे शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ॥ ज्वरा-
स्त्रिषु शरीरेषु स्थिता न त्वात्मनो ज्वराः ॥ ८ ॥ व्याधयो धातु-
वैषम्ये स्थूलदेहेस्थिता ज्वराः ॥ कामक्रोधादयः सूक्ष्मे द्वयोर्बीजं तु
कारणे ॥ ९ ॥ अद्वैतानन्दमार्गेण परात्मनि विवेचिते ॥ अपश्य-
न्वास्तवं भोग्यं किं नामेच्छेत्परात्मवित् ॥ १० ॥ आत्मानन्दो-
क्तरीत्यास्मिन् जीवात्मन्यवधारिते ॥ भोक्ता नैवास्ति कोप्यत्र शरीरे
तु ज्वरः कुतः ॥ ११ ॥ पुण्यपापद्वये चिन्ता दुःखमामुष्मिकं भवेत् ॥
प्रथमाध्याय एवोक्तं चिन्ता नैनं तपेदिति ॥ १२ ॥ यथा पुष्कर-
पर्णेऽस्मिन्नपामश्लेषणं तथा ॥ वेदनादूर्ध्वमागामिकर्मणोऽश्लेषणं बुधे
॥ १३ ॥ इषिकातृणतूलस्य वह्निदाहः क्षणाद्यथा ॥ तथा संचित-
कर्मास्य दग्धं भवति वेदनात् ॥ १४ ॥ यथैधांसि समिद्धोऽग्निर्भस्म-
सात्कुरुतेऽर्जुन ॥ ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा ॥ १५ ॥

यस्य नाहंकृतो भावो बुद्धिर्यस्य न लिप्यते ॥ हत्वापि स इमाँल्लो-
कान्न हन्ति न निबध्यते ॥ १६ ॥ मातापित्रोर्वधस्तेयं भ्रूणहत्या-
न्यदीदृशम् ॥ न मुक्तिं नाशयेत्पापं मुखकान्तिर्न नश्यति ॥ १७ ॥
दुःखाभाववदेवास्य सर्वकामाप्तिरीरिता ॥ सर्वान् कामानसावाप्त्वा
ह्यमृतोऽभवदित्यतः ॥ १८ ॥ जक्षन्क्रीडनरतिं प्राप्तः स्त्रीभिर्यानैस्त-
थेतरेः ॥ शरीरं न स्मरेत्प्राणः कर्मणा जीवयेदमुम् ॥ १९ ॥
सर्वान्कामान्सहाप्नोति नान्यवज्जन्मकर्मभिः ॥ वर्तन्ते श्रोत्रिये भोगा
युगपत्क्रमवर्जिताः ॥ २० ॥ युवा रूपी च विद्यावान्नीरोगो दृढचि-
त्तवान् ॥ सैन्योपेतः सर्वपृथ्वीं वित्तपूर्णां प्रपालयन् ॥ २१ ॥
सर्वैर्मानुष्यकैर्भोगैः संपन्नस्तृप्तभूमिपः ॥ यमानन्दमवाप्नोति ब्रह्मविच्च-
तमश्नुते ॥ २२ ॥ मर्त्यभोगे द्वयोर्नास्ति कामस्तृप्तिरतः समा ॥
भोगान्निष्कामतैकस्य परस्यापि विवेकतः ॥ २३ ॥ श्रोत्रियत्वाद्दे-
दशास्त्रैर्भोगदोषानवेक्षते ॥ राजा बृहद्रथो दोषांस्तान् गाथाभिरुदा-
हरत् ॥ २४ ॥ देहदोषांश्चित्तदोषान् भोग्यदोषाननेकशः ॥ शुना
वांते पायसे नो कामस्तद्वद्विवेकिनः ॥ २५ ॥ निष्कामत्वे समेप्यत्र
राज्ञः साधनसंचये ॥ दुःखमासीद्भाविनाशादतिभीरनुवर्तते ॥ २६ ॥
नोभयं श्रोत्रियस्यातस्तदानन्दोऽधिकोऽन्यतः ॥ गन्धर्वानन्द आशास्ति
राज्ञो नास्ति विवेकिनः ॥ २७ ॥ अस्मिन्कल्पे मनुष्यः सन्पुण्य-
पाकविशेषतः ॥ गन्धर्वत्वं समापन्नो मर्त्यगन्धर्व उच्यते ॥ २८ ॥
पूर्वकल्पे कृतात्पुण्यात्कल्पादावेव चेद्भवेत् ॥ गन्धर्वत्वं तादृशोऽत्र
देवगन्धर्व उच्यते ॥ २९ ॥ अग्निष्वात्तादयो लोके पितरश्चिरवासिनः ॥
कल्पादावेव देवत्वं गता आजानदेवताः ॥ ३० ॥ अस्मिन्कल्पेऽश्व-
मेधादि कर्मकृत्वा महत्पदम् ॥ अवाप्याजानदेवैर्याः पूज्यास्ताः
कर्मदेवताः ॥ ३१ ॥ यमाग्निमुख्या देवाः स्युर्ज्ञाताविन्द्रबृहस्पती ॥
प्रजापतिर्विराट् प्रोक्तो ब्रह्मा सूत्रात्मनामकः ॥ ३२ ॥ सार्वभौमा-

दिस्त्रान्ता उत्तरोत्तरकामिनः ॥ अवाङ्मनसगम्योयमात्मानन्दस्ततः
 परः ॥ ३३ ॥ तैस्तैः काम्येषु सर्वेषु सुखेषु श्रोत्रियो यतः ॥
 निःस्पृहस्तेन सर्वेषामानन्दाः सन्ति तस्य ते ॥ ३४ ॥ सर्वकामाप्ति-
 रेषोक्ता यद्वा साक्षिचिदात्मना ॥ स्वदेहवत्सर्वदेहेष्वपि भोगानवेक्षते
 ॥ ३५ ॥ अज्ञस्याप्येतदस्येव न तु तृप्तिरबोधतः ॥ यो वेद सोऽश्रुते
 सर्वान्कामानित्यब्रवीच्छ्रुतिः ॥ ३६ ॥ यद्वा सर्वात्मतां स्वस्य साम्ना
 गायति सर्वदा ॥ अहमन्नं तथान्नादश्चेति साम हृधीयते ॥ ३७ ॥
 दुःखाभावश्च कामाप्तिरुभे ह्येवं निरूपिते ॥ कृतकृत्यत्वमन्यच्च प्राप्त-
 प्राप्यत्वमीक्षताम् ॥ ३८ ॥ उभयं तृप्तिदीपे हि सम्यगस्माभिरी-
 रितम् ॥ त एवात्रानुसंधेयाः श्लोका बुद्धिविशुद्धये ॥ ३९ ॥
 ऐहिकामुष्मिकव्रातसिद्धयै मुक्तेश्च सिद्धये ॥ बहु कृत्यं पुरास्या-
 भूतत्सर्वमधुना कृतम् ॥ ४० ॥ तदेतत्कृतकृत्यत्वं प्रतियोगिपुरःस-
 रम् ॥ अनुसंदधदेवायमेवं तृप्यति नित्यशः ॥ ४१ ॥ दुःखिनोज्ञाः
 संसरन्तु कामं पुत्राद्यपेक्षया ॥ परमानन्दपूर्णेहं संसरामि किमि-
 च्छया ॥ ४२ ॥ अनुतिष्ठन्तु कर्माणि परलोकयियासवः ॥
 सर्वलोकात्मकः कस्मादनुतिष्ठामि किं कथम् ॥ ४३ ॥ व्याचक्षतां ते
 शास्त्राणि वेदानध्यापयन्तु वा ॥ येऽत्राधिकारिणो मे तु नाधिका-
 रोऽक्रियत्वतः ॥ ४४ ॥ निद्राभिक्षे स्नानशौचे नेच्छामि न करोमि
 च ॥ द्रष्टारश्चेत्कल्पयन्ति किं मे स्यादन्यकल्पनात् ॥ ४५ ॥
 गुञ्जापुञ्जादि दह्येत नान्यारोपितवह्निना ॥ नान्यारोपितसंसारधर्मा-
 नेवमहं भजे ॥ ४६ ॥ शृण्वन्त्वज्ञाततत्वास्ते जानन् कस्माच्छृणो-
 म्यहम् ॥ मन्यन्तां संशयापन्ना न मन्येहमसंशयः ॥ ४७ ॥
 विपर्यस्तो निदिध्यासेत्किं ध्यानमविपर्यये ॥ देहात्मत्वविपर्यासं न
 कदाचिद्भजाम्यहम् ॥ ४८ ॥ अहं मनुष्य इत्यादिव्यवहारो विना-
 प्यमुम् ॥ विपर्यासं चिराभ्यस्तवासनातोवकल्पते ॥ ४९ ॥

आरब्धकर्मणि क्षीणे व्यवहारो निवर्तते ॥ कर्माक्षये त्वसौ नैव
 शाम्येद्ध्यानसहस्रतः ॥ ५० ॥ विरलत्वं व्यवहृतेरिष्टं चेद्ध्यानमस्तु
 ते ॥ अवाधिकां व्यवहृतिं पश्यन्ध्यायाम्यहं कुतः ॥ ५१ ॥
 विक्षेपो नास्ति यस्मान्मे न समाधिस्ततो मम ॥ विक्षेपो वा समा-
 धिर्वा मनसः स्याद्विकारिणः ॥ ५२ ॥ नित्यानुभवरूपस्य को
 मेऽत्रानुभवः पृथक् ॥ कृतं कृत्यं प्रापणीयं प्राप्तमित्येव निश्चयः
 ॥ ५३ ॥ व्यवहारो लौकिको वा शास्त्रीयो वान्यथापि वा ॥
 ममाकर्तुरलेपस्य यथारब्धं प्रवर्तताम् ॥ ५४ ॥ अथवा कृतकृत्योपि
 लोकानुग्रहकाम्यया ॥ शास्त्रीयेणैव मार्गेण वर्तेहं का मम क्षतिः
 ॥ ५५ ॥ देवार्चनस्तानशौचभिक्षादौ वर्ततां वपुः ॥ तारं जपतु
 वाक् तद्वत्पठत्वाम्नायमस्तकम् ॥ ५६ ॥ विष्णुं ध्यायतु धीर्यद्वा
 ब्रह्मानन्दे विलीयताम् ॥ साक्ष्यहं किंचिदप्यत्र न कुर्वे नापि कारये
 ॥ ५७ ॥ कृतकृत्यतया तृप्तः प्राप्तप्राप्यतया पुनः ॥ तृप्यन्नेवं
 स्वमनसामन्यतेऽसौ निरंतरम् ॥ ५८ ॥ धन्योहं धन्योहं नित्यं
 स्वात्मानमञ्जसा वेद्मि ॥ धन्योहं धन्योहं ब्रह्मानन्दो विभाति मे
 स्पष्टम् ॥ ५९ ॥ धन्योहं धन्योहं दुःखं सांसारिकं न वीक्षेद्य ॥
 धन्योहं धन्योहं स्वस्याज्ञानं पलायितं कापि ॥ ६० ॥ धन्योहं
 धन्योहं कर्तव्यं मे न विद्यते किंचित् ॥ धन्योहं धन्योहं प्राप्तव्यं
 सर्वमद्य संपन्नम् ॥ ६१ ॥ धन्योहं धन्योहं तृप्तेर्मे कोपमा भवेल्लोके ॥
 धन्योहं धन्योहं धन्यो धन्यः पुनःपुनर्धन्यः ॥ ६२ ॥ अहो पुण्य-
 महो पुण्यं फलितं फलितं दृढम् ॥ अस्य पुण्यस्य संपत्तेरहो वयमहो
 वयम् ॥ ६३ ॥ अहो शास्त्रमहो शास्त्रमहो गुरुरहो गुरुः ॥ अहो
 ज्ञानमहो ज्ञानमहो सुखमहो सुखम् ॥ ६४ ॥ ब्रह्मानन्दाभिधे ग्रन्थे चतु-
 र्थोऽध्याय ईरितः ॥ विद्यानन्दस्तदुत्पत्तिपर्यन्तोऽभ्यास इष्यताम् ६५

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीविद्यारण्यस्वामिविरचितायां पञ्चदश्यां

ब्रह्मानन्दे विद्यानन्दो नाम चतुर्थोऽध्यायः समाप्तः ॥ ४ ॥

॥ इति ब्रह्मानन्दे विद्यानन्दप्रकरणम् ॥ १४ ॥

॥ ब्रह्मानन्दे विषयानन्दप्रकरणम् ॥ १५ ॥


श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

अथात्र विषयानन्दो ब्रह्मानन्दांशरूपभाक् ॥ निरूप्यते द्वारभू-
तस्तदंशत्वं श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥ १ ॥ एषोस्य परमानन्दो योऽखण्डैकरसा-
त्मकः ॥ अन्यानि भूतान्येतस्य मात्रामेवोपभुञ्जते ॥ २ ॥ शान्ता
घोरास्तथा मूढा मनसो वृत्तयस्त्रिधा ॥ वैराग्यं क्षान्तिरौदार्यमि-
त्याद्याः शान्तवृत्तयः ॥ ३ ॥ तृष्णा स्नेहो रागलोभावित्याद्या
घोरवृत्तयः ॥ संमोहो भयमित्याद्याः कथिता मूढवृत्तयः ॥ ४ ॥
वृत्तिष्वेतासु सर्वासु ब्रह्मणश्चित्स्वभावता ॥ प्रतिबिम्बति शान्तासु
सुखं च प्रतिबिम्बति ॥ ५ ॥ रूपं रूपं बभूवासौ प्रतिरूप इति
श्रुतिः ॥ उपमा सूर्यकेत्यादि सूत्रयामास सूत्रकृत् ॥ ६ ॥ एक
एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ॥ एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते
जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ ७ ॥ जले प्रविष्टश्चन्द्रोयमस्पष्टः कलुषे जले ॥
विस्पष्टो निर्मले तद्बद्धेधा ब्रह्मापि वृत्तिषु ॥ ८ ॥ घोरमूढासु मालि-
न्यात्सुखांशश्च तिरोहितः ॥ ईषन्नैर्मल्यतस्तत्र चिदंशप्रतिबिम्बनम्
॥ ९ ॥ यद्वाऽपि निर्मले नीरे बह्वैरौष्ण्यस्य संक्रमः ॥ न प्रकाशस्य
तद्वत्स्याच्चिन्मात्रोद्भूतिरेव च ॥ १० ॥ काष्ठे त्वौष्ण्यप्रकाशौ द्वावुद्भवं
गच्छतो यथा ॥ शान्तासु सुखचैतन्ये तथैवोद्भूतिमाप्नुतः ॥ ११ ॥
वस्तुस्वभावमाश्रित्य व्यवस्था तूभयोः समा ॥ अनुभूत्यनुसारेण
कल्प्यते हि नियामकम् ॥ १२ ॥ न घोरासु न मूढासु सुखानुभव
ईक्ष्यते ॥ शान्तास्वपि कचित्कश्चित्सुखातिशय ईक्ष्यताम् ॥ १३ ॥
गृहक्षेत्रादिविषये यदा कामो भवेत्तदा ॥ राजसस्यास्य कामस्य
घोरत्वात्तत्र नो सुखम् ॥ १४ ॥ सिध्येन्न वेत्यस्ति दुःखमसिद्धौ
तद्विवर्धते ॥ प्रतिबन्धे भवेत् क्रोधो द्वेषो वा प्रतिकूलतः ॥ १५ ॥


अशक्यश्चेत्प्रतीकारो विषादः स्यात्स तामसः ॥ क्रोधादिषु महदुःखं
सुखशङ्कापि दूरतः ॥ १६ ॥ काम्यलाभे हर्षवृत्तिः शान्ता तत्र
महत्सुखम् ॥ भोगे महत्तरं लाभप्रसक्तावीषदेव हि ॥ १७ ॥
महत्तमं विरक्तौ तु विद्यानन्दे तदीरितम् ॥ एवं क्षान्तौ तथौदार्ये
क्रोधलोभनिवारणात् ॥ १८ ॥ यद्यत्सुखं भवेत्तत्तद्ब्रह्मैव प्रतिबि-
म्बनात् ॥ वृत्तिष्वन्तर्मुखास्वस्य निर्विघ्नं प्रतिबिम्बनम् ॥ १९ ॥
सत्ता चितिः सुखं चेति स्वभावा ब्रह्मणस्त्रयः ॥ मृच्छिलादिषु
सत्तैव व्यज्यते नेतरद्वयम् ॥ २० ॥ सत्ता चितिर्द्वयं व्यक्तं धीवृ-
त्त्योर्घोरमूढयोः ॥ शान्तवृत्तौ त्रयं व्यक्तं मिश्रं ब्रह्मेत्थमीरितम्
॥ २१ ॥ अमिश्रं ज्ञानयोगाभ्यां तौ च पूर्वमुदीरितौ ॥ आद्येऽध्याये
योगचिन्ता ज्ञानमध्याययोर्द्वयोः ॥ २२ ॥ असत्ता जाड्यदुःखे द्वे
मायारूपं त्रयं त्विदम् ॥ असत्ता नरशृङ्गादौ जाड्यं काष्ठशिलादिषु
॥ २३ ॥ घोरमूढधियोर्दुःखमेवं माया विजृम्भिता ॥ शान्तादिबु-
द्धिवृत्त्यैक्यान्मिश्रं ब्रह्मेति कीर्तितम् ॥ २४ ॥ एवं स्थितेऽत्र यो
ब्रह्म ध्यातुमिच्छेत्पुमानसौ ॥ नृशृङ्गादिमुपेक्षेत शिष्टं ध्यायेद्यथाय-
थम् ॥ २५ ॥ शिलादौ नामरूपे द्वे त्यक्त्वा सन्मात्रचिन्तनम् ॥
त्यक्त्वा दुःखं घोरमूढधियोः सच्चिद्विचिन्तनम् ॥ २६ ॥ शान्तासु
सच्चिदानन्दांस्त्रीनप्येवं विचिन्तयेत् ॥ कनिष्ठमध्यमोत्कृष्टास्तिस्र-
श्चिन्ताः क्रमादिमाः ॥ २७ ॥ मन्दस्य व्यवहारेपि मिश्रब्रह्मणि
चिन्तनम् ॥ उत्कृष्टं वक्तुमेवात्र विषयानन्द ईरितः ॥ २८ ॥
औदासीन्ये तु धीवृत्तेः शैथिल्यादुत्तमोत्तमम् ॥ चिन्तनं वासनानन्दे
ध्यानमुक्तं चतुर्विधम् ॥ २९ ॥ न ध्यानं ज्ञानयोगाभ्यां ब्रह्मविद्यैव
सा खलु ॥ ध्यानेनैकाग्र्यमापन्ने चित्ते विद्या स्थिरीभवेत् ॥ ३० ॥
विद्यायां सच्चिदानन्दा अखण्डैकरसात्मताम् ॥ प्राप्य भान्ति न
भेदेन भेदकोपाधिवर्जनात् ॥ ३१ ॥ शान्ता घोराः शिलाद्याश्च

भेदकोपाधयो मताः ॥ योगाद्विवेकतो वैषामुपाधीनामपाकृतिः ॥ ३२ ॥
 निरुपाधिब्रह्मतत्त्वे भासमाने स्वयंप्रभे ॥ अद्वैते त्रिपुटी नास्ति
 भूमानन्दोऽत उच्यते ॥ ३३ ॥ ब्रह्मानन्दाभिधे ग्रन्थे पञ्चमोऽध्याय
 ईरितः ॥ विषयानन्द एतेन द्वारेणान्तः प्रविश्यताम् ॥ ३४ ॥
 प्रीयाद्धरिर्हरोनेन ब्रह्मानन्देन सर्वदा ॥ पायाच्च प्राणिनः सर्वान्स्वा-
 श्रिताञ्छुद्धमानसान् ॥ ३५ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीविद्यारण्यमुनिविरचितायां
 पञ्चदश्यां ब्रह्मानन्दे विषयानन्दः समाप्तः ॥ १५ ॥







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